[Cite as Weinsziehr v. Weinsziehr, 2021-Ohio-1568.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
HOCKING COUNTY
THOMAS D. WEINSZIEHR, :
: Case No. 20CA1
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
:
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
ALICIA D. WEINSZIEHR, :
: RELEASED: 04/27/2021
Defendant-Appellee. :
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Thomas D. Weinsziehr, Junction City, Ohio, Appellant, pro se.
Alicia D. Weinsziehr, Lancaster, Ohio, Appellee, pro se.
_____________________________________________________________
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} Thomas Weinsziehr (“Father”) appeals the judgment entry of the
Hocking County Court of Common Pleas ordering him to pay appellee Alicia
Weinsziehr’s (“Mother”) attorney fees after finding Father in contempt of the
agreed divorce decree. In his sole assignment of error, Father argues that the
trial court’s determination of the reasonableness of Mother’s attorney’s hourly
rate and the time spent on Mother’s contempt motion is not factually supported
by the record of the case.
{¶2} We disagree and affirm the trial court’s decision. The post-decree
litigation at issue here focused on Father’s failure to comply with the divorce
decree by denying Mother parenting time with the minor children for 328 days. In
addition, Father acquiesced that the hourly rate of $250 is reasonable and also
that the fees billed by his counsel were reasonable. Mother’s counsel’s hourly
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 2
rate was also $250 and the number of hours billed were comparable to those
charged by Father’s counsel. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by awarding Mother her attorney fees in the amount of $8,880.1
BACKGROUND
{¶3} The parties have been in continuous litigation since Father filed the
complaint for divorce back in February 2016. For purposes of this appeal, we will
limit our discussion to the contempt motions filed that relate to the trial court’s
decision ordering Father to pay Mother’s attorney fees.
{¶4} On March 15, 2017, Father and Mother came before the trial court for
a final uncontested divorce hearing. On said date, the parties agreed and the
court ordered that Father would be designated the residential parent and legal
custodian of the minor children. Mother would be designated the non-residential
parent with parenting time pursuant to the “Standard Parenting Time Order” with
a few exceptions. The parties abided by the parenting schedule until June 26,
2017, when Father refused to meet Mother to exchange the children for her one-
week summer parenting time.
{¶5} On July 20, 2017, Mother filed a motion for contempt because Father
“is not allowing [Mother] to see minor children per court orders.” Simultaneously,
Mother filed a motion to modify her visitation rights because Father “is not
allowing [Mother] to see minor children. Children are being completely isolated.
I would like visitation changed to: 50/50 custody or [Mother] to be Residential
1
The magistrate awarded Mother $9,630 in attorney fees but the trial court modified the amount to $8,880 after sustaining
in part Father’s objection.
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 3
parent.”2
{¶6} The next day, through counsel, Mother filed a memorandum in
support of her request to modify visitation. In her memorandum, Mother noted
Father’s continued failure to abide by the court’s order with regard to her
parenting time and that she is very concerned Father is “psychologically turning
the children against her.” On October 12, 2017, Father also filed a motion for
contempt for Mother’s failure to pay child support and for failing to sell or
refinance the marital home. Within his motion, Father also requested that
Mother’s parenting time be terminated or changed to supervised visitation.
{¶7} A one-day hearing was held on August 29, 2018, addressing
Mother’s motions and Father’s motion for contempt. At the hearing, both parties
testified on their own behalf. The Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) testified during
Mother’s case-in-chief, and during his case-in-chief, Father called his girlfriend
and parents as witnesses. The magistrate took the matter under advisement and
on November 18, 2018, issued a 27-page decision finding Father in contempt
and ordering him to pay Mother’s attorney fees:
“5. Father admits that he disobeyed the parenting time
orders of this Court. Father prevented the children from seeing
Mother for almost a year.
“* * *
“7. Thus, Father is in contempt for violating the parenting
time provisions of the parties’ Agreed Decree of Divorce.
“* * *
“10. Mother is entitled to her attorney fees in prosecuting the
contempt charge. The Court finds and concludes that Mother
2
Within an hour of Mother filing her two motions, the magistrate issued the agreed judgment entry/decree of divorce
based on the parties’ March 15 handwritten divorce agreement.
