In re Pers. Restraint of Ali

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FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
IN CLERK’S OFFICE SEPTEMBER 17, 2020
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
SEPTEMBER 17, 2020
SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME COURT CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Personal ) No. 95578-6
Restraint of: )
) EN BANC
SAID OMER ALI, )
) September 17, 2020
Filed __________________
Petitioner. )
______________________________ )

MONTOYA-LEWIS, J.—“‘Children are different.’” State v. Houston-

Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 8, 391 P.3d 409 (2017) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.

460, 480, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012)). The Eighth Amendment to the

United States Constitution requires our criminal justice system to address this

difference when punishing children. Central to this requirement is that courts must

take into account the differences between children and adults in criminal sentencing.

State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 428, 387 P.3d 650 (2017). Children’s ability to

assess risk and make judgments varies distinctly from that of adults because the brain

is not fully mature before adulthood. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72. Differences in brain

development mean that children possess lessened culpability, poorer judgment, and

greater capacity for change than adults. Id. In order to comply with the Eighth
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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali
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Amendment, courts must consider the mitigating qualities of youth and have

discretion to impose a proportional punishment based on those qualities. Houston-

Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 19. In Houston-Sconiers, we recognized these Eighth

Amendment requirements and held that “[t]rial courts must consider mitigating

qualities of youth at sentencing and must have discretion to impose any sentence

below the otherwise applicable [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A

RCW] range and/or sentence enhancements.” Id. at 21.

In this case and its companion, In re Personal Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio,

No. 97205-2, slip op. (Wash. Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/,

we consider whether the dual requirements of Houston-Sconiers apply retroactively

on collateral review. We hold that Houston-Sconiers constitutes a significant and

material change in the law that requires retroactive application. Further, we hold that

Ali has established actual and substantial prejudice, and we remand to superior court

for resentencing consistent with Houston-Sconiers.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Factual Background

In 2008, Said Omer Ali was arrested for his involvement in a series of

robberies. Each of the crimes involved a group of male perpetrators, and four victims

identified Ali as one of the assailants. A jury found Ali guilty of five counts of

robbery in the first degree, two counts of attempted robbery in the first degree, and

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one count of assault in the first degree. Two of the robbery counts and the assault

count carried a deadly weapon enhancement. Ali was 16 years old at the time of the

crimes, but he was charged and tried in adult court.1

Under the SRA, Ali faced a sentence between 240 and 318 months for the

substantive charges, plus 24 months each for 3 weapon enhancements. Because the

weapon enhancements must run consecutively under the SRA, the standard sentence

range was 312 to 390 months. RCW 9.94A.533(4)(e).

At sentencing, the State recommended imprisonment for 390 months, which

was the high end of the standard range for adults and included the three mandatory

consecutive weapon enhancements. The State argued that youth was not a factor that

would justify an exceptional sentence, citing State v. Ha’mim, 82 Wn. App. 139, 916

P.2d 971 (1996), aff’d, 132 Wn.2d 834, 940 P.2d 633 (1997), overruled in part by

State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696, 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

Defense counsel requested an exceptional sentence of 10 years (120 months),

which was below the standard range, and argued that the presumptive range was

“grossly excessive in light of the SRA purposes and that the Court does have legal

and factual basis to impose something exceptional below that.” 13 Verbatim Report

of Proceedings (Mar. 27. 2009) (VRP) at 1419-20, 1423. The defense maintained

1
There was a dispute over Ali’s age at trial, but all parties now agree that Ali was 16 years
old at the time of the crimes. The State concedes that Ali is entitled to an order correcting his date
of birth on the judgment and sentence to reflect his true year of birth as 1992.
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that the mitigating factors listed in the SRA were nonexclusive and that the court

should consider Ali’s age and background. Ali was only 17 years old at sentencing,

and the State recommended a sentence of 32.5 years. Defense counsel argued that

Ali was “a young adolescent” who “endured extreme turmoil in his young life” and

that “[v]ery little will be gained by crushing his hope and spirit by sending him away

for two lifetimes.” 13 VRP at 1420-23.

Ali presented mitigating testimony regarding his youthfulness and difficult

childhood. Dozens of members of his community submitted letters to the court

requesting leniency in his sentencing. Four people also spoke on his behalf at the

sentencing hearing, describing Ali as young and inexperienced but capable of

reform. One community member explained that Ali “has dealt with gang dealing and

peer pressure.” 13 VRP at 1426. Another described him as “a young boy who is a

victim for his whole life, back at home and here” because Ali was born in the midst

of a civil war, grew up in refugee camps, and was placed in high school instead of

middle school when he arrived in the United States at age 13. 13 VRP at 1429. A

family friend asked the court to

look this young boy on a keen eye, give him another chance to rebuild
his life, become an active citizen again. And I am sure he will thrive
and grow up with dignity and respect with others and to himself. To
conclude my statement, as a father, a parent, and a humanitarian, our
children make mistakes. And he’s one of those.

13 VRP at 1428.

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After hearing the statements from the community members on Ali’s behalf,

the sentencing judge explained,

Well, it’s very clear that Mr. Ali has wonderful community and family
support. These are individuals of great stature in the community and it
is clear that he has a lot of folks looking out for him. But I can’t simply
look at the popular support, I have to look at the law. And the question
is what does the law require me to impose and is there any justification
under the law for imposing a sentence below the standard range. And I
cannot find that there is any legal justification that would allow that. So
I find that the law requires me to impose a sentence within the standard
range.

13 VRP at 1431-32. The court imposed a total sentence of 312 months: the lowest

possible sentence within the standard range with the mandatory enhancements. The

low end of the standard range for each charge would run concurrently, and the

mandatory deadly weapon enhancements would run consecutively. The sentencing

judge acknowledged that 312 months “is a huge sentence for someone of your age.

