The New York Times v. Central Intelligence Agency

18-2112
The New York Times, et al., v. Central Intelligence Agency

1

2 In the
3 United States Court of Appeals
4 For the Second Circuit
5 ________
6
7 AUGUST TERM, 2019
8
9 ARGUED: SEPTEMBER 6, 2019
10 DECIDED: JULY 9, 2020
11
12 No. 18-2112-cv
13
14 THE NEW YORK TIMES, MATTHEW ROSENBERG,
15 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
16
17 v.
18
19 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
20 Defendant-Appellee.
21 ________
22
23 Appeal from the United States District Court
24 for the Southern District of New York.
25 ________
26
27 Before: KATZMANN, Chief Judge, and WALKER, and PARK, Circuit
28 Judges.
29 ________
30
31 New York Times and Matthew Rosenberg (collectively, the

32 Times) brought this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action

33 seeking acknowledgement from the Central Intelligence Agency
 2 No. 18-2112-cv

1 (CIA) that it was aware of the existence of records regarding a covert

2 program of arming and training rebel forces in Syria. Claiming that

3 such a disclosure was not required under two FOIA exemptions, the

4 CIA responded to the request with a so-called Glomar response stating

5 that the Agency could neither confirm nor deny the existence or

6 nonexistence of such records. The Times then filed a complaint

7 asserting that certain statements made by the President and another

8 individual precluded use of the Glomar response. The parties cross-

9 moved for summary judgment. The District Court for the Southern

10 District of New York (Carter, J.) granted summary judgment for the

11 CIA, holding that the relevant statements did not strip the CIA of the

12 two claimed exemptions because the statements did not officially

13 acknowledge or inadvertently declassify the existence of such a

14 program. We AFFIRM.

15 CHIEF JUDGE KATZMANN dissents in a separate opinion.

16 ________
17
18 DAVID E. MCCRAW, The New York Times
19 Company, Legal Department, New York, NY for
20 Plaintiffs-Appellants.

21 JEANNETTE A. VARGAS (Benjamin H. Torrance, on
22 the brief), for Geoffrey S. Berman, United States
23 Attorney for Southern District of New York, NY,
24 for Defendant-Appellee.

25

26
 3 No. 18-2112-cv

1 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:

2 New York Times and Matthew Rosenberg (collectively, the

3 Times) brought this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action

4 seeking acknowledgement from the Central Intelligence Agency

5 (CIA) that it was aware of the existence of records regarding a covert

6 program of arming and training rebel forces in Syria. Claiming that

7 such a disclosure was not required under two FOIA exemptions, the

8 CIA responded to the Times’ initial FOIA request with a so-called

9 Glomar response that that the Agency could neither confirm nor deny

10 the existence or nonexistence of such records. The Times filed a

11 complaint asserting that certain statements made by the President

12 and another individual precluded use of the Glomar response. The

13 parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court

14 (Carter, J.) granted summary judgment for the CIA, holding that the

15 relevant statements did not strip the CIA of the claimed exemptions

16 because the statements did not officially acknowledge or

17 inadvertently declassify the existence of such a program. We

18 AFFIRM.

19 BACKGROUND

20 Plaintiffs-Appellants, the New York Times and Matthew

21 Rosenberg, a reporter for the New York Times (collectively, the

22 Times), submitted a FOIA request on July 25, 2017, seeking to compel

23 disclosure by the CIA of records pertaining to a covert program
 4 No. 18-2112-cv

1 arming and training rebel forces in Syria. The FOIA request

2 specifically sought “[a]ll records and documents, including Inspector

3 General reports, related to the program to which President Trump

4 referred in a July 24, 2017 post on Twitter.” The Twitter post stated,

5 “The Amazon Washington Post fabricated the facts on my ending

6 massive, dangerous, and wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting

7 Assad . . . .” While President Trump did not specify the article in

8 question, the Washington Post had published an article on July 19,

9 2017, titled, “Trump ends covert CIA program to arm anti-Assad

10 rebels in Syria, a move sought by Moscow.” The article stated that

11 “President Trump ha[d] decided to end the CIA’s covert program to

12 arm and train moderate Syrian rebels battling the government of

13 Bashar al-Assad[.]”Additionally, during an interview with the Wall

14 Street Journal on July 25, 2017, the day after the Twitter post, the

15 President mentioned the “story about Syria that was in the New York

16 Times the other day” (before acknowledging that the story was in the

17 Washington Post). He then stated that the program was “not

18 something that [he] was involved in” and that the decision was

19 “made by people, not me.”

20 Separately, on July 21, 2017, United States Special Operations

21 Commander, General Raymond (Tony) Thomas, was asked about the

22 “roll[ing] up” of a “covert program to arm [anti-Assad rebels]” at a

23 national security conference at the Aspen Institute. In response,
 5 No. 18-2112-cv

1 Thomas said that the decision to end the program was “based on

2 assessment of the nature of the program, what we’re trying to

3 accomplish, the viability of it going forward, and [was] a tough, tough

4 decision.”

5 On August 22, 2017, the Times filed the complaint in this case,

6 asking the district court to compel disclosure of any records

7 responsive to its FOIA request. By letter dated August 23, 2017, the

8 CIA issued its Glomar response, 1 informing the Times that it could

9 neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records

10 responsive to the request, pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. To

11 support its response, the CIA submitted two declarations by

12 Antoinette B. Shiner, an Information Review Officer for the agency.

13 Shiner asserted that confirming the existence of responsive records

14 would, for instance, “confirm the existence and the focus of sensitive

1 The Glomar doctrine originated in a FOIA case, in the D.C. Circuit,
involving records pertaining to the Hughes Glomar Explorer, an oceanic
research vessel. See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
In Phillippi, the CIA claimed that the “existence or nonexistence of the
requested records was itself a classified fact exempt from disclosure under
... FOIA.” Id. at 1012 (emphasis added). The CIA asserted that, “in the
interest of national security, involvement by the U.S. government in the
activities which are the subject matter of [plaintiff's] request can neither be
confirmed nor denied.” Id. In this Circuit, we have held that the “Glomar
doctrine is applicable in cases where to answer the FOIA inquiry would
cause harm cognizable under a[] FOIA exception – in other words, in cases
in which the existence or nonexistence of a record is a fact exempt from
disclosure under a FOIA exception.” Wilner v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d
60, 70 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted).
 6 No. 18-2112-cv

1 Agency activity that is by definition kept hidden to protect U.S.

2 government policy objectives,” and that denying their existence

3 would “confirm the absence of specific foreign policy objectives . . . or

4 the Agency’s inability to successfully carry out the purported

5 operational activities . . . .”

