v. Tran

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
June 25, 2020

2020COA99

No. 16CA2136, People v. Tran — Crimes — Second Degree
Burglary; Constitutional Law — Eighth Amendment —
Proportionality Review

A division of the court of appeals affirms Daniel Roy Tran’s

convictions for second degree burglary and possession of burglary

tools.

But the division remands for the trial court to conduct a new

abbreviated proportionality review of Tran’s sentence considering

the supreme court’s recent decision in Wells-Yates v. People, 2019

CO 90M. In so doing, the court of appeals addresses an issue of

first impression: whether second degree burglary is still a per se

grave and serious offense after Wells-Yates.

Applying the framework set out in Wells-Yates, the division

concludes that, in its second abbreviated proportionality review, the
trial court should not treat Tran’s convictions for second degree

burglary as per se grave and serious offenses, but should analyze

the facts and circumstances of each offense to determine whether it

is grave and serious.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA99

Court of Appeals No. 16CA2136
El Paso County District Court No. 15CR986
Honorable Larry E. Schwartz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Daniel Roy Tran,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, ORDER REVERSED,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FURMAN
Welling and Pawar, JJ., concur

Announced June 25, 2020

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Stephen Arvin, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 A jury found defendant, Daniel Roy Tran, guilty of second

degree burglary and possession of burglary tools. The trial court

sentenced Tran to twenty-four years in the custody of the

Department of Corrections (DOC).

¶2 On appeal, Tran mounts two challenges to his convictions and

one challenge to his sentence.

¶3 Regarding his convictions, Tran contends that (1) the trial

court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right to

confront the witnesses against him by admitting into evidence a

document that contained inadmissible testimonial hearsay and (2)

the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct during rebuttal

closing argument.

¶4 Tran also contends that the trial court erred by denying his

request for an extended proportionality review of his sentence.

¶5 Because we conclude that (1) the trial court did not abuse its

discretion or violate Tran’s Confrontation Clause rights by admitting

the document and (2) the prosecutor did not commit reversible

misconduct, we affirm Tran’s convictions.

¶6 But we remand for the trial court to conduct a new

abbreviated proportionality review of Tran’s sentence considering

1
 the supreme court’s recent decision in Wells-Yates v. People, 2019

CO 90M.

I. The Burglary

¶7 Employees at a Colorado Springs Walmart caught Tran

shoplifting from the store. He tried to take eleven Blu-ray discs and

one digital camera. Together, these items were worth $300.

¶8 When the employees apprehended Tran, they looked him up in

a database where Walmart records the names of shoplifters. They

discovered that Tran had been caught shoplifting from Walmart

three times before. They also discovered that, after the most recent

shoplifting incident, on June 28, 2014, Walmart had issued Tran

the following “trespass notice.”

2
¶9 The trespass notice informed Tran that he was no longer

“allowed on property owned by [Walmart] . . . or in any area subject

3
 to [Walmart’s] . . . control.” And it warned him that if he tried to

enter Walmart property, Walmart “may contact law enforcement

and request [he] be charged with criminal trespass.”

¶ 10 Tran printed and signed his name under language in the

trespass notice that said, in relevant part, “I have read and

understand this Notice or, in the alternative, have had it read to me

and understand and acknowledge that as of 28 day of June, 2014, I

am prohibited from entering [Walmart] property.”

¶ 11 The Walmart employees contacted the police, and Tran was

arrested.

¶ 12 The trespass notice created a big problem for Tran because it

showed that he “knowingly . . . enter[ed] unlawfully in” Walmart’s

property. § 18-4-203(1), C.R.S. 2019. This meant that the

prosecution could charge him with second degree burglary, a class

4 felony, instead of just misdemeanor theft. See id.; § 18-4-

401(2)(d), C.R.S. 2019.

¶ 13 The prosecution introduced the trespass notice, among other

evidence, at trial.

¶ 14 After trial, the jury found Tran guilty of second degree burglary

and possession of burglary tools.

4
¶ 15 Later, the trial court found that Tran had six previous felony

convictions and adjudicated him a habitual criminal. The habitual

criminal statute required the trial court to sentence Tran to an

aggregate of twenty-four years in the custody of the DOC. See § 18-

1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. 2019; § 18-1.3-801(2)(a), C.R.S. 2019.

