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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-13485
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-23932-MGC
LINDAURA RAMOS,
JANVIER VILLARS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
KATZMAN CHANDLER PA,
2009-2019 A for profit association,
FIRST SERVICE RESIDENTIAL,
2016-2017 a for profit management/accounting corporation,
AKAM ON-SITE,
2017-2018 A for profit management/accounting corporation,
LILIANA CALDERON,
Ass’n Secretary 2017 to present,
MORDECHAI ZARGER,
Ass’n V. President 2017-present, et al.,
Defendants – Appellees.
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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 26, 2021)
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lindaura Ramos and Janvier Villars, proceeding pro se, appeal the district
court’s dismissal with prejudice of their amended complaint as an impermissible
shotgun pleading. We affirm.
The complaint contained conclusory, vague statements and immaterial facts.
Ms. Ramos and Mr. Villars asserted multiple claims against each defendant, without
making clear which defendants were alleged to be responsible for which acts as to
which plaintiff. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion when
dismissing the complaint.
I
The appellants filed a pro se 28-page complaint containing approximately 77
paragraphs against the Buckley Towers Condominium Association (“the Condo
Association”); board members of the Condo Association; First Service Residential;
accounting firms for the Condo Association-AKAM On-Site (“AKAM”) and
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Unlimited Property Management (“Unlimited”); and the Condo Association’s law
firm, Katzman Chandler (“the Law Firm”). See D.E. 1 at 1, 3-5. Ms. Ramos alleged
that she owned a unit in the Condo Association for which she struggled to pay the
fees the association assessed. Id. at 2-3, 5. Ms. Ramos then sold one percent of her
unit to Mr. Villars in order to pay the fees. Id. at 5. The Condo Association placed a
lien on the unit that the appellants allege was improper because it did not first attempt
to collect the fees and because there should have been multiple missed payments
before a lien was placed. Id. at 3, 7. Ms. Ramos attempted to resolve the issue with
the Law Firm, but it did not respond to her. Id. at 5. Ms. Ramos also alleges that the
board members ignored her proof of payments. Id.
The complaint further alleged that the accounting companies were “expected
to maintain Proper Accounting Practices as accounting professionals.” Id. at 4
(emphasis in original). The complaint stated that “[t]his Motion to Vacate is intended
to present . . . wanton misconduct by the [Board] Officers in confederacy with the
management/accounting company and [the law firm]; the Enterprise.” Id. at 6
(emphasis in original).
In a “Legal Argument” section, the appellants asserted that the Condo
Association lacked authority to place a lien on the unit because Ms. Ramos had paid
her fees three weeks prior to the lien being placed. Id. The appellants also claimed
that the Law Firm was unjustly enriched by collecting fees based on the fraudulent
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lien, refused to look at Ms. Ramos’ proof of payment, and defrauded the state court
by making material misrepresentations. Id. at 6-7.
The complaint further asserted a claim under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, and Florida law for the attempt to
collect a false debt, as Ms. Ramos allegedly owed one month of assessments, not the
five months claimed. See id. at 7. The related concealment of Ms. Ramos’ payment
records, the complaint claimed, violated due process. Id. at 7-8. The complaint stated
that “[t]o avoid reiterating the alleged facts; every succeeding [c]ause of [a]ction
shall be understood to include, by inference every averment within the four corners.”
Id. at 8.
The appellants asserted the following claims: (1) deceptive collection
practices and fraudulent inducement; (2) civil conspiracy, tortious interferences,
breach of fiduciary duties, and wrongful foreclosure; (3) intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”); (4) breach of third-party beneficiary contract; (5)
conversion and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962; and (6) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Id. at
8-20.1
1
The counts as listed in the complaint are misnumbered and for clarity they are numbered here in
order of appearance.
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The counts in the complaint containing multiple causes of action did not
specify the conduct applicable to each cause of action. See e.g., id. at 8-13, 18-22.
All counts were alleged against all of the defendants and, though some conduct was
identified as being exclusive to specific defendants, distinct offenses or violations
were not identified. See id. at 8-22. For example, as to Count 1, the appellants alleged
that the Condo Association’s board members refused to help Ms. Ramos and
concealed accounting records, that the Law Firm collected false debts as instructed
by the Condo Association, and that AKAM filed a bad-faith affidavit of such debts.
