In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-2805
P ATRICIA C LARETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
S TEVEN R OBERTS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 07 C 5625—John F. Grady, Judge.
A RGUED O CTOBER 28, 2010—D ECIDED S EPTEMBER 23, 2011
Before M ANION, R OVNER, and S YKES, Circuit Judges.
S YKES, Circuit Judge. Police officers went to Patricia
Clarett’s home in Lansing, Illinois, early one morning
to question her sons about a burglary that had occurred
overnight in nearby Lynwood, Illinois. A confrontation
ensued and escalated quickly. One of the officers
Tasered Clarett three times, and the officers arrested her
for obstruction and resisting arrest. Those charges were
subsequently dropped, and Clarett sued the officers
2 No. 09-2805
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging use of excessive force and
false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and
various state-law claims. A jury returned a verdict for
the officers on all counts. Clarett appealed.
We affirm. Clarett waived her most plausible claim
of trial error—the court’s decision to admit two of her
criminal convictions—when she introduced evidence of
the convictions herself, before the officers could do so.
Her remaining evidentiary challenges are meritless. We
also reject Clarett’s claims of instructional error. Finally,
the district court properly denied Clarett’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law as well as her motion for
a new trial. The parties told dramatically different
stories about the confrontation inside Clarett’s home,
and the jury was entitled to believe the officers’ version
of events.
I. Background
Early in the morning on October 11, 2005, officers with
the Lynwood Police Department received a report that
a suspicious vehicle was making unusual, repeated
trips to and from a garage. Officers dispatched to the
neighborhood saw a vehicle in the area matching the
caller’s description. The officers stopped the vehicle and
in it found Clarett, her boyfriend, and her two sons
Patrick and Anthony Peters. The officers also noticed an
air compressor in the vehicle; none of the occupants of
the vehicle claimed to own the compressor, so the
officers confiscated it. Soon thereafter, Lynwood police
received a call reporting a garage burglary. Among the
No. 09-2805 3
items reported stolen was an air compressor whose
model number matched the one recovered from Clarett
and her sons. Lynwood officers went to Clarett’s home
in Lansing to try to talk with her sons, but they first
called the Lansing Police Department for backup.
At trial Clarett and the officers disagreed about what
occurred when the officers arrived at her home. Clarett
testified that when the officers asked to speak with her
sons, she asked them to remain at the door while she
woke them. Despite her request that they wait outside,
the officers—including several she claimed were hiding
out of her sight—entered her home immediately. When
she asked them again to wait outside, Lansing Officer
Steven Roberts used his Taser to immobilize her, causing
intense pain. Roberts was six feet away, and he used
the setting on the Taser that caused barbs to project
from the device and attach to Clarett. Clarett testified
that once she regained muscle control, she tried to run
from Roberts. The Taser barbs were still attached to her,
however, and Roberts shocked her a second time. The
second deployment caused Clarett to fall in the hallway.
Clarett testified that Roberts deployed the Taser a third
time, totally without provocation.
The officers’ description of the confrontation was very
different. They claimed that they entered Clarett’s home
only after she consented and that none of the officers
were hiding. They testified that Clarett also gave them
permission to enter her sons’ bedroom. Several did so,
and a dispute soon arose. Clarett ran past some of the
officers who were still in the living room and blocked
4 No. 09-2805
their entry into the bedroom. Officer Roberts testified
that he told Clarett a number of times to move away
from the door, but she refused. Fearing for the safety of
the officers in the small bedroom, Roberts warned
Clarett that he would deploy the Taser if she did not
move. When she did not move, he deployed the Taser, and
she fell to the ground. The Taser delivered an electrical
current for five seconds. Roberts said he waited five
seconds, then tried to assist Clarett in getting back on her
feet, but she began to kick at him. He warned her
several times to stop, and when she did not, he deployed
the Taser a second time. Because she continued to
resist, Roberts decided to arrest her for obstruction.
When he attempted to handcuff Clarett, however, she
started to yell and flail her arms. When she would not
stop, Roberts shocked Clarett a third time. The officers
were then successful in placing Clarett under arrest.
