January 19, 2021
January 19, 2021
January 19, 2021
Supreme Court
No. 2019-140-Appeal.
(PC 13-5564)
Tammi Sousa et al. :
v. :
Gilbert Roy, Jr., individually and as :
Trustee of The Gilbert F. Roy, Jr.
Residence Trust—2005. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2019-140-Appeal.
(PC 13-5564)
Tammi Sousa et al. :
v. :
Gilbert Roy, Jr., individually and as :
Trustee of The Gilbert F. Roy, Jr.
Residence Trust—2005. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The plaintiffs, Tammi Sousa (Sousa)
and Charles G. Thibeault III (Thibeault) (collectively plaintiffs), appeal from the
grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, Gilbert F. Roy, Jr.,
individually and as trustee of The Gilbert F. Roy, Jr. Residence Trust—2005
(defendant). This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing
the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not
be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions
and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this
case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth
in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
-1-
I
Facts and Travel
Prior to their respective deaths, Flora I. Roy and Gilbert Roy, Sr., owned a
house located at 44 Ashburne Street in Pawtucket (the property).1 In approximately
1989, the couple’s daughter, Linda Mary Roy, contributed funds to build an addition
onto the property. After the addition was built, Linda lived at the property with her
children, who are the plaintiffs in this matter. Gilbert, Sr., died in 1997, and, in
1998, Flora signed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to defendant, who is
Linda’s brother, with a reserved life estate for herself. Flora also executed a will,
bequeathing to Linda her car and $25,000, bequeathing to defendant her kitchen set,
and bequeathing the rest and residue of her estate to Linda and defendant in equal
shares. Flora then gave the will to defendant, enclosed in an envelope. In 2005,
defendant conveyed his legal ownership in the property to himself, as trustee of the
Gilbert F. Roy, Jr. Residence Trust—2005.
Flora lived on the property until her death in 2010. Following Flora’s death,
defendant and his wife moved onto the property, where Linda continued to live. The
plaintiffs allege that in 2011 defendant signed a statement acknowledging that Linda
was “entitled to 50% of the proceeds, at the time of a sale and minus all expenses
1
Aside from defendant, this opinion will refer to family members who share the last
name Roy by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.
-2-
that [defendant had] incurred for the property” (the statement). The plaintiffs further
allege that, following Linda’s death in 2012, they asked defendant to sell the property
and to distribute the sale proceeds, but defendant refused to do so and continued to
live at the property.
The plaintiffs thereafter filed a complaint in Providence County Superior
Court, asking for a declaratory judgment that defendant was holding the property in
a constructive trust for their benefit, with plaintiffs having “the right upon the sale
of the real estate to $25,000.00 of the sale proceeds plus one-half of the balance of
the sale proceeds[,]” and asking the court to order defendant to convey a co-tenancy
interest to them. The plaintiffs further asked that, if defendant refused to sell the
property, the court appoint a commissioner to do so. They also asked for monetary
damages and asserted claims of promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment.
According to plaintiffs’ amended complaint, after Gilbert, Sr.’s death, Flora
conveyed the property to defendant,
“but with the family intention and understanding that
Linda owned one-half of the house and that upon the
eventual sale of the house either at her direction or
following her death that she or plaintiffs would be due
$25,000.00 to compensate Linda for her contribution of
the funds for the house addition, and that the balance of
the sale proceeds would be equally shared, one-half to
Linda or her children if Linda died before the sale, and
one-half to defendant or as he might designate if he died
before the sale.”
-3-
The plaintiffs called five witnesses at the jury trial: defendant; Sousa;
Thibeault; defendant’s wife; and Edward Stachurski, a licensed real estate broker
and certified general appraiser.
The defendant testified that, although Flora gave him an envelope containing
her will, he did not open the envelope until 2005, when he met with his attorney to
execute his own will. The defendant also testified that, until that day in 2005, he
was not aware that he owned the property; according to defendant, his mother had
not discussed the conveyance with him. He testified that he did not make any
statements to his mother to influence her to sign the deed to the property over to him
in 1998, nor did he discuss with her any issue concerning ownership of the property
or the distribution of any proceeds upon its eventual sale.
