In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-1193
L ISA M. G RACZYK, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
W EST P UBLISHING C OMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:09-cv-04760— Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
A RGUED F EBRUARY 11, 2011—D ECIDED S EPTEMBER 28, 2011
Before P OSNER, F LAUM, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs in this case
contend that West Publishing obtains their personal
information from state Department of Motor Vehicle
(“DMV”) records and resells the information in violation of
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2722. The district court granted West Publishing’s
motion to dismiss this lawsuit, finding that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing. We disagree and conclude that
the DPPA creates a federal private right of action
2 No. 10-1193
for persons who, like the plaintiffs, claim that their per-
sonal information has been disclosed in violation of
the Act. But, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) because we agree that the DPPA does
not prohibit West Publishing from reselling the plain-
tiffs’ personal information to those with permissible uses
under the Act.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs, citizens of Illinois, brought a class
action on behalf of licensed drivers in several states against
West Publishing, asserting claims under the DPPA and
for unjust enrichment, and seeking injunctive relief.
The plaintiffs contend that West Publishing acquires
the personal information contained in motor vehicle
records of millions of drivers from state DMVs (or
from entities that have acquired the information from
state DMVs) for resale in violation of the DPPA.
Before the district court, West Publishing filed a motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), arguing that the plaintiffs did not have standing,
an d u nd er Fe d eral Rule of Civil Proced ure
12(b)(6), contending that the plaintiffs had failed to state
a claim under the DPPA. The district court granted
the motion, finding that the plaintiffs did not have stand-
ing, that their complaint did not state a claim under
the DPPA, and that the plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment
and injunctive relief claims were derivative of their
DPPA claim and also failed. The plaintiffs appeal.
No. 10-1193 3
II. ANALYSIS
State DMVs require drivers to supply sensitive personal
information such as names, addresses, and social security
numbers when applying for a driver’s license. In
1993, Congress enacted the Driver’s Privacy Protection
Act to limit how state DMVs can share that personal
information with others. Congress passed the DPPA as
an amendment to the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1993 in response to nation-
wide reports that criminals were obtaining the personal
information of their victims from state DMV records
with relative ease. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143-
44 (2000). Congress was also concerned that many
states were selling drivers’ personal information to individ-
uals, marketers, and businesses without drivers’ knowl-
edge or consent. See id.
The DPPA prohibits state DMVs from “knowingly
disclosing or otherwise making available to any person
or entity personal information . . . about any individual
obtained by the department in connection with a
motor vehicle record.” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). It also
prohibits private individuals from “knowingly . . .
obtain[ing] or disclos[ing] personal information, from a
motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted
under section 2721(b).” 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a). The DPPA
gives aggrieved persons a private right of action:
A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses
information, from a motor vehicle record, for a
purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be
liable to the individual to whom the information
4 No. 10-1193
pertains, who may bring a civil action in a United
States district court.
18 U.S.C. § 2724(a).
The DPPA, however, does not prohibit all uncon-
sented disclosures of personal information. It permits
(and in some circumstances requires, see § 2721(b) (re-
quiring disclosure in connection with vehicle safety
and theft)) disclosure for certain uses. Section 2721(b) of
the DPPA lists fourteen permissible uses for which per-
sonal information may be disclosed.1
1
(1) For use by any government agency . . . in carrying out its
functions . . . .
(2) For use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver
safety and theft . . . .
(3) For use in the normal course of business by a legitimate
business or its agents, employees, or contractors, but only—
(A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted
by the individual to the business or its agents . . . ; and
(B) if such information as so submitted is not correct or is no
longer correct, to obtain the correct information, but only for
the purposes of preventing fraud . . . .
(4) For use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative,
or arbitral proceeding . . . .
(5) For use in research activities, and for use in producing
statistical reports . . . .
(6) For use by any insurer . . . in connection with claims investi-
gation activities . . . .
(continued...)
No. 10-1193 5
In section 2721(c), the DPPA regulates the resale of
personal information. That section provides in pertinent
part that, “An authorized recipient of personal informa-
tion. . . may resell or redisclose the information only for a
use permitted under subsection [2721(b)].” § 2721(c).
1
(...continued)
(7) For use in providing notice to the owners of towed or
impounded vehicles.
(8) For use by any licensed private investigative agency or
licensed security service for any purpose permitted under this
subsection.
(9) For use by an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain or
verify information . . . .
(10) For use in connection with the operation of private toll
transportation facilities.
(11) For any other use in response to requests for individual
motor vehicle records if the State has obtained the express
consent of the person to whom such personal information
pertains.
(12) For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations
if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to
whom such personal information pertains.
(13) For use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates it
has obtained the written consent of the individual to whom the
information pertains.
(14) For any other use specifically authorized under the law of
the State that holds the record, if such use is related to the
operation of a motor vehicle or public safety.
§ 2721(b).
6 No. 10-1193
A. Standing
The district court found that the plaintiffs did not have
standing to assert a claim under the DPPA because their
allegations fell short of standing requirements. We
review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. Doctors Nursing & Rehab. Ctr.
v. Sebelius, 613 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2010).