Though the parties radically disagreed about important
details, they agreed that Roberts deployed the Taser
three times. It was also undisputed that Clarett suffered
various injuries as a result of the deployments. A doctor
who examined her the day after the incident noted electri-
cal burns from the Taser barbs, as well as multiple
bruises and sprains. She was prescribed Valium for stress-
induced anxiety.
Clarett was charged with obstructing an officer and
resisting arrest, but those charges were eventually
dropped. Clarett then brought this action against four
officers from Lansing and three from Lynwood alleging
claims for excessive force and false arrest in violation of
No. 09-2805 5
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. She also
brought state-law claims for malicious prosecution and
failure to intervene. The case was tried to a jury, which
returned a verdict for the defendants on all counts.
Clarett moved for judgment as a matter of law under
Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in
the alternative for a new trial under Rule 59. The district
court denied the motions, and Clarett timely appealed.
II. Discussion
Clarett’s appeal focuses primarily on claimed evidentiary
and instructional errors. She also argues that the jury’s
verdict was against the weight of the evidence and asks
us to remand for entry of judgment in her favor as a
matter of law, or alternatively, a new trial.
A. Evidentiary Challenges
Clarett challenges three evidentiary rulings made by
the district court. First, she challenges the court’s pretrial
decision to admit evidence of two of her criminal con-
victions, one for retail theft and one for obstructing
a police officer. Second, she claims that the court errone-
ously allowed Officer Roberts, a lay witness, to offer
expert testimony. Finally, she argues that the court errone-
ously excluded evidence that the police did not have
a warrant to enter or search her home. We review the
district court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discre-
tion and will reverse “only where no reasonable person
6 No. 09-2805
could take the view adopted by the trial court.” United
States v. L.E. Myers Co., 562 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2009).
1. Admission of Clarett’s Convictions
The district court entered a ruling in limine that two
of Clarett’s criminal convictions—for misdemeanor
retail theft and obstructing a police officer—could be
admitted at trial.1 The judge held that her retail-theft
conviction was admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence as a crime involving an act
of dishonesty. The judge held that her obstruction con-
viction was also admissible, though he did not specify
the grounds. It appears that the judge admitted this
conviction—or perhaps both—for purposes of impeach-
ment since Clarett had denied in her deposition that
she had ever been convicted of a crime.
These rulings may have been problematic. Admission
of a criminal conviction under Rule 609(a)(2) is limited
to crimes for which “it readily can be determined that
establishing the elements of the crime required proof
or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement
by the witness.” FED. R. E VID. 609(a)(2). The Advisory
Committee Notes explain that this rule is generally
limited to “perjury or subornation of perjury, false state-
ment, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretenses,”
and similar crimes. Retail theft lacks an element of an
1
The judge excluded Clarett’s third conviction—for forgery—
because it was too old.
No. 09-2805 7
act of dishonesty that is common to crimes of this type.
As such, “[t]his circuit generally does not count retail
theft as a crime of dishonesty” for purposes of
Rule 609(a)(2). Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 675 (7th
Cir. 2008).
The authority to admit evidence for impeachment
purposes is implicit in Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See 27 C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT & V ICTOR
JAMES G OLD , FEDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 6096,
at 655 (2d ed. 2007). To the extent that the court gave
a green light to the introduction of either of Clarett’s
convictions to attack her truthfulness, their admission
was governed by Rule 608(b), which provides that
specific instances of conduct bearing on a witness’s char-
acter for truthfulness “other than conviction of crime
as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence.” FED. R. E VID. 608(b). Neither conviction was
admissible under Rule 609.2 So the defendants could
not make affirmative use of this evidence or prove it up
by way of extrinsic evidence. Moreover, it is generally
2
Under Rule 609(a)(1) evidence of a conviction is admissible
for impeachment purposes if the crime is “punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year.” Clarett’s retail
theft and obstruction convictions were both misdemeanors;
the defendants do not argue that they were admissible under
Rule 609(a)(1). As we have already explained, to be admissible
for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2), a conviction
must involve an act of dishonesty or false statement as proof
of an element of the offense; neither of Clarett’s convictions
qualifies.