II. The Trespass Notice

¶ 16 Tran contends the trial court erred, for two reasons, by

admitting the trespass notice. First, he contends that it contained

inadmissible hearsay. Second, he contends that it was testimonial

evidence and that admitting it violated his constitutional right to

confront the witnesses against him. See U.S. Const. amends. VI,

XIV.

¶ 17 We perceive no reversible error.

A. Hearsay

¶ 18 Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant

while at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of

the matter asserted. CRE 801(c). A statement “is (1) an oral or

written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is

intended by him to be communicative.” CRE 801(a).

5
¶ 19 Generally, hearsay statements are inadmissible. CRE 802.

But some statements are excluded from the rule against hearsay,

and are admissible, regardless of whether they are introduced for

the truth of the matter asserted. See generally CRE 801(d). And a

hearsay statement is admissible if it falls under one of the

enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule. See generally CRE 803,

804.

¶ 20 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 63.

¶ 21 Tran construes the entire trespass notice as one statement.

The People counter that the trespass notice contains two distinct

statements.

¶ 22 We agree with the People that the trespass notice contains two

statements: (1) Walmart’s statement that Tran is no longer allowed

on Walmart property and (2) Tran’s statement that he read and

understood the notification. See CRE 801(a).

¶ 23 We will analyze the admissibility of each statement in turn.

1. Walmart’s Statement

¶ 24 This statement read, in relevant part,

6
 This document constitutes formal notice and
warning that you are no longer allowed on
property owned by [Walmart] . . . or in any
area subject to [Walmart’s] . . . control. . . .
Should you elect to ignore this Notice and
enter [Walmart’s] . . . property, [Walmart] . . .
may contact law enforcement and request you
be charged with criminal trespass.

¶ 25 We first conclude that Walmart’s statement was hearsay. The

statement asserted that Tran was “no longer allowed on” Walmart

property. And, to prove that Tran committed second degree

burglary, the prosecution had to prove that Tran “unlawfully”

entered Walmart. § 18-4-203(1). Thus, the prosecution introduced

Walmart’s statement to prove the truth of the matter it asserted.

See CRE 801(c).

¶ 26 The trial court admitted Walmart’s statement under the

business records exception, CRE 803(6). That exception allows a

court to admit into evidence a “record” of

acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to
make the . . . record . . . unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.

7
 CRE 803(6).

¶ 27 Tran contends that Walmart’s statement does not fall under

the business records exception because it was created in

anticipation of criminal litigation. In support of this contention,

Tran points us to

 a police officer’s trial testimony suggesting that Walmart

issues trespass notices so police can “potentially file

burglary charges” against shoplifters;

 language from the trespass notice warning that Walmart

“may contact law enforcement and request you be

charged with criminal trespass”; and

 the prosecutor’s comment during rebuttal closing

argument that Walmart issues trespass notices because

“you, ladies and gentlemen, get to see it. Because this is

them giving proof.”

¶ 28 To address Tran’s contention, we first need to step back and

examine the rationale behind the business records exception and

why documents prepared in anticipation of litigation do not fall

within this exception.

8
¶ 29 The rationale behind the business records exception is that

businesses have a strong incentive to keep accurate and reliable

records of their regular affairs. See Schmutz v. Bolles, 800 P.2d

1307, 1312 (Colo. 1990); see also Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123,

1135 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining the rationale behind the similar

federal rule). And, “the regularity of creating such records leads to

habits of accuracy.” Jordan, 712 F.3d at 1135. Thus, business

records are presumptively reliable. Id.; see also People v. Flores-

Lozano, 2016 COA 149, ¶ 20.

¶ 30 But documents prepared in anticipation of litigation do not

have the same guarantees of reliability. Flores-Lozano, ¶ 20; see

also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321 (2009);

Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943); People v. Stribel,

199 Colo. 377, 380, 609 P.2d 113, 115 (1980). Unlike a business

keeping records of its normal activities, a business preparing

records for litigation has a strong incentive to portray the facts in a

way that will help it avoid liability. Jordan, 712 F.3d at 1135. And

businesses do not routinely prepare these documents. See Palmer,

318 U.S. at 113-14; Timberlake Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.,

71 F.3d 335, 342 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[O]ne who prepares a document

9
 in anticipation of litigation is not acting in the regular course of

business.”). Thus, documents prepared in anticipation of litigation

are presumptively unreliable and are not admissible under CRE

803(6). Flores-Lozano, ¶ 20.

