RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2000-18T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
VIDROLE MONACE, a/k/a
JAMES MONACE,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Argued telephonically May 19, 2020 –
Decided July 14, 2020
Before Judges Yannotti, Hoffman and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 13-08-1946,
15-06-1487 and 18-02-0646.
Kevin Walker, First Assistant Public Defender, argued
the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Kevin Walker, of counsel and on
the briefs).
Emily M. M. Pirro, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting
Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Emily M. M.
Pirro, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After a jury found defendant guilty of the 2012 sexual assault of his then
sixteen-year-old niece, G.G. (Gwen),1 the trial court sentenced defendant to an
aggregate eleven-and-a-half-year prison term, with an eight-and-a-half-year
parole bar, pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant
now appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by the Law Division on
December 4, 2018.
On appeal, defendant argues: 1) his right to a speedy trial was violated; 2)
the judge erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on count four;
3) certain testimony of the Sexual Abuse Nurse Examiner (SANE) should not
have been admitted; 4) the judge violated his due process and compulsory
process rights by improperly interfering with his decision to testify; 5) the
assistant prosecutor improperly asked defendant to vouch for the credibility of
Gwen; and 6) the judge imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review
of the record and applicable law, we reject these arguments and affirm.
1
Because of the sexual nature of the crimes, we use initials and a pseudonym
to protect the privacy of the victim. R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
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I
In light of defendant's speedy trial claim, we begin with a summary of the
procedural history of this case to provide context for the more than five-year
lapse between defendant's arrest and trial.
On August 12, 2013, an Essex County Grand Jury returned Indictment No.
13-08-1946 charging defendant with first-degree sexual assault (vaginal
penetration and "actor had supervisory or disciplinary power"), N.J.S.A. 2C:14 -
2(c)(3)(b) (count one); second-degree endangering welfare of a child, N.J.S.A.
2C:24-4(a) (count two); first-degree sexual assault (digital penetration and
"actor had supervisory or disciplinary power"), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(3)(b) (count
three); second-degree endangering welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)
(counts four and five); fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
3(b)(3)(b) (counts six and seven); and third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-3(a) (count eight).
On June 29, 2015, superseding Indictment No. 15-06-1487 added five
additional counts charging defendant with second-degree witness tampering,
N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a)(1) (count nine); third-degree terrorist threats, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-3(a) (count ten); third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution,
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N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(3) (counts eleven and twelve); and fourth-degree tampering
with evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(2) (count thirteen).
Almost three years later, on February 26, 2018, a second superseding
indictment, Indictment No. 18-02-0656, dropped the five supplemental counts
and charged defendant with fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A.
2C:14-3(b) and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(3)(c) (count one); endangering welfare of a
child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (counts two and seven); and second-degree sexual
assault; N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(3)(c) (counts three through six).
The charges returned in the second superseding indictment alleged that
defendant stood "in loco parentis" to Gwen. Later at trial, however, the State
did not pursue the pseudo-parental role, and the final superseding indictment
was amended to fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3 and
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1) (count one); fourth-degree child abuse, N.J.S.A. 9:6-1
and 9:6-3 (counts two and five); second-degree sexual assault, 2C:14-2(c)(1)
(count three); and second-degree sexual assault by digital penetration, N.J.S.A.
2C:14-2(c)(1) (count four).
The record of defendant's January 12, 2018 motion hearing highlighted
the events attributable to the delay in bringing the case to trial. During the
hearing, counsel for defendant represented she was "his fifth or sixth attorney."
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She explained that defendant refused to cooperate with prior counsel and
remained uncooperative, while asserting additional evidence existed that all
prior counsel allegedly refused to explore.
In addition to defendant's numerous counsel changes, the record shows
that defendant stated his intention to accept a plea offer on three separate
occasions; however, when it came time to provide a factual basis at each plea
hearing, defendant failed to provide one. In December 2017 and January 2018,
defendant filed various pro se motions, including a January 12, 2018 motion to
dismiss for failure to indict. The State filed motions regarding a fresh complaint
witness and statements made by defendant to another witness, which were
resolved by June 2018.
