FILED
8/21/2020
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Columbia
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AARON GIBBS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 20-2296 (UNA)
)
DON WILSON, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on consideration of Aaron Gibbs’s application to proceed
in forma pauperis, his pro se complaint, and motion for a temporary restraining order.1
Plaintiff is affiliated with The Church of the Only Begotten Son. He alleges that, in April
2020, the Sheriff of Dolores County, Colorado seized animals belonging to the church. See
Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 5; Mot. for TRO (ECF No. 2) at 1. He demands return of the animals,
compensation for their loss, and a permanent restraining order against the Sheriff and other local
law enforcement agents and agencies. See Compl. at 5; Mot. for TRO at 3.
Plaintiff’s demand for injunctive relief pertains not only to the seized animals, but also to
defendants’ alleged misuse of law enforcement authority. According to plaintiff, he is subjected
to “Bias Police Practices, religious discrimination, Physical assault, malicious prosecution,
obstruction of justice, FRAUD ON THE COURT, criminal statute violations, extortion . . . and
racketeering[.]” Mot. for TRO at 1 (emphasis in original). He alleges that he has been accused
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Plaintiff purports to represent the interests of The Church of the Only Begotten Son and
Bishop Sant. See Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 5; Mot. for TRO (ECF No. 2) at 1. Because plaintiff is
a not lawyer or otherwise demonstrates that he may represent the interests of others, the Court
proceeds as if Aaron Gibbs is the sole plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
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of crimes he did not commit and arrested without probable cause, see id., “stemming back to
2005 with incidents most recent in 2020,” id. at 4. Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining the Sheriff,
his deputies, and other law enforcement entities from harassing and threatening him, see id. at 2-
3, and transferring “current criminal investigations and criminal charges . . . to the appropriate
federal court,” id. at 2.
Injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy . . . that should not be granted
unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The Court
considers the same factors whether a plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Price v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 18-CV-1339, 2019 WL
2526439, at *3 (D.D.C. June 19, 2019) (quoting Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. Supp.
2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001)). They are: “(1) the movant’s showing of a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm to the movant, (3) substantial harm to the nonmovant,
and (4) public interest.” Davis v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). In the District of Columbia Circuit, courts have “traditionally balanced
these four factors on a ‘sliding scale’ whereby a movant’s unusually strong showing on one
factor could compensate for weaker showings on one or more other factors.” Pinson v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 177 F. Supp. 3d 474, 477 (D.D.C. 2016) (citations omitted). The sliding scale
approach is called into question, however, in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008), which requires “some showing on each
factor,” Singh v. Carter, 185 F. Supp. 3d 11, 20 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 23-24,
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31-32). Regardless of approach, the movant must demonstrate an irreparable injury. See Wisc.
Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (stating that the injury “must
be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical”); see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
Plaintiff addresses none of these factors, and thus fails to demonstrate that extraordinary relief is
warranted.
Furthermore, defects of plaintiff’s complaint warrant dismissal of this action. For
example, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he has standing to pursue claims arising from the
seizure of property belonging to the church. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992) (stating that a plaintiff “must have suffered an ‘injury in fact,’” that is “actual or
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” that there be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of,” and that it “be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision’”). Although dismissal of
a complaint “solely on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants”
is impermissible, Anger v. Revco Drug Co., 791 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1986), plaintiff offers
no basis for this court’s exercise of jurisdiction over parties who live or reside in Colorado, see,
e.g., Stringer v. Downy, No. 1:20-CV-01898, 2020 WL 4335524, at *2 (D.D.C. July 27, 2020).
And to the extent plaintiff pursues a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted because there is no private right of action under this
federal criminal statute. See e.g., Rockefeller v. U.S. Court of Appeals Office, for Tenth Circuit
Judges, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2003).
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The Court will grant plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, deny his motion
for a temporary restraining order, and dismiss the complaint and this civil action without
prejudice. An Order is issued separately.
DATE: August 21, 2020 /s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
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