United States v. Williams

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
March 7, 2008

No. 07-30179 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

MELVIN WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana

Before KING, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Melvin Williams appeals his conviction for forcibly
assaulting a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111. He was convicted
after a jury trial and was sentenced to 150 months imprisonment, to run
consecutively to any other sentence he was currently serving. On appeal,
Williams argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and
that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence pursuant to provisions of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”). Finding no error, we
affirm.
 No. 07-30179

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2006, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment
charging Williams with assaulting a government employee, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 111. Specifically, the indictment charged that on March 8, 2006,
Williams forcibly assaulted, by use of a dangerous weapon, Travis Bordelon, a
corrections officer at the United States Penitentiary in Pollack, Louisiana (“USP
Pollock”) while Officer Bordelon was engaged in his official duties.
Williams proceeded to trial during which the following facts were
established. Officer Bordelon, a corrections officer at USP Pollock, was stationed
in front of the cafeteria on the morning of March 8, 2006, monitoring inmates as
they walked through the cafeteria’s metal detector. Williams walked around the
metal detector instead of through it, explaining that he did not have to go
through the metal detector because he had “metal inside him.” Officer Bordelon
then informed him that he would have to conduct a pat-down search. While
Officer Bordelon was conducting the search, Williams jumped away and accused
Officer Bordelon of grabbing his buttocks.
At trial, Officer Bordelon described how he conducted the search and
explained that when he touched the buttocks of an inmate, he would use the
back of his hands. Officer Bordelon denied touching Williams in an
inappropriate manner. Officer Bordelon also testified that he did not recall if he
had previously patted down Williams and that he did not recall any previous
complaints from Williams about the manner in which he conducted his pat-down
searches. Since Williams refused to permit Officer Bordelon to finish the
pat-down search, Williams was escorted to the lieutenant’s office. The incident
was captured by a surveillance camera.
Later that morning, Officer Bordelon was on duty in the east corridor of
the facility. While Officer Bordelon was monitoring inmates returning to their
housing units, he noticed Williams walk by him in the hallway. Officer Bordelon

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then heard someone yell his name, and as Officer Bordelon started to look
around, Williams came up from behind him and hit him on the temple and on
the top of his head. Officer Bordelon was struck several times, and as he fell on
the ground, Williams continued to hit him. At one point, Williams stopped
hitting him, and Officer Bordelon saw that Williams was “taking something out”
and was putting it in his hand. When Officer Bordelon realized that Williams
had a shank (homemade knife) in his hand, Officer Bordelon struggled to get up
and get away from him. During trial, in response to the question, “And did
[Williams] make a move towards you with the shank in his hand?,” Officer
Bordelon responded, “Yes, sir.”
Officer Bordelon further testified, “He had the shank inside of his hand.
He started to come at me and then he stopped.” Officer Bordelon also testified
that as Williams approached him with a shank in his hand, the shank was
pointed towards him and that he feared for his life because he believed Williams
was going to stab him. Officer Bordelon testified he had bruises on his head and
suffered vision loss and headaches as a result of the blows. This incident was
also captured by a surveillance camera.
Steve Edwards, a maintenance worker supervisor for the Bureau of
Prisons, witnessed the incident. When Edwards saw Williams hitting Officer
Bordelon, he ran towards them and screamed at Williams to stop. When
Williams saw Edwards approaching, Williams stood up from beating Officer
Bordelon, backed up, and produced the homemade weapon. In response to the
question whether Williams pointed the shank at anyone, Edwards testified:
When I was hollering at him, Bordelon was still kind of kicking, and
he reached down and kind of made a swiping motion at Bordelon at
that time. And I was backing up and hollering at Bordelon, you
know, that he had a knife and Bordelon was trying to get away from
him the best he could of on his back, crab walking.