The defendant additionally testified that, due to Linda’s “nagging[,]” he wrote
the statement, dated March 9, 2011, that acknowledged that his sister was “entitled
to 50 percent of the proceeds, at the time of sale minus all the expenses that I have
incurred for the property[,]” and that, if she did not survive defendant, plaintiffs
would be given her share. He described it as “a proposal” and his “offer to her[,]”
and that he was “waiting for her to sign it so as to make some kind of a deal.” He
testified that Linda altered the statement by inserting the words “after your death[,]”
meaning Linda’s death, handed it back to him, and said it was “[n]ot acceptable”
because she did not want her children to have to pay any expenses. According to
-4-
defendant, there were no further discussions about the statement. He testified that,
after Linda died, he denied possession of the property to plaintiffs because “it was
[his] house.”
Sousa testified that, at some point in 1990 or 1991, there was a family
conversation involving Linda, Flora, and Gilbert, Sr., about the money Linda had
contributed to the addition on the property. She testified that her grandparents told
Linda that she would get extra money, approximately $25,000, from the sale of the
property for her contribution, and that “they’d split the house.” Sousa testified that
defendant was not part of these discussions and would not have known about the
understanding. Additionally, Sousa testified that Gilbert, Sr., said that her
stepfather, Linda’s husband, “was no good, he was a drunk and a gambler,” and that
“they didn’t want him to be able to take anything of my mother’s.”
Sousa further testified that she encouraged Linda to get something in writing
about her partial ownership of the property, after defendant moved in, so that her
mother would be protected. Sousa thereafter identified the statement, which was
given to her by Linda on March 10, 2011. Sousa testified that Linda thought she and
her children were “all set” after defendant signed the statement “acknowledg[ing
Linda’s] interest in the house[,]” “[e]xcept for the $25,000 that wasn’t on it.”
Similar to Sousa, Thibeault testified that his grandfather stated that his
stepfather was “not getting any of this property because the way he is, so your mom’s
-5-
name is not going on anything.” He testified that defendant was not present at any
family conversations between 1990 and 1998 regarding the property and Linda’s
interest in the property. He also testified that he remembered defendant, between
2010 and 2012, saying to Thibeault and Linda: “I will take care of you guys, you
guys get 50 percent of the house, an extra 25,000, and I’m not even interested in the
house because I’m retiring and moving to Florida because I own seven properties
there.” He further testified that defendant told him, “The only reason why your mom
is not on here is because of” his stepfather.
Edward Stachurski was qualified as “an expert in the field” of real estate
appraisal. He testified that in 2018 plaintiffs asked him to appraise the fair rental
value of the property, which he estimated was $1,800 per month between 2012 and
2018. The plaintiffs’ attorney then asked Stachurski whether they had also requested
the fair market value appraisal of the property as it is now and what it was without
the addition, to which defendant objected because defendant was not given advance
notice that there was “a change in the charge for valuation[.]” The plaintiffs
conceded that there had not been discovery on this issue, and the trial justice ruled
that the witness could not testify as to the fair market value of the property.
After the conclusion of plaintiffs’ presentation of their case, defendant moved
for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure. In her bench decision on the motion, the trial justice first addressed
-6-
the constructive trust claim, finding that there was “no evidence on this record, direct
or circumstantial, indicating that [defendant] promised his mother that he would care
for Linda[,]” nor was there any evidence that he “knew of the family understanding
with respect to the property.” She ultimately found that there was no evidence that
defendant “procured the property by a conscious false representation to his
mother[,]” and she, therefore, ruled that a constructive trust had not arisen.
Next, the trial justice addressed the promissory estoppel claim, finding that
there was “no clear and unambiguous promise” created by the statement. She found
that, because plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the prongs of promissory estoppel, the
doctrine did not apply.
Finally, the trial justice addressed plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment. She
noted that, for an unjust enrichment claim, a “plaintiff must confer a benefit upon
the defendant” and she found that this did not happen in the instant case.
Accordingly, the trial justice granted defendant’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law and entered an order to that effect. Final judgment was entered on
February 12, 2019. The plaintiffs timely appealed.
II
Standard of Review
“In reviewing a trial justice’s decision on a motion for judgment as a matter
of law, this Court is bound to follow the same rules and legal standards as govern
-7-
the trial justice.” Lemont v. Estate of Ventura, 157 A.3d 31, 36 (R.I. 2017) (quoting
Roy v. State, 139 A.3d 480, 488 (R.I. 2016)). “The trial justice, and consequently
this Court, must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, without weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and
draw from the record all reasonable inferences that support the position of the
nonmoving party.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Roy, 139 A.3d at 488). Therefore,
“a trial justice should enter judgment as a matter of law when the evidence permits
only one legitimate conclusion in regard to the outcome.” Id. (quoting Roy, 139 A.3d
at 488).