8 No. 09-2805
improper to rely on extrinsic evidence to impeach a
witness about a collateral matter. Young v. James Green
Mgmt., Inc., 327 F.3d 616, 627 (7th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Bonner, 302 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[O]ne
may not contradict for the sake of contradiction; the
evidence must have an independent purpose and an
independent ground for admission.” (quotation marks
omitted)). “A matter is collateral if it could not have
been introduced into evidence for any purpose other
than contradiction.” United States v. Williamson, 202
F.3d 974, 979 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).
The only remaining evidentiary option available to the
officers was inquiry on cross-examination. Under
Rule 608(b) specific instances of conduct bearing upon
truthfulness “may . . . be inquired into on cross-examina-
tion” in the discretion of the court. Perhaps this is what
the court and the officers had in mind. As things
unfolded at trial, however, and apparently based on the
court’s pretrial ruling, the first mention of the convic-
tions came during Clarett’s case-in-chief, when her
counsel questioned her about them on direct examination.
By introducing the convictions herself, Clarett waived
the right to challenge their admission on appeal. The
Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants who
introduce evidence of their own prior convictions in an
effort to remove the “sting” forgo the right to appeal the
trial court’s decision to admit those convictions into
evidence. Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 (2000).
The Court held that by introducing the evidence first,
the defendant adopts a concerted trial strategy to
No. 09-2805 9
minimize the prejudicial effect of the evidence and in so
doing waives the right to appeal the court’s ruling that
the evidence may be admitted at trial. Id.; see also
United States v. Saunders, 359 F.3d 874, 877-78 (7th Cir.
2004).
We have never addressed whether the Ohler principle
applies in civil cases. Clarett argues against applying
Ohler in the civil context, noting that criminal defendants
have the right not to testify in their defense, while civil
plaintiffs generally must do so in order to prove their
claim. This distinction is immaterial in light of Ohler’s
reasoning. The Court noted that even after a criminal
defendant chooses to take the stand, she “has a further
choice to make . . . . The defendant must choose whether
to introduce the conviction on direct examination and
remove the sting or to take her chances with the pros-
ecutor’s possible elicitation of the conviction on cross-
examination.” Ohler, 529 U.S. at 757-58. The same choice
is present in civil cases. Similarly, in the criminal
context, the government must also make a tactical decision:
If the defendant testifies, [the government] must
choose whether or not to impeach her by use of her
prior conviction. Here the trial judge had indicated
he would allow its use, but the Government still had
to consider whether its use might be deemed
reversible error on appeal. This choice is often based
on the Government’s appraisal of the apparent effect
of the defendant’s testimony. If she has offered a
plausible, innocent explanation of the evidence
against her, it will be inclined to use the prior con-
10 No. 09-2805
viction; if not, it may decide not to risk possible rever-
sal on appeal from its use.
Id. at 758 (footnote omitted). The Court noted in Ohler
that when the defendant decides to introduce the con-
viction evidence herself, she denies the government
“its usual right to decide, after she testifies, whether or
not to use her prior conviction against her.” Id.
The logic of Ohler applies with equal force in both
criminal and civil cases. The tactical nature of each
party’s decisions is the same; indeed, the stakes are
higher in a criminal case, and still the Supreme Court
found waiver. We note that every circuit to have
addressed the question has applied Ohler in civil cases.
See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1130
(9th Cir. 2010); Estate of Smith v. City of Wilmington, 317
F. App’x 237, 239 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009); Canny v. Dr. Pep-
per/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 904 (8th
Cir. 2006); Ludwig v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co., 50 F. App’x 743,
751 (6th Cir. 2002). In Canny the Eighth Circuit observed
that a civil litigant should not be allowed to “avoid the
consequence of its own trial tactic by arguing it was
forced to introduce the evidence . . . to diminish the
prejudice.” 439 F.3d at 904. We agree. Because Clarett
introduced the evidence of her retail theft and obstruc-
tion convictions herself, she is precluded from chal-
lenging their admissibility on appeal.