¶ 31 With these principles in mind, we conclude that Walmart’s

statement in the trespass notice was not prepared in anticipation of

litigation. We reach this conclusion for a few reasons.

¶ 32 First, Walmart’s statement warned Tran that he was not

allowed on Walmart property and that if he entered Walmart

property again, he could face criminal prosecution. This language

suggests that the statement’s purpose was to deter criminal

litigation, not to prepare for it.

¶ 33 Second, at the time Walmart issued the trespass notice to

Tran, there was nothing to litigate. If Tran had complied with the

notice, there would have been no criminal litigation. See Flores-

Lozano, ¶ 19.

¶ 34 Third, the reliability concerns associated with documents

prepared in anticipation of litigation — an incentive to deceive and a

lack of routine practice in making the document — are not present

here. Walmart was simply informing Tran that he could no longer

10
 enter its property. Walmart had no incentive to misrepresent this

fact to avoid liability. And the undisputed record shows that

Walmart routinely issued trespass notices to shoplifters across the

country.

¶ 35 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting this statement under CRE 803(6).

2. Tran’s Statement

¶ 36 The second “statement” in the trespass notice was Tran’s

signature.

¶ 37 Tran printed and signed his name under a block of text that

read, “I have read and understand this Notice or, in the alternative,

have had it read to me and understand and acknowledge that as of

28 day of June, 2014, I am prohibited from entering Walmart Stores

Inc., property. . . .”

¶ 38 We acknowledge that a signature, by itself, may not always be

a “statement” within the meaning of CRE 801(a). But, any “written

assertion” is a statement under the Rules of Evidence. See id. And

by printing and signing his name under a block of text that said, “I

have read and understand this Notice,” Tran was asserting that he

had read and understood the trespass notice.

11
¶ 39 We conclude that this statement was not hearsay because it

was the statement of a party opponent. We reach this conclusion

for the following reasons.

¶ 40 First, under CRE 801(d)(2)(A), a statement is not hearsay if

“[t]he statement is offered against a party” and is “the party’s own

statement in either an individual or a representative capacity.”

Tran’s statement falls under this rule. He made the statement.

And the prosecution offered the statement against him to prove that

he knowingly and unlawfully entered Walmart. See § 18-4-203(1).

¶ 41 Second, we disagree with Tran’s contention that there is no

evidence that he was the person who signed the document. At trial,

a Walmart employee testified that he issued a new trespass notice

to Tran on the date of the charged offenses. The employee testified

that Tran’s signature on the trespass notice from the date of the

charged offenses “appeared to be similar” to Tran’s signature on the

June 28, 2014, trespass notice.

¶ 42 This employee also testified that he used Tran’s date of birth

and photograph from Walmart’s records to confirm that Tran was

the same person to whom Walmart had issued the June 28, 2014,

trespass notice.

12
¶ 43 Finally, we are not persuaded by Tran’s contention that we

should not affirm his convictions on a ground that the prosecution

did not rely on at trial. We may affirm the trial court’s evidentiary

ruling on any ground supported by the record. Phillips, ¶ 63.

B. Confrontation Clause

¶ 44 Tran next contends that the trial court violated his federal

constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him by

admitting the trespass notice. We conclude that (1) Tran’s own

statement did not implicate the Confrontation Clause and (2) the

trial court did not commit plain error by admitting Walmart’s

statement.

¶ 45 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution

guarantees that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

him.”

¶ 46 The Supreme Court has construed the Sixth Amendment’s

Confrontation Clause to bar the admission of testimonial hearsay

against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable to

testify at trial and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to

13
 cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

68 (2004).

¶ 47 A hearsay statement is testimonial if it was made “under

circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to

believe that the statement would be available for use at a later

trial.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S.

at 51-52); Phillips, ¶ 78.

¶ 48 Whether a hearsay statement falls under an exception to the

rule against hearsay is immaterial to whether that statement

violates the Confrontation Clause. See People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970,

978-79 (Colo. 2004) (“Although admissibility under a hearsay

exception may have lent support to a finding of reliability under the

Roberts test, in light of Crawford, such a determination is no longer

relevant.”); Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305, 311 (Colo. 2001),

overruled on other grounds by Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (“Although an out-

of-court statement may be admissible because it falls within an

exception to the hearsay rule, the statement must nevertheless be

excluded at a criminal trial if admitting it into evidence would

deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.”).