And I’m very mindful of that. But the law does not allow me to depart from it simply

because of your age.” 13 VRP at 1432. The court also made a point “to note, for the

record that the sentence that was imposed was the lowest sentence that I legally felt

I had the option of imposing in this case. I recognize Mr. Ali’s young age and that is

primarily the reason why that was imposed.” 13 VRP at 1436.

B. Procedural History

Ali appealed unsuccessfully, and his judgment and sentence became final in

2011. Ali filed this personal restraint petition (PRP) in the Court of Appeals in 2017,

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asserting that his continued restraint is unlawful under RAP 16.4(c)(2). He argues

that even though it was filed more than a year after his judgment and sentence

became final, his petition is timely under RCW 10.73.100(6)’s exception to the time

bar: there has been a significant change in substantive law that is material to his

sentence and sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed

legal standard. He argues that Houston-Sconiers provides a basis both to overcome

the time bar and to entitle him to relief.

The Court of Appeals transferred his petition to this court as a successive

petition that raises new grounds for relief. We set Ali’s petition for full consideration

on the merits and also granted review of a companion case, Domingo-Cornelio, slip

op. at 4.

II. ANALYSIS

Ali was sentenced as an adult for crimes he committed as a child. He seeks

collateral review of that sentence. He filed this PRP more than one year after his

judgment and sentence became final, so the petition is untimely unless it is based

solely on a statutory exception to the time bar. RCW 10.73.090, .100. Ali relies on

the exception for a significant change in the law that is material to his sentence and

requires retroactive application. RCW 10.73.100(6). Ali argues he can overcome the

time bar and is entitled to relief based on Houston-Sconiers. We agree.

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In Houston-Sconiers, we held that when juveniles are adjudicated as adults,

“[t]rial courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and must

have discretion to impose any sentence below the otherwise applicable SRA range

and/or sentence enhancements.” 188 Wn.2d at 21 (emphasis added). There, 16- and

17-year-old defendants were adjudicated as adults for a series of robberies they

committed on Halloween. Id. at 8. The charges triggered the mandatory automatic

decline statute, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v), and both defendants were tried and

convicted as adults. Id. at 12. Each was convicted of several counts of robbery in the

first degree, one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, one count of assault in the

second degree, and multiple firearm enhancements. Id. Under the SRA, one

defendant faced a sentencing range of 501-543 months, which included 372 months

for the firearm enhancements; the other faced a sentencing range of 441-483 months,

which included 312 months for the firearm enhancements. Id. at 12-13. The State

recommended, and the trial court accepted, an exceptional sentence below the

standard range: zero months on each of the substantive counts for both defendants.

Id. at 13. The defendants received 372 and 312 months, respectively, the full time

for the consecutive weapon enhancements. Id. At sentencing, the judge heard

mitigating testimony regarding both defendants’ youth but “expressed frustration at

his inability to exercise greater discretion over the sentences imposed.” Id. The Court

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of Appeals affirmed the convictions and rejected the defendants’ challenges to their

sentences. Id.

On review, we traced the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions that

“explicitly hold that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution

compels us to recognize that children are different.” Id. at 18; see, e.g., Miller, 567

U.S. at 479-80 (the Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory sentences of life without

parole (LWOP) for juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S.

Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (the Eighth Amendment forbids LWOP for non-

homicide juvenile offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S. Ct. 1183,

161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (the Eighth Amendment forbids the death penalty for juvenile

offenders). “In each case, [Roper, Graham, and Miller,] the Court found that

legitimate penological goals failed to justify the sentences [that it] invalidated as

applied to youth.” Id. at 19 n.4. Those cases held that certain punishments are

impermissible because of three significant differences between children and adults:

(1) juveniles are more likely to possess a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped

sense of responsibility . . . [and t]hese qualities often result in impetuous and ill-

considered actions and decisions,” (2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible

to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” and (3) “the

character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult [and t]he personality

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traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed,” and more capable of reform.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70 (citing studies).

In Houston-Sconiers, we recognized that those cases invalidated certain

sentences for juvenile offenders because children have diminished culpability, which

renders some punishments “unconstitutionally disproportionate for youth.” 188

Wn.2d at 19 n.4. We concluded that

[t]hese cases make two substantive rules of law clear: first, “that a
sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children,”
rendering certain sentences that are routinely imposed on adults
disproportionately too harsh when applied to youth, and second, that
the Eighth Amendment requires another protection, besides numerical
proportionality, in juvenile sentencings—the exercise of discretion.

Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 481). We held that “sentencing

courts must have complete discretion to consider mitigating circumstances

associated with the youth of any juvenile defendant, even in the adult criminal justice

system . . . . To the extent our state statutes have been interpreted to bar such

discretion with regard to juveniles, they are overruled.” Id. at 21 (footnote omitted)

(citing State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 29, 983 P.2d 608 (1999)). Finally, we held

that “[t]rial courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and must

have discretion to impose any sentence below the otherwise applicable SRA range

and/or sentence enhancements.” Id. (emphasis added).

Following Miller, Graham, and Roper, Houston-Sconiers identified a

category of sentences that are beyond courts’ authority to impose: adult standard
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SRA ranges and enhancements that would be disproportionate punishment for

juveniles with diminished culpability. Recognizing that “legitimate penological

goals fail[] to justify” certain sentences as applied to youth, we held that courts must

exercise discretion and consider the mitigating qualities of youth to determine

whether standard SRA ranges and enhancements are proportionate for a particular

juvenile in order to avoid imposing unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences.

Id. at 19 n.4. Thus, we recognized that the Eighth Amendment requires that the

sentencing judge consider the defendant’s youthfulness and retain absolute

discretion to impose a lower sentence. Id. at 34.