6 Both parties filed for summary judgment and, on June 29, 2018,

7 the district court granted the CIA’s motion and denied the Times’s

8 motion. 2 The district court first determined that the Shiner

9 Declarations provided “sufficient bases for concluding that revealing

10 whether or not responsive records exist in connection with an alleged

11 program to arm and train Syrian rebels would lead to an

12 unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods.” 3 The

13 district court then held that: (1) the CIA’s Glomar response was

14 appropriately tethered to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3; (2) President

15 Trump’s statements did not declassify the existence of the covert

16 Syrian program;] (3) those same statements did not officially

17 acknowledge the existence of the program and therefore did not

18 waive the CIA’s eligibility for FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3; and (4) U.S.

19 Special Operations Commander Thomas’s statements did not

N.Y. Times Co. v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 314 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y.
2

2018).
3 Id. at 534.
 7 No. 18-2112-cv

1 independently confirm the existence of the covert government

2 program.

3 DISCUSSION

4 This case lies at the intersection of two important competing

5 interests: the need for the public to know what its government is

6 doing and the need to keep secret certain government activity the

7 disclosure of which could compromise national security, including by

8 revealing clandestine sources and methods used to acquire foreign

9 intelligence and to conduct covert operations. FOIA provides an

10 avenue for government transparency by making documents available

11 to the public. FOIA contains nine exemptions, however, to balance a

12 variety of governmental interests, including national security, against

13 the public interest in transparency. Exemptions 1 and 3, at issue here,

14 exempt information that is classified to protect national security

15 (Exemption 1) and information that is prohibited from disclosure by

16 another federal law (Exemption 3). 4 The right to claim these

17 exemptions can be waived, however, by official statements that

18 acknowledge the existence of records pertaining to the secret activity

19 and that meet certain, specific requirements.

4 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1), 552(b)(3).
 8 No. 18-2112-cv

1 To properly invoke a Glomar response, an agency must “tether

2 its refusal to one of the nine FOIA exemptions.” 5 The agency can do

3 this by submitting affidavits or declarations that provide sufficient

4 detail as to why an exemption is appropriate. 6 We review an agency’s

5 justification de novo, 7 but when the information requested concerns

6 national security, courts “must accord substantial weight to an agency’s

7 affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed

8 record.” 8 “Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA

9 exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible.” 9

10 “Affidavits or declarations . . . giving reasonably detailed

11 explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption

12 are sufficient to sustain the agency’s burden” and “are accorded a

13 presumption of good faith.” 10 “Summary judgment is warranted . . .

14 when the affidavits describe the justifications for nondisclosure with

15 reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld

5 Wilner, 592 F.3d at 71 (internal citation omitted).
6 Id. at 69.
7 Id. at 72.
8ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice, 681 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Wolf v.
CIA, 463 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).

Wilner, 592 F.3d at 75 (citing Larson v. Dep't of State, 565 F.3d 857, 864
9

(D.C. Cir. 2009)).

Id. at 69 (quoting Carney v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir.
10

1994)).
 9 No. 18-2112-cv

1 logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted

2 by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency

3 bad faith.” 11

4 I. FOIA Exemptions

5 Here, the CIA based its Glomar response on FOIA Exemptions

6 1 and 3.

7 a. Exemption 1

8 Exemption 1 permits the nondisclosure of classified records

9 that are: “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an

10 Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or

11 foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such

12 Executive order.” 12 The CIA contends that the records are classified

13 under the criteria set forth in Executive order 13,526. 13 Shiner’s

14 affidavit attested that, in accordance with the criteria set forth in

11 Id. at 73 (quoting Larson, 565 F.3d at 862).
12 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
13Executive order 13,526 allows records to be kept secret when: “(1) an
original classification authority is classifying the information; (2) the
information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the
United States Government; (3) the information falls within one or more of
the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and (4) the
original classification authority determines that the unauthorized
disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in
damage to the national security, which includes defense against
transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to
identify or describe the damage.” Classified National Security Information,
Exec. Order. No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
 10 No. 18-2112-cv

1 Executive order 13,256: (1) she was an original classification authority;

2 (2) the information was possessed by the United States Government;

3 and (3) the information sought related to intelligence activities,

4 intelligence source or methods, foreign relations or activities,

5 including confidential sources. Shiner then detailed why “any

6 substantive response would reveal sensitive information about the

7 CIA’s intelligence sources, methods, and activities that is protected

8 from disclosure under Exemption 1.”

9 b. Exemption 3

10 FOIA Exemption 3 applies to records “specifically exempted

11 from disclosure by statute,” provided that the statute “requires that

12 the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave

13 no discretion on the issue.” 14 The CIA pointed to Section 102(A)(i)(1)

14 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by 50 U.S.C.

15 § 3024(i)(1) (the National Security Act), which mandates that the

16 Director of National Intelligence “shall protect intelligence sources

17 and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” Shiner attested that

18 Exemption 3 applied because a substantive “response would reveal

19 information that concerns intelligence sources and methods,” which

20 the National Security Act expressly protects from disclosure.

14 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
 11 No. 18-2112-cv

1 Agent Shiner’s affidavits, together with the appropriate

2 deference owed to the agency, carried the CIA’s burden of showing

3 that the two exemptions apply. They set forth “logical or plausible”

4 justifications for both Exemption 1 and 3. 15

5 In sum, we find that both exemptions apply because any

6 substantive response could reveal, as Shiner attested, “whether or not

7 the United States exercised extraordinary legal authorities to covertly

8 influence the political, economic, and/or military conditions in Syria”

9 or “the CIA’s connection to such a program, if one existed.” At a

10 minimum, a substantive response to whether the CIA had any

11 documents would reveal that the agency had an interest – or lack

12 thereof – that could expose agency priorities, strategies, and areas of

13 operational interest.

14 II. Official Acknowledgement Doctrine

15 The Times argues that the CIA’s Glomar response, which

16 refuses to confirm nor deny the existence of records related to the

17 covert program at issue, is inappropriate because the President’s

18 statements, both in the tweet on July 24, 2017 and in the Wall Street

19 Journal interview the following day, officially acknowledged the

Wilner, 592 F.3d at 72-73 (citing Larson, 565 F.3d at 862–63) (noting that
15

agencies “need only proffer one legitimate basis for invoking the Glomar
response and FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 are separate and independent
grounds in support of a Glomar response”).
 12 No. 18-2112-cv

1 existence of the covert program and, therefore, the CIA waived its

2 right to assert a FOIA exemption.