14
¶ 49 We review de novo whether the trial court violated Tran’s

confrontation rights by admitting the trespass notice into evidence.

Phillips, ¶ 85. Because Tran did not raise a Confrontation Clause

objection at trial, we apply the plain error standard of reversal.

Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. Under this standard, we will

reverse only if the trial court committed an “obvious and

substantial” error that “so undermined the fundamental fairness of

the trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the

judgment of conviction.” Id. (quoting People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743,

750 (Colo. 2005)).

1. Tran’s Statement

¶ 50 We first conclude that the Confrontation Clause did not apply

to Tran’s statement in the trespass notice.

¶ 51 As noted, the Confrontation Clause guarantees that a

defendant shall have the right to confront the “witnesses against

him,” but it does not guarantee him the right to confront himself.

U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also United States v. Orm Hieng, 679

F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] defendant cannot complain

that he was denied the opportunity to confront himself.”); United

States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2006) (same).

15
¶ 52 Thus, the admission of Tran’s own statement did not violate,

or even implicate, his rights under the Federal Confrontation

Clause.

2. Walmart’s Statement

¶ 53 We next conclude that the trial court did not commit plain

error in admitting Walmart’s statement in the trespass notice. We

reach this conclusion, without deciding whether Walmart’s

statement was testimonial, because the evidence was cumulative.

¶ 54 Tran points out that the crucial issue at trial was whether he

knew that he could not lawfully enter Walmart property. See § 18-

4-203(1). But Tran’s statement in the trespass notice

independently established that he knew he was not allowed to enter

Walmart property. Thus, because Walmart’s statement was

cumulative of Tran’s statement on this point, the court did not

plainly err by admitting Walmart’s statement. See People v. Joyce,

68 P.3d 521, 524 (Colo. App. 2002) (concluding that admitting

hearsay statements was not plain error because the statements

were cumulative of other evidence); see also People v. Douglas, 2015

COA 155, ¶ 41 (concluding that the trial court did not commit plain

16
 error in admitting lay testimony that was cumulative of properly

admitted expert testimony).

¶ 55 Accordingly, we cannot say that any error in admitting

Walmart’s statement was “obvious and substantial,” or so

“undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to

cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.”

Hagos, ¶ 14 (quoting Miller, 113 P.3d at 750).

III. Prosecutor’s Rebuttal Closing Argument

¶ 56 Tran next contends that the prosecutor committed reversible

misconduct at three points during his rebuttal closing argument.

We disagree.

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 57 Prosecutors may not offer rebuttal closing arguments that

“inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury, denigrate defense

counsel, misstate the evidence, or assert a personal opinion as to

the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Nardine, 2016 COA 85, ¶ 35.

Instead, a prosecutor’s argument must focus on the “evidence and

reasonable inferences to be drawn” from the evidence. Id. (citing

People v. Ferrell, 200 Colo. 128, 131, 613 P.2d 324, 326 (1980)).

17
¶ 58 Still, prosecutors have “wide latitude in the language and

presentation style used” during closing argument. Domingo-Gomez

v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1048 (Colo. 2005). This is especially true

when a prosecutor is responding to defense counsel’s closing

argument. People v. Lovato, 2014 COA 113, ¶ 64.

¶ 59 Because Tran did not object to the prosecutor’s rebuttal

closing argument, we review for plain error and will reverse only if

the prosecutor committed misconduct that was “flagrantly,

glaringly, or tremendously improper.” Wend v. People, 235 P.3d

1089, 1097 (quoting Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053).

B. Analysis

¶ 60 We first place the prosecutor’s challenged remarks in their

context. We will highlight the specific comments with which Tran

takes issue.

¶ 61 Defense counsel’s closing argument challenged the evidence

supporting the “knowing” element of second degree burglary. See

§ 18-4-203(1). She pointed out that Tran had received the trespass

notice eight months before the date of the charged offenses. She

also pointed out that Tran received the trespass notice at a different

Walmart store.