Not long after we decided Houston-Sconiers, we accepted review of In re

Personal Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 440 P.3d 978 (2019). A majority of

the court declined to reach the question of retroactivity in that case, instead holding

that “[e]ven assuming Meippen can show that Houston-Sconiers is a significant,

material change in the law that applies retroactively, [the petitioner was] not entitled

to collateral relief because he [did] not demonstrate that any error actually and

substantially prejudiced him.” Id. at 312. As discussed below, Ali does demonstrate

actual and substantial prejudice, so we must decide whether Houston-Sconiers is a

significant and material change in the law that requires retroactive application.2

2
Although we assumed without deciding the retroactivity question in Meippen and
dismissed that PRP based on the petitioner’s failure to establish prejudice, we are not required to
conduct the analysis in that order. Whether a PRP is exempt from the one year time limit under
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A. Houston-Sconiers Requires Retroactive Application

Under RCW 10.73.100(6), the one year time limit to file a PRP does not apply

when a petition is based on a significant change in the law, which is material to the

conviction or sentence, and sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application

of the changed legal standard. Houston-Sconiers constitutes such a change in the

law, and Ali’s PRP is, therefore, timely.

1. Significant Change in the Law

Houston-Sconiers represents a significant change in the law because it

requires the sentencing court to consider the youthfulness of the defendant. A

significant change in the law exists “when an intervening appellate decision

overturns a prior appellate decision that was determinative of a material issue.” State

v. Miller, 185 Wn.2d 111, 114, 371 P.3d 528 (2016) (citing In re Pers. Restraint of

Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d 91, 104, 351 P.3d 138 (2015)). Prior to Houston-

Sconiers, we held that the SRA “deprives a sentencing court of discretion to impose

an exceptional sentence downward below the time specified for a mandatory deadly

weapon enhancement.” Brown, 139 Wn.2d at 22. Under Brown, Ali’s sentencing

RCW 10.73.090 “is a threshold inquiry; we do not have to decide whether the entire claim is
completely meritorious in order to decide whether it fits within an exception to the time bar.” In
re Pers. Restraint of Schorr, 191 Wn.2d 315, 320, 422 P.3d 451 (2018) (citing In re Pers. Restraint
of Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d 91, 99-108, 351 P.3d 138 (2015)). “To actually obtain relief on
collateral review based on a constitutional error the petitioner must demonstrate [prejudice] by a
preponderance of the evidence.” In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 671, 101 P.3d 1
(2004) (emphasis added).
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court was required to run each of his weapon enhancements consecutively and had

no discretion to run them concurrently. In Houston-Sconiers, we stated explicitly

that we overruled any interpretation that would bar such discretion with regard to

juveniles, citing to Brown and recognizing that the case failed to address juveniles.

188 Wn.2d at 21 n.5. Prior to Houston-Sconiers, sentencing courts did not have

discretion to consider the defendant’s age at sentencing as a basis to run weapon

enhancements concurrently. Thus, Houston-Sconiers is a significant change in the

law because it overruled Brown.

Another “‘test to determine whether an [intervening case] represents a

significant change in the law is whether the defendant could have argued this issue

before publication of the decision.’” Miller, 185 Wn.2d at 115 (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 154

Wn.2d 249, 258-59, 111 P.3d 837 (2005)). Even if Ali’s sentencing court had

discretion to run the sentence enhancements concurrently before Houston-Sconiers,

Ali could not have argued that the court must consider the mitigating factors of his

youthfulness and that it had absolute discretion to impose any sentence below the

applicable SRA range and sentence enhancements. 188 Wn.2d at 21. Ali could have,

and did, argue that the court had some discretion and that it should consider

youthfulness. But before Houston-Sconiers, he could not have argued that the court

was required to consider youthfulness and could impose a lesser sentence based on

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youth. Under either test proffered to demonstrate a significant change in the law,

Houston-Sconiers qualifies.

2. Materiality

Houston-Sconiers is material to Ali’s case. Ali was sentenced to a standard

adult range under the SRA, which included mandatory consecutive weapon

enhancements, just as in Houston-Sconiers. If Houston-Sconiers applies

retroactively, it would affect a materially determinative issue in Ali’s petition:

whether the sentencing judge had discretion to impose a lower sentence given the

mitigating testimony regarding his youthfulness. The sentencing judge heard

testimony and argument regarding Ali’s youthfulness but felt that she had no

discretion to impose any sentence below the bottom of the standard range, explaining

that “the law does not allow me to depart from it simply because of your age.” 13

VRP at 1432. If Houston-Sconiers applies retroactively, it would materially affect

Ali’s sentence because it would allow the sentencing judge discretion to run the

weapon enhancements concurrently or impose any exceptional sentence downward

based on youthfulness. 3 Ali received the kind of sentence that implicates Houston-

Sconiers; therefore, that case is material.

3
If, for example, the sentencing judge had run enhancements concurrently, the sentence
would have been shortened by 48 months.
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The State argues that Houston-Sconiers is a significant change in the law but

is not material to Ali’s case because Houston-Sconiers is limited to effective life

sentences. Nothing in Houston-Sconiers limited the holding to life sentences or the

functional equivalent. In fact, one of the defendants in Houston-Sconiers received a

sentence of 312 months, the same as Ali. 188 Wn.2d at 13. We explicitly stated that

“sentencing courts must have complete discretion to consider mitigating

circumstances associated with the youth of any juvenile defendant, even in the adult

criminal justice system,” and that “[t]rial courts must consider mitigating qualities

of youth at sentencing and must have discretion to impose any sentence below the

otherwise applicable SRA range and/or sentence enhancements.” Id. at 21 (emphasis

added). 4 Houston-Sconiers applies to adult standard range sentences as well as

mandatory enhancements under the SRA imposed for crimes committed while the

defendant was a child. This is material to Ali’s case because he was sentenced as an

adult under the SRA for crimes he committed as a child.