3 “[W]hen an agency has officially acknowledged otherwise

4 exempt information through prior disclosure, the agency has waived

5 its right to claim an exemption with respect to that information.” 16

6 More than a decade ago, in Wilson v. CIA, 17 we applied a precise and

7 strict test for claims of official disclosure. Classified information that

8 a party seeks to obtain or publish is deemed to have been officially

9 disclosed “only if it (1) ‘[is] as specific as the information previously

10 released,’ (2) ‘match[es] the information previously disclosed,’ and (3)

11 was ‘made public through an official and documented disclosure.’” 18

12 We cautioned in Wilson that courts will “not infer official

13 disclosure of information classified by the CIA from (1) widespread

14 public discussion of a classified matter, (2) statements made by a

15 person not authorized to speak for the Agency, or (3) release of

16 information by another agency, or even by Congress.” 19 The

17 consequence of our holding in Wilson is that just because the existence

18 of classified activity may be inferred from publicly available

19 information or from official statements, government waiver will not

16 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. C.I.A., 710 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
17 586 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2009).
18 Id. at 186 (quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d at 378).
19 Wilson, 586 F.3d at 186-87 (internal citations omitted) (collecting cases).
 13 No. 18-2112-cv

1 be found unless all legal criteria have been met. As relevant here, an

2 agency is precluded from issuing a Glomar response if the existence or

3 nonexistence of the specific records sought by the FOIA request has

4 been the subject of an official public acknowledgment. 20

5 The Times contends that district court: (1) erred by finding that

6 President Trump’s statements were too ambiguous to have officially

7 acknowledged the records at issue; and (2) misread Wilner as holding

8 that a Glomar response is appropriate whenever the CIA might have

9 an “interest” in the discussed covert program even if the program is

10 conducted by another agency.

11 As an initial matter, the district court did not misread Wilner.

12 In Wilner, the “record [was] clear” that the “general existence of the

13 [relevant covert program] ha[d] been officially acknowledged”

14 through express statements by President Bush and CIA Director

15 Michael Hayden, although those statements did not disclose “the

16 specific methods, targets, and information obtained.” 21 We held that,

17 even though the general existence of the program had been disclosed,

18 a Glomar response was still appropriate with respect to “those aspects

19 of the program that have not been subject to such disclosures.” 22

20 Additionally, we found that “an agency only loses its ability to

20 Wilner, 592 F.3d at 70 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 69.
22 Id. at 70.
 14 No. 18-2112-cv

1 provide a Glomar response when the existence or nonexistence of the

2 particular records covered by the Glomar response has been officially

3 and publicly disclosed.” 23 This aligns with the district court’s reading

4 of Wilner that “a general acknowledgement of the existence of a

5 program alone does not wholesale waive an agency’s ability to invoke

6 Glomar where certain aspects of the program remain undisclosed.” 24

7 Even assuming arguendo that President Trump’s statements revealed

8 the general existence of the alleged covert program, a Glomar response

9 is still appropriate if none of the relevant statements officially

10 acknowledged the existence or nonexistence of specific records.25 As

11 we will explain, in light of the Wilson test, the relevant statements did

12 not officially acknowledge the existence of a covert program, much

13 less the existence of corresponding, specific records.

14 The Times maintains that Wilner “supplies no basis for the

15 CIA’s Glomar response” because, by disclosing the records sought, the

16 CIA would only be revealing its “interest” in the allegedly disclosed

17 program. We disagree. The Shiner affidavits contain sufficiently

18 detailed justifications for invoking Exemptions 1 and 3 that are

23 Id. (emphasis added).
24 N.Y. Times Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d at 530.
25 See Wilner, 592 at 70.
 15 No. 18-2112-cv

1 broader than just a potential interest in the program: they include

2 protecting classified information and sources and methods. 26

3 We have repeatedly advised that official disclosure is a “strict

4 test,” and here, we agree with the district court that the President’s

5 statements do not satisfy the “specificity” or “matching”

6 requirements set forth in Wilson. 27 Wilson starkly illustrated the

7 specificity requirement. There, plaintiff Valerie Plame Wilson, a

8 former CIA agent, sued the CIA arguing that her pre-2002 service

9 with the CIA could not remain classified. 28 Agent Wilson pointed to

10 a letter, written on CIA letterhead, that specified the actual dates of

11 her prior service. An official from the Agency’s personnel

12 department signed the letter, which Wilson claimed to be an official

13 acknowledgment. 29 Aware that the CIA still demanded that her

See Executive order 13,526 (allowing classified records to be kept secret
26

when “the information falls within one or more of the categories of
information listed in section 1.4 of this order,” which includes records that
“pertain[]” to “intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence
sources or methods”); see also James Madison Project v. Dep’t of Justice, 302 F.
Supp. 3d 12, 30 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, ACLU’s
narrow holding is not controlling here because the FBI in this case asserts a
broader justification for issuing a Glomar response than merely concealing
an ‘interest’ in the Synopsis.”).

See, e.g., Wilson, 586 F.3d at 186; N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
27

756 F.3d 100, 120 (2d Cir. 2014), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 758 F.3d
436 (2d Cir. 2014), supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014).
28 Wilson, 586 F.3d at 173–74.
29 Id. at 181, 195.
 16 No. 18-2112-cv

1 service dates remain secret, Wilson then authorized a member of

2 Congress to publish the CIA letter in the Congressional Record. 30

3 In Wilson, we acknowledged that the letter was “reliable as

4 evidence of [plaintiff]’s prior CIA affiliation,” but stated that it was

5 “hardly akin to the CIA director personally reading relevant

6 information into the Congressional Record, as took place in Wolf v.

7 CIA.” 31 Accordingly, we held that there had been no official

8 acknowledgement even though the letter specified Wilson’s dates of

9 service. 32 It was our view that anything less than the official

10 disclosure upheld in Wolf “necessarily preserves some increment of

11 doubt regarding the reliability of publicly available information,” and

12 that the CIA’s “refusal to permit the elimination of that remaining

13 doubt . . . protects valuable information.” 33 Ultimately, we

14 “decline[d] to discount the importance of such ‘lingering doubts’ to

15 maintaining the secrecy of CIA sources and methods.” 34 And we do

16 so again here, notwithstanding the public statements by the President

17 and General Thomas regarding governmental activities in Syria.