18
¶ 62 The prosecutor’s challenged comments during rebuttal closing

argument responded to these points.

¶ 63 First, the prosecutor reminded the jury that the prosecution

had the burden to prove Tran’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

He explained that “[t]he defense does not have to do a single thing

in this case. They could sit over there, and if I haven’t proven this

case beyond a reasonable doubt, you have to find [Tran] not guilty.”

¶ 64 Then, he began to challenge the defense theory of the case:

But, when they do have some sort of a theory,
you get to ask yourself, [“]What supports that
theory[?] What evidence do you have that
really supports it? What are the things that
you can use?[”] You can use testimony. You
can use photos, physical or tangible evidence.
If we brought some of those items in, you can’t
use vague or speculative hunches or guesses.
That whole notion of there could be an
identical twin out there, that’s a speculation.
That’s a guess.

Think about how bad our legal system would be
when people were using those kind of things.
You can’t use mere possibilities. They are
unsupported by the actual evidence that you
have, if they don’t rise to the level of
reasonable doubt. There is all possibilities out
there [sic]. But it has to rise to the level of
reasonable doubt.

(Emphasis added.)

19
¶ 65 Later, he challenged the defense theory on different grounds:

Their theory is that he had no idea what was
really going on. He realized he wasn’t allowed
to be coming back to Walmart. By the way,
who would ever make that confusion of, oh,
yeah, you guys are fine if I go shoplift at the
other store, right? That’s no big deal. I can go
do that. You don’t want me to shop at this one
store over here.

That doesn’t make any sense. Why is [it] that
they are arguing all of this if their theory
doesn’t fit with the evidence. There is a simple
saying, [“]You admit what you can’t deny, and
you deny what you can’t admit.[”] What it
basically means, it’s the notion of, look, we
have to — we can’t deny all of this stuff. So,
we will go ahead and admit some of it. It’s
kind of like minimization, damage control . . . .

That’s exactly what the defense strategy is in
this case. Folks, don’t let them get away with
this. This seriously undermines the criminal
justice system. This seriously minimized what
happened in this case. Walmart deserves
protections of law. Just because they come in
with the theory of, [“]Admit what you can’t
deny, and deny what you can’t admit,[”]
doesn’t mean they should get away with it . . . .

The law is very clear on this. You commit the
crime, you have to be convicted of it . . . .
Every bit of evidence points to the fact that the
defendant is guilty of the second degree
burglary and possession of burglary tools.
Folks, you need to find him guilty. You need to
hold him accountable for this.

(Emphasis added.)

20
¶ 66 Tran contends that the prosecutor committed reversible

misconduct by telling the jurors that Tran should be held

“accountable” because his defense “seriously undermines the

criminal justice system” and by warning the jurors “how bad our

legal system would be” were Tran’s defense to prevail. He also

asserts that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel

and Tran by using the terms “they” and “them.”

¶ 67 We conclude that the prosecutor’s remarks, taken in context,

were not so improper as to constitute plain error. We reach this

conclusion for the following reasons.

¶ 68 First, the prosecutor’s argument that the jury “need[ed] to hold

[Tran] accountable” was not improper because the prosecutor made

this comment immediately after arguing that the evidence

established Tran’s guilt and that if “[y]ou commit the crime, you

have to be convicted of it.”

¶ 69 Second, the prosecutor argued that Tran’s theory of defense

relied on “mere possibilities” and “speculation.” But the prosecutor

emphasized that the prosecution had the burden to prove Tran’s

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Then, he encouraged the jury to

focus on the evidence, not on “mere possibilities” or “speculation.”

21
 This statement was proper because it tracks how the Colorado

model jury instructions define “reasonable doubt.” See COLJI-

Crim. E:03 (2019) (“[Reasonable doubt] is not a vague, speculative,

or imaginary doubt . . . .”).

¶ 70 Third, on one reading, the prosecutor’s statement that the

defense theory of the case “seriously undermines the criminal

justice system” could sound like an attempt to inflame the jury.

But these comments could also mean that a jury’s reliance on

speculation, instead of the evidence presented at trial, would

undermine the criminal justice system. We thus conclude that this

comment was not so improper as to constitute plain error. Wend,

235 P.3d at 1097.

¶ 71 Fourth, we disagree with Tran’s contention that the prosecutor

denigrated defense counsel by referring to Tran and defense counsel

as “they” and “them.” “They,” in and of itself, is not a denigrating

term.

