NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-2624
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RODERICK JOHNSON,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI;
JOHN/JANE DOES (1-52)
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-01924)
District Judge: Matthew W. Brann
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 23, 2020
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 16, 2021)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (the “DOC”) and its officials
(collectively with the DOC, “Defendants”) kept Roderick Johnson in solitary
confinement for almost twenty years, even after his conviction and sentence were vacated
and he was granted a new trial. Johnson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of procedural and substantive due process. The
District Court dismissed his complaint. Under our precedents in two analogous cases
against the DOC—Porter v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 974 F.3d 431 (3d
Cir. 2020), and Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 848 F.3d
549 (3d Cir. 2017)—we vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Johnson’s procedural due
process claim and remand for further proceedings. However, we affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of the remaining claims.
I. Background
In 1997, Johnson was convicted and sentenced to death on two counts of first-
degree murder. Solitary confinement followed in February 1998 while Johnson was on
death row. His complaint describes the severe conditions he endured during this
confinement. For 22 to 24 hours a day, he was confined to his cell, where he ate, slept,
and used the toilet. To leave his cell, Johnson had to submit to a strip search and
shackling, after which he was allowed brief “recreation” time in an enclosed space akin
to a dog kennel. Although Johnson handled some of his post-conviction proceedings pro
se, his sole opportunity to conduct legal research was in a law library inside a three-foot
2
by four-foot cage. He could shower only three times a week and was denied most of the
benefits offered to other inmates; for example, he was not allowed to participate in the
educational offerings, physical activity, religious studies, or music programs available to
other prisoners. Johnson asserts that, every three months, prison officials automatically
renewed his placement in solitary confinement without conducting any meaningful,
individualized assessment of his case. Unsurprisingly, Johnson reports that this
continual, profound isolation caused “irreversible damage” to his mental health, including
“severe anxiety, depression, panic attacks, paranoia, bipolar mood shifts, [and] suicidal
and violent impulses.” App. 37–38.
Johnson alleges his solitary confinement continued even as some of the evidence
supporting his conviction began to unravel. Several years after he was convicted,
Johnson learned the Commonwealth had concealed documents that might have cast doubt
on the credibility of the witness who provided the “crucial link” between Johnson and the
murder weapon. App. 85. After discovering this critical information, Johnson filed an
amended petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), arguing
that the Commonwealth had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing
to disclose material exculpatory evidence.
In 2015, the PCRA court granted Johnson’s petition, vacated his conviction and
sentence, and called for a new trial. The Commonwealth appealed, which, following
local rules, automatically stayed the PCRA court’s order while the appeal was pending.
Pa. R. App. P. 1736(b). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the PCRA court in
December 2017, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Johnson was not
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released from solitary confinement until January 2018, after spending almost two decades
in near-total isolation.
Johnson soon thereafter filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1
alleging that his years of isolation without penological justification violated the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.2 As relief, he sought damages, a declaratory judgment that
Defendants had violated his rights, and “lifetime therapy.”3 App. 31. In making his
Fourteenth Amendment claim, Johnson relied heavily on our precedent in Williams—
another case brought against the DOC—where we held that prisoners on death row who
have been granted resentencing hearings have a liberty interest in avoiding indefinite
detention in solitary confinement. 848 F.3d at 558–70.
In May 2019, the District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding
Williams inapplicable because Johnson, unlike the inmate in that case, had an “active
capital sentence” even after the PCRA court vacated his conviction and sentence, given
that the PCRA court’s order was stayed when the Commonwealth filed an appeal. App.
14. The District Court also ruled that Johnson’s conditions of confinement were not so
bad as to be deemed cruel and unusual punishment per our precedent in Peterkin v. Jeffes,
855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988). And even if Johnson had stated a claim for an Eighth or
1
Johnson’s initial complaint was filed pro se; however, he is represented by counsel on
appeal.
2
Johnson also brought an equal protection claim, which he does not press on appeal.
