[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 26, 2006
No. 05-15137 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00150-CV-5-SPM-AK
YRAIDA LEONIDES GUANIPA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
CARLYLE HOLDER,
Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 26, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Federal prisoner Yraida Leonides Guanipa appeals the district court’s denial
of her petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP’s) method of calculating good time
credits under 18 U.S.C. § 3624.1 Guanipa asserts 18 U.S.C. § 3624 should be
interpreted to require calculation of good time credits on the basis of the sentence
imposed and not on the basis of time served. Guanipa contends: (1) we should
reconsider our decision in Brown v. McFadden, 416 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2005),
which upheld the BOP’s time served interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624; (2) Brown
is distinguishable because, due to her lack of notice of 28 C.F.R. § 523.20,2 the rule
of lenity should apply in her case; and (3) Brown is distinguishable because it does
not address the issue of whether the retroactive application of the BOP’s
interpretation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court did not err, and
we affirm.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 de novo. Cook v.
Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Section 3624 provides a prisoner who is serving more than one year of imprisonment
“may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s sentence, beyond the time served, of up
to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of
the first year of the term . . . .”
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28 C.F.R. § 523.20 calculates good time credit based on time actually served, not the
total sentence.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Reconsideration of Brown
We cannot reach a result contrary to a prior panel’s decision unless that
decision is inconsistent with an earlier decision. Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857,
862 (11th Cir. 2005).
While an intervening decision of the Supreme Court can overrule the
decision of a prior panel of our court, the Supreme Court decision
must be clearly on point. See Florida League of Professional
Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir.1996) (“[W]e are
not at liberty to disregard binding case law that is so closely on point
and has been only weakened, rather than directly overruled, by the
Supreme Court.”) “Without a clearly contrary opinion of the Supreme
Court or of this court sitting en banc, we cannot overrule a decision of
a prior panel of this court . . . .” National Labor Relations Board v.
Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123, 129 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr.1981)
(emphasis added).
Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir.
2003).
We lack the authority to overrule Brown. Contrary to Guanipa’s assertion,
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), is not clearly on point because, in
Gonzales, the Attorney General lacked the authority to issue the rule prohibiting
doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide. Id.
at 925. In contrast, the BOP has the implied statutory authority to construe 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 534 n.5 (4th Cir.
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2005); Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2005); White v. Scibana,
390 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. White v. Hobart, 125 S.
Ct. 2921 (2005).
B. Rule of Lenity
In Brown, we found the rule of lenity inapplicable because the BOP’s
interpretation was reasonable. Brown, 416 F.3d at 1273. As explained in the cases
we cited in Brown, deference to the BOP’s interpretation foreclosed an inquiry into
whether the rule of lenity required an interpretation in the prisoners’ favor. Yi, 412
F.3d at 535; O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2005), pet. for cert.
filed (Jan. 3, 2006) (05-8504); Perez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 53-54.
In Brown, the issue of notice for the purposes of applying the rule of lenity is
never reached. Therefore, that Guanipa was sentenced before the enactment of 28
C.F.R. § 523.20 does not provide a basis on which to distinguish this case from
Brown.
C. Ex Post Facto Clause
To prevail on an ex post facto claim, a party must demonstrate (1) the law
was retrospective, in that it applied to events occurring before its enactment, and
(2) she was disadvantaged by it. United States v. Abraham, 386 F.3d 1033, 1037
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 417 (2005). In Knuck v. Wainwright, 759
4
F.2d 856, 858 (11th Cir. 1985), we held a change in an agency’s interpretation of
an ambiguous statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Knuck pled guilty in
April 1976 to crimes he committed in October 1975. Id. at 857. For ten years
prior to 1979, the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) interpreted the gain
time statute to provide for the award of gain time on the basis of the sentence
imposed. Id. at 857-58. In 1976, the statute was amended, and in 1979, the DOC
determined its calculation method was in error because it did not impose gain time
on the basis of time served. Id. at 858. The DOC then recalculated Knuck’s gain
time. Id. We rejected the DOC’s argument there was no ex post facto violation
because the law (i.e. the statute) had not changed, and held this recalculation was
an ex post facto violation because the gain time statute was ambiguous, the DOC’s
original interpretation was reasonable, and Knuck “had over 10 years notice
through the established practice and regulations of the D.O.C. that he would be
awarded lump sum gain time.” Id. at 858-59.
Although the parties dispute whether 28 C.F.R. § 523.20 was applied to
Guanipa, assuming that it was, she cannot prevail on her ex post facto claim. Like
the statute in Knuck, 18 U.S.C. § 3642(b)(1) is ambiguous. Brown, 416 F.3d at
1273. However, unlike the changed interpretation in Knuck, Guanipa concedes the
“BOP had consistently construed 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) against [her]
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interpretation both before and after [she] committed her offense in 1996.” Based
on this concession, Guanipa was not disadvantaged by 28 C.F.R. § 523.20.
III. CONCLUSION
There are no grounds for this Court to overrule the Brown decision.
Additionally, the rule of lenity does not apply and there is no ex post facto
violation. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Guanipa’s 28
U.S.C. § 2241 petition.
AFFIRMED.
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