¶ 72 Accordingly, we perceive no reversible misconduct. Domingo-

Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1048; Lovato, ¶ 64.

22
 IV. Proportionality Review

¶ 73 Next, Tran contends that the trial court erred by denying his

request for an extended proportionality review of his twenty-four-

year sentence.

¶ 74 We remand for the trial court to conduct a new abbreviated

proportionality review considering the supreme court’s recent

decision in Wells-Yates.

A. The Law On Sentence Proportionality

¶ 75 The Eighth Amendment guarantees that “no cruel and

unusual punishments” shall be “inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII;

see also Colo. Const. art. II, § 20.

¶ 76 The Supreme Court has concluded that the Eighth

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits

“extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Solem

v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)); see also Ewing v. California, 538

U.S. 11 (2003).

¶ 77 To determine whether a sentence is so grossly

disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment, the

23
 Colorado supreme court’s Wells-Yates opinion recently articulated

the following analysis.

¶ 78 First, the court conducts an “abbreviated proportionality

review.” Wells-Yates, ¶¶ 10-11. This review has two steps. Id.

¶ 79 In step one, the court must assess the gravity or seriousness

of each offense for which the defendant was convicted. Id. at ¶ 12.

Colorado has recognized certain offenses as “per se” grave and

serious — that is, offenses that are always grave and serious

regardless of the underlying facts of the conviction. See id. at ¶ 13;

People v. Deroulet, 48 P.3d 520, 524 (Colo. 2002), abrogated on

other grounds by Wells-Yates, 2019 CO 90M.

¶ 80 In step two, the court must compare the gravity of the

defendant’s offenses with the harshness of the sentence imposed for

those offenses. Wells-Yates, ¶ 14. When weighing the harshness of

the defendant’s sentence, the court must factor in the defendant’s

parole eligibility. Id.

¶ 81 An abbreviated proportionality review of a sentence imposed

under the habitual criminal statute has slightly different contours

because the sentence is based on a triggering offense — the offense

for which the defendant was convicted in the current case — and

24
 multiple predicate offenses — the defendant’s previous felony

convictions. See id. at ¶¶ 20-28. The supreme court has explained

that, in this scenario,

[i]f there are multiple triggering offenses, the
reviewing court must look at the sentence
imposed for each such offense and engage in a
proportionality review of that sentence because
each sentence represents a separate
punishment for a distinct and separate crime.
As to each sentence, the inquiry is whether the
corresponding triggering offense and the
predicate offenses, considered together, are so
lacking in gravity or seriousness as to suggest
that the sentence is grossly disproportionate.

Id. at ¶ 24 (citation omitted).

¶ 82 A court only reaches the second part of a proportionality

review — known as an “extended proportionality review” — if the

abbreviated proportionality review raises an inference that the

defendant’s sentence was “grossly disproportionate” to the gravity of

his offense. Id. In this phase of the analysis, the court must

compare the sentence at issue with “(1) sentences for other crimes

in the same jurisdiction and (2) sentences for the same crime in

other jurisdictions.” Id. at ¶ 17.

25
 B. Tran’s Proportionality Review

¶ 83 After the trial court entered Tran’s convictions for second

degree burglary and possession of burglary tools, it held a habitual

criminal hearing.

¶ 84 The trial court found that the prosecution proved, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that Tran had convictions for the following

offenses:

 two convictions for possession of a controlled substance,

a class 4 felony;

 forgery, a class 5 felony;

 two convictions for attempt to obtain a controlled

substance by fraud or deceit, a class 6 felony; and

 second degree burglary, a class 4 felony.

¶ 85 Because Tran had six prior felony convictions, the trial court

sentenced him under the habitual criminal statute. See § 18-1.3-

801(2)(a)(I)(A).

¶ 86 The habitual criminal statute required the court to sentence

Tran to twenty-four years in the custody of DOC for his second

degree burglary conviction and twelve years for his possession of

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 burglary tools conviction. See id.; see also § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A).

The trial court imposed these sentences concurrently.

¶ 87 Tran requested a proportionality review of his sentence.

