RENDERED: MAY 14, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-1270-ME
KENNETH ANDREW ISAACS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LIBBY G. MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-D-01316-005
JENNIFER LYNETTE MCCLURE APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
JONES, JUDGE: Kenneth Andrew Isaacs (Isaacs) appeals from a domestic
violence order (DVO) entered by the Fayette Circuit Court against him on March
2, 2020. After careful review of the entire record and finding no error, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 16, 2019, Jennifer Lynette McClure (McClure) filed a
Petition/Motion for Order of Protection (Petition) with the Fayette Circuit Court
seeking an emergency protective order (EPO) against Isaacs and requesting a
hearing. An interpersonal protective order (IPO) was granted that same date, with
Isaacs ordered to remain five hundred feet away from McClure; to refrain from
disposing of or damaging any property of the parties; to refrain from any acts of
domestic violence or abuse; and to remain five hundred feet away from the
residence known as 832 Lochmere Place, Lexington, Kentucky (Lochmere
Residence).
In her Petition McClure alleged, among other things, that Isaacs:
[c]ontinues to have people drive by my house daily and
film me [and] watch me [and] my kids[.] So many
people that now my neighbors send me the videos of the
cars [and the] times they saw them. [Two] times [Isaacs]
had an EPO in place and violated it, [he] thinks he is
above the law. . . .
He scares my kids [and] me[.] My daughter saw him
watching her through her window and is scared to sleep
in her room alone.
McClure and Isaacs had been involved in what could fairly be
characterized as a complex and volatile relationship. Though the exact nature of
that relationship is subject to some dispute, the parties agreed their relationship was
sufficient to enable McClure to petition for entry of a DVO against Isaacs.1
1
“A petition for an order of protection may be filed by: (a) A victim of domestic violence and
abuse; or (b) An adult on behalf of a victim who is a minor otherwise qualifying for relief under
this subsection.” Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.725(1). “Domestic violence” is defined
as “physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, strangulation, assault, or the
infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse,
strangulation, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried couple.” KRS
403.720(1) (emphasis added). A “member of an unmarried couple” means “each member of an
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The Petition was not the first litigation between the parties.2 Though
the record of other collateral proceedings is not available on appeal, the testimony
at the hearing does establish a rough history. Isaacs originally obtained an EPO
against McClure on or about April 16, 2020.3 Early the following morning, the
Fayette County Sheriff’s office served the EPO on McClure at the Lochmere
Residence and compelled her to leave the premises. The following day, McClure
filed for an EPO against Isaacs.4
At some point between April 17, 2019, and the hearing in the instant
matter, Isaacs sued McClure in a separate civil action in Fayette Circuit Court (the
civil action). The civil action concerns the ownership of and right to possess the
Lochmere Residence. While that case remains pending, it is undisputed that
between McClure’s removal from the Lochmere Residence and the filing of the
unmarried couple which allegedly has a child in common, any children of that couple, or a
member of an unmarried couple who are living together or have formerly lived together.” KRS
403.720(5) (emphasis added). Based on the record, it appears that Isaacs and McClure formerly
resided together for some period of time meaning they meet the definition of an unmarried
couple for the purposes of the DVO statutes.
2
The matter before us bore the case number 18-D-01316-005 and was referred to as “trailer five”
in the trial court. The hearing held on January 7, 2020 and March 2, 2020 also concerned 18-D-
01316-002, “trailer two,” a petition filed by Isaacs against McClure.
3
Case number 18-D-01316-002 (referred to by the trial court as trailer two).
4
Case number 18-D-01316-003 (referred to by the trial court trailer three).
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instant case on October 19, 2019, she and her children did return and live at that
residence while Isaacs lived elsewhere.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Petition on
January 7, 2020 and March 2, 2020. Following testimony from both parties and
several other witnesses, the trial court entered a DVO against Isaacs.5 The order
was to expire on September 2, 2020.
