MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
FILED
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Jul 27 2020, 9:47 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the
CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Lisa Diane Manning Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Danville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Megan M. Smith
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
M.R., July 27, 2020
Appellant/Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-JV-696
v. Appeal from the Vermillion
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Hon. Jill D. Wesch, Judge
Appellee/Petitioner. Trial Court Cause No.
83C01-2002-JD-2
Bradford, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-696 | July 27, 2020 Page 1 of 5
Case Summary
[1] While riding on his school bus in February of 2020, then-eleven-year-old M.R.
told the bus driver that he would throw wads of paper in the principal’s face,
blow up the school, and/or bring firearms to school. The State alleged that
M.R. was a juvenile delinquent for committing what would be Level 6 felony
intimidation if committed by an adult, and the juvenile court agreed. M.R.
contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile
court’s delinquency adjudication. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] M.R. was born on February 23, 2008. On February 4, 2020, M.R. was sitting
in the front seat of the school bus on his way home from Ernie Pyle Elementary
School (“the School”) in Vermillion County, with his brother and sister sitting
one seat back. M.R. was throwing paper airplanes at his sister and, despite
being asked to stop by his sister and the bus driver, did not stop. M.R. also
began to wad up pieces of paper, which he placed next to him on the seat. The
bus driver asked M.R.’s brother to report his behavior to their parents and
indicated that if he did not, she would report it to the School’s principal,
Kimberly Kesler. M.R. responded, “I don’t care about that principal. I will hit
her in the face with this paper. I don’t care about that school. I will blow up
that school[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 70; State’s Ex. 1. M.R. also used the word
“bomb[,]” but the rest of this particular statement was unclear. Tr. Vol. II p.
70; State’s Ex. 1. M.R. continued, saying “[w]e have no dynamite. I [will] go
get guns. I [will] shoot one. I will take one to school. I will take all of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-696 | July 27, 2020 Page 2 of 5
guns.” Tr. Vol. II p. 70; State’s Ex. 1. The transportation director reported
M.R.’s statements to Kesler.
[3] The next day, Kesler reviewed surveillance footage from the bus and brought
M.R. into her office to question him about his statements. M.R. admitted to
having access to firearms at his grandmother’s house and a “.410 at home.” Tr.
Vol. II p. 71. When Kesler questioned M.R. as to whether he knew what it
meant to bomb something, M.R. responded that he did and that “[i]t means
people die[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 70. M.R.’s sister verified to Kesler that M.R. had
made the statements on the bus.
[4] On February 6, 2020, the State filed a delinquency petition in which it alleged
that M.R. had committed what would be Level 6 felony intimidation if
committed by an adult. On February 14, 2020, the juvenile court adjudicated
M.R. a delinquent. On March 3, 2020, the juvenile court ordered M.R. to serve
a one-year commitment suspended to probation.
Discussion and Decision
[5] When reviewing claims of insufficient evidence in a juvenile case, appellate
courts apply the same standard of review as if it were an appeal of a criminal
conviction. K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612. (Ind. 2013). In reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or
assess the credibility of witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126. (Ind.
2005). “It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts to assess witness
credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to
support a conviction.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146. (Ind. 2007). We
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-696 | July 27, 2020 Page 3 of 5
look only to evidence in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling and
must affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the
elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126. The
evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Craig v.
State, 730 N.E.2d 1262, 1266. (Ind. 2000).
[6] Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1 provides, in part, that a person who
communicates a threat of a forcible felony with the intent of interfering with the
occupancy of a building commits intimidation, a Level 6 felony. “Whether a
statement is a threat is an objective question for the trier of fact.” E.B. v. State,
89 N.E.3d 1087, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[a]
defendant’s intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone, and
knowledge and intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each
case.” Id. (citation omitted).
[7] The record contains evidence that M.R. told his bus driver that he was going to
hit Kesler in the face with wadded-up paper, blow up the School, and/or bring
guns to the School. Kesler also testified that M.R. acknowledged that he had
access to firearms and was aware that bombing the School could result in death.
The juvenile court was free to interpret M.R.’s statements as objective threats.
Additionally, the juvenile court was free to infer that M.R. intended—and knew
or should have known—that his threats would be passed on to Kesler (who
was, after all, included in his threats) and that Kesler would then cause
occupancy of the School to be affected, possibly by closing it or instituting
additional security measures. See, e.g, B.B. v. State, 141 N.E.3d 856, 862 (Ind.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-696 | July 27, 2020 Page 4 of 5
Ct. App. 2020) (in case where B.B. communicated his plan to commit mass
murder at a high school and showed his “manifesto” to a fellow student,
concluding that “a reasonable fact finder could conclude that B.B. knew or
should have known that R.A. would report a plan of mass murder to other
students at the high school”). We conclude that the State produced sufficient
evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s finding that M.R. committed what
would be Level 6 felony intimidation if committed by an adult.
[8] M.R. seems to argue that our decisions in E.B. and B.B. set some special
standard for sufficiency of the evidence in cases where it is alleged that a person
made a threat with the intent to interfere with the occupancy of a school, a
standard that was not met here. Nothing in E.B. or B.B. purports to establish
some sort of minimum standard based on the facts of those cases, and we
decline the invitation to interpret them as doing so. While E.B. and B.B. stand
for the proposition that the evidence was sufficient to prove intimidation in those
cases, they do not stand for the proposition that it was necessary.
[9] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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