[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 26, 2006
No. 05-15309 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00037-CR-3-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NATHANIEL FIELDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 26, 2006)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nathaniel Fields appeals his conviction for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii). Fields
asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We
conclude the district court did not err, and affirm Fields’ conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
Fields filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered from him and his
vehicle on February 1, 2005. Fields was detained after officers discovered his car,
which matched a description provided by an anonymous informant, in the
driveway of a well-known drug house. Prior to the detention, Fields drove away
from three marked patrol cars in an accelerated manner, and then walked away
from a police officer who was attempting to get his attention. During the course of
the detention, Fields was handcuffed and placed briefly in a patrol car. The district
court denied the motion to suppress.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We apply a mixed standard of review to the denial of a defendant’s motion
to suppress, reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
application of law to those facts de novo.” United States v. Lyons, 403 F.3d 1248,
1250 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 732 (2005). Moreover, “all facts are
construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.” United States
v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Reasonable suspicion to stop Fields
Fields asserts his detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion, as his
facts are synonymous with the facts of Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000). He
contends the officers acted solely on an anonymous tip, in which the tipster
provided the officers with a physical description of two vehicles, but provided no
predictive information as to future conduct. Fields further notes the caller failed to
provide a description of the occupants of either vehicle, and there were
discrepancies between the vehicle described by the tipster and his car. Fields also
contends presence in a high crime area and walking away from police are
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a stop. Lastly, Fields asserts the
court’s finding he was in a known drug-trafficking area was erroneous because
there was no support for this finding, other than Deputy Bruster’s allegations at the
suppression hearing, allegedly based on previous anonymous calls.
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment's “protections extend to brief
investigatory stops of persons or vehicles.” United States v. Arvizu, 122 S. Ct. 744,
750 (2002). For brief investigatory stops, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the
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police officer has reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity may be afoot.
Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968)). When evaluating
whether reasonable suspicion exists to make such a seizure, the district court must
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the arresting officer
had a “‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’”
United States v. Hunter, 291 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Arvizu,
122 S. Ct. at 750). “[A] reviewing court must give due weight to the officer’s
experience.” United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1991).
We have found a defendant’s presence in a high crime area and his nervous
or evasive behavior are relevant factors in determining reasonable suspicion.
Hunter, 291 F.3d at 1306-07 (finding reasonable suspicion where defendant was
located in an area with a reputation for high crime and walked away from illegal
activity upon arrival of police); United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 755-56
(11th Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable suspicion where defendant was in an area
known for drug sales and walked toward his car upon the arrival of police);
Briggman, 931 F.2d at 709 (finding reasonable suspicion where defendant was
parked in a high crime area and then attempted to evade an officer by driving
away).
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Reasonable suspicion need not be based on an officer’s personal
observations, but rather may be based on information supplied by another person,
so long as the information bears sufficient indicia of reliability. Adams v.
Williams, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1924 (1972) (habeas context). An anonymous tip alone
lacks sufficient indicia of reliability where the tip merely provides an accurate
description of a subject’s readily observable location, but provides no predictive
information that would provide the police with the means to test the informant’s
knowledge or credibility. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1379. “[A] suspect’s adverse reaction
to police may independently corroborate information provided by an anonymous
informant.” United States v. Heard, 367 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir.) (emphasis in
original), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 235 (2004).
In light of the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Bruster had reasonable
suspicion to stop Fields. Although the tip alone may have been insufficient to
support a finding of reasonable suspicion, the tip, along with Fields’ presence at a
house known by officers in the area for high drug activity, a short distance from
the intersection described by the informant, and Fields’ evasive behavior in first
driving away in an accelerated manner from three marked patrol cars and then later
walking away and ignoring Deputy Bruster’s attempts to get his attention, are
sufficient for a finding of reasonable suspicion. These facts are analogous to
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Hunter, Gordon and Briggman, which found a defendant’s presence in a high
crime area and attempts to evade police sufficient for a finding of reasonable
suspicion. See Hunter, 291 F.3d at 1306-07; Gordon, 231 F.3d at 755-56;
Briggman, 931 F.2d at 709.
The district court did not clearly err in finding the house where Fields was
discovered and the surrounding area had a reputation for drug-trafficking. The
court, in making this finding, found Deputy Bruster credible on the reputation of
the area. Credibility determinations are within the province of the finder of fact.
United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). Fields
contends Deputy Bruster had no basis for this testimony other than previous
anonymous calls. Nothing from the record indicates, however, the previous calls
were in fact anonymous, and Deputy Bruster, with about three and one half years
on the force, was aware of the areas in the community prone to criminal activity.