In denying defendant's January 12, 2018 motion for failure to indict, the
motion judge stated:
I want to make the record clear . . . this matter's been
dancing around since 2015, since I became a judge, and
it's not a delay because of this [c]ourt. It is not a delay
because of counsel. . . .
The delay is because of [defendant]. . . . [H]e's been
through three attorneys since I've been on this case,
different prosecutors have handled this case as well . . . .
This is a serious case and there's always been a –
commitment on the part of the State to resolve this case
based on all of the circumstances.
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On March 20, 2018, defendant again appeared before the same motion
judge, who questioned him in order to rule upon his motion to represent himself.
After extended questioning by the motion judge, defendant decided to continue
with his trial counsel and withdrew his motion to represent himself. Trial
counsel then withdrew defendant's remaining motions, including his third
motion to dismiss for failure to indict.
On June 13, 2018, defendant's four-day trial commenced. On June 20,
2018, the jury convicted defendant of all five counts in the final superseding
indictment. On December 4, 2018, the trial court sentenced defendant and
awarded him 2089 days of jail credit.
II
We next summarize the facts elicited at trial which resulted in defendant's
conviction. Defendant resided in a one-bedroom apartment in East Orange. He
lived there with his wife, two children, and a nephew. Defendant and his family
are natives of Haiti and primarily speak Creole.
In December 2012, Gwen immigrated from Haiti to live with her father;
however, the two did not get along, so defendant's wife allowed Gwen to stay at
their apartment. In the one-bedroom apartment, Gwen slept in the living room
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behind a curtain, defendant's children slept on the couch, and defendant and his
wife slept in the bedroom.
On December 7, 2012, Gwen woke up to the sensation of someone
fondling her from behind. When she rolled over, she recognized defendant, who
proceeded to reach his hand down the front of her pajama pants and touch her
vagina. Gwen told defendant she would tell his wife what he did, but defendant
told her that no one would believe her. On December 11, 2012, Gwen told her
aunt, R.G., that defendant touched her inappropriately. R.G. did not believe her.
On December 12, 2012, defendant woke up Gwen in the middle of the
night and whispered, "[N]o one will know what we are going to do." Defendant
then got on top of Gwen, covered her mouth with one hand, and proceeded to
pull off her skirt and underwear, with the other. Defendant then penetrated
Gwen with his hands and penis, ejaculating inside of her. Afterward, defendant
ordered Gwen to take a bath.
Gwen again called R.G. and requested she come over. R.G. drove to
defendant's apartment early that morning; defendant was not present when she
arrived. There, Gwen told R.G. about the second assault and R.G. called
defendant, requesting he return to the apartment. Defendant denied having sex
with Gwen.
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In response to defendant's denial, R.G. stated her desire to call the police
"to make everything straight[.]" Defendant then admitted to having sex with
Gwen. Before R.G. engaged defendant, she had phoned her sister, who remained
on the line throughout the confrontation. At some point, R.G.'s sister called the
police.
After the police arrived, Gwen provided a statement to the responding
officers and EMS transported her to a local hospital. R.G. accompanied Gwen
and translated for her. Marti Hayducka, a certified SANE nurse, examined
Gwen at the hospital. Gwen provided a vaginal sample, anal swab, cervical
swab, and her underwear for testing. The tests revealed defendant's DNA
matched the semen found in Gwen's vaginal sample and underwear. Police
arrested defendant on March 16, 2013.
As noted, the jury convicted defendant of all five counts contained in the
final indictment. This appeal followed, with defendant presenting the following
arguments:
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
WAS VIOLATED BY THE MORE THAN FIVE-
YEAR DELAY IN BRINGING HIM TO TRIAL.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT
OF ACQUITAL ON COUNT FOUR.
POINT III.
THE TESTIMONY OF THE SANE NURSE ON
REDIRECT WENT FAR BEYOND WHAT THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE PERMIT.