30 Id. at 174.
31 Id. at 195.

We held that the CIA had not officially acknowledged the plaintiff’s
32

pre-2002 service even though the Agency letter expressly stated “Dates of
Service: CIA from 11/9/1985 to 1/9/2006 – total 20 years, 7 days.” Id. at 181.
33 Id. at 195.
34 Id. (internal citation omitted).
 17 No. 18-2112-cv

1 Likewise here, even after the public statements by President

2 Trump and General Thomas, lingering doubts remain as to the

3 information sought. The President never specified that there was any

4 program – let alone one led by the CIA – designed to arm and train

5 Syrian rebels. While the matching aspect of the Wilson test does not

6 require “absolute identity,” 35 the Times is asking us to draw

7 inferences that the President acknowledged the existence of a covert

8 CIA program. For instance, regarding the President’s statement to

9 the Wall Street Journal that the program was “not something that [he]

10 was involved in” and that the decision was “made by people, not me,”

11 it remains unclear what “decision,” made by unidentified “people,”

12 President Trump was not “involved in.” While the Times argues that,

13 at a minimum, it “plainly” must be a decision to end a covert CIA

14 program, these statements, even packaged together, do not remove

15 all doubt as to their meaning. 36

16 We agree with the Times that one reasonable way to interpret

17 President Trump’s tweet regarding “massive, dangerous, and

18 wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad” is with respect to

19 payments tied to the alleged covert program, as referenced in the

35 N.Y. Times Co., 756 F.3d at 120.

See ACLU, 710 F.3d at 428 (holding that official statements left “no
36

doubt” that some agency operates drones and thus this program was
officially acknowledged).
 18 No. 18-2112-cv

1 antecedent Washington Post article. As the district court suggested,

2 however, these statements “could just as easily be the President

3 relaying what he believed to be the Post’s ‘fabricated’

4 characterizations.” 37 Indeed, the tweet and the President’s interview

5 both focus on the Washington Post’s allegedly inaccurate reporting.

6 The references to payments are incidental to this criticism, which

7 obscures what, if anything, the President actually “disclosed.” The

8 tweet and interview thus are not the straightforward disclosures

9 satisfying Wilson that the dissent depicts them to be. 38

10 Further, neither the tweet nor the Wall Street Journal interview

11 mentions the CIA and, therefore, anything other than a Glomar

12 response would likely reveal or refute that the CIA had an intelligence

13 interest in the program, evidenced by a cache of records. 39 The dissent

14 minimizes the fact that neither the tweet nor the interview explicitly

37 N.Y. Times Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d at 529.
38 See Dissent at 2–5.
39The dissent argues that “while the majority speculates that a Glomar
response may additionally be appropriate to disguise any ‘intelligence
interest’ the CIA has in the program, the CIA never advances this as a
justification for its response and we are thus foreclosed from justifying the
CIA’s nondisclosure on this basis.” Dissent at 1. We disagree. To the
contrary, the Shiner affidavits invoke the CIA’s “intelligence and regional
interests,” App’x 60, as a basis for its Glomar response. Agent Shiner
declared that a non-Glomar response “would reveal the presence or absence
of Agency priorities, capabilities, authorities, interests, resources, and
relationships with foreign entities.” App’x 22 (emphasis added).
 19 No. 18-2112-cv

1 references the CIA, 40 but the absence is significant because it means

2 that there are “lingering doubts” as to the CIA’s interest in the alleged

3 program. An official response that acknowledged the existence – or

4 nonexistence – of responsive records would eliminate those doubts.41

5 The Times points to New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 42

6 to support its contention that the information sought needs only

7 “substantial overlap” with that which is publicly disclosed. [BB 18]

8 This argument is unpersuasive. First, the Times in this case takes the

9 phrase “substantial overlap” in the prior case out of context. In that

10 earlier case, the Times sought an Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and

11 Department of Defense (DOD) Memorandum containing information

12 regarding targeted killings. 43 We held that the CIA had officially

13 acknowledged its role in targeted killings as a result of numerous,

14 express statements from President Obama, CIA Director Panetta,

15 Director of National Intelligence Clapper, and various senior-ranking

16 members of Congress. 44 We also referenced a publicly-released DOJ

See Dissent at 3, 7–8.
40

Wilson, 586 F.3d at 195 (holding that “anything short of an [official
41

disclosure] necessarily preserves some increment of doubt regarding the
reliability of the publicly available information”).
42 756 F.3d at 116.
43 Id. at 103.

We noted three interviews, two instances of congressional testimony,
44

and one speech in which these officials disclosed the CIA’s involvement in
targeted killings as the basis to conclude that such killings “ha[d] been
 20 No. 18-2112-cv

1 White Paper that “virtually parallel[ed]” the sought-after

2 information. Moreover, Attorney General Holder had publicly

3 acknowledged a “close relationship” between the DOJ White Paper

4 and the information sought. 45

5 We then applied the Wilson test to hold that the information

6 contained in the OLC-DOD Memorandum had been officially

7 disclosed because it was “as specific as the information previously

8 released in the DOJ White Paper, it match[ed] the information

9 previously disclosed, and was made public through an official and

10 documented disclosure.” 46 We still held, however, that other portions

11 of the Memorandum remained exempted due to a lack of specificity

12 and matching with the official disclosures. 47

13 The Times’s continued reliance on ACLU v. CIA, 48 which held

14 that the CIA’s Glomar response pertaining to drones used for targeted

15 killings was unjustified, is also misplaced. The Times argues that

16 ACLU supports its contention that there is no “basis for the CIA’s

publicly acknowledged at the highest levels of the Government.” Id. at 118-
19.
45 Id. at 116-17.
46 Id. at 120 (citation omitted).

Id. at 117. (“The loss of protection for the legal analysis in the OLC-
47

DOD Memorandum does not mean, however, that the entire document
must be disclosed.”).
48 710 F.3d at 422.
 21 No. 18-2112-cv

1 Glomar response” because the CIA would be revealing nothing more

2 than its “interest” in the allegedly disclosed program. This argument

3 is unavailing for two reasons.

4 First, the pertinent official statements in ACLU were far more

5 precise, thorough, and numerous than those found here. The ACLU

6 court found that the “extent of the official statements” regarding

7 drone strikes was highly significant. 49 President Obama “publicly

8 acknowledged that the United States uses drone strikes against al

9 Qaeda.” 50 In a speech, the President’s counterterrorism advisor, John

10 Brennan, discussed the United States’ procedures for conducting

11 drone strikes. 51 CIA Director Panetta answered questions about

12 drone strikes during separate public remarks.52 While no statement

13 expressly indicated “that the CIA has documents relating to drone

14 strikes,” 53 the D.C. Circuit had no difficultly concluding that the

15 statements were detailed enough to “le[ave] no doubt that some U.S.

16 agency” operates drones. 54 Thus, it was neither “logical” nor

17 “plausible” to maintain that the CIA had no documents related to

49 Id. at 429.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 431.
53 Id. at 430.
54 Id. at 429.
 22 No. 18-2112-cv

1 drones. 55 The difference between the circumstances in ACLU and this

2 case is stark: here, based upon the doubts left by the statements, we

3 are unable to find an official acknowledgement.