The trial court sorted the evidence presented by and on behalf of
McClure into two broad categories. On the one hand, McClure testified at length
concerning Isaacs’s conduct during the parties’ relationship. McClure downplayed
the romantic nature of their time together and instead characterized Isaacs as
someone who sought to involve himself in and control every aspect of her life. We
need not recount this testimony in detail as the trial court did not rely on any
conduct during the relationship to support granting the DVO. In fact, the trial
court specifically characterized all or nearly all of McClure’s testimony concerning
this time period as unreliable. As set forth in a docket order in support of the
DVO, the trial court did “not find the testimony of [McClure] to be credible
regarding her fear or [Isaacs’s] controlling behavior during the relationship.”
5
The trial court also heard testimony regarding trailer two. Isaacs was also granted a DVO
against McClure at the conclusion of the hearing. Trailer two is not before us on appeal.
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In contrast, the trial court did base its ruling on a second broad
category of evidence, which concerned Isaacs’s behavior after April 17, 2019, the
date the legal disputes between the parties began. As this testimony and other
evidence formed the basis of the trial court’s decision to enter a DVO against
Isaacs, it is necessary to consider its nature in greater detail.
McClure testified that since the parties’ relationship ended and
litigation between them commenced, Isaacs engaged in a pattern of behavior
designed to stalk and intimidate her. She described the situation as such:
He follows [me]. He waits up at the end of my road at
the cul-de-sac, comes and watches me through my
windows, sends people to watch me, sends people to
video me and my kids. I can’t even like go outside. I
have like thousands and thousands and thousands of
videos and text messages from my kids that show it.
McClure also testified that cars drove by her house and filmed her on a regular
basis. According to her testimony, this occurred frequently enough that her
children began taking videos of the cars that drove by and her neighbors began to
use their Ring™ doorbell devices to film passing cars.
McClure did not call any witnesses to testify regarding Isaacs’s
behavior after April 17, 2019, instead relying solely on her own testimony. In
further support of her Petition, McClure testified that Isaacs had been arrested for
violating the IPO in the instant case. She also testified that Isaacs would hide in
her neighborhood, look into her windows, and knock on the door when she had
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people in the house. More specifically, she described an evening when she
returned home from a school auction and was confronted at her front door by
Isaacs thirty minutes later.
McClure also testified that Isaacs entered her property and zip-tied
roses to her fence after litigation commenced. On cross-examination, however,
McClure admitted that she had no first-hand knowledge of how the roses came to
be there. She testified that a friend, “Karen,” told her she had seen Isaacs put them
there.6
Additionally, McClure testified that on one occasion David Higdon,
an attorney for Isaacs, came to the Lochmere Residence and began filming her and
her property. In the conversation that ensued, Higdon stated that he was there at
Isaacs’s request to monitor work being done on the property.
Significantly, Isaacs disputed some but not all of McClure’s
testimony. For example, he denied any knowledge of the placement of the roses
and testified that he did not direct his attorney to take video of McClure at the
house. Despite testifying twice during the hearing, at no time did he address
McClure’s allegations regarding knocking on her door or looking into her
windows. While Isaacs states in his brief that he strongly denied stalking during
6
During the hearing, the trial court commented on the lack of hearsay objections from either
attorney.
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the hearing, having reviewed the cited portion of the record,7 we note that his
testimony at that time concerned another matter entirely.
The trial court found the testimony concerning Isaacs’s activities after
the parties ended their relationship compelling. In its docket order granting the
DVO, the court noted:
However, the Ct. finds that after the filing of trailer 002
and 003 [Isaacs] continued to engage in a pattern of
conduct tracking [McClure], her comings and goings and
activities at the [Lochmere Residence] upon her lawful
return thereto that do [sic] constitute [s]talking [b]ehavior
and placed [McClure] in reasonable fear for her safety.
Further, the trial court noted: “It is clear that until the legal issues surrounding the
house are resolved there is an ongoing risk that this behavior will continue absent
an order in this case.”