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When identifying the shank, Edwards testified, “This is the weapon that Melvin
Williams had pulled out of his waistband and aimed in my direction and also
swiped at Officer Bordelon with.” While demonstrating “the swiping motion” he
had observed, Edwards testified as follows:
Mr. Williams, when I ran up to him, he had this in his waistband
and he pulled it out and he kind of did this toward me. I was
hollering at Bordelon; he was on the ground. And he turned his
attention to Bordelon then because Bordelon was kicking, and he
made like a swiping motion toward Officer Bordelon.
Edwards also stated that Williams had the weapon in his right hand and was
using it as an “offensive weapon” towards him and Officer Bordelon. During
cross-examination, Edwards was shown the videotape of the incident and was
asked if he saw Williams swinging the shank at Officer Bordelon in the video.
Edwards replied as follows:
I can’t see it in the video myself either, but in my eyes, I saw it. I
mean, I can’t deny that. And I am not going to say that – the video
is not in real time either. I think there’s gaps and starts in the
video. There’s second gaps every frame of that video because these
cameras are not operating real time, you know. It’s stop, start, stop,
start. That’s my understanding. I mean, but I can only say what I
believe that I saw.
On redirect, Edwards reiterated that Williams pulled out the weapon, pointed
it at him, and then swung the weapon at Officer Bordelon.
Kendall Francois, a counselor at USP Pollock, testified that at the time of
the incident, he received a call and went towards the east corridor where he
found Williams running away from the corridor. Francois turned around and
ran after Williams to the prison yard where Williams was surrounded by
approximately 30 other staff members. Francois was eventually able to talk
Williams into relinquishing the shank.
Williams testified on his own behalf and claimed that he attacked Officer
Bordelon because of the inappropriate manner in which Officer Bordelon had

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conducted the pat-down search. He admitted that he intended to confront
Officer Bordelon “to stop him, get my point across and stop him from touching
me.” Williams testified that there had been previous occasions when
Officer Bordelon touched him inappropriately, and although he had complained
to several prison officials, nothing was done about his complaints. Williams
explained that he feared that he would ultimately be forced to submit to
homosexual activity with Officer Bordelon or someone else in the prison. Several
inmates also testified that they had witnessed other instances where Officer
Bordelon had touched Williams inappropriately. Williams denied “using” the
shank as part of the assault, contending instead to have had it in order to draw
attention to the situation and so that his complaints against Officer Bordelon
would finally be addressed. Williams nevertheless admitted that he had the
shank in his hand when he took a step towards Officer Bordelon.
At the completion of the Government’s case, Williams moved for a
judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. In his motion, Williams argued that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. The district court denied his
motion. At the completion of the defendant’s case, Williams re-urged his Rule
29 motion, which was again denied. The jury returned a verdict of guilty,
finding that Williams had forcibly assaulted a federal officer by means and use
of a dangerous weapon.
The probation officer determined Williams’s total offense level to be 29.
Using a base offense level of 14 for an aggravated assault, the probation officer
added: (1) four levels because Williams used a dangerous weapon pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B); (2) three levels because Officer Bordelon sustained
injuries pursuant to § 2A2.2(b)(3)(A); (3) two levels because Williams was
convicted under § 111(b) pursuant to § 2A2.2(b)(6); and (4) six levels because
Officer Bordelon was a Government employee and the offense of conviction was

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motivated by Officer Bordelon’s status as a Government employee pursuant to
§ 3A1.2(b). Williams’s criminal history category was IV, resulting in an advisory
guidelines sentencing range of 121 to 151 months of imprisonment.
The district court subsequently sentenced Williams to a term of
150 months of imprisonment, to run consecutively with any term Williams was
currently serving. Williams timely filed a notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Williams contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient
to sustain the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of assault by use of a dangerous
weapon. While he admits that he assaulted Officer Bordelon with his fists and
that he possessed a shank during the altercation, he argues that he never
“swung or swiped the homemade knife during the assault or otherwise
attempted to strike the guard with it and thus, he did not ‘use’ a dangerous
weapon during the commission of the assault as required by 18 U.S.C. § 111(b).”
The Government asserts that the evidence was more than sufficient to support
the conviction since it established that Williams swung the shank at Officer
Bordelon.
1. Standard of Review
Because Williams moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the
Government’s case-in-chief and at the close of all evidence, he properly preserved
his sufficiency claim for appellate review. See United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d
465, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1999). While we review a district court’s denial of a motion
for judgment of acquittal de novo, United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 273
(5th Cir. 2001), our review is “narrow.” Moreno, 185 F.3d at 471. “In deciding
the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether, viewing the evidence and
the inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offenses

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beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Pruneda-Gonzalez, 953 F.2d 190,
193 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). We accept the jury’s credibility
determinations unless a witness’s testimony is incredible or patently
unbelievable. United States v. Lopez, 74 F.3d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1996). While
“[t]he evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be
wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt” in order to be
sufficient, “[i]f the evidence tends to give equal or nearly equal circumstantial
support to guilt or innocence [] reversal is required.” Moreno, 185 F.3d at 471
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
2. Analysis
18 U.S.C. §111 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 111. Assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or
employees

(a) In general. Whoever –
(1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or
interferes with any person designated in section 114 of this
title while engaged in or on account of the performance of
official duties; . . . shall, where the acts in violation of this
section constitute only simple assault, be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, and where
such acts involve physical contact with the victim of that
assault or the intent to commit another felony, be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.