2. Admission of Expert Testimony by Lay Witness
Clarett next argues that the district court erred by
allowing Officer Roberts, a lay witness, to offer expert
No. 09-2805 11
testimony. Roberts was questioned about an incon-
sistency between the number of times he Tasered
Clarett and the digital register retained in the Taser’s
internal memory. The parties agreed that Roberts Tasered
Clarett three times and that each shock lasted for five
seconds. But the printout from the Taser’s digital memory
recorded six separate deployments of the Taser, some
just one second apart. When Clarett’s counsel asked
Roberts about the discrepancy, he disclaimed technical
knowledge about the mechanics of the Taser or the com-
puter download that produced the printout. At one
point during this testimony, the judge instructed
Clarett’s attorney not to “ask this witness a great many
technical questions. He does not purport to be an expert,
and it would be unfair to put words in his mouth.”
Under questioning from his own counsel, however,
Roberts testified that based on his experience and
training, it would be physically impossible to discharge
the Taser multiple times just one second apart. He also
testified more generally about the Taser printout, which
registered 585 separate deployments occurring over the
span of more than a year. He also said that “[a]fter review-
ing this printout, there does appear to be many
different malfunctions in the printout.” Clarett argues
that this was impermissible expert testimony by a lay
witness, offered without compliance with the require-
ments of Rule 702.
We disagree. Roberts did not give technical testimony
about how the Taser’s internal memory operated or how
data was uploaded from the Taser to the police depart-
12 No. 09-2805
ment’s central computer—subjects that no doubt would
have required some form of properly qualified expert
testimony under Rule 702. Rather, his testimony was
limited to his own experience in operating the Taser.
He explained the steps required to fire the Taser in order
to illustrate the incongruity of rapid, successive deploy-
ments only one second apart. Neither this testimony,
nor his discussion of the Taser printout, was couched in
terms of an expert opinion. See 29 C HARLES A LAN
W RIGHT & V ICTOR JAMES G OLD , FEDERAL P RACTICE AND
P ROCEDURE § 6253, at 119-20 (1997) (“[S]everal courts
have held that, in cases involving opinions based on
various types of extensive experience in a given
industry or on a specific subject, the opinions properly
could have been classified as either lay or expert.”).
Even if this testimony crossed the line into the domain
of expert opinion, its admission was harmless. F ED. R.
E VID. 103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a sub-
stantial right of the party is affected . . . .”); Liu v. Price
Waterhouse LLP, 302 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“[A]n error is harmless if it did not contribute to the
verdict in a meaningful manner.”). The parties agreed
that Roberts deployed the Taser three times for five
seconds each; had there been a dispute on this subject, the
evidence of the Taser printout discrepancy might
have been more important. As it was, in light of the
parties’ agreement, this discrepancy had little signifi-
cance. See Aguirre v. Turner Constr. Co., 582 F.3d 808,
814 (7th Cir. 2009). Indeed, the judge might have ex-
cluded the evidence of the Taser printout on grounds of
No. 09-2805 13
irrelevancy; once the issue was raised, however, it was
not an abuse of discretion to permit Roberts to testify
about it to the limited extent that he did.
3. Exclusion of Evidence that the Officers Did Not
Have a Warrant
Clarett also challenges the district court’s decision
to exclude evidence that the officers did not have a
warrant to enter and search her home. The officers
moved before trial to exclude this evidence as well as
any testimony about whether Clarett consented to their
entry into her home. They argued that whether they had
a warrant or consent was irrelevant to the elements of
Clarett’s § 1983 claims. The district court granted the
motion in part, excluding all references to the absence
of a warrant. The court held, however, that whether
Clarett consented was potentially probative of what
happened once the officers were inside the house.
This was not an abuse of discretion. That the officers
did not have a warrant was irrelevant to whether they
used excessive force or falsely arrested Clarett for ob-
struction after they entered the house. Stated differently,
the fact that they did not have a warrant does not make
it any more or less likely that they subsequently
violated her federal rights by using excessive force or
falsely arresting her for obstruction. Even if there was
error, it was harmless. Despite the court’s pretrial
ruling, Clarett put the issue before the jury anyway. On
at least two occasions, Clarett testified that the officers
did not have a warrant to enter her home. Accordingly,
14 No. 09-2805
she can hardly claim to have been harmed by the
district court’s pretrial ruling.
