IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 29, 2020
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2019-SC-0344-MR
MICHAEL R. P’SIMER APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE REBECCA PHILLIPS, JUDGE
NO. 17-CR-00226
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A Carter Circuit Court jury convicted Michael R. P’Simer, of two counts of
trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree (second-offense) and
possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Mr. P’Simer to thirty years’
imprisonment. He now appeals as a matter of right.1
On appeal, P’Simer alleges two errors. First, he argues that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on each
first-degree trafficking charge. Second, he claims that palpable error resulted
1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) (“Appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court imposing
a sentence of ... imprisonment for twenty years or more shall be taken directly to the
Supreme Court.”).
1
from the introduction of certain testimony. Following a review of the record
and applicable law, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 5th, 2017, Kentucky State Police Trooper Shane Goodall, (Trp.
Goodall), conducted a stop of Mr. P’Simer’s vehicle. During the stop, Tpr.
Goodall asked P’Simer to exit the vehicle. As P’Simer complied with this
request, Tpr. Goodall noticed P’Simer attempt to slide an object under the
driver’s seat. Upon further inspection, Tpr. Goodall observed that the object
was a small, camouflage package with a clear plastic baggie containing white
powder visible through an opening in the end of the pack.
Tpr. Goodall seized the package. Within the package, he found two bags
containing powdery substances and one bag containing a substance suspected
to be marijuana. P’Simer insisted that he did not know the substances were in
the vehicle because he had just purchased the car earlier that day. Forensic
testing revealed that one baggie contained 3.945 grams of methamphetamine
and the other contained 4.607 grams of fentanyl.2
Soon thereafter, P’Simer was indicted on one count of trafficking in a
controlled substance of more than two grams of methamphetamine in the first
degree, second offense; one count of trafficking in a controlled substance
greater than two grams of fentanyl, second offense; and one count of
possession of marijuana. At trial, Tpr. Goodall testified that, based on his
2 Lab testing was not performed on the bag containing suspected marijuana.
2
experience, the quantity of drugs found in P’Simer’s vehicle was inconsistent
with personal use, considering the typical dosage unit and approximate street
value of the substances.
The jury convicted P’Simer on all charges. The jury found each
trafficking offense to be a second offense and fixed P’Simer’s sentence for each
trafficking conviction at 15 years’ imprisonment, set to run consecutively.3 The
trial court imposed the sentences recommended by the jury for all convictions.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The trial court did not err in denying P’Simer’s motion for a
directed verdict on each trafficking charge.
P’Simer alleges that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a
directed verdict on each count of trafficking in a controlled substance. This
issue is properly preserved for our review.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict for abuse
of discretion.4 In considering a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the
reviewing court “must consider the evidence as a whole, presume the
Commonwealth’s proof is true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
Commonwealth, and leave questions of weight and credibility to the jury.”5
3P’Simer was also sentenced to 45 days’ imprisonment, for the possession of
marijuana charge. This sentence is set to run concurrent with his other sentences.
4 The standard for abuse of discretion is whether the court acted in a manner
that was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
5 Acosta v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 809 (Ky. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187-188 (Ky. 1991)).
3
Only if the Commonwealth has produced no more than a mere scintilla of
evidence is directed verdict appropriate.6 On appellate review, we must
determine whether “it would be clearly unreasonable for the jury to find guilt.”7
Under KRS8 218A.1412(1)(b), a person commits “trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree when he or she knowingly and
unlawfully traffics in: … [t]wo grams or more of methamphetamine.” Under
subsection (1)(d) a person is guilty of first-degree trafficking if he or she
knowingly traffics in “any quantity of fentanyl.” A person “traffics” a controlled
substance when he or she “means to manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell,
transfer, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a
controlled substance.”9
P’Simer argues that the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient
evidence that he intended to sell either the methamphetamine or the fentanyl.
He points to the relatively low quantity of drugs and the absence of any indicia
of commercial activity (e.g. no scales, pre-packaged bags of drugs, cash, or
ledgers). As such, P’Simer contends that the jury lacked sufficient grounds to
find him guilty of trafficking. We disagree.
