[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 12, 2007
No. 06-13076 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00189-CR-01-CAP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FARON LEE STEWART,
a.k.a. Kenneth Lee Banks,
a.k.a. Faron Stewart,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 12, 2007)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Faron Lee Stewart appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 922(g) and 924(e). Police officers
went to Stewart’s home to serve him with an arrest warrant for violation of his
parole. After Stewart refused to answer the door, and was found hiding under the
covers of his father’s bed, the officers searched Stewart’s bedroom and found a
gun. Stewart argues that the evidence collected during the warrantless search of
his home should have been suppressed because the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. He argues that, although his parole conditions authorized
warrantless searches, the Fourth Amendment requires an officer to have reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity in order to search a parolee. He further argues that
the officers who searched his bedroom did not have reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to warrant the search.
“Rulings on motions to suppress evidence constitute mixed questions of law
and fact.” United States v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 925 (11th Cir. 2006) pet. for
cert. filed, No. 06-7877 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2006). We accept the district court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous but we review questions of law de
novo. Id. We construe the facts in the light most favorable to the party that
prevailed below. United States v. Nunez, 455 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006).
Recently, the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless, suspicionless search that
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was conducted pursuant to a California statute requiring parolees to agree, in
writing, “‘to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace
officer at any time of the day or night with or without a search warrant and with or
without cause.’” Samson v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2196, 165
L.Ed.2d 250 (2006) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 3067(a) (West 2000)). The Court
held that, while individualized suspicion usually is a prerequisite to a warrantless
search, it is not always required. Id. at 2201 n. 4. The Court then balanced the
privacy interests of the parolee against the degree to which the search served the
needs of the state. Id. at 2198-2200. On the one hand, the Court held, “parolees
have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin
to imprisonment than probation is akin to imprisonment.” Id. at 2198.
Furthermore, given “the plain terms of the parole search condition,” the parolee did
not have an expectation of privacy. Id. at 2199. On the other hand, the Court held,
the search requirement served the state’s “substantial” interest in supervising
parolees in order to reduce recidivism and promote reintegration. Id., 126 S.Ct. at
2200. Accordingly, the Court concluded that “the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Id.
at 2202.
Because Stewart’s parole certificate required him to submit to a search “at
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any time” without a warrant, the search was authorized by the terms of Stewart’s
parole conditions. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Stewart’s
motion to suppress evidence.
AFFIRMED
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