B. Jury Instructions
Clarett raises three claims of instructional error. She
contends that the jury instructions on excessive force
and probable cause were erroneous, and also that the
district court should not have rejected her request for a
limiting instruction regarding the jury’s use of her
prior convictions. We review de novo whether the jury
instructions fairly and accurately summarized the law.
United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 753 (7th Cir. 2010).
We review the district court’s decision whether to give
a particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion,
United States v. Tavarez, 626 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir.
2010), and will reverse only if the instructions in
their entirety so thoroughly misled the jury that they
prejudiced Clarett. Quintero, 618 F.3d at 753.
1. Excessive-Force Instruction
The district court’s excessive-force jury instruction
was based on the Seventh Circuit pattern jury instruc-
tion and was adapted to conform to the evidence in
the case. The court explained that excessive force “means
more force than is reasonably necessary under the cir-
cumstances shown by the evidence,” and instructed
the jury that “if [Clarett] did in fact interfere with the
arrest of her sons, then the defendant Roberts also had
the right to use the degree of force necessary to arrest
No. 09-2805 15
the plaintiff for that interference and for the offense of
resisting her own arrest.” The court also explained that
to recover against Roberts on her excessive-force claim,
Clarett had the burden of proving that he used excessive
force, that she suffered injury or harm, and that his use
of excessive force was the proximate cause of her injury
or harm.
Clarett argues that this approach to the excessive-
force instruction improperly conflated her excessive-
force claim with her false-arrest claim, making the
former contingent on the latter. Not so. The district
court simply explained that some degree of force may
have been appropriate to arrest Clarett if the jury
found she was actually obstructing the officers. The
jury’s consideration of the excessive-force claim was not
improperly linked to its determination of the false-
arrest claim. Put differently, the jury was free to
conclude that Roberts used excessive force in subduing
and arresting Clarett even if it found that the arrest
itself was legal.
Clarett also argues that the excessive-force instruction
improperly required her to prove that injury or harm
occurred as a result of the excessive force. She cites
Briggs v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355 (7th Cir. 1996), for the
proposition that injury need not be shown in order to
prevail on a claim of excessive force.3 But this was not a
3
The pattern jury instruction leaves the harm element of
the excessive-force claim to the discretion of the trial judge
(continued...)
16 No. 09-2805
“no injury” excessive-force case. Everyone agreed that
Clarett sustained injuries during the course of her con-
frontation with Roberts. In this situation, a nominal-
damages instruction—perhaps appropriate in a true no-
injury case—would have been inappropriate here.
2. Probable Cause
On the false-arrest claim, the court gave the jury the
following instruction on the meaning of probable cause:
“Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances
known to the officer are sufficient to warrant a
reasonable person in believing that the suspect had com-
mitted or was committing an offense.” Clarett proposed
that the court substitute “a reasonable police officer” for
“a reasonable person” and now claims it was error for
the judge to decline to do so. For support she cites
Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
but that case is silent on this particular claim of instruc-
tional error. The issue in Llaguno was whether the
probable-cause instruction elucidated or confused the
issues before the jury based on the specific facts of
that case. Id. at 1569.
3
(...continued)
because the law on this point is not settled. See 7 TH C IR . P ATTERN
C IVIL JURY I NSTRUCTION 7.08. Briggs says only that there is no
per se rule preventing a party from seeking nominal damages
in an excessive-force claim without a provable injury. Briggs
v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Frizzell v.
Szabo, 647 F.3d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2011).
No. 09-2805 17
Here, the district court’s probable-cause instruction was
adapted from the pattern instruction, which defines
“probable cause” in terms of what a “prudent person”
would have believed at the time an arrest was made.