3. Retroactivity

Houston-Sconiers announced a new substantive constitutional rule that must

be applied retroactively upon collateral review. Washington courts follow the test

4
See also State v. Gilbert, 193 Wn.2d 169, 175-76, 438 P.3d 133 (2019) (“Our opinion in
[Houston-Sconiers] cannot be read as confined to the firearm enhancement statutes as it went so
far as to question any statute that acts to limit consideration of the mitigating factors of youth
during sentencing.”).
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laid out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989)

to determine whether a rule applies retroactively. See In re Pers. Restraint of

Colbert, 186 Wn.2d 614, 623-26, 380 P.3d 504 (2016). Under Teague, a new rule

applies retroactively on collateral review only if it is a new substantive rule of

constitutional law or a watershed rule of criminal procedure. Montgomery v.

Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). Houston-

Sconiers applies retroactively because it announced (1) a new rule (2) of

constitutional magnitude (3) that is substantive.

First, Houston-Sconiers announced a new rule. Whether there is a “new rule”

under Teague is a distinct inquiry from whether there has been a significant change

in the law. Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 103-05. A new rule is one that breaks new ground or

imposes a new obligation, or “‘if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at

the time the defendant’s conviction became final.’” Id. at 104 (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 444, 114 P.3d 627 (2005)).

“‘If before the opinion is announced, reasonable jurists could disagree on the rule of

law, the rule is new.’” Id. (quoting Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 444). The dual mandates of

Houston-Sconiers, that sentencing courts must consider youth and must have

discretion to impose any exceptional sentence downward based on youth, were not

dictated by existing precedent at the time Ali’s conviction became final. Reasonable

jurists could disagree whether the court had such discretion or whether they could

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consider youth; however, because no prior precedent required courts to do so,

Houston-Sconiers announced a new rule.

Second, we decided Houston-Sconiers on constitutional grounds. We

concluded that “the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution compels

us to recognize that children are different” and “courts must address those

differences in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment[] with discretion to

consider the mitigating qualities of youth.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 18-19.

We reached this conclusion based on rules stemming from Roper, Graham, and

Miller, which we identified as “substantive rules”: some sentences routinely

imposed on adults are disproportionately too harsh when imposed on children who

lack adult culpability, and the Eighth Amendment requires the exercise of discretion

in order to protect such children from disproportionate punishment. Id. at 19 n.4.

Third, Houston-Sconiers announced a substantive constitutional rule.

“Substantive rules . . . set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place

certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to

impose” and include “‘rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class

of defendants because of their status or offense.’” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729,

728 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d

256 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.

Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002)). “Procedural rules, in contrast, are designed to

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enhance the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating ‘the manner of

determining the defendant’s culpability.’” Id. at 730 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin,

542 U.S. 348, 353, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004)). Houston-Sconiers

established a category of punishments that are prohibited: adult standard SRA ranges

and enhancements that would be disproportionate punishment for juveniles who

possess diminished culpability. It also established a mechanism necessary to

effectuate that substantive rule: sentencing courts must consider the mitigating

qualities of youth and have discretion to impose sentences below what the SRA

mandates.

Following Miller, Graham, and Roper, Houston-Sconiers recognized that

“legitimate penological goals fail[] to justify” certain sentences as applied to youth,

and courts must have the discretion to impose sentences below the SRA,

proportionate to the individual’s culpability. 188 Wn.2d at 19 n.4. Without the

context of a defendant’s youthfulness and the discretion to impose something less

than what the SRA mandates, sentencing courts cannot protect juveniles’ Eighth

Amendment right to be free from unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment.

The discretion and consideration that Houston-Sconiers requires are necessary to

effectuate the substantive rule that certain punishments routinely imposed on adults

are unconstitutional as applied to youth.

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Miller and Montgomery compel the conclusion that Houston-Sconiers is a

new substantive constitutional rule. Miller held that mandatory LWOP sentences for

juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment because “[b]y making youth (and all that

accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a

scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” 567 U.S. at 479. In

Montgomery, the Supreme Court explained that “Miller took as its starting premise

the principle established in Roper and Graham that ‘children are constitutionally

different from adults for purposes of sentencing.’” 136 S. Ct. at 733 (quoting Miller,

567 U.S. at 471). The Court concluded that mandatory LWOP for children

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because those differences “result from

children’s ‘diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,’” and “‘the

distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications’” for imposing

certain punishments on juveniles. Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72). A life

sentence for a child is rarely constitutional, and the sentencing court must exercise

discretion and consider youth and its effect on a child’s culpability and capacity for

change in order to distinguish between “children whose crimes reflect transient

immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” Id.

at 734. 5

5
As the dissent correctly acknowledges, Miller contained both a substantive and a
procedural component: Miller categorically banned LWOP for juveniles whose crimes reflect the
transient immaturity of youth and required the exercise of discretion as the mechanism to protect
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The same constitutional principles form the foundation of Houston-Sconiers.

In Houston-Sconiers, we recognized that the Eighth Amendment compels courts to

treat children differently from adults because the legitimate penological goals fail to

justify certain sentences for juveniles in light of the mitigating qualities of youth.

188 Wn.2d at 18. We concluded that the Eighth Amendment requires courts to

consider the mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and to have absolute

discretion to impose anything less than the standard adult sentence because children

possess diminished culpability, and “certain sentences that are routinely imposed on

adults [are] disproportionately too harsh when applied to youth.” Id. at 18, 19 n.4.

Houston-Sconiers is substantive because it placed certain adult sentences beyond

courts’ authority to impose on juveniles who possess such diminished culpability

that the adult standard SRA ranges and enhancements would be disproportionate

punishment.