On March 11, 2020, Isaacs timely filed a CR8 59.05 “Motion to
Reconsider” the trial court’s entry of the DVO. Isaacs argued that McClure did not
present evidence sufficient to establish the existence of implicit or explicit threats
to her and the evidence presented consisted of hearsay.
After a lengthy delay occasioned by COVID-19 protocols, Isaacs’s
CR 59.05 motion was denied on September 2, 2020, as was McClure’s motion to
7
Video Record of March 2, 2020, 2:05:45-2:10:07.
8
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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extend the duration of the DVO.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court’s decision on a petition for a DVO under an
abuse of discretion standard. “[T]he test is not whether we would have decided it
differently, but whether the court’s findings were clearly erroneous or that it
abused its discretion.” Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008)
(citation omitted). Findings are not clearly erroneous so long as “they are
supported by substantial evidence or, in other words, evidence that when taken
alone or in light of all the evidence has sufficient probative value to support the
trial court’s conclusion.” Rupp v. Rupp, 357 S.W.3d 207, 208 (Ky. App. 2011)
(citation omitted). A trial court’s findings of fact are not to be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, as the trial court is entitled to due regard to assess the credibility
of witnesses. CR 52.01.
III. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, we note that the DVO at issue expired on
September 2, 2020, nearly a month before the notice of appeal was filed. The trial
court declined to extend the DVO at the September 2, 2020, hearing. Generally
speaking, “[a]n appellate court is required to dismiss an appeal when a change in
circumstance renders that court unable to grant meaningful relief to either party.”
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Medical Vision Group, P.S.C. v. Philpot, 261 S.W.3d 485, 491 (Ky. 2008). The
Supreme Court of Kentucky has, however, recognized a “collateral consequences”
exception to this doctrine when an adjudication may impact the parties in the
future. Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Ky. 2014). This Court has
previously held that this exception applies to DVO cases as the entry of a DVO
may have future consequences for the alleged perpetrator. Caudill v. Caudill, 318
S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010).
The instant case is distinguishable from Caudill and Morgan in that,
here, the DVO expired prior to the filing of the notice appeal as opposed to during
the pendency of the appeal. As the rationale behind the collateral consequences
exception remains, we do not believe that distinction is material to this analysis.9
Thus, we are persuaded it is appropriate to decide this appeal on the merits
notwithstanding the fact that the DVO has expired.
Isaacs argues that the trial court’s ruling is inconsistent with its
observations that McClure’s testimony concerning the relationship was unreliable.
Further, he argues that the evidence concerning stalking after the breakup and
9
We also note that the expiration of the DVO prior to the filing of the notice of appeal is due to
the unique circumstances inherent in the COVID-19 pandemic. Isaacs timely filed his CR 59.05
motion but could not have that motion heard for several months due to factors outside the control
of the parties and the trial court.
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during the pendency of litigation was largely hearsay, unreliable, and insufficient
to support the granting of a DVO.
McClure argues that the court did rely on substantial evidence and
therefore did not err. While she recounts evidence which was presented
concerning both conduct during the relationship and thereafter, we note that the
former did not form the basis of the trial court’s analysis and thus we do not
consider it.
A court may issue a DVO if it “finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and may again occur[.]”
KRS10 403.740(1). Domestic violence is defined as:
Physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual
abuse, strangulation, assault, or the infliction of fear of
imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual
abuse, strangulation, or assault between family members
or members of an unmarried couple.
KRS 403.720(1). While there was no evidence that Isaacs physically harmed or
verbally threatened harm to McClure after April 17, 2019, the trial court did rule
that his behavior towards McClure amounted to stalking.
For the purposes of granting a DVO, stalking is defined as conduct
prohibited under KRS 508.140 or KRS 508.150.
A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when he
intentionally:
10
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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(a) Stalks another person; and
(b) Makes an explicit or implicit threat with the intent to
place that person in reasonable fear of:
1. Sexual contact as defined in KRS 510.10;
2. Physical injury; or
3. Death.
KRS 508.150(1). Stalking in the first-degree requires additional elements, but
because a violation of either statute may support a DVO, we analyze this case with
the least restrictive statute in mind.