(b) Enhanced penalty. Whoever, in the commission of any acts
described in subsection (a), uses a deadly or dangerous weapon
(including a weapon intended to cause death or danger but that fails
to do so by reason of a defective component) or inflicts bodily injury,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both.

“While the language of the statue seems to suggest that there are three different
punishments for one crime, this circuit has interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 111 to create
three separate offenses: ‘(1) simple assault; (2) more serious assaults but not

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involving a dangerous weapon; and (3) assault with a dangerous weapon.’”
United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by, United States v. Longoria, 298 F.3d 367, 372 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citing United v. Nunez, 180 F.3d 227, 233 (5th Cir. 1999)). Because the
Government’s indictment charged Williams with assaulting Officer Bordelon
with a dangerous weapon, we must determine whether the evidence supports a
finding that Williams “used” the shank in a manner as contemplated by the
statute.1
Our court has yet to decide when a dangerous weapon is “used” within the
meaning of § 111(b), and the word is not defined by the statute. Thus, we must
apply the “ordinary or natural” meaning of the word “use,” variously defined as
“[t]o convert to one’s service,” “to employ,” “to avail oneself of,” and “to carry out
a purpose or action by means of.” See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-
29 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Webster’s New
International Dictionary of English Language 2806 (2d ed. 1939) and Black’s
Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990) to define the term “use” under 18 U.S.C. §
924). Such a meaning of the word is also consistent with this court’s pattern
jury instructions for § 111, which define the word “use” as follows:
The term “deadly or dangerous weapon” includes any object capable
of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. For such a weapon to
have been “used,” it must be proved that the defendant not only
possessed the weapon but that the defendant intentionally
displayed it in some manner while carrying out the forcible assault.

1
Neither party disputes that Williams inflicted bodily injury upon Officer Bordelon
when he assaulted him, and therefore because of those injuries, Williams was subject to the
enhanced penalty provision of § 111(b). See Ramirez, 233 F.3d at 321. However, because the
indictment specifically charged that Williams committed the assault with a dangerous weapon,
the Government was required to prove that Williams used a dangerous weapon within the
meaning of § 111(b) regardless of whether Officer Bordelon suffered bodily injury. See Nunez,
180 F.3d at 233.

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5TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 2.09 (2001). The record
reflects that the jury was properly instructed in accordance with the pattern jury
instruction with regard to the meaning of the word “use” under § 111(b).
In light of these definitions of the word “use,” the testimony was sufficient
to support the jury’s conclusion that Williams used a dangerous weapon when
he assaulted Officer Bordelon. Williams admitted that he had the weapon in his
hand when he approached Officer Bordelon during the attack. Officer Bordelon
testified that Williams approached with the shank in hand, he believed Williams
was going to stab him, and that he feared for his life. Finally, Edwards testified
that Williams pointed the shank at him and swiped it at Officer Bordelon. These
facts, as well as the applicable jury instruction, lead us to conclude that a
reasonable jury could find that Williams used his shank within the meaning of
§ 111(b) when he assaulted Officer Bordelon.
We are not persuaded by Williams’s argument that the evidence was
insufficient because the videotape which captured the incident does not explicitly
show him swiping the shank at Officer Bordelon. While we agree with
Williams’s assessment of the videotape, given that the recording is not in real
time, the videotape does not establish that Williams did not swipe at Officer
Bordelon. Here, the jury heard from Officer Bordelon, Edwards, and Williams
and could have decided that Williams did in fact swipe the shank at the officer.
Such a credibility determination would not have been unreasonable, and
therefore we cannot disturb it. See Lopez, 74 F.3d at 578 (“[O]n a review for
sufficiency of the evidence we may not invade the jury’s province by substituting
our own credibility assessments for those of the jury.”). Further, even assuming
arguendo, that the evidence conclusively established that Williams did not swing
the shank at Officer Bordelon, his argument would still fail. Even if, as Williams
asserts, his conduct amounted only to brandishing the shank, our court has
previously held that brandishing a knife can constitute use of a dangerous