The fact that a juvenile could receive a sentence within the adult standard

range if the sentencing court complies with the dual requirements of Houston-

Sconiers does not render Houston-Sconiers procedural. Miller did not foreclose a

sentencing court’s ability to impose LWOP on all juveniles; it acknowledged that

such a punishment may be appropriate for “‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime

that substantive rule. Like Miller, Houston-Sconiers’s procedural component (consideration of
youth and discretion to impose sentences below the SRA) is necessary to achieve the substantive
protection (punishment proportionate to culpability).
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reflects irreparable corruption,’” as long as the sentencing court takes the

defendant’s youth into consideration as the Eighth Amendment requires. Miller, 567

U.S. at 479-80 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573). But the sentencing court must

engage in this consideration in order to determine whether the juvenile falls within

the category of people for whom such a severe and rarely imposed punishment would

be permissible. Similarly, under Houston-Sconiers, sentencing courts must exercise

discretion and consider youth to determine whether the child falls within the

category of juveniles for whom standard adult sentences or enhancements are

permissible. Like in Miller, Houston-Sconiers announced a procedural component

as a mechanism to protect the substantive rule. The substantive protection of

proportionate punishment ceases to exist without the mechanism to determine

whether the juvenile belongs in the class of culpability that would allow adult

sentences versus the more likely outcome of a sentence that reflects the juvenile’s

immaturity. This does not transform Houston-Sconiers’s substantive rule into a

procedural rule.

In Montgomery, the Supreme Court held that Miller was not procedural

because it “did more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth

before imposing life without parole; it established that the penological justifications

for life without parole collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’” 136

S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472). In reaching that conclusion, the Court

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rejected the State’s argument that Miller announced a procedural rule because it

mandated a process of considering youth before imposing a particular sentence. Id.

at 734. The Court explained that that argument

conflates a procedural requirement necessary to implement a
substantive guarantee with a rule that “regulate[s] only the manner of
determining the defendant’s culpability.” There are instances in which
a substantive change in the law must be attended by a procedure that
enables a prisoner to show that he falls within the category of persons
whom the law may no longer punish. . . . Those procedural
requirements do not, of course, transform substantive rules into
procedural ones.

Id. at 734-35 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at

353). The Court concluded that Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional

law because “it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class

of defendants because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes

reflect the transient immaturity of youth.” Id. at 734 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at

330).

Our holding in Houston-Sconiers contains the same substantive and

procedural components as Miller. Houston-Sconiers followed Miller and its

progeny, which centered on the substantive guaranty of the Eighth Amendment:

punishment proportionate to culpability. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732-33

(“Protection against disproportionate punishment is the central substantive

guarantee of the Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining

a defendant’s sentence.”). Like Miller, Houston-Sconiers includes a procedural
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component that specifies a method of achieving its substantive requirement: courts

must consider youthfulness with the knowledge that they have absolute discretion to

impose any sentence less than the standard adult sentence based on a finding of

diminished culpability due to youth.

Again, this does not render Houston-Sconiers procedural. Rather than merely

establishing a manner of determining the defendants’ culpability, Houston-Sconiers

prohibits certain punishments when imposed without the consideration and

discretion that the Eighth Amendment requires. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735

(“The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller’s substantive holding

that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect

transient immaturity.”). Houston-Sconiers prohibits a certain category of

punishment (adult standard SRA ranges and enhancements) for a class of juvenile

defendants because of their status (juveniles who possess such diminished capacity

that those punishments would be unconstitutionally disproportionate). That

Houston-Sconiers prohibits a broader category of punishments than LWOP or an

effective life sentence is inapposite. The difference is one of scope, not of kind.6

6
To the extent the dissent argues that Houston-Sconiers is not substantive because, as it
contends, the reasoning of Roper, Graham, and Miller should not apply to lesser sentences, the
dissent’s dispute is with the holding of Houston-Sconiers itself, not with our conclusion about the
substantive nature of that holding. In order for us to reconsider an established rule of law that is
otherwise entitled to stare decisis, there must be a clear showing that the rule is incorrect and
harmful, or that the legal underpinnings have changed or disappeared altogether. State v. Pierce,
195 Wn.2d 230, 240, 455 P.3d 647 (2020) (plurality opinion). No party has argued that Houston-
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Like Miller, Houston-Sconiers protects juveniles from receiving certain

disproportionate sentences. Houston-Sconiers rendered certain adult sentences

beyond the courts’ authority to impose on juveniles who possess such diminished

culpability that the standard SRA ranges and sentences would be disproportionate

punishment. The Eighth Amendment requires both consideration of youthfulness

and absolute discretion in order to avoid imposing unconstitutionally

disproportionate sentences on juveniles. Houston-Sconiers announced a new

substantive rule that must be applied retroactively.

Houston-Sconiers satisfies RCW 10.73.100(6)’s exemption to the time bar:

(1) it constitutes a significant change in the law (2) that is material to Ali’s sentence

and (3) requires retroactive application. Therefore, Ali’s PRP is timely under RCW

10.73.100(6), and he may be entitled to relief. In order to obtain relief, he must show

that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the error in sentencing and there

are no other adequate remedies available under the circumstances.

B. Ali Demonstrates Actual and Substantial Prejudice

“We have three available options when reviewing a personal restraint petition:

(1) dismiss the petition, (2) transfer the petition to a superior court for a full

determination on the merits or a reference hearing, or (3) grant the petition.” In re

Sconiers is incorrect and harmful, or that its legal underpinnings have changed, nor does the
dissent.
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Pers. Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 17, 296 P.3d 872 (2013). A petitioner must

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was actually and

substantially prejudiced by the constitutional error in order to obtain relief on

collateral review. In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 671-72, 101 P.3d

1 (2004). A reference hearing “is appropriate where the petitioner makes the required

prima facie showing, but ‘the merits of the contentions cannot be determined solely

on the record.’” Yates, 177 Wn.2d at 18 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Hews, 99

Wn.2d 80, 88, 660 P.2d 263 (1983)).