POINT IV.
IMPROPER JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE WITH
DEFENDANT'S DECISION TO TESTIFY
VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS
AND COMPULSORY PROCESS RIGHTS. (NOT
RAISED BELOW)
POINT V
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE PROSECUTOR
TO REPEATEDLY ASK DEFENDANT TO
VOUCH FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF
ANOTHER TRIAL WITNESS. (NOT RAISED
BELOW)
POINT VI.
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE.
A. Speedy Trial Claim.
We turn first to defendant's contention that his right to a speedy trial was
violated due to the more than five years that elapsed between his arrest and trial.
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Defendant argues that we should reverse his conviction, contending a proper
application of the four-part analysis established by the United States Supreme
Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), mandated the dismissal of his
indictment. Alternatively, defendant argues this court should remand the matter
to the trial court for a full hearing and further consideration of his speedy -trial
claim.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a
defendant's right to a speedy trial and that right is applied to the states by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Cahill, 213 N.J.
253, 264 (2013) (citing Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967)).
"The constitutional right . . . attaches upon defendant's arrest." State v.
Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Fulford, 349 N.J. Super. 183, 190 (App. Div. 2002)).
The State owes the defendant a duty to promptly bring his or her case to
trial and avoid excessive delays. Ibid. At trial, the defendant bears the burden
of establishing a violation of his or her speedy trial right. Id. at 9.
In State v. Cahill, our Supreme Court reaffirmed that the four-factor
balancing analysis of Barker "remains the governing standard to evaluate claims
of a denial of the federal and state constitutional right to a speedy trial." 213
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N.J. at 258. Barker identified four non-exclusive factors a court should consider
when evaluating a speedy-trial claim: length of the delay, reasons for the delay,
assertion of the right to a speedy trial by the defendant, and prejudice to the
defendant. Id. at 530-33. Not all four factors are necessary or sufficient "to the
finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related
factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may
be relevant." Id. at 533. Each application for dismissal based on speedy trial
principles is fact-sensitive and requires "a case-by-case analysis rather than a
bright-line time limitation." Cahill, 213 N.J. at 270.
When the delay exceeds one year, a court presumptively should analyze
all of the Barker factors. Id. at 265-66. Legitimate delays, "however great,"
will not violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial, unless those delays
specifically prejudice the defense. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656
(1992). Delays attributable to the defendant do not support a speedy trial
violation and such delays are subtracted from the total calculus. United States
v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Battis, 589
F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 2009)). Naturally, purposeful delay tactics weigh heavily
against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
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Applying these factors to this matter, we are not convinced defendant was
denied his right to a speedy trial. The record shows defendant's arrest occurred
on March 16, 2013, and his trial began on June 13, 2018. Defendant contends
that any and all delay in his case was attributable to the State. We disagree,
finding the delay was primarily, if not entirely, caused by defendant.
As observed by the motion judge during pretrial hearings in January 2018,
and evidenced by defendant's actions throughout trial, his consistent refusal to
cooperate with the court and his counsel caused much of the delay.
Significantly, defendant's trial counsel was defendant's sixth 2 attorney in the
case. At one point, defendant indicated he wished to represent himself at trial;
however, he withdrew the motion after it caused additional delay. Defendant
also filed numerous additional pro se motions, most lacking in merit.
Furthermore, defendant repeatedly indicated his intention to accept a plea offer,
but then failed to provide the required factual basis on three separate occasions,
significantly frustrating the State's efforts in bringing the case to trial.
Defendant contends the State contributed to his delay because it continued
to "alter[] [its] legal theory of the case." To the contrary, the superseding
indictment added charges after defendant attempted to interfere with a witness
2
Defendant's counsel confirmed this fact at oral argument before this court.
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and evidence, and the subsequent indictments attempted to streamline the case
and move it forward to trial. The State's theory throughout the case remained
that defendant sexually assaulted his minor niece.