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 4
entitled to her attorney fees of $9,630.00. Thus, Father is ordered
to pay Mother $9,630.00 at the rate of $500 per month payable on
the first of each month starting on January 1, 2019, on until fully
paid.”
{¶8} In reaching this conclusion, the magistrate outlined the history of the
case, including Mother’s previous motion in contempt filed back in 2016 because
Father failed to comply with the court’s summer parenting time provisions. In
addition, the magistrate noted the previous GAL’s concern that Father “will at
some point in the future attempt to unilaterally prohibit [Mother] to have contact
with the children.” The magistrate also referenced the current GAL’s report:
“It appears to this GAL that Father’s decision to deny all
contact with Mother is not supported by the slapping incident that
occurred in June of 2017, even when viewed in light of the prior
violent conduct of Mother. The harm Father has done by alienating
the boys from Mother far exceeds the harm that Mother inflicted by
slapping their son. It does not appear to this GAL that Father is
motivated to protect the boys. Father wants to be rid of Mother.
“* * *
“In light of observations made in this report, the GAL makes
the following recommendations. It is essential in this matter that the
Court insist on compliance with its Orders. Money seems to be a
motivating factor for Parents. Court costs, attorney fees, GAL fees,
counseling fees, child support, and other costs should be allocated
as deemed appropriate by the Court with an eye toward securing
future compliance of the Parents. This GAL recommends that this
Court heavily sanction any party found in contempt and clearly
convey to Parents how future contempts will be treated by the
Court.” (Emphasis deleted.)
{¶9} Father subsequently filed two motions objecting to the magistrate’s
award of attorney fees to Mother. In Father’s second objection, he argued that
the amount of attorney fees awarded to Mother was not supported by any factual
evidence to demonstrate the reasonableness of the hourly rate or the time spent
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 5
addressing Mother’s motion for contempt. Specifically, Father highlighted
Mother’s attorney’s final bill in which “only one reference to contempt in
Counsel’s time records and it is combined with ‘hearing prep’ (10/18/17 entry).
There is little proof necessary when the Plaintiff admits to denying visitation.”
{¶10} The trial court overruled Father’s objections as to the award of
attorney fees to Mother by applying R.C. 3109.051(K), R.C. 3105.73 and caselaw
from this court. The court also made critical factual findings based on the record
of the case:
“At the hearing on the contempt and parenting time motions,
the Magistrate, without objection by either counsel, allowed counsel
for both parties to submit updated attorney fee statements by
September 21, 201[8]. On September 21, 201[8], Plaintiff’s counsel
submitted an itemized list of attorney fees totaling $9,266.73 at a
rate of $250 per hour. Also on September 21, 201[8], Defendant’s
counsel submitted an itemized final billing statement of attorney
fees totaling $9,630.00 at a rate of $250 per hour. Because both
parties submitted bills with a $250 hour billing rate, and because
that rate is becoming common in our area, this Court finds that
$250 per hour is a reasonable rate in this case.
“Although Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s attorney’s bill
did not parse out exactly which item on that bill was for which
motion, the same is true of Plaintiff’s attorney’s bill. Despite a lack
of evidence to parse out the exact nature of each item of
Defendant’s attorney fees, the record as a whole reveals that the
bulk of the recent litigation in this case was due to Plaintiff’s refusal
to obey the court’s parenting time order, by keeping the children
away from their mother for nearly a year. Although Plaintiff did
admit to that contempt, he presented hours of evidence attempting
to prove he had a good faith reason to disobey the court order.
“* * *
“In the instant case, Plaintiff’s contempt was not intermittent;
Plaintiff denied Defendant parenting time with her children for
nearly a year. Although Plaintiff admitted he disobeyed the
parenting time court order, he vigorously defended his actions by
presenting witnesses and exhibits in an effort to show he was
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 6
justified in disobeying that court order. Plaintiff’s defense of his
disobedience expanded the issues before the court, and expanded
the work that Defendant’s counsel had to do to counter that
defense. * * * The bulk of the case concerned Plaintiff’s egregious
contempt; Defendant’s two relatively minor contempts occupied a
small portion of the litigation in this case. Although the parties also
filed motions to modify Defendant’s parenting time, the evidence
presented for and against those motions was nearly the same
evidence presented for and against Plaintiff’s defense to the
contempt motion against him.”
