IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0713
Filed November 3, 2021
DONALD ANTONIO VAUGHN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey Farrell, Judge.
Donald Antonio Vaughn appeals the summary dismissal of his third
application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Schumacher, JJ.
2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
Donald Antonio Vaughn appeals the summary dismissal of his third
application for postconviction relief (PCR). Because Vaughn does not fit within the
narrow exception to avoid the statutory three-year limitation period established in
Allison v. State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 891 (Iowa 2018), we find no error in the dismissal
of his untimely PCR application.
In 2006, Vaughn was convicted of murdering Matthew Glover. Vaughn v.
State, No. 11-0147, 2013 WL 5743668, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2013).
Over Vaughn’s pro se objections, his direct appeal was dismissed by our supreme
court as frivolous. Id. at *2. Procedendo issued on December 24, 2008.
In 2009, Vaughn filed his first PCR application, raising eight claims of
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and four other claims. See id.
The district court rejected all claims and dismissed his PCR application; we
affirmed. Id. at *5–9. Procedendo issued on November 21, 2013.
Vaughn filed a second PCR application on May 26, 2015, which he later
voluntarily dismissed.
Vaughn filed this third PCR application on May 6, 2019, asserting trial,
appellate, and PCR counsel were ineffective. The State moved for summary
judgment, asserting the application was barred by the three-year limitation in Iowa
Code section 822.3 (2019).
The district court dismissed the action, noting Vaughn “does not claim any
new evidence that could not have been discovered within the three year statute of
limitations,” and ruling Vaughn’s claims were untimely. Vaughn appeals.
3
We review summary disposition rulings in PCR proceedings for legal error.
Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019).
Vaughn contends the district court improperly applied Allison in finding his
PCR application is untimely. We disagree. Allison held,
[W]here a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel
has been timely filed per section 822.3 [1] and there is a successive
PCR petition alleging postconviction counsel was ineffective in
presenting the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the
timing of the filing of the second PCR petition relates back to the
timing of the filing of the original PCR petition for purposes of . . .
section 822.3 if the successive PCR petition is filed promptly after
the conclusion of the first PCR action.
914 N.W.2d at 891 (emphasis added). Allison allowed a second PCR petition to
relate back to the timing of a first PCR petition, but it is a very narrow exception.
Id.; see Davis v. State, No. 20-0884, 2021 WL 4592813, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct.
6, 2021); Long v. State, No. 19-0726, 2020 WL 2061934, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr.
29, 2020). This court has repeatedly stated Allison only contemplated one round
of relating back to the original timely filed application. See Goode v. State, No. 20-
0282, 2021 WL 4889249, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021) (collecting cases
where we have held Allison does not apply to third or subsequent PCR
applications).
Furthermore, Vaughn did not file this action until 2019, and procedendo
issued on his first PCR action in 2013. Vaughn is hard-pressed to argue this third
PCR application—filed almost six years after his first—could be considered
1Effective July 1, 2019, the legislature abrogated Allison. See Iowa Code § 822.3
(Supp. 2019) (“An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in a prior case
under this chapter shall not toll or extend the limitation periods in this section nor
shall such claim relate back to a prior filing to avoid the application of the limitation
periods.”).
4
“promptly” filed under Allison. See Thompson v. State, No. 19-0322, 2020 WL
2060310, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020) (collecting cases addressing what
is considered a “promptly” filed successive petition and noting “this third PCR
action filed eighteen years after the conviction and fifteen years after the expiration
of the three-year statute of limitations for PCR applications . . . . cannot meet the
‘promptly’ filed condition”); see also Polk v. State, No. 18-0309, 2019 WL 3945964,
at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2019) (finding a gap of nearly six months was not
prompt).
On appeal, Vaughn alternatively asserts the three-year limitation period is
unconstitutional. We find no mention of this claim below and, therefore, it is not
preserved for our review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa
2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily
be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on
appeal.”); accord Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012).
We affirm the summary disposition of Vaughn’s PCR application.
AFFIRMED.