III
Discussion
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial justice committed three errors. First,
plaintiffs assert that the trial justice misapplied the law of constructive trusts to the
facts. Second, with respect to their promissory estoppel claim, plaintiffs contend
that the trial justice improperly found the alleged contract to be ambiguous and
unenforceable. Third, plaintiffs maintain that the trial justice erred in her analysis
of plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim and in limiting plaintiffs’ examination of
Stachurski regarding the appreciation in value of the property created by the
addition. We address these claims of error seriatim.
-8-
A
Constructive Trust
The plaintiffs first assert that the trial justice misapplied the law of
constructive trusts to the facts of this case. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the trial
justice applied the wrong caselaw and that she overlooked “the clear and convincing
evidence presented at trial[.]” In making this argument, they point to defendant’s
knowledge of the family understanding, as evidenced by the statement.
“This Court previously has held that ‘the underlying principle of a
constructive trust is the equitable prevention of unjust enrichment of one party at the
expense of another in situations in which legal title to property was obtained by fraud
or in violation of a fiduciary or confidential relationship.’” Connor v. Schlemmer,
996 A.2d 98, 109 (R.I. 2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta,
873 A.2d 101, 111 (R.I. 2005)). “To demonstrate that the imposition of a
constructive trust is appropriate, ‘a plaintiff is required to show by clear and
convincing evidence (1) that a fiduciary duty existed between the parties and (2) that
either a breach of a promise or an act involving fraud occurred as a result of that
relationship.’” Id. (quoting Manchester v. Pereira, 926 A.2d 1005, 1013 (R.I.
2007)). “With respect to real property there must be some element of fraudulent
conduct by the person in possession of the property in procuring the conveyance in
order for a constructive trust to arise.” Curato v. Brain, 715 A.2d 631, 634 (R.I.
-9-
1998). “The actual existence of any fraudulent intent need not be shown because
the breach of the fiduciary duty itself amounts to constructive fraud.” Cahill v.
Antonelli, 120 R.I. 879, 883, 390 A.2d 936, 938 (1978); see also J.K. Social Club v.
J.K. Realty Corp., 448 A.2d 130, 134 (R.I. 1982) (constructive trust operates in
presence of fraud or breach of a fiduciary relationship).
Our review of the record reveals that, although the parties agreed that a
fiduciary relationship existed, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that defendant
procured the conveyance through a misrepresentation to Flora, or in any way
breached his fiduciary duty, amounting to constructive fraud. See Curato, 715 A.2d
at 634; Cahill, 120 R.I. at 883, 390 A.2d at 939. The record is, in fact, devoid of any
evidence that indicates that defendant made a promise to Flora regarding the
property or that defendant “abused [Flora’s] trust and confidence by persuading her
to convey the real estate to him[.]” Cahill, 120 R.I. at 883, 390 A.2d at 938. Sousa
herself testified that she was unsure if defendant made any promises to Flora at any
time regarding the property and that she was not aware of Flora’s mindset at the time
of the conveyance. We agree with the trial justice that “[t]here is no evidence on
th[e] record indicating that [defendant] knew of the family understanding with
respect to the property. In fact, the record shows otherwise.” In their testimony,
both plaintiffs indicated that defendant was not present at any of the family
- 10 -
conversations concerning the property and he would not have known about the
alleged understanding.
The plaintiffs additionally argue that the statement evinces that defendant
knew about the family understanding; however, the statement in no way indicates
that defendant procured the property by a false representation to Flora or breached a
promise to her. See Curato, 715 A.2d at 634; Cahill, 120 R.I. at 883, 390 A.2d at
938. As such, plaintiffs failed to present evidence that would establish that defendant
breached a promise or that “an act involving fraud occurred as a result of [the
fiduciary] relationship.” Connor, 996 A.2d at 109 (quoting Manchester, 926 A.2d at
1013).
Accordingly, we discern no error in the trial justice’s finding in favor of
defendant on the constructive trust claim.
B
Promissory Estoppel
The plaintiffs next contend that the trial justice erroneously found the alleged
contract to be ambiguous and unenforceable regarding their promissory estoppel
claim. Specifically, they argue that the statement was “a promise which [defendant]
should have reasonably expected Linda to rely upon in forbearing to pursue a claim
against him, and that Linda did, in fact, accept the offer and therefore did not make
- 11 -
a claim against [defendant], and that injustice can only be avoided by enforcing
[defendant’s] promise.”