In Houston-Sconiers, we explained that the sentencing court should have

considered

mitigating circumstances related to the defendant’s youth—including
age and its “hallmark features,” such as the juvenile’s “immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” It must
also consider factors like the nature of the juvenile’s surrounding
environment and family circumstances, the extent of the juvenile’s
participation in the crime, and “the way familial and peer pressures may
have affected him [or her.]” And it must consider how youth impacted
any legal defense, along with any factors suggesting that the child might
be successfully rehabilitated.

188 Wn.2d at 23 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S.

at 477); see also Gilbert, 193 Wn.2d at 176. We also held that “sentencing courts

must have absolute discretion to depart as far as they want below otherwise

applicable SRA ranges and/or sentencing enhancements.” Houston-Sconiers, 188

Wn.2d at 9.

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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali
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Ali has demonstrated actual and substantial prejudice. His sentencing judge

was presented with, and considered, testimony and evidence regarding the mitigating

factors of Ali’s youthfulness, but she found that she lacked the discretion to impose

an exceptional sentence downward based on those mitigating factors. The State

requested a high end standard sentence of 390 months. Ali’s defense counsel

requested an exceptional downward sentence of 10 years (120 months), arguing that

Ali was a “young adolescent” at the time of the crimes, and “[v]ery little will be

gained by crushing his hope and spirit by sending him away for two lifetimes, which

is what the State is asking for.” 13 VRP at 1420, 1422. Ali presented letters and

testimony from members of his community, who referenced his age, inexperience,

and susceptibility to peer pressure, and the fact that “children make mistakes.” 13

VRP at 1424-29.

Ali has demonstrated prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge

imposed 312 months, the minimum sentence she had discretion to impose under the

SRA. She imposed the lowest available sentence after hearing and considering

testimony from family, friends, and community members who knew Ali well and

described his inexperience, challenges with peer pressure, and potential for

rehabilitation. She made a point to note for the record that she was imposing what

she believed to be the lowest available sentence and that Ali’s age was the primary

reason she imposed the low end sentence.

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Ali’s case is unlike Meippen, where the sentencing judge imposed a high end

standard range sentence but said nothing about whether his discretion was limited to

the standard range and, instead, emphasized his reasons for imposing a sentence at

the high end of the range. 193 Wn.2d at 313. While nothing in the record in Meippen

suggested that the sentencing judge would have exercised discretion to depart from

the SRA in light of the defendant’s youth, id. at 317, here, the sentencing judge made

a point to state that she was ordering the lowest sentence she had discretion to and

that she was doing so primarily because of Ali’s age.

Ali’s sentencing comported with only one of the two constitutional

requirements we announced in Houston-Sconiers. The sentencing judge considered

the mitigating factors of Ali’s youth and arguments for an exceptional sentence, but

because she did not have the discretion to impose any sentence below the standard

SRA range and mandatory enhancements, she sentenced according to the SRA’s

mandates for adult sentencing. Based on the record, it appears that more likely than

not, the judge would have imposed a lower sentence had she understood that the

Eighth Amendment requires absolute discretion to impose any sentence below the

standard range based on youthful diminished culpability. Since Houston-Sconiers

applies retroactively, Ali was actually and substantially prejudiced by the sentencing

court’s (understandable) error.

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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali
No. 95578-6

C. Ali Is Entitled to Resentencing

A court will only grant relief by a PRP if other remedies available to the

petitioner are inadequate under the circumstances. RAP 16.4(d). The State argues

that Washington’s Miller-fix statute, RCW 9.94A.730, is an adequate remedy

because it would allow Ali to petition for early release after serving 20 years of his

26 year sentence. We disagree.

The Miller-fix statute does not necessarily provide a remedy to a Houston-

Sconiers violation. RCW 9.94A.730 permits a person convicted of crimes committed

when they were under 18 years old to petition for early release after serving 20 years

in confinement. After receiving the petition, the Department of Corrections will

assess the petitioner’s dangerousness and the likelihood that they will engage in

future criminal behavior. RCW 9.94A.730(3). The assessment at this stage is not

whether the person possessed adult culpability at the time of the crimes but whether

they pose a continued danger after 20 years of incarceration. In Houston-Sconiers,

we emphasized that sentencing courts must consider the mitigating qualities of youth

and have absolute discretion “at the time of sentencing itself, regardless of what

opportunities for discretionary release may occur down the line.” 188 Wn.2d at 20

(emphasis added). We acknowledged that “[s]tatutes like RCW 9.94A.730 may

provide a remedy on collateral review,” but we viewed that statute as “just one

possible remedy . . . on postconviction review.” Id. at 23, 22 (emphasis added).

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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali
No. 95578-6

Additionally, Houston-Sconiers applies to all juveniles sentenced as adults

under the SRA, including those who received far less than life sentences. Id. at 21.

While RCW 9.94A.730 might provide an adequate remedy for a Miller violation, it

may be grossly inadequate under the circumstances of a Houston-Sconiers violation.

As explained above, Houston-Sconiers is not limited to life sentences, and, in this

case, the Miller-fix statute would still require Ali to serve most of the sentence

imposed in violation of Houston-Sconiers before he could even be considered for

early release. Although Miller is limited to life sentences and de facto life sentences,

Houston-Sconiers applies to any adult standard sentence imposed on a juvenile, so

RCW 9.94A.730 cannot provide an adequate remedy under all circumstances.7

A statute that permits early release after 20 years of incarceration based on

rehabilitation is not always an adequate remedy when a sentencing court fails to

comply with the dual mandates of Houston-Sconiers. That case announced a rule

requiring something more than Miller. It is imperative for courts to consider

youthfulness at sentencing and for courts to have absolute discretion to impose any

sentence below the SRA, including as little as no prison time, for crimes committed