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weapon in the context of § 111(b). See United States v. Rouse, 452 F.2d 311 (5th
Cir. 1971) (upholding a defendant’s conviction for using a dangerous weapon
under § 111 when the defendant, during a scuffle with F.B.I. agents, brandished
a knife).
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support Williams’s
conviction.
B. Sentence Enhancements
Next, Williams makes two arguments for why the district court
erroneously enhanced his sentence. First, he contends that the court erred when
it applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A) on the basis
that a dangerous weapon was “otherwise used” during the assault. Second, he
asserts that he should not have been given a six-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(b) on the basis that he was motivated in committing the assault
by the officer’s status as a government employee. We will examine each
argument in turn.
1. Standard of Review
Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), sentences are
reviewed for reasonableness in light of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519-20 (5th Cir. 2005).
Although Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory, district courts are still
required to properly calculate the advisory guidelines range prior to imposing a
sentence. See § 3553(a)(4); Mares, 402 F.3d at 519. In calculating the guidelines
range, the district court determines all facts relevant to sentencing in the same
manner as before Booker. Mares, 402 F.3d at 519. If the sentencing judge
imposes a sentence within a properly-calculated guideline range, the sentence
is entitled to a nonbinding presumption of reasonableness. Rita v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 553-54 (5th
Cir. 2006).

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This court reviews the district court’s findings of fact at sentencing for
clear error, and its application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. United
States v. Anderson, 174 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 1999). “A factual finding is not
clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record read as a whole.” United
States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358, 364 (5th Cir. 2001). The district court may
consider any relevant evidence, provided that the information has sufficient
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. United States v. Davis, 76
F.3d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1996).
2. Section 2A2.2(b)(2)(A)
Section 2A2.2 of the Guidelines applies to violations of § 111 where the
conduct constituted an aggravated assault.2 § 2A2.2, introductory cmt. The
section provides that the base offense level should be increased by four levels if
a dangerous weapon was “otherwise used” and by three levels if a dangerous
weapon was brandished or its use was threatened. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B), (C).
“Otherwise used” and “brandished” are defined in the commentary to U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.1. According to that provision: “‘Otherwise used’ with reference to a
dangerous weapon . . . means that the conduct did not amount to the discharge
of a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm
or other dangerous weapon.” § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(I). “Brandished . . . means that
all or part of the weapon was displayed, or the presence of the weapon was
otherwise made known to another person, in order to intimidate that person,
regardless of whether the weapon was directly visible to that person.” § 1B1.1,
cmt. n.1(C). Prior to the November 1, 2000 amendments to the Guidelines,
brandished was defined to mean that “the weapon was pointed or waved about,
or displayed in a threatening manner.” § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(C) (1999).

2
“‘Aggravated assault’ means a felonious assault that involved (A) a dangerous
weapon with intent to cause bodily injury (i.e., not merely to frighten) with that weapon; (B)
serious bodily injury; or (C) an intent to commit another felony.” § 2A2.2, cmt. n.1.

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Williams argues that, at most, his conduct amounted to brandishing a
dangerous weapon. In making this argument he maintains that he never swung
the shank at Officer Bordelon. During sentencing his lawyer explained: “I’m
simply making a factual objection that Mr. Williams never swung the weapon
. . . and the person who testified to that I believe was impeached on that issue.”
The district court disagreed, responding: “Well, I will tell you that I reviewed the
evidence again in light of your objection, and I don’t agree with you.” As
discussed above, that factual finding was not clearly erroneous, and so we are
bound by it. Thus, we now decide whether Williams “otherwise used” the shank
when he pulled it out and swung it at Officer Bordelon.
We have not previously had an opportunity to address the distinction
between brandishing and “otherwise used” since the November 1, 2000
amendments. However, several of our sister circuits have interpreted the post-
amendment guidelines in a manner that supports the district court’s conclusion
that Williams, rather than brandishing, “otherwise used” the shank during the
assault. See, e.g., United States v. Paine, 407 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the amendment allows “some instances involving pointing a
weapon [to be included] within the definition of ‘otherwise used.’”); United States
v. Orr, 312 F.3d 141, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2002) (after highlighting the differences
between brandishing and “otherwise using,” concluding that “pointing a gun at
the head of the assistant manager and ordering her to empty money into a
garbage bag was a ‘specific threat’ directed at her and was precisely the type of
conduct which satisfies the ‘otherwise used’ requirement.”). We agree with such
an interpretation. Here, Williams did more than just display the shank or make
its presence known in order to intimidate; the evidence established that he both
pointed and swung the shank towards Officer Bordelon. Further, even under
our pre-amendment caselaw, where the definition of brandishing was arguably
more expansive, Williams’s conduct would still not have been considered