Here, evidence showed that P’Simer possessed nearly 4 grams of
methamphetamine and over 4 grams of fentanyl. Moreover, Tpr. Goodall
6 Id.
7 Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187 (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5
(Ky. 1983)).
8 Kentucky Revised Statute.
9 KRS 218A.010(56).
4
testified that, in his experience, the typical user of methamphetamine and
fentanyl purchases and uses around one-tenth of a gram at a time. He noted
that individuals who buy in grams often do so for the purpose of dividing that
amount into smaller quantities for purposes of reselling them. Tpr. Goodall
approximated the typical street value of one-tenth on a gram of either
methamphetamine or fentanyl as between twenty and twenty-five dollars,
depending of the potency of the substances, demand, and the individual dealer.
Finally, Tpr. Goodall opined that the presence of three different drugs at one
time suggests an intent to traffic because, in his experience, many users picked
a single drug as their drug of choice.
Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, we conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence to overcome the motion for directed verdict. A reasonable jury could
infer that P’Simer possessed the methamphetamine and fentanyl with the
intent to distribute it. The Commonwealth presented evidence that P’Simer
possessed an amount of both methamphetamine and fentanyl worth over
$1,500 and sufficient for dozens of uses of each substance by the typical user.
While possession of this quantity does not qualify as intent to traffic per se, it
raises a significant enough inference for a jury to be allowed to decide the
issue. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion for directed verdict.
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B. The admission of Trooper Goodall’s testimony was not palpable
error.
P’Simer contends that the trial court erred in allowing Trooper Goodall to
offer improper opinion testimony related to the defendant’s specific state of
mind.
P’Simer’s counsel did not object to this testimony during trial. On
appeal, P’Simer requests palpable error review. We review for palpable error
pursuant to RCr10 10.26. An unpreserved error may only be reversed on
appeal if the error is both “palpable” and “manifest injustice resulted from the
error.”11 An error is “palpable” when it is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious,
and readily noticeable.”12 For an error to bring about manifest injustice, the
error must be “so fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due
process of law.”13 In sum, a palpable error threatens the integrity of the
judicial process.14
P’Simer specifically alleges that two instances of Tpr. Goodall’s testimony
improperly opined about P’Simer’s mens rea. First, Tpr. Goodall stated that
the amount of drugs found in P’Simer’s car was an amount that individuals
often purchase to break up and resell. Next, he stated that the quantity of
drugs he recovered from Mr. P’Simer’s vehicle was consistent with the amount
of drugs he typically observes in the possession of traffickers.
10 Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
11 RCr 10.26.
Young v. Commonwealth, 426 S.W.3d 577, 584 (Ky. 2014) (citing Brewer v.
12
Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006)).
13 Id. (citing Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky.2006)).
14 Martin, 207 S.W.3d at 5.
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Neither of the aforementioned statements are inadmissible under
Kentucky law. As such the introduction of the statements was not erroneous
at all, let alone palpable error. Numerous decisions of this court permit law
enforcement officers to opine that the quantity of drugs recovered in a given
case was inconsistent with personal use.15 This Court’s decision in McGuire
proves relevant to the case at hand. There, a law enforcement officer testified
that the presence of multiple bags of drugs suggested an intent to traffic and
that 2.623 grams of methamphetamine was inconsistent with personal use.16
This Court held that such testimony was not improper opinion testimony
because it did not speak to the ultimate issue of guilt.17 Here, Tpr. Goodall
offered substantially similar testimony; he opined that the quantity of drugs
recovered from P’Simer was inconsistent with personal use. Therefore, we hold
that the testimony was not inadmissible, and no error resulted from its
inclusion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment.
All sitting. All concur.
15 See e.g. McGuire v. Commonwealth, 595 S.W.3d 90, 94-95 (Ky. 2019) (holding
that officer’s testimony that evidence recovered was consistent with trafficking and not
personal use was admissible); Sargent v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W.2d 801 (Ky.
1991)(holding that officer’s opinion testimony that quantity of marijuana and unique
packaging suggested an intent to traffic was admissible).
16 McGuire, 595 S.W.3d at 93.
17 Id. at 94-95.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Brandon Neil Jewell
Department of Public Advocacy
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:
Daniel Jay Cameron
Attorney General
Stephanie L. McKeehan
Assistant Attorney General
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