Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-20-00277-CV
Bruce KNEESE,
Appellant
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.;
Mark C. Sparrow; and Dawn M. Sparrow,
Appellees
From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 15115
Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 18, 2021
AFFIRMED
This appeal arises from a general contractor’s claims against the homeowners and the
construction loan lender relating to work the contractor performed but for which he was not paid.
Separately, the homeowners and the lender moved for summary judgment on traditional and no-
evidence grounds, and the trial court granted the motions. Because Appellant’s brief failed to
present legal arguments challenging the no-evidence grounds, we affirm the trial court’s order.
04-20-00277-CV
BACKGROUND
In 2006, Appellees Mark and Dawn Sparrow hired Appellant Bruce Kneese to construct
an addition to their home. Kneese and the Sparrows executed a “Contract for Improvements with
Deed of Trust and Power of Sale.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s predecessor in interest, Wells Fargo
Home Mortgage, Inc., funded the construction loan, and Kneese assigned his mechanic’s and
materialmen’s lien to Wells Fargo’s predecessor in interest. 1
In 2009, Kneese sued the Sparrows for breach of contract and other causes of action. Three
years later, an arbitrator awarded Kneese damages, costs, attorney’s fees, and interest, and the trial
court rendered judgment on the award for about $134,000. Despite Kneese’s repeated attempts to
execute on the judgment, he was not able to collect the monies owed.
In 2014, the Sparrows refinanced a 2004 loan and the 2006 construction loan with a new
promissory note secured by a new deed of trust. Under the terms of the 2006 contract, Wells Fargo
released its 2006 lien.
Kneese sued Wells Fargo, the Sparrows, and others for releasing the lien without ensuring
that his $134,000 judgment was paid. Later, Kneese nonsuited, or the trial court dismissed, the
other defendants except for Wells Fargo, the Sparrows, and one other. In their respective motions,
Wells Fargo and the Sparrows moved for summary judgment on traditional and no-evidence
grounds, which the trial court granted.
After the court severed Kneese’s claims against the other remaining defendant, Wells
Fargo’s and the Sparrows’ interlocutory summary judgments became final, and Kneese appealed.
We begin by reviewing the applicable law.
1
Appellant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. asserts that it is the successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.
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04-20-00277-CV
APPLICABLE LAW
A. Challenging Independent Grounds
Traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment are independent grounds for
the trial court to grant summary judgment for the movant. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (traditional
motion); id. R. 166a(i) (no-evidence motion); see FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22
S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex.
2004) (same).
To obtain a reversal of a trial court’s judgment or order, “[a]n appellant must challenge all
independent bases or grounds that fully support a judgment or appealable order.” In re M.J.M.G.,
543 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.); accord Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v.
Adkins, 615 S.W.3d 580, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Otherwise, if an
independent ground fully supports the judgment, but the appellant fails to challenge the
independent ground by presenting a legal argument for appellate review, we must affirm the
judgment or order. See Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see also Oliphant Fin. LLC v. Angiano, 295 S.W.3d 422, 424
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
B. Brief Requirements
“The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require adequate briefing.” ERI Consulting
Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)); accord
Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, no pet.). “A brief in the court of appeals ‘must contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.’” Ross v. St. Luke’s
Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015) (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)); accord ERI
Consulting Eng’rs, 318 S.W.3d at 880. A brief that does not provide “clear and concise argument
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04-20-00277-CV
for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record,” TEX. R. APP.
P. 38.1(i), fails to present a legal argument for appellate review, Lowry v. Tarbox, 537 S.W.3d 599,
620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied); see RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d
116, 126 (Tex. 2018).
DISCUSSION
In their separate motions, Wells Fargo and the Sparrows moved for summary judgment
against all of Kneese’s claims on traditional and no-evidence grounds. Their traditional and no-
evidence motions for summary judgment were independent grounds to support the trial court’s
judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c), (i); Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600; FM Props. Operating
Co., 22 S.W.3d at 872. The trial court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo and the
Sparrows on both traditional and no-evidence grounds.
To obtain appellate relief, it was Kneese’s burden to present legal arguments to challenge
both the traditional and no-evidence grounds. See In re M.J.M.G., 543 S.W.3d at 864; see also
Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 615 S.W.3d at 612. Kneese’s brief presented arguments challenging the
traditional grounds, but his brief failed to present legal arguments on the no-evidence grounds.
To address the no-evidence grounds, Kneese’s brief provides a single sentence:
The Court erred by granting Wells Fargo[’s] and [the] Sparrows[’] no-evidence
motion for summary judgment because Plaintiff provided summary-judgment
evidence that raised a fact issue on [its] equitable claims and causes of action for
being left with no viable collection remedy (i.e., secured interest) to enforce the
judgment obtained through the arbitration provisions of the contract between the
three parties. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).
Kneese’s brief does not identify the evidence that supports each essential element of each
of his claims, it does not provide citations to the record to show where the evidence was presented
to the trial court, and it does not provide appropriate citations to supporting authorities. Contra
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see Lowry, 537 S.W.3d at 620 (briefing waiver); Canton-Carter, 271
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S.W.3d at 931 (same); Blake v. Intco Invs. of Tex., Inc., 123 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2003, no pet.) (“As an appellate court, we are not required to search the record for a
scintilla of evidence raising a material fact issue without more specific guidance.”); see also
Aleman v. Ben E. Keith Co., 227 S.W.3d 304, 309 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)
(“In determining whether a respondent to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment has
produced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, courts are not required to
search the record without guidance.”).
Kneese’s brief failed to present legal arguments challenging the trial court’s judgments
granting summary judgment for Wells Fargo and for the Sparrows on no-evidence grounds. See
Canton-Carter, 271 S.W.3d at 931; Blake, 123 S.W.3d at 525. Because Kneese’s brief failed to
challenge independent grounds that fully support the trial court’s summary judgments, we must
affirm the trial court’s severance order (which made the summary judgments final). See Britton,
95 S.W.3d at 681; see also Oliphant Fin., 295 S.W.3d at 424.
CONCLUSION
To obtain reversal of the trial court’s judgment, Kneese’s brief was required to challenge
and overcome each independent ground supporting the summary judgments. Because Kneese’s
brief failed to present legal arguments challenging Wells Fargo’s and the Sparrows’ no-evidence
grounds, and the no-evidence grounds support the judgments, we affirm the trial court’s order.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
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