7 TH C IR. P ATTERN C IVIL JURY INSTRUCTION 7.06. Although
some authority uses the more specific “objectively rea-
sonable police officer” standard, see Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996), probable cause is most
often assessed by reference to the “prudent person”
standard, see, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)
(per curiam); see also Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392,
398 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Police officers possess probable
cause to arrest when the facts and circumstances within
their knowledge and of which they have reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person in believing that the suspect had com-
mitted an offense.” (emphasis added) (quotation marks
omitted)). Clarett does not explain how her proposed
alternative instruction would have made any difference
here. The court’s probable-cause instruction was not
improper.
3. Limiting Instruction
Finally, Clarett challenges the district court’s failure
to provide a limiting instruction regarding the jury’s use
of the evidence of her criminal convictions. She
preserved this issue in the district court by submitting
proposed limiting instructions; the record does not
reflect why the court rejected her proposal. But on
appeal Clarett’s entire argument on this issue is limited
18 No. 09-2805
to two sentences in her opening brief: “Plaintiff offered
a curative instruction (153-1 p. 39) ‘you may not con-
sider this evidence for any other purpose’ which was
rejected. (Tr. 873) These errors prejudiced Plaintiff
and were not harmless error.” She neither cited legal
authority nor made any meaningful argument in
support of this claim of error.
We have repeatedly held that undeveloped arguments
are considered waived. See Gross v. Town of Cicero, 619
F.3d 697, 704-05 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Tockes,
530 F.3d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Unsupported and
undeveloped arguments . . . are considered waived.”); APS
Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports Time, Inc., 299 F.3d 624, 631
(7th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is not this court’s responsibility
to research and construct the parties’ arguments, and
conclusory analysis will be construed as waiver.” (quota-
tion marks omitted)). We see no reason not to find
waiver here.
C. Rule 50 and Rule 59 Motions
Finally, Clarett contends that the undisputed evidence
that Roberts deployed the Taser three times con-
stitutes “overwhelming evidence” of excessive force and
required the district court to enter judgment in her favor
as a matter of law under Rule 50 or at least grant a new
trial under Rule 59. We review the district court’s denial
of Clarett’s motion for judgment as a matter of law de
novo, reviewing the record as a whole to “determine
whether the evidence presented, combined with all rea-
sonable inferences permissibly drawn therefrom, is suffi-
No. 09-2805 19
cient to support the verdict when viewed in the light
most favorable to the party against whom the motion
is directed.” Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600,
601 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). We will
overturn the jury’s verdict only if no reasonable juror
could have found in the defendants’ favor. Id.; see also
Davis v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 445 F.3d 974, 975 (7th Cir. 2006).
On the other hand, we review the denial of Clarett’s
motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Id. at 979.
“A new trial may be granted if the verdict is against the
clear weight of the evidence or the trial was unfair to
the moving party.” David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851,
863 (7th Cir. 2003). On review, however, “[a] new trial
should be granted ‘only when the record shows that
the jury’s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or
where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be over-
turned or shocks our conscience.’” Davis, 445 F.3d at 979
(quoting Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344,
1353 (3d Cir. 1991)).
The jury’s verdict finds ample support in the record.
Clarett’s telling of events differed sharply from that of
the officers, and it was entirely the jury’s province to
choose which version to believe. Roberts testified at
length regarding his reasons for deploying the Taser.
He testified that Clarett was blocking the doorway to
her sons’ bedroom after some officers had already en-
tered. He heard a commotion in the bedroom and
believed that the officers may need help. He told Clarett
to move away from the doorway and she refused. He
used the Taser to temporarily immobilize and remove
20 No. 09-2805
her from the doorway. He said he considered using
other alternatives, such as physically moving Clarett out
of the way, but because the apartment was small
and crowded, a physical confrontation might escalate
quickly, risking serious injury. Under the circumstances,
he concluded that using the Taser was his best option.
Explaining the second and third Taser deployments, he
said that Clarett was kicking and flailing at him and
continued this assaultive behavior when he tried to
arrest her. The other officers testified similarly.
The jurors were entitled to believe the officers’ version
of events, and we will not disturb their credibility deter-
mination. On this record a reasonable juror could easily
find for the defendants; the verdict does not “cry out
to be overturned” or “shock the conscience.” Clarett’s
Rule 50 and Rule 59 motions were properly denied.
A FFIRMED.
9-23-11