¶ 88 During its abbreviated proportionality review, the trial court

found that the fact of Tran’s “six prior felony offenses, even ignoring

the issue of grave and serious, tends to lend itself to somebody [for

whom] any habitual offender sentence would be considered

constitutionally proportionate.”

¶ 89 Then, relying on Deroulet, 48 P.3d at 524, the trial court found

that Tran’s two second degree burglary convictions were per se

grave and serious.

¶ 90 Relying again on Deroulet, the trial court found that Tran’s two

convictions for possession of a controlled substance were per se

grave and serious.

¶ 91 Because the trial court found that four of Tran’s convictions

were “grave and serious,” it denied Tran’s request for an extended

proportionality review.

C. Wells-Yates

¶ 92 In late 2019, three years after Tran was sentenced, our

supreme court decided Wells-Yates, which made significant changes

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 to the law on sentence proportionality in Colorado. See Wells-Yates,

¶¶ 1-5.

¶ 93 The supreme court held that

(1) during an abbreviated proportionality
review of a habitual criminal sentence, the
court must consider each triggering offense
and the predicate offenses together and
determine whether, in combination, they are
so lacking in gravity or seriousness as to raise
an inference that the sentence imposed on that
triggering offense is grossly disproportionate;
(2) in determining the gravity or seriousness of
the triggering offense and the predicate
offenses, the court should consider any
relevant legislative amendments enacted after
the dates of those offenses, even if the
amendments do not apply retroactively; (3) not
all narcotic offenses are per se grave or
serious; and (4) the narcotic offenses of
possession and possession with intent are not
per se grave or serious.

Id. at ¶ 2 (footnote omitted).

¶ 94 Wells-Yates left a few questions unanswered. As relevant here,

the supreme court declined to decide whether second degree

burglary is still a per se grave and serious offense. See id. at ¶ 65

n.17.

D. Analysis

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¶ 95 The trial court conducted its abbreviated proportionality

review of Tran’s sentence long before the supreme court decided

Wells-Yates. So, the trial court relied on several points of law that

are no longer valid.

¶ 96 First, the trial court concluded that Tran’s two felony

convictions for possession of a controlled substance were per se

grave and serious. This was true at the time of Tran’s abbreviated

proportionality review. See, e.g., Deroulet, 48 P.3d at 524. But after

Wells-Yates, convictions for possession of a controlled substance

are no longer per se grave and serious. Wells-Yates, ¶ 2.

¶ 97 Second, it is not clear from the record whether the trial court

considered subsequent legislative amendments as evidence of

whether the offenses were per se grave and serious. Wells-Yates

clarified that “in determining the gravity or seriousness of the

triggering offense and the predicate offenses, the court should

consider any relevant legislative amendments enacted after the

dates of those offenses, even if the amendments do not apply

retroactively.” Id.

¶ 98 Third, the record suggests that the trial court found Tran’s two

convictions for second degree burglary were per se grave and

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 serious. The supreme court, in earlier cases, held that burglary is a

per se grave and serious offense. See Deroulet, 48 P.3d at 524;

Gaskins, 825 P.2d at 37, abrogated by Wells-Yates, 2019 CO 90M,

(“The crimes of aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary, and

accessory to first-degree murder involve violence or potential for

violence by their very nature.”) But in Wells-Yates, the supreme

court signaled that it was retreating from this, in part:

Because the question is not before us, we do
not address whether the designation of
burglary as a per se grave or serious crime
extends to third degree burglary, which
includes breaking into a coin vending
machine, see [section 18-4-204(1), C.R.S.
2019], or even second degree burglary, which
includes unlawfully remaining in a building or
occupied structure after a lawful entry with the
intent to commit therein a crime against
property, see [section 18-4-203(1), C.R.S.
2019].

Wells-Yates, ¶ 65 n.17.

¶ 99 Thus, after Wells-Yates, it is unclear whether and to what

extent second degree burglary remains a per se grave and serious

offense. The facts of Wells-Yates do not help us answer this

question. One of the defendant’s triggering convictions in Wells-

Yates was for second degree burglary of a dwelling. See id. at ¶¶

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 29-31. The supreme court remanded for a “factual analysis” of the

sentence imposed on this triggering offense — along with the

defendant’s six other triggering offenses — but declined to say

whether the second degree burglary conviction was per se grave and

serious. Id. at ¶ 75 n.19.

