Opinion issued July 8, 2021
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-19-00926-CV
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ROBERT J. SALAZAR AND ELIA SALAZAR, Appellants
V.
HP TEXAS I LLC D/B/A HP TEXAS LLC, HPA TEXAS SUB 2016-1 LLC,
SER TEXAS LLC, AND PATHLIGHT PROPERTY MANAGEMENT CO.,
Appellees
On Appeal from the 127th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2019-17589
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants Robert J. Salazar and Elia Salazar appeal the district court’s denial
of their renewed application for a temporary injunction against appellees HP Texas
I LLC d/b/a HP Texas LLC (“HP Texas”), HPA Texas Sub 2016-1 LLC (“HPA”),
Ser Texas LLC, and Pathlight Property Management Co. (“Pathlight”). In a prior
forcible detainer proceeding in county court, HPA obtained a judgment against the
Salazars. The Salazars then sued appellees in district court and filed an application
for a temporary injunction effectively seeking to stay execution of the county court
judgment. The district court denied the Salazars’ application, and the Salazars
appealed. The Salazars filed an emergency motion in this Court requesting a similar
temporary injunction, which the Court denied.
On appeal, the Salazars argue that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying their renewed application for temporary injunction and that this Court erred
in denying their emergency motion. We affirm the district court’s order, and we
dismiss for want of jurisdiction the Salazars’ challenge to this Court’s denial of their
emergency motion.
Background
The Salazars signed a lease with HP Texas in 2015 to rent a house in Spring,
Texas (“the rental property”). The lease expressly expired in April 2018, and it
included a right to purchase the rental property effective during the term of the lease.1
1
The Salazars argue that the 2015 lease was for a five-year term, which they support
with a February 2016 email from a Pathlight employee to Robert stating, “To clarify,
your lease actually automatically renews for 4 terms, covering 5 years.”
2
On March 9, 2018, the Salazars signed a new lease for the rental property with HPA
and Pathlight, HPA’s agent. The Salazars also signed a termination agreement,
stating that the 2015 lease “is scheduled to and shall expire at 11:59 p.m. on March
26, 2018[,] . . . and [the Salazars have] no further rights to extend or renew the [2015
lease] beyond [its] Expiration Date.”
Sometime in late 2018 or early 2019, HPA filed suit for forcible detainer
against the Salazars in the County Court at Law No. 1 of Harris County alleging that
the Salazars had not paid rent since September 2018. After a trial, the county court
entered judgment against the Salazars. The judgment recited that Robert—but not
Elia—appeared for trial and included findings that citation and notice of the trial was
properly served on the Salazars, that they had not paid rent from September 2018 to
March 2019, and that HPA was entitled to judgment for possession of the rental
property. The judgment awarded possession to HPA; ordered the Salazars to vacate
the rental property within one month; ordered the Salazars to pay past-due rent, costs,
and attorney’s fees; and set a supersedeas bond in the amount of $28,350. The
Salazars appealed the county court judgment to this Court. See Salazar v. HPA Tex.
Sub 2016-1 LLC, No. 01-19-00330-CV, 2020 WL 7702176 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2020, no pet. h.).
In April 2019, the Salazars filed an application for a temporary restraining
order in Harris County district court against HPA and Pathlight. Among other things,
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the application sought to enjoin HPA and Pathlight from taking steps to evict them
from the rental property, “including steps to enforce the eviction order entered by
the County Civil Court [a]t Law No. 1 . . . .” The district court denied the Salazars’
application. The Salazars filed a second application for a temporary restraining
order. The district court granted this application on June 7, 2019, and set a hearing
for a temporary injunction, after which the court denied the application for
temporary injunction. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 680 (“Every restraining order shall include
an order setting a certain date for hearing on the temporary or permanent injunction
sought.”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 687(e) (requiring temporary restraining order to set
hearing for temporary injunction within fourteen days); In re Tex. Nat. Res.
Conservation Comm’n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (“A
temporary restraining order is one entered as part of a motion for a temporary
injunction, by which a party is restrained pending the hearing of the motion.”)
(quoting Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 845 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex. 1992)).