4 Second, as in the recent D.C. district court case, James Madison

5 Project, the CIA “asserts a broader justification for issuing a Glomar

6 response than merely concealing an ‘interest’ in the [requested

7 document].” 56 As Agent Shiner attested, acknowledging the existence

8 of responsive documents would: (1) “confirm the existence and the

9 focus of a sensitive Agency activity that is by definition kept hidden

10 to protect U.S. Government foreign policy objectives”; (2) “reveal

11 whether or not the United States Government exercised extraordinary

12 legal authorities to covertly influence the political, economic, and/or

13 military conditions in Syria,” which could, “in turn, either

14 compromise a specific foreign policy goal . . . or serve as confirmation

15 for U.S. adversaries that there was no such objective”; and “require

16 the disclosure of an intelligence source or method.” 57 As we have

55 Id. at 431.
56 302 F. Supp. 3d 12, 30 (D.D.C. 2018).
57Even assuming, as the Times argues, that the CIA would have an
intelligence interest in arming and training rebel groups in Syria, just as it
does with drone strikes, the statements here do not rise to the level of
specificity found in ACLU to have waived the CIA’s right to claim an
exemption. ACLU, 710 F.3d at 239-40. The ACLU court relied on “the extent
of the official statements on the subject,” before holding that forcing the CIA
to reveal whether it had an intelligence interest in drone strikes “would
 23 No. 18-2112-cv

1 noted, these justifications are sufficiently specific to support our

2 finding that the claimed Exemptions are “logical and plausible.”

3 Wolf v. CIA, in the D.C. Circuit, is also distinguishable. 58 There,

4 the CIA issued a Glomar response to a FOIA request for records

5 relating to Jorge Eliecer Gaitain, a Colombia politician, who had been

6 assassinated. 59 The Court held the information was officially

7 acknowledged when the CIA Director testified before Congress and

8 “explicitly read some excerpts of [CIA] dispatches related to” Gaitan’s

9 assassination into the record. 60 After finding that the official

10 acknowledgement waiver applied, the D.C. Circuit made clear that it

11 “relates only to the existence or nonexistence of the records about

12 Gaitan disclosed by [the CIA Director]’s testimony.” 61 Therefore, the

13 plaintiff was entitled to the disclosure of only “the existence of the

14 CIA records about Gaitan that have been previously disclosed (but

15 not any others).” 62

reveal something not already officially acknowledged.” Id. at 242 (emphasis
added).
58 Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
59 Id. at 373.
60 Id. at 379.
61 Id.

Id. (emphasis added). We also recognize that a D.C. district court
62

recently held, upon examining the same presidential tweet before us, that
the CIA’s Glomar response was improper because the tweet was sufficient
to officially acknowledge such a program. Leopold v. CIA, 419 F. Supp. 3d
 24 No. 18-2112-cv

1 Finally, the Times contends that U.S. Special Operations

2 Commander General Thomas’s statements independently undermine

3 the plausibility of the CIA’s justifications for its Glomar response. At

4 oral argument, however, the Times conceded that General Thomas’s

5 statements acted only as an “extra add-on” to those made by

6 President Trump. In any event, it is undisputed that General Thomas,

7 a high-ranking officer in the Department of Defense, was not

8 authorized to speak for the CIA, and courts will “not infer official

9 disclosure of information classified by the CIA from . . . statements

10 made by a person not authorized to speak for the [CIA].” 63

56 (D.D.C. 2019). However, we are not persuaded by the district court’s
reasoning. As an initial matter, apart from the fact that the ruling is not
precedent, the district court itself observed that courts can only “infer such
a disclosure when the statement does not explicitly disclose the
information, but leaves no doubt as to its existence.” Id. at 66-67 (citing
Leopold I, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 24) (emphasis added). As discussed, we think
lingering doubts remain as to the existence of any program and
corresponding records.

Wilson, 586 F.3d at 186; see also Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774 (D.C.
63

Cir. 1999) (holding that disclosures are not “official” when “made by
someone other than the agency from which the information is being
sought”) (collecting cases). Additionally, General Thomas’s comments
appear to have been made in his personal capacity (e.g., “based on what I
know about that program”), albeit with knowledge gleaned from his
position as U.S. Special Operations Commander. Thus, they differ from
those in Wilson (e.g., CIA disclosures on agency letterhead).
 25 No. 18-2112-cv

1 As it did before the district court, the Times relies on Florez v.

2 CIA. 64 The Times, however, reads Florez too broadly. In that case,

3 Florez filed a FOIA request seeking “the disclosure and release of any

4 and all records between 1958 and 1990 related to and or mentioning

5 [his] father, Armando J. Florez,” who had served in several high-level

6 diplomatic roles on behalf of Cuba. 65 The CIA answered with a Glomar

7 response, which was upheld by district court. 66 During the pendency

8 of Florez’s appeal, the FBI “released several declassified documents

9 pertaining” to Florez’s father. 67 The narrow issue facing us was

10 whether the FBI disclosures were “relevant” and, if so, whether

11 remand was required. 68 We remanded the case to allow the district

12 court to consider the new FBI disclosures in the first instance, without

13 determining their effect on the Glomar response. 69 Moreover, we

14 confirmed that the official acknowledgement doctrine is “limited only

15 to official and public disclosures made by the same agency providing

16 the Glomar response, and therefore does not ‘require[e] [the agency]

64 829 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2016).
65 Id. at 180.
66 Id. at 181.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 183.
69 Id. at 190.
 26 No. 18-2112-cv

1 to break its silence’ as a result of ‘statements made by another

2 agency.’” 70

3 To be sure, there are times when other agency disclosures can

4 be “relevant evidence” regarding the “sufficiency of the justifications

5 set forth by the CIA in support of its Glomar response.” 71 But that is

6 not the case here. As the district court noted, General Thomas’s

7 statements are more ambiguous than the ones in Florez. 72 General

8 Thomas stated that he did not “know enough about the [program] to

9 criticize it,” that he could not describe the program because it was too

10 complex, and that he offered his opinion based only upon what he

11 gathered the program to be. He also stated (without identifying the

12 agency) that the organization was one that he was not “necessarily . .

13 . affiliated with[.]”

14 In sum, after according appropriate deference to “the uniquely

15 executive purview of national security,” 73 we conclude that the

Florez, 829 F.3d at 186 (quoting Furgone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 775 (D.C.
70

Cir. 1999)).
71 Id. at 184, 187.

In Florez, the FBI disclosed that: “(1) the FBI investigated Dr. Florez’s
72

background and tracked his career development, official activities, and
international relocations; (2) the FBI cultivated informants in order to obtain
information concerning Dr. Florez, including material which pertained to
both his professional and personal conduct; and (3) several other
government departments and agencies provided to or received from the
FBI information concerning Dr. Florez.” Id. at 178.
73 Wilner, 592 F.3d at 76.
 27 No. 18-2112-cv

1 President Trump’s statements, even when coupled with General

2 Thomas’s statements, left lingering doubts and thus were insufficient

3 to amount to an official acknowledgement of the alleged covert

4 program in Syria, much less the existence of records related to the

5 program. It is still “logical or plausible” that disclosing the existence

6 or nonexistence of an intelligence interest in such a program would

7 reveal something not already officially acknowledged and thereby

8 harm national security interests.