7
Compare State v. Scott, 190 Wn.2d 586, 594, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) (the Miller-fix statute
provided an adequate remedy for a juvenile sentenced to 900 months because it transformed a de
facto life sentence without the possibility of parole to a life sentence with “‘some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’”) (quoting Miller,
567 U.S. at 479), with Domingo-Cornelio, slip op. at 14 n.8 (the Miller-fix statute would not
provide an adequate remedy for a petitioner sentenced to 20 years because it would not allow early
release until he served the full sentence imposed in violation of Houston-Sconiers).
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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali
No. 95578-6

by children. Thus, under Houston-Sconiers, Ali’s sentencing range went from 312-

390 months to 0-390 months. RCW 9.94A.730 would permit Ali to petition for early

release only after serving 240 months of the 312 month sentence imposed in

violation of Houston-Sconiers. Under these circumstances, other available remedies

are inadequate, and Ali is entitled to resentencing.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that Houston-Sconiers is a significant and material change in the law

and that it announced a new substantive constitutional rule that must be applied

retroactively upon collateral review. Ali has established actual and substantial

prejudice, and his PRP is granted. We remand to superior court for resentencing

consistent with Houston-Sconiers.

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In re Pers. Restraint ofAli
No. 95578-6

WE CONCUR:

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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali

No. 95578-6

JOHNSON, J. (dissenting)—I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that

our cases establish a substantive rule of constitutional interpretation requiring

retroactive application—though I agree our cases can be read to establish a

procedural factor requiring sentencing judges to consider general qualities of youth

in considering the discretionary sentencing decision. Our cases, however, also

recognize that the sentencing framework under the Sentencing Reform Act of

1981, ch. 9.94A RCW, continues to guide sentencing decisions for juveniles in

adult court. In order to maintain principles of consistency and finality in

sentencing, I view our cases as establishing additional procedural factors

applicable to the sentencing process, and, as being procedural not retroactive. I

dissent.

ANALYSIS

This case asks us to decide whether State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1,

391 P.3d 409 (2017), announced a new, substantive rule of constitutional law that

applies retroactively. There, we held that “courts must consider mitigating qualities
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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)

of youth at sentencing and must have discretion to impose any sentence below the

otherwise applicable [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981] range and/or sentence

enhancements.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21. The majority reasons that

Houston-Sconiers must apply retroactively because it established the same kinds of

substantive and procedural components as the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407

(2012), and Miller applies retroactively. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __,

136 S. Ct. 718, 732, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). I disagree.

In my view, Houston-Sconiers does not contain a substantive rule because,

unlike Miller, it does not set a category of punishment altogether beyond the

State’s power to impose for a class of offenders. To understand the distinction

between substantive and procedural rules, we must engage with the Eighth

Amendment analysis at the heart of the United States Supreme Court’s juvenile

sentencing decisions. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

The United States Supreme Court has told us that the Eighth Amendment

prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, including “‘extreme sentences that are

grossly disproportionate to the crime.’” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60, 130 S.

Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836

(1991) (controlling opinion of Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in

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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, No. 95578-6
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judgment)). Miller implicated two lines of United States Supreme Court precedent

regarding the proportionality of punishments. 567 U.S. at 470.

The first line of precedent “has adopted categorical bans on sentencing

practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and

the severity of a penalty.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 470. These categorical bans create

substantive rules of constitutional law: they place certain punishments “altogether

beyond the State’s power to impose.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729. Substantive

rules are retroactive because when the State imposes an unconstitutional sentence,

that punishment is always unlawful. When a substantive rule has eliminated the

State’s power to impose a particular punishment, the “possibility of a valid result

does not exist”—even “the use of flawless sentencing procedures [cannot]

legitimate a punishment where the Constitution immunizes the defendant from the

sentence imposed.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 730.

The second line of precedent holds that sentencing laws that make the

harshest punishments mandatory pose “too great a risk of disproportionate

punishment,” so those sentences can be imposed only when a sentencing court is

able to “consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense” to

ensure the harshness of the punishment matches the individual offender’s

culpability for the crime. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 470. These cases condition the

imposition of the law’s harshest sentences on a particular procedure—namely, a

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(Johnson, J., dissenting)

sentencing judge’s consideration of the offender’s individual culpability—“to

enhance the accuracy of a . . . sentence by regulating ‘the manner of determining

the defendant’s culpability.’” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 730 (quoting Schriro v.

Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004)). New

procedural rules are generally not retroactive because they merely enhance the

accuracy of future sentencing rather than taking a category of punishments out of

the State’s hands altogether. Accordingly, the announcement of a new procedural

rule does not “have the automatic consequence of invalidating a defendant’s

conviction or sentence.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 730. Automatically

invalidating sentences imposed under procedures that were understood to be

constitutional at the time would “seriously undermine[] the principle of finality

which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system” and deprive

criminal law “of much of its deterrent effect.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309,

109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989).

Drawing from both lines of precedent, in my view, Miller announced both a

new substantive rule and a new procedural requirement. Miller’s substantive rule

“rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants

because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the

transient immaturity of youth”—because the distinctive attributes of youth are

inconsistent with the penological justifications for imposing life without parole.

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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109

S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989)). In order to enforce that categorical

constitutional guaranty, Miller’s procedural component requires a sentencing judge

to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics “to separate

those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may

not.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735. These rules work together: “when the

Constitution prohibits a particular form of punishment for a class of persons, an

affected prisoner receives a procedure through which he can show that he belongs

to the protected class.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735. Both rules apply to juvenile

sentences imposed after Miller.

However, only Miller’s substantive rule applies to juvenile sentences

imposed before Miller was decided. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. States

must ensure that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity will

not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, but Miller “does not require States to relitigate sentences” so a

sentencing judge can consider youthfulness under the procedures Miller

established “in every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory life

without parole.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. Instead, States can establish their

own procedures to remedy such sentences retroactively, including “by permitting

juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct.