See id. at 8-11. Furthermore, Count 1 alleged that “the Officers, refus[ed] to correct
an Association[‘s] wrongful debt claim, which they knew [ ] was detrimental to the
Association[’s] contract with the member’s Property and LIFE, the Enterprise
wantonly breached [its] fiduciary duty.” Id. at 12 (emphasis in original). At the end
of the complaint, Mr. Villars attested that his “sole interest” was “assisting in the
protection of constitutional rights and in defense of the insular minority.” Id. at 27.
The Condo Association, First Service, and the board members moved to
dismiss the complaint. See D.E. 4 at 1. AKAM joined the motion to dismiss. See
D.E. 5 at 1.
The defendants argued that the lawsuit was barred by defensive non-mutual
collateral estoppel because it shared the same common nucleus of facts as five prior
lawsuits litigated and adjudged in state court between the plaintiffs and the Condo
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Association, the Law Firm, Liliana Calderon, Ilina Muxo, and Mordechai Zarger.
See D.E. 4 at 1, 8-14 (citing to Buckley Towers Condo., Inc. v. Villars, et al., Case
No. 2016-000447-CC-23 (Fla. Miami-Dade County Ct. Jan. 12, 2016); Villars v.
Buckley Towers Bd. Of Dirs., et al., Case No. 2016-004101-CA-01 (Fla. 11 Cir. Ct.
Dec. 22, 2017); Buckley Towers Condo., Inc. v. Villars, et al., Case No. 2016-
007415-CA-01 (Fla. 11 Cir. Ct. Mar. 24, 2016); Villars v. Katzman Chandler Law
Firm, et al., Case No. 18-029097-CA-01(06) (Fla. 11 Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019);
Buckley Towers Condo., Inc. v. Villars, Case No. 19-14571-CA-01(06) (Fla. 11 Cir.
Ct. May 30, 2019)). Similarly, these defendants argued the lawsuit was precluded
because the state court cases—the five prior lawsuits and an additional foreclosure
lawsuit brought by the Association against Ms. Ramos and resulting in a default final
judgment of foreclosure against her, Buckley Towers Condo., Inc. v. Ramos, et al.,
Case No. 2017-013000-CC-23 (Fla. Miami-Dade County Ct. Dec. 17, 2018)—
formed the basis for this lawsuit and had all been dismissed without appeal.
Therefore, the defendants argued, reaching the merits of this lawsuit would amount
to a federal district court sitting in direct review of a state court decision in violation
of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.E. 4 at 8. See generally Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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The defendants also identified several deficiencies with the complaint. For
example, there were no allegations that (1) First Service was a debt collector or that
the board members attempted to collect a debt from Ms. Ramos and Mr. Villars in
Count 1; (2) specified overt actions were undertaken by each defendant in Count 2;
(3) the contracts between the Condo Association and its lawyers or AKAM benefited
either plaintiff; and (4) the collection of money was illegal under RICO. See D.E. 4
at 10-11. They also noted, in relation to some of the claims, that it was unclear
whether Mr. Villars raised a claim based on his ownership interest in the unit or was
a third-party to the suit based on the third-party disclaimer in the complaint stating
“Mr. Villars [ ] sole interest in this case is in assisting in the protection of
constitutional rights and in defense of the insular minority class.” D.E. 1 at 27. The
appellants filed a response to the motion to dismiss. See D.E. 7.
The district court sua sponte struck the complaint without prejudice and
denied any pending motions as moot. See D.E. 26 at 1, 3. The district court ruled
that the complaint was an impermissible shotgun pleading that failed to comply with
Rules 8(a) and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 2. The district
court ruled that the complaint was full of conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts
that did not obviously connect to a particular cause of action and contained citations
to laws and statutes whose application were unclear (citing the “Legal Argument”
section of the complaint). See id. The district court further noted that Ms. Ramos and
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Mr. Villars “lump[ed]” four state law causes of action in Count 2, and that they also
cited a federal mail fraud statute in support of those claims, but failed to delineate
what facts correlated to what cause of action. See id. The district court pointed out
that the factual allegations under the RICO claim did not seem to pertain to such a
cause of action. See id. at 2-3. Thus, the district court struck the complaint. It gave
the plaintiffs time to file an amended complaint, and explained the pleading
requirements under Rules 8(a) and 10(b). See id.