9 III. The President’s Statements Did Not Declassify the

10 Existence of the Covert Program

11 The Times next contends that the President’s tweet and

12 statements to the Wall Street Journal interviewer declassified the fact

13 that the program existed, thus precluding the CIA from invoking

14 FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. The Times argues that this “conclusion

15 flows inexorably from the President’s supreme authority in matters

16 of classification.” This novel argument is without merit.

17 It is true that the President has broad authority to classify and

18 declassify, derived from the President’s dual role “as head of the

19 Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief” of the armed forces.74

20 The “authority to classify and control access to information bearing

21 on national security . . . flows primarily from this constitutional

74 Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).
 28 No. 18-2112-cv

1 investment of power in the President and exists quite apart from any

2 explicit congressional grant.” 75

3 To make its declassification claim, the Times essentially recasts

4 its “official acknowledgement” claim as one of “inferred

5 declassification.” To prevail in any claim of declassification, inferred

6 or otherwise, the Times’s must show: first, that President Trump’s

7 statements are sufficiently specific; and second, that such statements

8 subsequently triggered actual declassification. The first is easily

9 disposed of because we have already found that the statements are

10 insufficiently specific to quell any “lingering doubts” about what they

11 reference. The second requires further discussion.

12 Declassification cannot occur unless designated officials follow

13 specified procedures. 76 Moreover, courts cannot “simply assume,

14 over the well-documented and specific affidavits of the CIA to the

15 contrary,” that disclosure is required simply because the information

16 has already been made public. 77 The Shiner affidavits, in addition to

Id. (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961)).
75

As explained above, Executive order 13,526 established the detailed
76

process through which secret information can be appropriately
declassified.

Phillippi, 655 F.2d at 1325, 1330. The Times is also concerned that
77

“unless the President declassifies information by formal means or with
magic words – or the circumstances are otherwise “exceptional” – a court
can never infer declassification[.]” [BB 33] Such concerns are mitigated,
however, by the “official acknowledgement” doctrine. If the President
publicly discloses the existence of a covert program within the Wilson
 29 No. 18-2112-cv

1 justifying the two FOIA exemptions, expressly stated that no

2 declassification procedures had been followed with respect to any

3 documents pertaining to the alleged covert program. 78 Moreover, the

4 Times cites no authority that stands for the proposition that the

5 President can inadvertently declassify information and we are aware

6 of none. Because declassification, even by the President, must follow

7 established procedures, that argument fails.

8 Finally, as the district court recognized, the suggestion that

9 courts can declassify information raises separation of powers

10 concerns. 79 In light of the executive branch’s “compelling interest” in

11 preventing declassification of highly sensitive information, 80 we

12 decline to hold that the judiciary may conclude that certain executive

13 branch statements may trigger inadvertent declassification because

14 such determinations encroach upon the President’s undisputedly

15 broad authority in the realm of national security.

framework, [BB 32-32] then there would be no need for courts to “infer
declassification.”

While the Times argues that the Court is “not bound by conclusory
78

statements” in the CIA Affidavits, it does concede that such affidavits are
entitled to “[d]eferential review[.]”
79 See N.Y. Times Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d at 527.
80 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509, n. 3 (1980).
 30 No. 18-2112-cv

1 In sum, mindful of the requisite deference courts traditionally

2 owe to the executive in the area of classification, 81 we decline to find

3 that President Trump’s statements inadvertently declassified the

4 existence of the alleged covert program.

5 CONCLUSION

6 For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

7 district court.

81 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
 1 KATZMANN, Chief Judge, dissenting:

2 Unlike the majority, I believe that President Trump’s public statements

3 cannot be logically interpreted as anything other than an acknowledgement of

4 the existence of “payments to Syrian rebels.” The justifications the CIA provides

5 for issuing a Glomar response are neither “logical [n]or plausible” given the

6 President’s public acknowledgement of the program the CIA purportedly seeks

7 to keep secret. Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 73 (2d Cir. 2009). 1 And

8 while the majority speculates that a Glomar response may additionally be

9 appropriate to disguise any “intelligence interest” the CIA has in the program,

10 the CIA never advances this as a justification for its response and we are thus

11 foreclosed from justifying the CIA’s nondisclosure on this basis. See id. at 68 (the

12 “agency resisting disclosure of the requested records” bears the burden of

13 justifying application of a FOIA exemption). A Glomar response is “justified only

14 in unusual circumstances, and only by a particularly persuasive affidavit.” Florez

1 Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all internal quotation marks,
alterations, footnotes, and citations are omitted.

1
 1 v. CIA, 829 F.3d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 2016). Because I do not believe this is such a

2 circumstance, I respectfully dissent.

3 It is worth emphasizing the limited nature of the question before us, and

4 the extraordinarily limited practical consequences of requiring the CIA to issue a

5 non-Glomar response. The question before us is not whether the CIA must

6 disclose whether it has run, or even been involved in, any program of covert

7 payments to Syrian rebels. And it is not whether the CIA must disclose any

8 records it possesses concerning such a program, if it indeed possesses any

9 records. The question before us is solely whether the CIA must disclose the fact

10 that records responsive to the Times’ request either do or do not exist. Were we

11 to find a Glomar response unjustified, the CIA could still avoid disclosing the

12 contents of any responsive records by making a proper showing before the

13 district court. See, e.g., ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The

14 collapse of the CIA’s Glomar response does not mark the end of [a] case.”).

15 I. President Trump’s Official Acknowledgment

16 The majority finds that President’s Trump’s tweet—“The Amazon

17 Washington Post fabricated the facts on my ending massive, dangerous, and

2
 1 wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad,” App. 39—is ambiguous

2 because it could “just as easily” be read in two ways. According to the majority,

3 the President could mean either that: (1) he had ended a program of payments to

4 Syrian rebels that he himself thought was “massive, dangerous, and wasteful;”

5 or (2) the Post fabricated the existence of the payments program and described

6 that fictitious program as involving “massive, dangerous, and wasteful

7 payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad.” See Maj. Op. at 17–18 (finding that the

8 tweet “could just as easily be the President relaying what he believed to be the

9 Post’s ‘fabricated’ characterizations.”).

10 I find only the first reading plausible. Like the D.C. district court to

11 address the same tweet in another FOIA case, I can locate “no logical reading . . .

12 in which the tweet does not acknowledge that the U.S. government had some

13 knowledge of some payments to Syrian rebels.” Leopold v. CIA, 419 F. Supp. 3d 56,

14 67 (D.D.C. 2019) (emphasis in original).