Additionally, J.L. differs from this case in important respects; J.L. did not
involve a defendant located in a high crime area, and there was no indication the
defendant engaged in any behavior to evade the police. 120 S. Ct. at 1377.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding Deputy Bruster had reasonable
suspicion to stop Fields.
B. Detention/Arrest of Fields
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Next, Fields contends his detention constituted an arrest for which a showing
of probable cause was necessary. Fields asserts Deputy Bruster’s actions in
handcuffing him and placing him in a patrol car were unreasonable because the
officer did not have an objective reason to believe he was armed and dangerous
after (1) a pat-down of his person revealed no weapons, and (2) a computer check
on his Washington license returned negative.
“[A]n officer’s investigation of a traffic stop must be ‘reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’”
United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Terry, 88 S.
Ct. at 1879). “[W]hen the totality of circumstances indicate that an encounter has
become too intrusive to be classified as a brief seizure, the encounter is an arrest
and probable cause is required.” United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502,
1506 (11th Cir. 1986). In determining whether a seizure is an arrest or stop, we
consider the following four non-exclusive factors: (1) the law enforcement
purposes served by the detention; (2) the diligence with which the police pursued
their investigation; (3) the scope and intrusiveness of the detention; and (4) the
duration of the detention. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1146 (11th Cir.
2004). In analyzing whether law enforcement purposes are served by the
detention, we consider whether the officer detained the defendant to pursue a
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method of investigation likely to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions quickly
with minimal interference. Id. The fact the investigation could have been
accomplished by less intrusive means does not automatically render a Terry stop
unreasonable. United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575-76 (1985).
An officer’s action in handcuffing a defendant or securing him in a patrol car
does not automatically convert a Terry stop into an arrest. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1147.
The inquiry as to whether the use of a particular restraint converts a stop into an
arrest is reasonableness. United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 791 n.4 (11th
Cir. 1985). Police are permitted to take reasonable action to protect themselves or
to maintain the status quo. Id.
The district court did not err in treating Fields’ detention as a Terry stop, as
opposed to an arrest, because Deputy Bruster’s actions in handcuffing Fields and
placing him in his patrol car were reasonable under the circumstances. We have
recognized that “[d]rug dealing is known to be extremely violent.” United States v.
Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 1993). In light of the nature of the
suspected offense, it was reasonable for Deputy Bruster to believe Fields was
going to pull out a weapon when Fields reached for his back pocket while walking
away. Moreover, Deputy Bruster’s action in handcuffing Fields was reasonably
necessary to preserve the status quo. Given Fields’ behavior in ignoring
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Deputy Bruster and walking away when Deputy Bruster attempted to engage him
in conversation, Deputy Bruster could have reasonably believed restraining Fields
was necessary to prevent him from escaping so that Deputy Bruster could conduct
his investigation.
Deputy Bruster claims to have placed Fields in the patrol car because it was
raining. An officer’s action in placing a defendant in a patrol car due to weather
conditions does not convert the officer’s Terry stop into an arrest. Thomas v.
Newsome, 821 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th Cir. 1987) (habeas context).
Deputy Bruster’s action in placing Fields in the patrol car was reasonable to ensure
the officer’s safety and to provide for Fields’ comfort. Moreover, any belief by
Fields that he was being arrested would have been dispelled by Deputy Bruster
repeatedly informing Fields that he was not under arrest.
The other factors considered by courts in determining if a detention is a stop
or an arrest also weigh in the Government’s favor. Deputy Bruster had reasonable
suspicion to believe Fields was involved in a serious crime, and pursued a method
of investigation likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly. See Acosta, 363
F.3d at 1146. After obtaining Fields’ licenses, Deputy Bruster checked quickly to
see if the licenses were valid and if Fields had any warrants showing a background
in narcotics-related activities. An officer may ask a suspect to identify himself or
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request to see a suspect’s identification during the course of a Terry stop. See
Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d at 1221. There is no indication from the record that
Deputy Bruster did not conduct his investigation with diligence, and he detained
Fields for no more than ten minutes before issuing a formal arrest. Moreover, he
issued a formal arrest immediately after determining he had probable cause to
arrest Fields due to Fields’ suspended license. Accordingly, the district court did
not err in finding Fields’ detention reasonable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Bruster had reasonable
suspicion to detain Fields and investigate if he was involved in a narcotics
violation. Moreover, Deputy Bruster’s action in handcuffing Fields and placing
him in a patrol car was reasonable in order to protect his safety, to maintain the
status quo by assuring Fields would not escape, and to provide for Fields’ comfort
in the rainy weather. The district court did not err in denying Fields’ motion to
suppress, and we affirm Fields’ conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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