3
A letter Johnson submitted in March 2020 under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
28(j) references an “injunctive claim,” but his complaint and opening appellate brief do
not reflect such a claim. ECF 81 at 1.
4
Fourteenth Amendment violation, the District Court held Defendants would be entitled to
qualified immunity. Johnson timely appealed.
Meanwhile, in November 2019, the DOC reached a settlement with death-
sentenced prisoners in a related case, Reid v. Wetzel, 1:18-cv-00176 (M.D. Pa.). Under
the settlement, these prisoners in the Capital Case Unit (“CCU”) are no longer subject to
solitary confinement.4
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction over Johnson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over Johnson’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“Our review of an order granting a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is
plenary.” Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2019). “We accept
all factual allegations as true and determine whether[,] under any reasonable reading of
the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff [(1)] must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and [(2)] must show that
the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
4
Insofar as Johnson seeks a declaration concerning his death row confinement, such a
request is moot because Defendants’ conduct is not capable of repetition yet evading
review, as Johnson is no longer housed in solitary confinement in the CCU and
Defendants have moved to withdraw their request for the death penalty at his retrial. We
take no position on whether Johnson’s claim for declaratory relief may be construed more
broadly, and the District Court may consider that issue on remand.
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III. Discussion
A. Procedural Due Process Claim
Johnson argues that his allegations stated a viable procedural due process claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We agree.
To establish a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in a challenge to
the conditions of confinement, “the right alleged must confer ‘freedom from restraint
which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Williams, 848 F.3d at 559 (quoting Griffin v. Vaughn,
112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997)) (omission and emphasis in original). In Williams, we
held that “inmates on death row whose death sentences have been vacated have a due
process right to avoid continued placement in solitary confinement . . . [] absent . . .
meaningful protections.” Id. at 576. We described “the devastating effects of extreme
isolation and sensory deprivation,” both psychological and physical, which risk
“disintegrati[ng]” “an individual’s very identity.” Id. at 566, 568. Our conclusion was
that these hardships were both atypical and significant. In this context, the state must
conduct individualized determinations to justify that extreme level of deprivation. Id. at
574. While the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by qualified immunity, we emphasized that
our holding “provides ‘fair and clear warning’ that, despite our ruling against Plaintiffs,
qualified immunity will not bar such claims in the future.” Id. at 574 (quoting United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).
In Porter—yet another case against the DOC—we applied Williams to a prisoner
who had been held in solitary confinement for 33 years without penological justification
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or individualized review, even after his sentence had been vacated. 974 F.3d at 437–40.
We rejected arguments virtually identical to those raised by the Defendants in this case.5
The defendants in Porter argued that Williams should not apply because the
Commonwealth had appealed the order vacating Porter’s sentence, which automatically
stayed that order pending resolution of the appeal. We declined to distinguish Williams
on this basis, holding that Porter had a liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement
because, like the Williams plaintiffs, he was initially sentenced to death but was later
granted a new sentencing hearing, meaning he no longer had an active death sentence.
Porter, 974 F.3d at 439. The Commonwealth’s appeal made no difference. Id.
The argument for a procedural due process right is even stronger for Johnson,
given that he alleges he was held in solitary confinement after both his death sentence
and his underlying conviction were vacated. And although Johnson claims he was in
solitary confinement for 13 fewer years than Porter, spending 20 years in confinement
without hope for relief is equally violative of procedural due process requirements.
Defendants attempt to assert the defense of qualified immunity, but we also
rejected that argument in Porter, holding that the prisoner’s procedural due process rights
had been clearly established since 2017 when we decided Williams. Id. at 449. The same
conclusion applies here. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
5
Defendants concede that Porter controls the outcome of Johnson’s procedural due
process claim because “the issues and factual assertions [between the two cases] are too
similar to be meaningfully distinguished.” ECF No. 89 at 2.
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on Johnson’s procedural due process claim, and we vacate the District Court’s dismissal
of that claim.