15 Even setting aside what we already understand as ordinary readers, we

16 know that the President was not relaying the Post’s characterizations of the

17 fabricated program because the Post never characterized the program as

3
 1 “massive, dangerous, and wasteful.” In the Post’s reporting, it is the President’s

2 decision to end the payments that is dangerous and wasteful, not the payments

3 themselves. The Post article focuses on the perspectives of officials who believed

4 that the payments program was valuable, concluding that “[e]ven those who

5 were skeptical about the program’s long-term value[] viewed it as a key

6 bargaining chip”—a value that, in the Post’s reporting, was lost by the

7 Administration’s decision to end the program. 2 App. 37. While some of the

8 officials who were skeptical of the program may have viewed it as “wasteful,”

9 the article never uses this word. And nowhere does the article describe the

10 payments to Syrian rebels as “massive” or “dangerous.” Only the President

11 describes the payments as “massive, wasteful, and dangerous”—qualities that

2 For instance, the Post reported that some analysts “said the decision to
end the program was likely to empower more radical groups inside Syria and
damage the credibility of the United States” and might cause the United States to
“lose its ability to block other countries, such as Turkey and Persian Gulf allies,
from funneling more sophisticated weapons . . . to anti-Assad rebels, including
more radical groups.” App. 36–37. One analyst equated the decision with “falling
into a Russian trap” by “making the moderate resistance more and more
vulnerable.” Id. at 36. Another concluded that “Putin won in Syria.” Id. One
former official described “ending the aid to the rebels altogether” as “a huge
strategic mistake.” Id. at 37.

4
 1 payments can only have if they exist.

2 The President’s comments to the Wall Street Journal the day after the tweet

3 offer yet further confirmation that he was intentionally acknowledging the

4 payments. Discussing “the story about Syria that was in The [Washington Post]

5 the other day,” President Trump said that “they didn’t write the truthful story”

6 because “[i]t turns out it’s—a lot of al-Qaeda we’re giving these weapons to.”

7 App. 44. Reading the exchange leaves an ordinary reader with no doubt that the

8 President is clearly, consciously acknowledging and discussing the payments

9 program in order to dispute the Post’s characterization of the program and to

10 advocate for more serious efforts to root out leaks in his administration.

11 Despite all this evidence of the President’s meaning, the majority

12 nevertheless concludes that the President did not acknowledge the payments

13 program because his statements are not clear enough to “remove all doubt as to

14 their meaning.” Maj. Op. at 17. But we have never suggested that the ability to

15 read any doubt whatsoever, no matter how implausible or how belied by

16 context, into a statement calls an official acknowledgment into question. The

17 majority’s description of the value of even an “increment of doubt” is borrowed

5
 1 from a discussion of a very different kind of doubt, the “lingering doubts” left as

2 to information’s accuracy when it is disclosed to the public by unofficial means

3 without official acknowledgment. Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 195 (2d Cir. 2009).

4 In Wilson, we concluded that “anything short” of an official disclosure

5 “necessarily preserves some increment of doubt regarding the reliability of the

6 publicly available information,” or, in other words, plausible deniability. Id.; see

7 also id. at 196–99 (Katzmann, J., concurring in the judgment). Here, we are not

8 addressing an unofficial statement that would leave this kind of doubt as to

9 accuracy; we are addressing a disclosure that came directly from the President.

10 Had the President himself publicly stated the dates of Ms. Wilson’s employment

11 in the CIA—the information there at issue—Wilson would have been a different

12 case entirely.

13 To the degree that the majority is suggesting that some critical mass of

14 official statements is required to find official acknowledgment, I disagree. 3 I see

3 See Maj. Op. at 19–20 (discussing the number of statements in New York Times
Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 116–20 (2d Cir.), opinion amended on denial of
reh'g, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir.), supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014)); Maj. Op. at 21
(discussing the number of statements in ACLU, 710 F.3d at 422, 429–31).

6
 1 no support in case law or in logic for the position that more than one official

2 acknowledgment is required, or that a public, official, documented statement

3 directly from the President is insufficient to constitute an official

4 acknowledgment. Rather, even a single statement by the President—who is, after

5 all, the official charged with the functioning of the entire Executive Branch—may

6 suffice, without the need for external corroboration or support. To hold

7 otherwise would fail to accord the proper weight and respect owed to

8 presidential statements.

9 The majority also contends that the President’s statements do not meet the

10 “specificity” and “matching” requirements for official disclosure. Maj. Op. at 14–

11 17. But “[i]n the Glomar context, the ‘specific information’ at issue is not the

12 contents of a particular record, but rather the ‘existence vel non’ of any records

13 responsive to the FOIA request.” ACLU, 710 F.3d at 427. As the majority notes,

14 we have on occasion considered official statements that are more “precise” and

15 “thorough” than the President’s statements here. Maj. Op. at 21. However, the

16 level of precision and detail in an official statement is relevant to what has been

17 officially acknowledged, not whether there has been any official

7
 1 acknowledgment at all. Here, the question before us at this time is only whether

2 the President has officially acknowledged the existence of a payments program,

3 not whether he provided a thorough description of the program. The latter

4 would be relevant to the determination of what records concerning the program

5 must be disclosed were the CIA to issue a non-Glomar response, not whether the

6 CIA can issue a Glomar response declining to disclose the program’s existence.

7 President Trump’s acknowledgment of the payments’ existence is sufficient for

8 Glomar purposes.

9 Presumably, in choosing to repeatedly acknowledge the existence of the

10 payments program, the President engaged in a calculus, weighing whether the

11 need to dispute the Post’s characterization of the program as valuable and of his

12 administration’s termination of it as “falling into a Russian trap,” App. 36,

13 outweighed the national security risks posed by acknowledging that such a

14 program had indeed existed. The President evidently determined that the

15 benefits of official disclosure outweighed the risks. It is not our business as

16 judges to second-guess the President’s decision, or to create doubt to avoid its

17 consequences. See, e.g., Wilner, 592 F.3d at 76 (noting “our deferential posture in

8
 1 FOIA cases regarding the uniquely executive purview of national security” given

2 “the relative competencies of the executive and the judiciary”). We must proceed

3 on the basis of whatever decision the President has made as to disclosure,

4 regardless of whether we would have made the same determination had we the

5 authority to do so.

6 II. The CIA’s Justifications

7 Given the President’s acknowledgment of the payments program, the CIA

8 has failed to meet its burden of showing that its justification for invoking

9 Exemptions 1 or 3—that a substantive response would disclose the existence of

10 the program—“appears logical or plausible.” Wilner, 592 F.3d at 73.

11 I agree with the majority that, under our precedent in Wilner, even where a

12 FOIA request concerns “a program whose existence has been publicly revealed,”

13 id. at 69, an agency may provide a Glomar response if the request concerns

14 “aspects of the program that have not been the subject of such disclosures,” id. at

15 70. However, unlike in Wilner, a non-Glomar response would not reveal

16 undisclosed aspects of the payments program; it would only reveal the already-

9
1 disclosed fact that some payments program existed. 4

2 The CIA argues that a Glomar response is justified because acknowledging

3 the existence of responsive documents would: (1) “confirm the existence and the

4 focus of a sensitive Agency activity that is by definition kept hidden to protect

5 U.S. Government foreign policy objectives,” App. 21; (2) reveal “whether or not

6 the United States Government exercised extraordinary legal authorities to

7 covertly influence the political, economic, and/or military conductions in Syria,”

8 which “could, in turn, either compromise a specific foreign policy goal . . . or

9 serve as confirmation for U.S. adversaries that there was no such objective,” App.