Finally, Kentucky law defines “stalk” as engaging in an intentional
course of conduct:
1. Directed at a specific person or persons;
2. Which seriously alarms, annoys, intimidates,
or harasses the person or persons; and
3. Which serves no legitimate purpose.
KRS 508.130(1)(a).
A court may issue a DVO following a hearing if it “finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and
may again occur. . . .” KRS 403.740(1). The trial court issued the DVO against
Isaacs as it believed that domestic violence had occurred in the form of stalking
and was likely to continue without the trial court’s intervention. In determining
whether this finding was clearly erroneous, our inquiry is whether it was supported
by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
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Substantial evidence is “[e]vidence that a reasonable mind would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
We have noted repeatedly that trial courts have broad latitude in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses. This general rule is certainly applicable
in domestic cases. As this Court explained in Bailey v. Bailey, 231 S.W.3d 793,
796 (Ky. App. 2007):
A family court operating as finder of fact has extremely
broad discretion with respect to testimony presented, and
may choose to believe or disbelieve any part of it. A
family court is entitled to make its own decisions
regarding the demeanor and truthfulness of witnesses,
and a reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its
judgment for that of the family court, unless its findings
are clearly erroneous.
While we agree with Isaacs that certain portions of McClure’s
testimony were vague and were not supported by corroborating evidence, we are
not persuaded that it logically follows that the trial court was required to discount
her entire testimony. “Clearly, the family court was familiar with the history of the
parties, and was within its authority to weigh the testimony, make credibility
judgments, and conclude that the evidence supported the [issuance] of the DVO.”
Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 388 (Ky. App. 2007). Similar to the family court
in Baird, the trial court here was familiar with the parties’ history over the course
of multiple cases. While the trial court may have doubted the sincerity of
McClure’s testimony regarding the nature of the parties’ relationship prior to their
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split, a review of the trial court’s findings indicates that it believed McClure’s
testimony that following the breakup, Isaacs engaged in a pattern of surveilling
McClure’s movements, prowling around her home, looking into her windows, and
making numerous unwanted visits to her residence even though he was prohibited
from doing so by the IPO. The trial court was entitled to pick and choose which
portions of McClure’s testimony, if any, it found credible.
Additionally, while Isaacs adamantly denied the allegations of
wrongdoing during the relationship and produced text messages between the
parties to bolster his testimony, he did not address many of McClure’s allegations
concerning his conduct following the parties’ breakup, including the fact that he
violated the previously issued IPO and/or EPO.
Although we agree with Isaacs that the assertion he entered the
property to affix roses to McClure’s gate was not supported by competent
evidence, there remains more than sufficient evidence on the record to establish the
elements of stalking. Taking simply the unchallenged testimony of McClure, the
trial court’s finding that Isaacs engaged “in a pattern of conduct tracking
[McClure], her comings and goings and activities at the [Lochmere Residence],” is
not unreasonable. This finding is supported by evidence that Isaacs spent time
watching McClure in her neighborhood, looked into her windows, and approached
the Lochmere Residence to ring the doorbell. Some or perhaps all of this alleged
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behavior occurred while the IPO was in effect, making it more than reasonable that
McClure would be fearful of physical injury. Indeed, McClure testified that Isaacs
was arrested on at least one occasion for violating the IPO.
Similarly, McClure’s testimony establishes a course of conduct as
required by KRS 508.130(1)(a). While Isaacs might have persuasively argued that
sending his attorney to the property served a legitimate purpose and was therefore
outside the meaning of the statute, that appears to be the only evidence of conduct
which would potentially fall under that exception.
Taking the evidence into account, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Isaacs’s behavior established a course of conduct that
met the definition of stalking and that, given his arrest for violating the trial court’s
IPO, it was not unreasonable to assume that absent court intervention the conduct
was likely to continue in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s
domestic violence order.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Louis W. Rom Fred E. Peters
Lexington, Kentucky Rhey Mills
Lexington, Kentucky
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