We do note that defendant filed pro se motions to dismiss for a failure to
indict. Nevertheless, defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay
in bringing his case to trial. Moreover, defendant is the primary reason for the
delay. We conclude that defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated.
B. Denial of Motion for Acquittal on Count Four.
We next consider defendant's contention that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for acquittal on count four, sexual assault by digital
penetration, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(1). Defendant argues a reasonably jury could
not convict him of the digital penetration count based on the trial record.
Specifically, he asserts that, because Gwen required her memory to be refreshed
by her five-year-old statements regarding the digital penetration before
testifying, the record lacked credible evidence to find him guilty of that offense.
We reject this argument, finding the record contains sufficient evidence from
which the jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant committed
sexual assault by digital penetration.
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During the State's direct examination of Gwen, the assistant prosecutor
questioned her regarding the sexual acts defendant performed. Although Gwen
initially testified that defendant did not penetrate her digitally, she testified to
that fact after her memory was refreshed by reviewing her statement to the
police. After the State rested, defendant moved to dismiss count four of th e
indictment.
In ruling on defendant's Rule 3:18-1 motion, the judge reviewed the
applicable standard in State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967), and stated:
. . . the question the trial judge must determine is whether
viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that
evidence direct or circumstantial, and given the State the
benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the
favorable inferences which reasonabl[y] could be drawn
therefrom a reasonable juror could find [defendant] guilty
of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
Based on . . . the testimony of the victim, I find that . . .
giv[ing] the evidence of the State[] the benefit of all
favorable testimony as well as the favorable inferences
which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable
jury could find guilt of the defendant as to the charge
contained in [c]ount [four] of the indictment and,
therefore, the application is denied.
We review a trial court's decision to deny a motion for acquittal de novo.
State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 593-94 (2014) (citing State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534,
548-49 (2004)). Accordingly, we inquire "whether, based on the entirety of the
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evidence and after giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony and all
the favorable inferences drawn from that testimony, a reasonable jury could find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 594 (citing Reyes, 50 N.J. at 458-59).
Under Rule 3:18-1, a court "is not concerned with the worth, nature or extent
(beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed most
favorably to the State." State v. Muniz, 150 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App. Div. 1977).
"If the evidence satisfies that standard, the motion must be denied." State v. Spivey,
179 N.J. 229, 236 (2004).
Here, before testifying to defendant digitally penetrating her, Gwen needed to
have her recollection refreshed by reviewing the statement she provided to the
police, over five years before, when she was sixteen years old. A jury "may draw
logical inferences from the evidence presented to them," including direct and
circumstantial evidence. State v. Cango, 211 N.J. 488, 512 (2012). The State
presented the evidence to the jury after properly refreshing Gwen's memory.
Defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine Gwen and present his own
evidence at trial. Gwen's refreshed recollection clearly provided an adequate basis
for a reasonable jury to find defendant guilty of count four, sexual assault by digital
penetration. Therefore, we find no error in the trial judge's decision to deny
defendant's motion for acquittal.
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C. Evidentiary Error Claims.
For the first time on appeal, defendant contends the trial court made two clear
evidentiary errors by allowing both improper cross-examination and redirect
testimony. First, defendant argues the State improperly questioned the SANE nurse
regarding information Gwen provided her following the assault. He contends the
questioning went beyond the proper scope of redirect. Second, defendant asserts the
State, during its cross-examination, asked him a series of improper questions
calculated to characterize Gwen as truthful.
Because defendant did not object to either line of questioning at trial and both
arguments are raised for the first time on appeal, we apply a plain-error standard of
review. Under that standard, a conviction will be reversed if the error was "clearly
capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; see also State v. Macon, 57 N.J.
325, 337 (1971). As such, we must determine whether the claimed error was
"sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a result it
otherwise might not have reached." State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 581 (2018) (quoting
State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004)) (alteration in original). In both instances,
we find no clear error.