B. Eighth Amendment Claim
Johnson argues that his decades in solitary confinement were so cruel and unusual
as to violate the Eighth Amendment.6 We agree Johnson stated a viable claim, though
we ultimately affirm its dismissal because Defendants have a valid qualified immunity
defense.
In evaluating Eighth Amendment claims, we apply a two-prong test: (1) the
deprivation must be “objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official’s act or omission
must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”; and (2)
the prison official must have been “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to inmate health or
safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Johnson’s complaint states a claim under both prongs.
We held Porter had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on
the first prong because it is well established that prolonged solitary confinement poses
substantial risks of serious psychological and physical harm. Porter, 974 F.3d at 441–42.
6
Johnson also argues that Defendants’ actions violated his right to substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. “Under the more-specific-provision rule, ‘if a
constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the . . .
Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that
specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.’” Porter, 974 F.3d at
447 (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 272 n.7 (1997)). Johnson’s “substantive due process
claim challenges the same conduct as his Eighth Amendment claim, namely, his
prolonged solitary confinement.” Id. at 448. Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment
provides the appropriate vehicle for considering Johnson’s claim.
8
We described the anxiety, depression, paranoia, panic attacks, and suicidal ideation that
solitary confinement can cause—which Johnson alleges he also suffered. Id. at 442. The
defendants in Porter argued, as Defendants do here, that an Eighth Amendment claim
was barred under our precedent in Peterkin, where we held that a class of prisoners
bringing a facial challenge to death row conditions “ha[d] not established that the totality
of the conditions of their confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” 855
F.2d at 1022. We rejected that contention, concluding that Peterkin did not control
because (1) Porter (like Johnson, and unlike the Peterkin plaintiffs) was making an as-
applied challenge, not a facial challenge; (2) Porter (again, like Johnson) had spent
substantially more time in solitary confinement than the Peterkin plaintiffs, who had
spent at most four years in such confinement; and (3) the research and caselaw have
advanced since Peterkin was decided, making the devastating effects of prolonged
solitary confinement abundantly clear. Porter, 974 F.3d at 443–44. The same
conclusions apply here. The objective evidence is indisputable: “Years on end of near-
total isolation,” like those which Johnson alleges he endured, “exact a terrible price.”
Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 289 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
We further held that a reasonable jury could find Porter satisfied the second prong
of the Eighth Amendment test because “the substantial risks of prolonged solitary
confinement are ‘obvious,’ ‘longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, [and] expressly
noted by prison officials in the past.’” Porter, 974 F.3d at 445 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 842) (alteration in original). We observed that DOC officials had “publicly
9
acknowledged these harms.” Id. at 446. This reasoning applies with equal force here.
Accordingly, Johnson’s complaint states an Eighth Amendment claim.
However, we are also bound by our holding in Porter that the Eighth Amendment
right in this context was not clearly established at the time of Porter’s (and Johnson’s)
solitary confinement, so the Defendants can assert a qualified immunity defense. Id. at
450–51. Johnson attempts to distinguish Porter by emphasizing that his case was
dismissed at the pleading stage, rather than on summary judgment, and argues that a more
developed record would help him prove the right was clearly established. This
procedural distinction is unavailing, as the facts and law are too similar to Porter.
Additional discovery could not overcome the lack of binding, precedential opinions
clearly establishing the Eighth Amendment right at issue at the time of Johnson’s solitary
confinement. Accordingly, we must affirm the dismissal of Johnson’s Eighth
Amendment claim. We emphasize, however, as we did in Porter, that going forward it is
well established in our Circuit that solitary confinement of the sort alleged by Johnson
and Porter satisfies the second prong of the Eighth Amendment test and supports an
Eighth Amendment claim.
*****
For these reasons, we vacate in part and affirm in part. We vacate the District
Court’s dismissal of Johnson’s procedural due process claim. We affirm the Court’s
dismissal of Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim, though only on the ground that
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm the dismissal of Johnson’s
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substantive due process claim. And we remand to the District Court for further
proceedings.
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