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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-15039
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D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00955-JHE
JOHN DIXON WALKER, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_______________________
(February 11, 2021)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
This appeal requires us to decide whether an administrative law judge failed
to give proper weight to the opinions of two medical professionals. John Dixon
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Walker Jr. applied to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration for
disability insurance benefits. A physician and a vocational rehabilitation specialist
both concluded that he was disabled. But an administrative law judge assigned
little weight to their opinions and denied Walker’s application. The district court
affirmed, and so do we. The Commissioner delegates the determination of
disability at the hearing level to an administrative law judge with review by the
Appeals Council. And here, substantial evidence supports the administrative law
judge’s decision that Walker is not disabled.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2011, while at work unloading an air-conditioning unit from a truck,
John Walker injured his back. A few months later, he went to an orthopedic clinic
for treatment for ongoing pain in his back and his left leg. Tests revealed a mild
defect in one of his lumbar vertebrae and a pinched nerve.
A physical therapist performed a functional-capacity evaluation and
determined that Walker had a lumbar spine impairment of five percent. In the
therapist’s opinion, Walker could work an eight-hour day with medium physical
demands, but he would have difficulty in a job that required frequent or constant
standing.
After discussing the possibility of surgery, the physician at the orthopedic
clinic told Walker that he could resume light work and that he should return to the
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clinic as needed. But the physician cautioned Walker that he eventually might have
to leave his current job because of his inability to lift or carry heavy objects.
In March 2012, Walker visited a primary-care physician, Pat Herrera, who
prescribed medication for his pain. Walker continued to visit Herrera through May
2013 for check-ups and refills on his pain medications. Herrera’s examinations of
Walker showed no significant abnormalities.
After Walker filed a claim for workmen’s compensation with his employer
and an application for disability insurance benefits with the Social Security
Administration, Walker’s lawyer asked Herrera in October 2012 to complete two
forms for these claims. The first form consisted of a series of “Yes” or “No”
questions. One of these questions asked, “[H]as John Walker suffered a
permanent/partial impairment to his low back . . . that causes him to have constant
severe pain, which is made worse by any activities he tries to engage in?” Herrera
answered, “Yes.” The next question asked, “[W]ill John Walker be permanently
and totally disabled from any gainful employment . . . ?” Again, Herrera answered,
“Yes.” The second form was titled “Clinical Assessment of Pain,” and it asked a
series of multiple-choice questions about the severity of Walker’s pain and the
prospects for long-term recovery and treatment. Herrera selected the answers
stating that “[p]ain is present to such an extent as to be distracting to adequate
performance of daily activities or work,” and that physical activity such as
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walking, standing, bending, or stooping “[g]reatly increased pain . . . to such a
degree as to cause distraction from task or total abandonment of task.” On the
subject of pain medication, Herrera selected the answer stating that Walker’s
medication would cause “[s]ignificant side effects” that “may limit the
effectiveness of work duties or the performance of everyday tasks.” He also
answered that “[p]ain and/or drug side effects can be expected to be severe and to
limit effectiveness due to distraction, inattention, drowsiness, etc.” As for Walker’s
prospects for long-term recovery, Herrera selected the answer stating that
“[a]lthough pain may be less intense in the future, it will remain a significant
element in this person’s life.” And he answered that treatments such as bio-
feedback, nerve stimulation, and injections “have had no appreciable effect or have
only briefly altered the level of pain this patient experiences.”
In March 2013, Walker visited William Crunk, Ph.D., a vocational
rehabilitation specialist. He later deposed Crunk for his workmen’s compensation
claim. Crunk said that Walker “would not be able to maintain an [eight]-hour day,
he would not be able to be [at work] on a routine and regular basis, [and]
persistence and pace would be a problem.” In Crunk’s opinion, Walker was “just
not capable of working. So he would have a 100 percent loss of earning capacity.”
An administrative law judge denied Walker’s disability claim, and the
Appeals Council denied Walker’s request for review. After Walker filed a
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complaint in the district court, the Commissioner moved to remand so that an
administrative law judge could “fully consider and address the medical opinions
and evidence” and “reassess [Walker’s] residual functional capacity.” The district
court granted the motion and remanded the claim to the Commissioner for further
proceedings. Following supplemental hearings, an administrative law judge again
denied Walker’s claim.
Consistent with the five-step evaluation process in the governing
regulations, the administrative law judge found, first, that Walker was last insured
on December 31, 2016, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged onset of his disability on May 17, 2011. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, he found that Walker had two severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease and carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c).
Third, he found that Walker’s impairments did not meet or equal the severity of
one of the impairments necessary to trigger an automatic disability finding. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). Fourth, he determined that Walker had the residual
functional capacity to perform sedentary, unskilled work with limitations. Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1567(a). Finally, he found that, based on Walker’s
“age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that [Walker] could
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have performed.” See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). So he concluded that Walker was
not disabled.
In his explanation about Walker’s residual functional capacity at step four,
the administrative law judge said that he assigned little weight to Crunk’s opinion
that Walker would be unable to work an eight-hour day and would have a 100
percent loss of earning capacity. “[T]he decision regarding disability,” the
administrative law judge said, “is reserved to the Commissioner based on all the
evidence.” See id. § 404.1527(d). And Crunk’s opinion was “not consistent with
the medical evidence,” including a lack of any significant abnormalities during
Walker’s medical examinations and the opinion of Walker’s first treating physician
that Walker could perform light work.
