NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 10 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARTHUR LOPEZ, No. 19-55231
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:17-cv-02379-VBF-
MRW
v.
CORONA POLICE DEPARTMENT, MEMORANDUM*
official capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Valerie Baker Fairbank, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 5, 2020**
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Arthur Lopez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Blankenhorn v.
City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Lopez failed
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants’ decision to
impound his vehicle was not justified under the community caretaking exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, given that his vehicle was parked
blocking a private driveway. See United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141
(9th Cir. 2012) (“Under the community caretaking exception, police officers may
impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of
vehicular traffic.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Clement v. City
of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The costs and burdens on the
car owner associated with a tow can only be justified by conditions that make a
tow necessary and appropriate, such as that the car is parked in the path of traffic,
blocking a driveway, obstructing a fire lane or appears abandoned”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Lopez because
Lopez knowingly submitted a materially doctored document to the district court for
an improper purpose. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills,
482 F.3d 1091, 1094-97 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming sanctions where party
photocopied records in a way to support misleading date calculation; conduct was
a “fraud on the court”); F.J. Hanshaw Enters. v. Emerald River Dev., 244 F.3d
1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez’s motion for
2 19-55231
reconsideration because Lopez set forth no valid grounds for reconsideration. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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