{¶11} The trial court, however, sustained Father’s objection with regard to
his entitlement to attorney fees because Mother was found in contempt for being
one month behind in child support. The court awarded Father $750 in attorney
fees (3 hours times the hourly rate of $250) and offset that amount from what he
owes Mother. Logistically, the court also deducted 3 hours from Mother’s
attorney’s time for defending against Father’s motion for contempt and offset an
additional $750 from the total award of attorney fees. Rather than having the
parties pay each other, the court ordered Father to pay Mother $8,130.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO
PAY APELLEE’S ATTORNEY FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF
$9,630.
{¶12} Father disputes the amount of attorney fees awarded to Mother
because they do not solely represent the attorney’s representation on her motion
for contempt. According to Father, Mother’s attorney fees also include
advocating for her request for change of custody and defending against his
motion for contempt. We first note that Mother did not file an appellate brief or
otherwise appear in this appeal. Since Mother did not file a brief, App.R. 18(C)
authorizes us to accept Father’s statement of facts and issues as correct, and
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 7
then reverse a trial court’s judgment as long as Father’s brief reasonably appears
to sustain such action. See Sites v. Sites, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 09CA19, 2010-
Ohio-2478, ¶ 13. In the matter at hand, Father’s brief does not reasonably
appear to support a reversal of the trial court’s contempt sanction to pay Mother’s
attorney fees.
{¶13} Trial courts have the authority to impose financial sanctions,
including reasonable attorney fees, when a parent disobeys court orders and
interferes with the other parent’s parenting time. R.C. 3109.051(K) provides:
If any person is found in contempt of court for failing to
comply with or interfering with any order or decree granting
parenting time rights issued pursuant to this section or section
3109.12 of the Revised Code or companionship or visitation rights
issued pursuant to this section, section 3109.11 or 3109.12 of the
Revised Code, or any other provision of the Revised Code, the
court that makes the finding, in addition to any other penalty or
remedy imposed, shall assess all court costs arising out of the
contempt proceeding against the person and require the person to
pay any reasonable attorney’s fees of any adverse party, as
determined by the court, that arose in relation to the act of
contempt, and may award reasonable compensatory parenting time
or visitation to the person whose right of parenting time or visitation
was affected by the failure or interference if such compensatory
parenting time or visitation is in the best interest of the child.
{¶14} The imposition of sanctions for contempt, including reasonable
attorney fees, is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. In re
Skinner, 4th Dist. Adams No. 93CA547, 1994 WL 93149, *9 (March 23, 1994),
citing Planned Parenthood Assn. of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho, 52 Ohio
St.3d 56, 57, 556 N.E.2d 157 (1990). “An abuse of discretion connotes more
than an error of law or judgment; it implies an unreasonable, arbitrary or
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 8
unconscionable attitude.” Id. at *5, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 217 (1983).
{¶15} We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
finding $250 as a reasonable hourly rate and also finding the time of
approximately 35.52 hours as reasonable. We agree with the court’s conclusion
that although Father admitted to the contempt, he “vigorously defended his
actions by presenting witnesses and exhibits in an effort to show he was justified
in disobeying that court order” and that Mother’s “two relatively minor contempts
occupied a small portion of the litigation in this case.” The filings and hearing
focused on Father’s conduct of denying Mother parenting time for 328 days.
{¶16} We begin our analysis with the hearing held on August 29, 2018.
Mother was the first witness and her direct examination focused on Father’s
denial of her parenting time from June 26, 2017, to Mother’s Day in 2018. During
Mother’s cross-examination, out of the 18 pages of questioning, Father’s counsel
spent less than 2 pages asking Mother questions regarding her failure to sell or
refinance the marital home. More importantly, Father’s counsel did not pose any
questions to Mother about her obligation to make child support payments.