The administrative law judge also assigned little weight to Herrera’s
responses on the medical questionnaire and form that Walker was “permanently
and totally disabled from any gainful employment” and that his pain and
medication side effects would significantly limit his ability to work. The
administrative law judge reiterated that “[t]he decision regarding disability is
reserved to the Commissioner based on all the evidence.” And he explained that
Herrera’s responses in the forms were “not consistent with the evidence,”
including Herrera’s own medical examinations that showed no significant
abnormalities.
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After the Appeals Council denied Walker’s request to review the
administrative law judge’s decision, Walker filed a complaint against the
Commissioner in the district court, which affirmed the Commissioner’s denial. The
district court concluded that the administrative law judge had good cause to assign
little weight to the opinions of Crunk and Herrera. It explained that their opinions
conflicted with the other evidence, including the opinion of Walker’s first
physician that Walker could perform light work. And it explained that Crunk’s
opinion was not entitled to any particular weight because he was not a treating
physician.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
When an administrative law judge denies an application for disability
insurance benefits and the Appeals Council denies review, we review the
administrative law judge’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner.
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). Our review of the
Commissioner’s decision is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the
decision and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Winschel v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We
review de novo both the Commissioner’s legal conclusions, Moore v. Barnhart,
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405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005), and the district court’s decision about
whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, Wilson
v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
Walker argues that the administrative law judge erred by failing to give
proper weight to the opinions of Crunk and Herrera. He takes issue with the
administrative law judge’s statements that the disability decision is “reserved for
the Commissioner.” But Walker’s argument misunderstands the administrative law
judge’s decision and the regulations governing disability determinations.
The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration has, at the hearing
level, delegated to an administrative law judge the responsibility of determining a
claimant’s residual functional capacity and whether the claimant is disabled. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(l) (authorizing the
Commissioner to delegate his powers to any member, officer, or employee of the
Social Security Administration). When determining a claimant’s residual
functional capacity, an administrative law judge must consider all medical opinions
in the record together with other pertinent evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). In
deciding how much weight to give a medical opinion, the administrative law judge
considers, among other things, the examining relationship, the treatment
relationship, the extent to which the opinion is supported by medical evidence and
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explanations, and whether the opinion is consistent with the whole record. Id.
§ 404.1527(c).
Absent “good cause” to the contrary, the administrative law judge must give
substantial weight to the opinion, diagnosis, and medical evidence of a treating
physician. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Good cause may exist when the treating
physician’s opinion is not supported by evidence, evidence supports a contrary
finding, or the treating physician’s opinion is conclusory or inconsistent with the
physician’s own records. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).
An administrative law judge is not required to agree with the statement of a
medical source that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(1). Whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability is
an administrative finding, not a medical opinion. That administrative finding is
“reserved to the Commissioner.” Id. § 404.1527(d). And because the
Commissioner has delegated his authority to make the finding at the hearing level
to an administrative law judge, the finding is effectively reserved to the
administrative law judge. See id. § 404.1546(c). A medical source’s opinion that a
claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not dispositive of a disability claim
because the determination is reserved to administrative law judge acting on behalf
of the Commissioner. Id. § 404.1527(d)(1).
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The administrative law judge applied the correct legal standard when he
assigned little weight to Crunk’s and Herrera’s opinions. He accurately quoted the
Social Security regulation that the decision regarding Walker’s disability was
“reserved to the Commissioner.” Id. § 404.1527(d). To be sure, that language was
imprecise insofar as the Commissioner delegated his responsibility at the hearing
level to the administrative law judge who acted on behalf of the Commissioner.
But the administrative law judge correctly understood that Crunk’s and Herrera’s
statements that Walker was disabled were not dispositive. He then evaluated their
opinions and determined that good cause existed to assign them little weight.
Substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s decision. Crunk
is a vocational rehabilitation specialist, not a treating physician, so his opinion is
not entitled to substantial or considerable weight. See Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. And
even if Crunk were a physician, his opinion that Walker was not capable of
working conflicted with other evidence, including several examinations that
showed no significant abnormalities and the opinions of other medical experts that
Walker could perform light work. As for Herrera, his opinion that Walker would
be “permanently and totally disabled” conflicted with his own examinations of
Walker, which showed no significant abnormalities. And it conflicted with other
medical evidence, including Walker’s functional-capacity evaluation.
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Walker urges us to follow Bjornson v. Astrue, where the Seventh Circuit
characterized as “imprecise” a remark by an administrative law judge that a
disability determination is reserved to the Commissioner. 671 F.3d 640, 647–48
(7th Cir. 2012). The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that, under the governing
regulations, “a statement by a medical source that [a claimant is] disabled or
unable to work does not mean that [the Commissioner] will determine that [the
claimant is] disabled.” Id. at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, it
explained, the regulations do not mean “that such a statement is improper and
therefore to be ignored.” Id. An administrative law judge cannot use a medical
source’s statement that a claimant is disabled as an excuse to ignore the medical
source’s opinion about the claimant’s alleged disability.
Bjornson does not help Walker’s argument. The administrative law judge
did not ignore Crunk’s and Herrera’s opinions. He instead considered them and
assigned them little weight after concluding that they conflicted with other
evidence in the record. The concern at issue in Bjornson is not present here.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the denial of Walker’s disability claim.
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