4 In Wilner, the plaintiffs were requesting records showing whether they
had been a target of surveillance under the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”)
Terrorist Surveillance Program, see 592 F.3d at 64, which was then “no longer a
secret program in light of the government’s public acknowledgment of its
existence and purpose following its controversial disclosure by the news media,”
id. at 69. We held that the NSA could still issue a Glomar response because,
although the program was public, the fact of whether plaintiffs had been a target
of surveillance was not and would be revealed by a non-Glomar response to the
detriment of national security concerns. Id. at 7–74. But the Wilner plaintiffs’
request is not analogous to the Times’ request in the instant case. Unlike in
Wilner, here the CIA did not simply refuse to confirm or deny the existence of
particular records relating to the payments program, but refused to confirm or
deny that any records related to such program exist—even though, as discussed
above, the President himself has acknowledged the existence of the program.

10
 1 60; and (3) reveal “whether or not the CIA is exercising covert action” and

2 thereby “require the disclosure of an intelligence source or method,” App. 60. In

3 other words, the CIA argues that a Glomar response is necessary to keep the

4 program secret. Given that the President has already disclosed the program, this

5 justification is no longer plausible. To the extent that the CIA also argues that a

6 non-Glomar response would reveal additional details of the program’s focus or

7 methods, this may serve as justification for withholding release of the contents of

8 certain specific responsive documents, but does not justify a blanket Glomar

9 response. A non-Glomar response would not result automatically in disclosure of

10 the contents of any responsive records and therefore would not disclose whether

11 the CIA was involved in the payments, only that it had records concerning them.

12 The majority conjectures that a Glomar response additionally may be

13 required to avoid revealing whether the CIA had an “intelligence interest” in the

14 payments. Maj. Op. at 27. The majority leaves unclear the degree to which it

15 actually believes that any “lingering doubts as to the CIA’s interest in the alleged

16 program” can be maintained, id. at 17–18, at some points describing the need to

17 avoid disclosing any CIA “interest” and at other points stressing the fact that the

11
1 CIA “asserts a broader justification for issuing a Glomar response than merely

2 concealing an interest in the requested document,” id. at 21; see also id. at 14 (“The

3 Shiner affidavits contain sufficiently detailed justifications . . . that are broader

4 than just a potential interest in the program . . . .”).

5 But even if it could be plausibly maintained that there are any lingering

6 doubts about whether the CIA might be interested in the existence of a program

7 providing payments and training to Syrian rebels, the CIA has never justified its

8 Glomar response on the ground that it is necessary to conceal any “intelligence

9 interest,” 5 likely because the Central Intelligence Agency itself does not consider it

5 To defend its reliance on the purported need to avoid disclosure of an
“intelligence interest,” the majority refers to two paragraphs in the Shiner
affidavits that claim that the CIA’s “interests” would be impaired by a non-
Glomar response. Maj. Op. 18 n.37. But each paragraph only asserts that the CIA’s
interests would be harmed by the disclosure of CIA involvement in any covert
payments program. See App. 22 (“A response other than Glomar as to the
existence or nonexistence of a program and any CIA involvement would disclose a
classified fact. . . . [I]t would reveal the presence or absence of Agency priorities,
capabilities, interests, resources, and relationships with foreign entities.”)
(emphasis added); id. at 60 (“Further, the CIA’s connection to such a program, if one
existed, would tend to reveal the Agency’s capabilities, intelligence and regional
interests, accesses, funding, and relationships or lack thereof.”) (emphasis
added). The government’s brief confirms—relying upon the very same
paragraphs cited by the majority—that the CIA’s objection is only to disclosure
of its involvement with a covert payments program. See Appellee’s Brief at 9 (“A

12
 1 “logical” or “plausible” that “an agency charged with gathering intelligence

2 affecting the national security does not have an ‘intelligence interest’ in [such

3 payments], even if that agency does not operate the [payment program] itself.”

4 ACLU, 710 F.3d at 430 (addressing the plausibility of the CIA having no

5 intelligence interest in drone strikes). As a recent D.C. district court opinion

6 addressing a Glomar response to a similar FOIA request observed, “it seems

7 wildly unlikely that, in the eight and a half years since the Syrian civil war began,

8 the Central Intelligence Agency has done no intelligence-gathering that

9 produced a single record even pertaining to payments Syrian rebels are receiving

10 from somewhere, or a single record even mentioning or referring to any program to

11 arm or train anti-Assad rebels.” Leopold, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 67.

12 To the contrary, the CIA has been clear that it seeks only to conceal its

13 actual “involvement or non-involvement” in the payments. Appellee’s Br. 23; see

confirmation or a denial of the CIA’s connection with any such program would
therefore reveal the presence or absence of CIA priorities, capabilities,
intelligence and regional interests, resources, and relationships with foreign
entities.”) (citing App. 22, 60) (emphasis added). Therefore, in my view, the
record does not support the majority’s position that, even if the program’s
existence has been confirmed, the CIA has asserted a need to hide any interest in
the program.

13
 1 also id. at 24 (arguing that issuing a non-Glomar response “would be tantamount

2 to disclosing . . . whether the CIA was in fact involved in such a program”

3 (emphasis added)). Indeed, the CIA argues that a non-Glomar response would

4 “reveal more than the CIA’s general intelligence interest in a program”—thus

5 implicitly conceding that such an interest would not, standing alone, be

6 sufficient—and urges that non-disclosure is justified because a non-Glomar

7 response would reveal “information about a CIA operational role or lack or one.”

8 Id. at 25–26.

9 There is no question that it is the CIA’s burden to present and prove its

10 justification for a Glomar response. Wilner, 592 F.3d at 68. Our role is merely to

11 ensure that the justifications the CIA puts forth are logical and plausible, not to

12 advance bases for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not claimed.

13 Accordingly, avoiding disclosure of the CIA’s intelligence interest in payments to

14 foreign rebels is not a basis for us to affirm.

15 CONCLUSION

16 Reversing the district court would leave the CIA free to argue on remand

17 that every single responsive document or even that any information about those

18 documents other than their mere existence is exempt from disclosure. Instead of

14
1 reversing and remanding to district court to allow the CIA the opportunity to

2 make such a showing, the majority decision puts its “imprimatur to a fiction of

3 deniability that no reasonable person would regard as plausible”—that the

4 President never acknowledged the existence of payments to Syrian rebels. ACLU,

5 710 F.3d at 431. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

6

7

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