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brandishing. See, e.g., United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 678 n.22 (5th Cir.
1997) (noting that threats along with the display of firearms constituted
“otherwise using” rather than brandishing for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1).
Therefore, we hold that the four level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2A2.2(b)(2)(A) was proper.
3. Section 3A1.2(b)
Section 3A1.2(a) provides that a defendant’s base offense level should be
increased by three levels if the victim was a government officer or employee and
the offense of conviction was motivated by the officer’s status as a government
employee. § 3A1.2(a). However, § 3A1.2(b) further provides that the defendant’s
base offense level should be increased by six levels rather than three levels if, as
in this case, the “applicable Chapter Two guideline is from Chapter Two, Part
A (Offenses Against the Person).”3 § 3A1.2(b). The commentary to § 3A1.2
provides that “motivated by such status” means “that the offense of conviction
was motivated by the fact that the victim was a government officer or employee.”
§ 3A1.2 cmt. n.3. The commentary further provides for a “personal dispute”
exception, noting that the adjustment would not apply “where both the
defendant and victim were employed by the same government agency and the
offense was motivated by a personal dispute.” Id.
Williams argues that the district court erred in enhancing his base offense
level under § 3A1.2(b) because there was no evidence that his assault on Officer
Bordelon was motivated by the officer’s status as a government employee.
Williams asserts that he would have assaulted anyone who touched him
inappropriately. The district court rejected Williams’s argument, explaining
that the enhancement applied because the incident emanated from Williams’s
allegation that Officer Bordelon, in the course of his official duties,

3
The guideline for a violation of § 111, Aggravated Assault, is found at U.S.S.G.
§ 2A2.2. Thus, the six-level increase applies. See § 3A1.2(b).

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inappropriately touched him. The court concluded that “[the incident] stemmed
from the official exercise of official duties by Mr. Bordelon.”
Our Court has had limited occasion to interpret the “motivated by such
status” language of § 3A1.2(a) and (b). See, e.g., United States v. Polk, 118 F.3d
286, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding a § 3A1.2(a) sentence enhancement of
defendant who was convicted of plotting to blow up an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) building because, although no one was killed and the defendant did not
know the names of his intended victims, the defendant did intend to “kill, injure,
or maim federal employees in the [building] solely because those person worked
for the IRS.”); United States v. Harris, 104 F.3d 1465, 1476 (5th Cir. 1997)
(reversing a defendant’s enhancement under § 3A1.2(a) because while two of the
defendant’s co-conspirators had shot a police officer while fleeing, the
defendant’s offense of conviction, accessory after the fact, “was not motivated by
the government employee status” of the officer.); United States v. Hooker, 997
F.2d 67, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendants’ sentences were
properly enhanced under § 3A1.2(b) because they assaulted an officer employed
by the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics and during the assault, made statements
including “they are the police. Let’s kill them.”).
We have previously never considered an argument similar to that
advanced by Williams: namely, that the assault was motivated not by Officer
Bordelon’s official status, but by his inappropriate touching, which was more
akin to a personal dispute. However, the Sixth Circuit has rejected a similar
argument. See United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 1004 (6th Cir. 1999). In
Talley, the court held that the “motivated by official status” enhancement of §
3A1.2(a) applied to a defendant who was convicted of soliciting to kill an FBI
agent. In Talley, the defendant argued that his motivation in soliciting the
murder of the agent was solely to eliminate the agent as a potential witness
against him in a pending prosecution. Id. at 1003. Because the defendant in

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Talley knew the victim was an FBI agent when he solicited the murder, and
given that the sole reason the agent was a potential witness against the
defendant was due to his employment as an FBI agent, the Sixth Circuit held
that the solicitation was motivated by the victim’s status, and therefore held
that the defendant’s sentence was appropriately enhanced under § 3A1.2. Id. at
1004. We find such reasoning persuasive and applicable in this case. Here, the
sole reason Williams’s allegation of improper touching by Officer Bordelon arose
was because Officer Bordelon was employed as a corrections officer at USP
Pollock. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Williams’s assault
was motivated by Officer Bordelon’s status.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Williams’s conviction and his 150 month term
of imprisonment are AFFIRMED.

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