This Court defines promissory estoppel as “a promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee
or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance, and therefore is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Andrews v.
Lombardi, 231 A.3d 1108, 1130 (R.I. 2020) (quoting Cote v. Aiello, 148 A.3d 537,
547 (R.I. 2016)). “Application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel also has been
extended to situations in which the promisee’s reliance on the promise was induced,
and injustice may be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Id. (quoting
Cote, 148 A.3d at 547). Promissory estoppel requires: (1) a clear and unambiguous
promise; (2) reasonable and justifiable reliance upon the promise; and (3) detriment
to the promisee, caused by his or her reliance on the promise. Cote, 148 A.3d at 547.
We first note that, even if the statement were construed to contain an
unambiguous promise, Linda, or her children, would not be entitled to 50 percent of
the proceeds until “the time of sale”—an event that clearly had not occurred when
this case was tried. At the very least, plaintiffs’ claim of promissory estoppel had
not yet ripened into a cause of action.
More significantly, however, the trial justice found that plaintiffs failed on the
first prong—a clear and unambiguous promise—because of the phrase “after your
- 12 -
death[,]” which was handwritten on the statement by Linda. The first paragraph of
the statement reads as follows:
“I, Gilbert Roy am acknowledging that you, Linda Roy,
are entitled to 50% of the proceeds, at the time of a sale
and minus all expenses that I have incurred for the
property located at 44 Ashburne St., Pawtucket, 02861.”
The plaintiffs submitted two versions of this statement into evidence, one containing
the handwritten “after your death” language modifying the first paragraph and one
without such a change.
We agree with the trial justice that this modification shows an “expense
adjustment,” as the language would affect the amount owed to defendant by
plaintiffs, depending on whose death “your” refers to. The writing does not make
clear who “your” is meant to identify, nor is it clear whether such a change was
agreed to, because the version without the “after your death” language was already
signed by defendant. This modification creates an ambiguity and, as such, plaintiffs’
promissory estoppel claim fails.
Thus, we find no error with the trial justice’s finding that plaintiffs failed to
establish a valid promissory estoppel claim.
- 13 -
C
Unjust Enrichment
The plaintiffs’ final assertion is that the trial justice erred in her analysis of
plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim.2
It is well settled by this Court that “to recover for unjust enrichment, a
claimant must prove: (1) that he or she conferred a benefit upon the party from whom
relief is sought; (2) that the recipient appreciated the benefit; and (3) that the
recipient accepted the benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequitable
for the recipient to retain the benefit without paying the value thereof.” South County
Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 210-11 (R.I. 2015) (brackets omitted)
(quoting Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. BankNewport, 105 A.3d 85, 90 (R.I.
2014)).
The trial justice found that the plaintiffs did not confer a benefit upon the
defendant and, additionally, that the second and third prongs of the analysis were not
met. We agree and can dispense with this argument easily because the plaintiffs
2
The plaintiffs, in making their argument in support of their claim of unjust
enrichment, additionally assert that the trial justice erred in limiting plaintiffs’
examination of Stachurski regarding the appreciation in value of the property created
by the addition; however, they present no argument beyond merely stating that this
action was in error. As a result, plaintiffs have waived this issue for our review by
“simply stating this issue for appellate review, without a meaningful discussion
thereof or legal briefing of the issues.” State v. Andrade, 209 A.3d 1185, 1197 (R.I.
2019) (brackets and deletion omitted) (quoting State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 58 (R.I.
2014)).
- 14 -
presented no evidence to suggest that they conferred any kind of benefit upon the
defendant. The plaintiffs’ contention that Linda’s financial contributions to the
construction of an addition onto her parents’ home constituted a benefit to the
defendant is simply too attenuated to warrant the equitable remedy of unjust
enrichment. Accordingly, we find that the trial justice did not err in her analysis of
the plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The record shall be returned to the Superior Court.
Justice Goldberg, Justice Lynch Prata, and Justice Long did not participate.
Justice Flaherty participated in the decision but retired prior to its publication.
- 15 -
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Tammi Sousa et al. v. Gilbert Roy, Jr., individually
Title of Case and as Trustee of The Gilbert F. Roy, Jr. Residence
Trust −− 2005.
No. 2019-140-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 13-5564)
Date Opinion Filed January 19, 2021
Justices Suttell, C.J., Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter
For Plaintiffs:
Robert J. Ameen, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:
Christopher M. Lefebvre, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)