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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)

at 736 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301(c) (2013) (“juvenile homicide

offenders eligible for parole after 25 years”)). 1 Under the Eighth Amendment, the

procedural sentencing requirements Miller prescribed do not apply retroactively.

Houston-Sconiers announced a similar procedural rule that should not apply

retroactively. It does not bar any particular punishment for a category of offender

but, instead, requires the sentencing court to consider a juvenile offender’s

youthful attributes with the knowledge it has the discretion to impose a sentence

below the standard SRA range because of those attributes. 188 Wn.2d at 21. So

long as those proper procedures are followed, Houston-Sconiers does not

categorically place any sentence beyond the authority of the judge to impose. The

majority seemingly recognizes this: “a juvenile could receive a sentence within the

adult standard range if the sentencing court complies with the dual requirements of

Houston-Sconiers.” Majority at 19. Because Houston-Sconiers does not

categorically bar any SRA sentence for juvenile offenders, it should not be viewed

1
Two years ago, this court approved Washington’s similar “Miller fix” statute—
RCW 9.94A.730, which allows juvenile offenders sentenced as adults to petition for early
release after serving 20 years—without dissent. State v. Scott, 190 Wn.2d 586, 597, 416
P.3d 1182 (2018) (“Montgomery provides that the Washington Miller fix statute’s parole
provision cures the Miller violation in Scott’s case.”), 603 (Gordon McCloud, J.,
concurring) (agreeing “that under current Eighth Amendment precedent, RCW 9.94A.730
. . . provides an adequate remedy for the Miller violation” and writing separately “to
clarify that the adequacy of the statutory remedy available to Scott . . . remains an open
question [only] under Washington law”).

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(Johnson, J., dissenting)

as announcing a substantive rule. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729 (“Substantive

rules . . . set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain . . .

punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.”). Because Houston-

Sconiers did not announce a substantive rule, it does not apply retroactively.

The majority disagrees, reasoning that “Miller and Montgomery compel the

conclusion that Houston-Sconiers is a new substantive constitutional rule” because

“[o]ur holding in Houston-Sconiers contains the same substantive and procedural

components as Miller.” Majority at 18, 21. I disagree because this conclusion, in

my view, blurs the distinction between Miller’s substantive and procedural

components and consequently it mischaracterizes the nature of Houston-Sconiers’s

holding in three ways.

First, I disagree with the majority’s claim that Houston-Sconiers is like

Miller because both “announced a procedural component as a mechanism to

protect the substantive rule.” Majority at 20. But unlike Miller, the majority’s

description of Houston-Sconiers fails to provide an adequate distinction between

the substantive and procedural components. The United States Supreme Court has

discussed how Miller’s substantive rule is distinct from the procedure protecting

the rule: “Even if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a

lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child

whose crime reflects ‘“unfortunate yet transient immaturity.”’” Montgomery, 136

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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)

S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.

551, 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005))). Miller announced a

substantive rule precisely because it took a category of punishment (life without

parole sentences) off the table for a class of offenders (juveniles whose crimes

reflect the transient immaturity of youth) regardless of the procedures followed in

imposing that punishment. In contrast, Houston-Sconiers announced a procedural

rule because it took a category of punishment (standard SRA sentences and

enhancements) off the table for a class of offenders (juveniles) unless the

sentencing judge considers the mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing with the

knowledge it has the discretion to impose a lesser sentence because of those

qualities. 188 Wn.2d at 21. What this means is that the sentencing judge retains

discretion to determine the appropriate sentence under the SRA and the sentencing

range remains the same.

That is the difference I see in these cases. Miller’s substantive rule is

categorical and distinct from its procedural requirements, while Houston-

Sconiers’s holding is conditional and can best be described in terms of its

procedural requirements.

Second, I disagree with the majority that the “fact that a juvenile could

receive a sentence within the adult standard range” after Houston-Sconiers “does

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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, No. 95578-6
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not render Houston-Sconiers procedural.” Majority at 19. The majority bases this

conclusion on the fact that Miller applies retroactively even though “Miller did not

foreclose a sentencing court’s ability to impose LWOP [life without parole] on all

juveniles; it acknowledged that such a punishment may be appropriate for ‘the rare

juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’” Majority at 19-20

(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80). But I view that reading of Miller as being

rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Mongtomery. Miller did not

purport to categorically bar life without parole for all juvenile offenders: “Miller

drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those

rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct.

at 734. That Miller’s substantive rule does not bar life without parole for every

single juvenile offender does not make it equivalent to Houston-Sconiers’s

procedural rules.

Finally, I disagree that the difference between Miller and Houston-Sconiers

“is one of scope, not of kind.” Majority at 22. The United States Supreme Court

has reasoned: “Life-without-parole terms . . . ‘share some characteristics with

death sentences that are shared by no other sentences.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 474

(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). But Houston-Sconiers concerns the “other

sentences” that do not share characteristics of life without parole or the death

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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)

penalty. According to Miller itself, that difference is one of kind and not merely of

scope.

And the difference between the “ultimate penalt[ies] for juveniles” and

lesser sentences is crucial. Miller, 567 U.S. at 475. After all, the Eighth

Amendment “‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,’

but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the

crime.’” Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001). The analytical justifications that inform the

substantive rules announced in Roper, Graham, and Miller should not apply to the

lesser sentences, however long in duration.

While I agree Houston-Sconiers proscribes new, better methods of

determining a juvenile offender’s culpability, not every juvenile offender

previously sentenced as an adult is suffering from an unconstitutionally cruel and

unusual punishment. That conclusion is not supported by the United States

Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper, Graham, Miller, or Montgomery or the

Eighth Amendment itself. Accordingly, I dissent.

CONCLUSION

I would hold that Houston-Sconiers’s rules are procedural and apply only

prospectively. I would therefore dismiss the personal restraint petition.

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For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
In re Pers. Restraint ofAli, No. 95578�6
(Johnson, J,, dissenting)

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