The Salazars also filed a second amended petition asserting numerous causes
of action against appellees, including claims for wrongful eviction, fraud, and
violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
In October 2019, the Salazars filed a renewed application for a temporary
injunction, the denial of which is the subject of this interlocutory appeal. In their
renewed application, the Salazars argued that they had obtained newly discovered
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evidence indicating that HPA was not the owner of the rental property when it filed
the forcible detainer action against them in county court, rendering the county
court’s judgment void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Salazars relied on
a certified copy of a special warranty deed dated June 4, 2018, showing that HPA
conveyed the rental property to HP Texas. The Salazars’ renewed application asked
the court to immediately restore possession of the rental property to them, to enjoin
appellees from leasing or selling the rental property to a third party, to enjoin
appellees from collecting or demanding any payments from the Salazars, and to set
a $1,500 bond.2 The Salazars did not aver that the district court had subject-matter
jurisdiction to consider the renewed application for a temporary injunction. The
Salazars set their renewed application for consideration by submission. The district
court denied the renewed application, stating, “Submission hearing is not an
appropriate method to obtain the type of relief sought by the Movant.” This appeal
followed.
After filing their notice of appeal, the Salazars filed an emergency motion
asking this Court to enter the temporary injunction that the district court had denied.
The emergency motion requested an injunction restoring immediate possession of
2
Although the Salazars’ original application for temporary restraining order only
named HPA and Pathlight, the renewed application sought temporary injunctive
relief against all appellees.
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the rental property to them, prohibiting appellees from leasing or selling the rental
property to a third party or making changes to it, prohibiting appellees from
collecting or demanding any payments from the Salazars, and setting a supersedeas
bond in the amount of $1,500 through final judgment in the district court. The Court
denied the Salazars’ emergency motion and their subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry that can be addressed by the
Court sua sponte and at any time. Fallon v. Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr.,
586 S.W.3d 37, 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (en banc)
(citations omitted). “Whether a pleader has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating
a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Tex.
Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). A court
must have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide a case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air
Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). “Subject matter jurisdiction is never
presumed and cannot be waived.” Id. at 443–44.
Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 65.013 authorizes a suit for an
injunction to stay execution on a judgment. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.013;
Shor v. Pelican Oil & Gas Mgmt., LLC, 405 S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex. App.—Houston
6
[1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); McVeigh v. Lerner, 849 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). However, section 65.023(b) provides, “A
writ of injunction granted to stay . . . execution on a judgment must be tried in the
court in which . . . judgment was rendered.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
65.023(b). Section 65.023(b) applies even when an application for an injunction does
not expressly seek to stay execution of a prior judgment if the injunction would have
the effect of staying the prior judgment. McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 915; Butron v.
Cantu, 960 S.W.2d 91, 94–95 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1997, no writ).
This section “is intended to ensure that comity prevails among the various trial courts
of Texas” because “[o]rderly procedure and proper respect for the courts will require
that . . . attacks upon their judgment should be made in the court rendering such
judgment, rather than in other courts indiscriminately.” Shor, 405 S.W.3d at 743
(quoting McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 914).
Section 65.023(b) is a jurisdictional statute “so long as the judgment in
question is valid on its face.” Id. at 744 (quoting McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 914); see
Butron, 960 S.W.2d at 94 (“This requirement that an action to enjoin execution on a
judgment must be brought in the court in which the judgment was rendered is
jurisdictional, and does not relate merely to venue.”). “The requirement of facial
validity is a requirement that the underlying judgment is not void.” Shor, 405 S.W.3d
at 744 (citing Butron, 960 S.W.2d at 95, and McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 914). “A
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judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment had no
jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to
enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.” McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 914
(quoting Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987)); see State Bar of Tex.
v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (“As a general proposition, before a
court may address the merits of any case, the court must have jurisdiction over the
party or the property subject to the suit, jurisdiction over the subject matter,
jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, and capacity to act as a court.”).
B. District Court
Neither party has raised the issue of the district court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the Salazars’ renewed application for temporary injunction, and
we thus address the issue sua sponte. See Fallon, 586 S.W.3d at 55. The Salazars’
renewed application for temporary injunction essentially asked the district court to
stay execution of the county court’s judgment. Contra TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 65.023(b). The county court’s judgment awarded possession of the rental property
to HPA; ordered the Salazars to vacate the rental property by a certain date; awarded
past-due rent, costs, and attorney’s fees to HPA; and set a supersedeas bond of
$28,350. The Salazars’ renewed application for temporary injunction asked the
district court to restore possession of the rental property to them, to prohibit HPA
and Pathlight from collecting or demanding payments from the Salazars, and to set
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a bond in the amount of $1,500. The renewed application was directly tailored to
stay enforcement of the county court judgment, and the effect of granting the
temporary injunction would have been to stay execution of the county court
judgment. See McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 915; Butron, 960 S.W.2d at 95. The district
court lacked jurisdiction to stay enforcement of the county court’s judgment if the
judgment was valid on its face. See Shor, 405 S.W.3d at 744.