During defendant's cross-examination of the SANE nurse, counsel sought to
elicit testimony highlighting the fact that her evaluation of Gwen failed to indicate
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the presence of physical injury. The questioning sought to imply that Gwen
fabricated her account, or that the sex was consensual. On redirect, the State
questioned the SANE nurse whether Gwen gave any indication that the encounter
was nonconsensual during the evaluation. In response, the SANE nurse testified that
Gwen told her defendant threatened and physically restrained her during the
encounter. The State's questioning of the SANE nurse fell within the proper scope
of redirect examination.
As to the State's cross examination of defendant, he argues the assistant
prosecutor asked him a series of improper questions in order to bolster Gwen's
credibility. The State maintains the questioning was proper cross-examination,
admissible to highlight the inconsistences between defendant's testimony and
Gwen's testimony.
The record reflects the State did not misrepresent or mischaracterize the
testimony of either party. Nor did the State seek to bolster Gwen's credibility by
having defendant characterize her as truthful. Moreover, defendant did not show
how either the State's questioning of the SANE nurse, or him, prejudiced his defense.
D. Judicial Interference Claim.
Defendant also contends the trial judge interfered with his right to testify,
claiming he "berated and threatened" him before he testified. This argument lacks
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sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Our review of the
record reveals the trial judge displayed considerable patience with defendant and did
not berate or threaten him. Instead, the record reflects the judge appropriately
addressed defendant to confirm his decision to testify and that he had enough time
to speak with his attorney regarding his testimony. The judge further advised
defendant how his testimony would proceed before the jury.
E. Excessive Sentence Claim.
Defendant argues the trial judge erred by affording undue weight to
aggravating factors two, N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(a)(2) (the gravity and seriousness of the
harm inflicted on the victim), and three, N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(a)(2) (the risk that
defendant will commit another offense). Defendant asserts Gwen was not seriously
harmed as a result of the sexual assaults. He also maintains the judge abused his
discretion in finding factor three because he had no prior record and is unlikely to
reoffend.
"An appellate court's review of a sentencing court's imposition of sentence is
guided by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018).
In reviewing a sentence, we must determine whether: "(1) the sentencing guidelines
were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were . . . 'based
upon competent credible evidence in the record;' [and] (3) 'the application of the
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guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] the judicial conscience.'" State v.
Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (third alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth,
95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).
We are "bound to affirm a sentence, even if [we] would have arrived at a
different result, as long as the trial court properly identifies and balances aggravating
and mitigating factors that are supported by competent credible evidence in the
record." State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989) (citing State v. Jarbath, 114
N.J. 394, 400-01 (1989); Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65).
As to finding aggravating factor two applied, the judge clearly did not abuse
his discretion. The judge noted the difficulty Gwen encountered in testifying, which
reflected "the gravity and seriousness of the mental and emotional harm [defendant]
inflicted upon the minor victim," and found the record reflected defendant's
knowledge of her vulnerability. Competent credible evidence in the record
established that defendant forcibly assaulted his then sixteen-year-old niece, who
lived with him at the time. Not only did defendant sexually assault a family member
under his care, he tried to intimidate her when he told her, "[N]obody will believe
you." In addition to its physical nature, the assault will undoubtedly leave Gwen
with lasting psychological harm, evidenced by her visible emotion in recalling the
traumatic events at trial.
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In finding factor three applied, the trial judge noted that defendant showed no
remorse and maintained his refusal to accept any responsibility for his actions.
Defendant contends the judge's finding inappropriately penalized him for exercising
his trial right. We disagree. Throughout trial and at sentencing, defendant continued
to deny any wrongdoing, telling the judge at his sentencing hearing, "I didn't do
anything wrong." Rather than accept responsibility for his own conduct, defendant
instead chooses to place blame on his multiple attorneys and the criminal justice
system, notwithstanding the compelling DNA evidence in the case. The judge's
finding of factor three was supported by the record.
We are satisfied the trial judge properly identified and weighed the
appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing defendant. We discern
no sentencing error.
Affirmed.
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