[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 5, 2007
No. 05-17228
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 02-21125-CV-FAM
SME RACKS, INC., a Florida corporation,
VALTEC INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Florida corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
SISTEMAS MECANICOS PARA, ELECTRONICA, S.A.,
a Spanish company,
CARMELO GARCIA APARICIO, S.A., SME, S.A.,
a Spanish company, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 5, 2007)
Before CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and STAGG,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
SME Racks, Inc. and Valtec Information Systems, Inc. appeal the district
court's denial of a pre-litigation, asset-freezing preliminary injunction. We review
the district court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. See Mitsubishi
Int’l Corp v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d 1507, 1517 (11th Cir. 1994).
However, no discretion is afforded the district court's legal determinations. See
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.
1995).
On appeal, the Appellants argue that the district court had "equitable
powers" to grant an injunction and that the court erred in refusing to invoke such
powers. Essentially, the Appellants maintain that they are automatically entitled to
an injunction solely by virtue of the equitable relief they seek, irrespective of the
legal principles that are considered in making such a determination. We find the
Appellants' arguments lack merit.
It is well-settled that “equitable relief is available only in the absence of an
adequate remedy at law.” See Mitsubishi, 14 F.3d at 1518; Deckert v.
*
Honorable Tom Stagg, United States District Judge for the Western District of
Louisiana, sitting by designation.
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Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 289, 61 S.Ct. 229, 233 (1940) (“That a
suit to rescind a contract induced by fraud and to recover the consideration paid
may be maintained in equity, at least where there are circumstances making the
legal remedy inadequate, is well established.”) (emphasis added). The critical
question is whether there exists an adequate remedy at law, not whether the
moving party prefers one remedy to another. See Rosen v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 21
F.3d 1520, 1531 (11th Cir. 1994) (instructing that the “test of the inadequacy of a
remedy at law is whether a judgment could be obtained, not whether, once
obtained it will be collectible.”) (internal marks omitted). Here, the district court
properly determined that there are various forms of alternative relief available to
the Appellants, namely damages for breach of contract. Indeed, breach of contract
damages would more adequately compensate the Appellants for their losses, as
opposed to the likely remedy the Appellants would receive for rescission of the
contract. In sum, nothing in the record suggests that the existing legal remedies
would insufficiently vindicate the Appellants’ rights.
The district court’s decision is further bolstered by our conclusion that the
Appellants have failed to satisfy the prerequisites for a preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy” that cannot be
granted unless the moving party clearly proves: (1) a substantial likelihood of
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success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted, (3) the
threatened injury to the moving party outweighs the damage the injunction may
cause to the opposing party, and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the
public interest. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000). The
Appellants simply cannot establish irreparable injury under the facts presented.
Irreparable injury “must be neither remote nor speculative, but actual and
imminent.” Id. at 1176 (internal marks omitted). Moreover, if an injury can be
“undone through monetary remedies,” it is not irreparable. Ne. Fla. Chapter of
Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283,
1285 (11th Cir. 1990).
The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries,
however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily
expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough. The possibility
that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available
at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily
against a claim of irreparable harm.
Id. (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90, 94 S.Ct. 937, 953 (1974)); see
also BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., LLC,
425 F.3d 964, 970 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[e]conomic losses alone do not
justify a preliminary injunction”). The Appellants argue only about the prospect
of depletion of the Appellees’ assets. However, prospective harm, by itself,
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clearly does not meet the test of imminence. Further, whatever harm the
Appellants may suffer can be remedied by monetary damages. We therefore find
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction.
Finally, the Appellants unconvincingly argue that the district court failed to
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which provides in pertinent
part that “in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall . . . set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of
its action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). We disagree with the Appellants’ contentions,
concluding that the factual and legal findings assigned in the district court’s oral
decision at the Conflict of Laws Hearing are sufficient to allow us to discern the
basis for the court’s decision.
AFFIRMED.
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