The Salazars had the burden to demonstrate that the district court had subject-
matter jurisdiction to enter the temporary injunction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at
226. Although they primarily argued that they were entitled to an injunction because
HPA did not own the property when it filed the forcible detainer suit and thus the
county court judgment was void, the Salazars did not attach that judgment to their
renewed application. However, appellees did attach the judgment to their response
to the Salazars’ renewed application, and thus it is included in the record on appeal.
The judgment recites that Robert—but not Elia—appeared for trial, that citation and
notice of the trial were properly served on the Salazars, and that HPA was entitled
to judgment for possession of the rental property. The judgment does not indicate
that the county court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the Salazars’
application for a temporary injunction. See Shor, 405 S.W.3d at 744. Thus, the
judgment is valid on its face.
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Nothing in the record on appeal indicates that the facially valid judgment is
actually void. See McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 914 (stating that judgment is void “only
when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment had . . . no jurisdiction of the
subject matter”). The Salazars rely on a special warranty deed to argue that HPA
was not the owner of the rental property when it filed the forcible detainer action
against them and, because only an owner of real property has standing to sue tenants
for forcible detainer, HPA lacked standing. As a result, the Salazars contend that the
county court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter judgment against them,
rendering the judgment void.
However, the Property Code authorizes a landlord or lessor to bring a forcible
detainer action. See TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 24.002, 24.005(a) (discussing “landlord
who files a forcible detainer suit”), 24.0051(b) (stating that “landlord may recover
unpaid rent under this section”), 24.0061(a) (“A landlord who prevails in an eviction
suit is entitled to a judgment for possession of the premises and a writ of
possession.”). In the context of residential tenancies, the Property Code defines
“landlord” as “the owner, lessor, or sublessor of a dwelling, but does not include a
manager or agent of the landlord unless the manager or agent purports to be the
owner, lessor, or sublessor in an oral or written lease.” Id. §§ 92.001(2), 92.002. The
sole issue in a forcible detainer action is who has the right to immediate possession
of property. Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
10
Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). “To prevail in a forcible detainer action, a plaintiff is not
required to prove title but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership
to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession.” Id.
Thus, the Salazars are incorrect that only the owner of real property has
standing to sue a tenant for forcible detainer. The 2018 lease expressly states that
HPA is the landlord of the rental property and, as the landlord, HPA was authorized
by the Property Code to bring the forcible detainer action against the Salazars. See
TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 24.002, 24.005(a), 24.0051(b), 24.0061(a). The 2018 lease thus
provided sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate HPA’s superior right to
immediate possession of the rental property. See Villalon, 176 S.W.3d at 70. The
Salazars did not present any evidence showing that the county court’s facially valid
judgment was void. See Shor, 405 S.W.3d at 744; McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 914. We
therefore conclude that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a
temporary injunction effectively staying enforcement of the county court judgment.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.023(b); McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 915.
We note that this Court has already decided the issue of HPA’s standing in
the county court in the Salazars’ prior direct appeal from the county court judgment.
See Salazar, 2020 WL 7702176. In that case, the Salazars raised many of the same
arguments that they raise in this appeal, including that the county court lacked
jurisdiction over the forcible detainer action because HPA conveyed the rental
11
property to HP Texas and thus HPA was not the owner when it filed the forcible
detainer action. See id. at *2. The Court disagreed with the Salazars and held that
HPA had standing to bring the forcible detainer action against the Salazars to regain
possession of the rental property. Id. at *4–5. We reasoned that the existence of a
landlord-tenant relationship is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction, that the Property
Code authorizes a landlord to bring a forcible detainer action against a tenant to
reclaim possession of real property, and that HPA presented evidence that it is the
lessor under the 2018 lease. Id.
We overrule the Salazars’ challenge to the district court’s interlocutory order
denying the renewed application for temporary injunction.
C. Court of Appeals
After filing their notice of appeal, the Salazars filed an emergency motion in
this Court requesting that we enter the temporary injunction that the district court
denied. We denied the Salazars’ emergency motion, and the Salazars challenge this
denial on appeal. For the same reasons that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
stay execution of the county court’s judgment, this Court also lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to stay execution of that judgment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
65.023(b); McVeigh, 849 S.W.2d at 915; Butron, 960 S.W.2d at 94–95. We therefore
dismiss this part of the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
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Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s order denying the Salazars’ renewed application
for temporary injunction, and we dismiss for want of jurisdiction the part of the
appeal challenging this Court’s denial of the Salazars’ emergency motion for a
temporary injunction. We dismiss any pending motions as moot.
April L. Farris
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Goodman and Farris.
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