¶ 100 Still, Wells-Yates gave a few guideposts for courts considering

whether to designate an offense as per se grave and serious. First,

the supreme court warned that “designating a crime per se grave or

serious has significant consequences and courts should therefore

do so cautiously.” Id. at ¶ 62. Second, it suggested that “[t]his

concern is magnified in the habitual criminal context, where every

sentence under review has been imposed without the trial court’s

exercise of discretion.” Id. Third, the court cautioned that “a crime

should not be designated per se grave or serious unless the court

concludes that the crime would be grave or serious in every

potential factual scenario. Using the designation otherwise is

fraught with peril.” Id. at ¶ 63.

¶ 101 Following these guideposts, we conclude that on remand, the

trial court should not treat Tran’s second degree burglary

convictions as per se grave and serious. Instead, the trial court

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 should analyze the facts of each offense to determine whether it is

grave and serious. See id. We do not hold that second degree

burglary is never a per se grave or serious offense — Well-Yates

does not go so far. See id. at ¶ 65 n.17. We hold only that the trial

court, in this case, should not treat Tran’s second degree burglary

convictions as per se grave and serious. See id. at ¶ 63.

¶ 102 Fourth, after concluding that Tran had four per se grave and

serious offenses, it appears that the trial court did not analyze the

harshness of Tran’s sentence. Wells-Yates clarified that a court

must analyze the harshness of the defendant’s sentence, including

parole eligibility, “even when the triggering offenses and/or the

predicate offenses supporting a habitual criminal sentence include

grave or serious crimes . . . .” Id. at ¶ 27.

¶ 103 Thus, we remand for the trial court to conduct a new

abbreviated proportionality review under Wells-Yates. When

conducting this review, the trial court should keep the following

principles from Wells-Yates in mind:

 The court must consider each triggering offense together

with Tran’s six predicate offenses “to determine whether,

in combination, they are so lacking in gravity or

32
 seriousness as to raise an inference that the sentence”

for each triggering offense is grossly disproportionate, id.

at ¶ 2.

 Tran’s two convictions for possession of a controlled

substance are not per se grave and serious, id.

 The court should consider any relevant legislative

amendments, even if they do not apply retroactively, as

“the best evidence” of the gravity and seriousness of each

of Tran’s convictions, id. at ¶¶ 49, 58.

 Whether and to what extent second degree burglary is

per se grave and serious is now an open question, see id.

at ¶ 65 n.17.

 The supreme court has cautioned that courts should use

the per se grave and serious designation sparingly, see

id. at ¶¶ 54-67.

 In assessing the harshness of Tran’s sentence, the trial

court must consider Tran’s parole eligibility, id. at ¶ 14.

 Even if the trial court concludes that some, or all, of

Tran’s convictions are grave and serious, it still must

33
 weigh the seriousness of those convictions against the

harshness of Tran’s sentence, id. at ¶ 27.

¶ 104 Should the trial court find that either of Tran’s sentences

raises an inference of gross disproportionality, we point out that

Wells-Yates also clarified the procedure for conducting an extended

proportionality review. Wells-Yates explained that “courts

conducting an extended proportionality review should compare the

sentence at issue to (1) sentences for other crimes in the same

jurisdiction and (2) sentences for the same crime in other

jurisdictions.” Id. at ¶ 17.

¶ 105 But wait, says Tran. Why don’t we just cut out the middleman

and conduct an abbreviated proportionality review on appeal?

¶ 106 In Wells-Yates and its two companion cases, the supreme

court concluded that trial courts are “uniquely suited” to conduct

the kind of factual analysis required under Wells-Yates. See id. at

¶ 75 (quoting People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d 30, 35 (Colo. 1992)).

Thus, in all three cases, the supreme court remanded for the trial

court to conduct a new abbreviated proportionality review following

the principles it set out in Wells-Yates. Id.; see also People v.

34
 McRae, 2019 CO 91, ¶ 19 (same); Melton v. People, 2019 CO 89,

¶ 28 (same). We do the same.

V. Conclusion

¶ 107 The judgment of conviction is affirmed, the trial court’s order

denying Tran’s request for an extended proportionality review is

reversed, and the case is remanded for the trial court to conduct a

new abbreviated proportionality review in accordance with Wells-

Yates.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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