{¶17} The next witness was Father as if on cross-examination. His
testimony also focused on his unilateral decision to deny Mother her parenting
time. Father admitted to disobeying the agreed divorce decree. Father
continued to deny Mother parenting time even after his concern she was abusing
the minor children did not result in criminal charges or an investigation by
children protective services and even after the GAL issued her opinion that
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 9
Mother needed to see the children. Father acknowledged that he did not seek
termination or modification of Mother’s parenting time until almost four months
after he unilaterally decided to disobey the court order.
{¶18} The next witness was the GAL. She testified that to her knowledge,
no police or children protective services investigation was conducted and no
charges were filed against Mother. The GAL also confirmed that there was no
requirement for Mother’s parenting time with the children be supervised. In her
opinion, supervised visitation was unnecessary. The GAL went on to testify that
there is significant harm being done by the alienation that’s taking place between
the minor children and Mother. The GAL asserted that Father is alienating
Mother from the minor children and that the alienation was continuing even as of
the date of the hearing.
{¶19} During the GAL’s cross-examination and re-cross examination,
Father’s counsel did not pose any questions regarding child support payments or
Mother’s obligation to sell or refinance the marital home. Rather, what the GAL
reiterated is the prolonged consequences and harm Father’s conduct has
created:
Not having had any contact with mom for that extended
period of time made what was - - made what was probably
something that could have been taken care of in counseling fairly
easily into something that like a bomb that has to be diffused. So
yes, there were problems with mom for the way she interacted with
the kids, but they were manageable and the separation I think has
made this whole situation extreme as it was mismanaged.
{¶20} Next at the hearing were Father’s witnesses. Father’s girlfriend and
parents solely testified concerning Mother’s past violent tendencies to justify
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 10
Father’s behavior of denying Mother parenting time and disobeying the trial court
orders. None of Father’s witnesses answered any questions regarding Mother’s
obligation to pay child support or the status of the marital home. Moreover, even
during Father’s direct and redirect examination that spanned over 41 pages, only
3 pages were spent on Mother’s obligation to pay child support and 9 pages
discussed the status of the marital home.
{¶21} Moreover, Father testified that he already received his equity from
the marital home and even admitted that Mother was only one month behind her
child support payments. So this did not warrant a lengthy litigation regarding
Father’s motion for contempt. Therefore, the record supports the trial court’s
finding that the litigation focused on Father disobeying the agreed divorce decree
which is the subject of Mother’s motion for contempt.
{¶22} We also hold that the award of $8,880 is based on a reasonable
hourly fee and reasonable hours of representation. At the hearing, Father’s
counsel agreed that a final billing statement should be submitted by both
counsels no later than the end of the day on September 21, 2018. Father’s
counsel submitted his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and
included a request for attorney fees. Attached to the document was counsel’s
billing statement with an hourly rate of $250 and total hours of 37.13. The total
bill was $9,266.73.
{¶23} During his testimony at the hearing, Father testified his attorney’s
hourly rate of $250 is reasonable. In addition, Father stated that the billing
statement generated as of the date of the hearing was for the hours spent in
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 11
defending the contempt motion Mother filed against Father. Father also asserted
that his counsel’s bill included discounts and was reasonable.
{¶24} Mother’s counsel on September 21, 2018, also submitted a final
billing statement that is comparable to Father’s billing statement. Mother’s
counsel’s hourly rate was similarly $250. Moreover, the total hours were 38.52
and the total bill was $9,630, so just shy of $400 more than Father’s total
attorney fees. And as the trial court noted, Father did not file any document
disputing Mother’s attorney’s billing statement.
{¶25} Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
Mother $8,880 in attorney fees with an hourly rate of $250 for 35.52 hours of
representation.
CONCLUSION
{¶26} Having overruled Father’s assignment of error, we affirm the trial
court’s decision requiring Father to pay Mother’s attorney fees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Hocking App. No. 20CA1 12
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed
to appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Hocking County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the
date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Abele, P.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.