The plaintiffs filed a 24-page amended complaint with approximately 87
paragraphs against the same defendants, with the exception of the Condo
Association and Unlimited Property Management. See D.E. 27 at 1. The amended
complaint reiterated verbatim the original complaint’s factual allegations, its “Legal
Argument” section, the adoption of the factual allegations for each count, and Mr.
Villars’s third-party disclaimer. See id. at 2-8, 23. It did not reassert causes of action
for a RICO violation or for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, but it did add a
claim for mail fraud. See id. at 20. In response to the district court’s order, the
plaintiffs divided the counts and discussion according to causes of action. See, e.g.,
id. at 8-10. The amended complaint, however, largely reiterated the discussion of
each cause of action from the original complaint. See id. at 8-22.
The amended complaint also made minor changes to the substantive counts.
For example, it reduced its discussion of the IIED claim and, regarding the contract,
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added a paragraph that further explained the third-party beneficiary relationship with
the Condo Association’s subcontractors. See id. at 15-16. The amended complaint,
however, still largely failed to specify what conduct pertained to each individual
defendant’s potential liability. It also retained such statements as “But for being a
low-income, [widow] with no family to assist her [to] pay for an attorney, she had
to ensure this illegal action more severely, because it disgracefully attacks her self-
worthiness in this country.” Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
The amended complaint further alleged a whole raft of crimes and tortious
conduct on the part of the defendants, yet made no distinction as to which defendant
was responsible for which act. In addition, the conduct that was alleged to have taken
place against Mr. Villars was at best unclear. See id.
The district court subsequently entered an order sua sponte dismissing the
amended complaint and closed the case. See D.E. 31 at 1. The district court found
that the plaintiffs had not cured the defects that required the striking of the initial
complaint and dismissed the action with prejudice. See id. This appeal followed.
II
We review the dismissal of a shotgun pleading under Rule 8 for abuse of
discretion. See Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018).
A document filed pro se must be liberally construed and should be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Erickson v.
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Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Liberal construction of pro se pleadings, however,
“does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite
an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” See Campbell v. Air
Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted).
III
A district court has the inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the
prompt resolution of lawsuits, which includes the ability to dismiss a complaint for
failing to comply with Rules 8(a) and 10(b). See Shabanets, 878 F.3d at 1294. A
district court is generally required to allow a litigant at least one chance to remedy
any deficiencies before dismissing a complaint with prejudice. See id.
Shotgun pleadings violate Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement
of the claim” showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Pleadings of this sort fail to give defendants adequate notice of the claims against
them and the grounds upon which the claims rest. See Shabanets, 878 F.3d at 1295.
Shotgun pleadings waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of
discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the public’s
respect for the courts. See id.
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We have previously described four types of shotgun pleadings: (1) a
complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts all the allegations of
all the preceding counts; (2) a complaint that is replete with conclusory, vague, and
immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action; (3) a
complaint that does not separate each cause of action or claim for relief into different
counts; and (4) a complaint that asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants
without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or
omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against. See Weiland v.
Palm Beach Cty. Sherriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015). The
amended complaint here implicated each of the above-mentioned forms of shotgun
pleadings in some form. Although a district court is required to show some lenience
towards pro se parties, that lenience is not boundless. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94.
Even after liberally construing the amended complaint, the district court did not err
in dismissing it with prejudice after providing one opportunity to amend. The district
court provided examples of some of the errors in the original complaint, such as
noting that the complaint made vague allegations and had a legal discussion
unconnected to any counts, and the motion to dismiss identified additional
deficiencies. See D.E. 4 at 10-11; D.E. 26 at 2-3.
In response to the district court’s initial order, the plaintiffs filed a nearly
identical complaint that still constituted a shotgun pleading on several fronts.
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Compare D.E. 1 with D.E. 27. The amended complaint (1) made vague, conclusory
allegations, (2) did not identify specific violations by specific defendants, and (3)
did not separate the “Legal Argument” section into counts. See D.E. 27 at 8-23.
Given the deficiencies in the amended complaint, the district court did not subject
the appellants to a heightened pleading standard. Nor did it fail to liberally construe
that complaint. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23; Shabenets, 878 F.3d at 1295. On
this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to allow more
than one opportunity to amend before dismissing with prejudice. See Shabenets, 878
F.3d at 1294.2
IV
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the amended
complaint with prejudice. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.
2
As to any other issues raised by the appellants, we summarily affirm.
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