We disagree with the district court’s resolution of the
standing question. The DPPA protects individuals
from certain uses or disclosures of their personal informa-
tion and creates a federal right of action for the same.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a); see also Taylor v. Tex. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 325, 340 n.15 (5th Cir. 2010). Con-
gress has defined the relevant injury under the DPPA
as the “obtain[ment], disclos[ure], or [use],” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2724(a), of an individual’s personal information.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (“Con-
gress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or contro-
versy where none existed before.”). The plaintiffs
allege that West Publishing engages in bulk compilation
and distribution of their personal information, which
West Publishing obtains from DMV records, and that
this constitutes a disclosure or use of the plaintiffs’ per-
sonal information that is prohibited by the DPPA. A
ruling in the plaintiff’s favor would mean that West
Publishing could no longer obtain the plaintiffs personal
information and resell it. The plaintiffs have therefore
alleged an injury in fact, caused by West Publishing,
that would be redressed by a decision in their favor, and
so they have standing to bring this case. See id.; see
No. 10-1193 7
also Taylor, 612 F.3d at 340-41 (addressing same legal
question presented in this case and concluding that the
plaintiffs had standing).
B. Motion to Dismiss
The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint
for failure to state a claim. We review a district
court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim de novo. Greenberger v. GEICO Gen. Ins.
Co., 631 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir. 2011). In doing so, we
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw
all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Fednav Int’l Ltd.
v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2010).
The plaintiffs contend that West Publishing obtains
personal information contained in DMV records from state
DMVs (and other sources), stores the information in
a database, and eventually sells the information to oth-
ers. According to the plaintiffs, this practice is
unlawful because a person may only obtain DMV records
if she or he has a permissible use for the information
as provided in one of the fourteen exceptions listed
in section 2721(b). The plaintiffs contend that “resale”
to the public is not in the list, and that as a result West
Publishing does not have a permissible “purpose”
for obtaining the records. See 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a) (prohibit-
ing obtaining or using information for a purpose
“not permitted under this chapter”).
The plaintiffs acknowledge that section 2721(c) of
the DPPA permits authorized recipients to resell informa-
8 No. 10-1193
tion for uses listed under section 2721(b). However,
the plaintiffs argue that West Publishing is not an autho-
rized recipient because the plaintiffs construe the
term “authorized recipient” to mean a person or
entity who in the first instance obtains the records for
one of the purposes listed in section 2721(b). West Publish-
ing contends that it is an authorized recipient because
its “obtainment of information for those who intend to
use [the information] in one of the ways permitted by
section 2721(b) is obtainment [for a purpose permitted by
the DPPA].” Unfortunately, the dispute cannot be resolved
exclusively by reference to the text of the DPPA because
the DPPA does not define the term “authorized recipient.”
What is apparent from considering the DPPA as a whole
is that it is concerned with the ultimate use or uses
to which personal information contained in motor vehicle
records is put. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (listing per-
missible “uses” of records); Howard v. Criminal Inf.
Servs. Inc., ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 10-35751, 10-35779, 2011 WL
3559940, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2011). The plaintiffs
here do not allege that the ultimate users of the
records compiled and sold by West Publishing do not
have a permissible use for those records as required
by section 2721(b). The plaintiffs contend, however,
that the DPPA does not allow West Publishing to
obtain and store DMV records in bulk in order to later
sell them to someone with a permissible use. According
to the plaintiffs, the person requesting the records
must have an immediate permissible use for them.
However, the plaintiffs concede that “if West
Publishing, as an agent, first receives a valid request for
No. 10-1193 9
Personal Information, it then may be allowed to request
that individual’s information from the state on behalf of its
principal.” Indeed, the plaintiffs would be hard pressed
to argue that the task of obtaining records cannot
be delegated to someone else. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721(b) (permitting a business or its agents to
obtain motor vehicle records to verify personal informa-
tion); 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c) (permitting resale of records
to those with permissible uses).
The plaintiffs’ concession undermines their contention
that West Publishing cannot resell the records it compiles
because it lacks a valid purpose under the DPPA. There
is no meaningful difference in terms of West
Publishing’s purpose between the practice the
plaintiffs approve — obtaining the records each time West
Publishing receives a valid request— and the practice they
object to— compiling the records first and then disclosing
them in response to a valid request. In both cases,
West Publishing’s “purpose” for obtaining the records is
to make a profit since West only obtains the records
in order to sell them to others with permissible uses.
So, even under the plaintiffs’ view of the DPPA, it
cannot be the profit motive that renders West Publishing’s
conduct unlawful.
And if West Publishing is only selling the records
to those who fall under one of the exceptions listed
in section 2721(b) (the plaintiffs do not contend other-
wise), why would Congress care whether each record
is obtained individually by someone who intends to
put the record to immediate use, or in bulk by
someone who intends to sell and transmit the records
10 No. 10-1193
to others with valid uses? The plaintiffs’ response at
oral argument was that Congress intended the states to
be the “gatekeepers” of personal information. The
plaintiffs thus implied that the states are the only
ones that can store personal information from motor
vehicle records. But the DPPA does not prohibit storing
records for which an individual has a valid use
under section 2721(b). See Howard, 2011 WL 3559940, at
*3. The DPPA does prohibit DMVs from releasing
personal information for uses not listed in § 2721(b). The
same prohibition also applies to private individuals.
§ 2724. But, since the plaintiffs do not allege that
West Publishing is releasing personal information
to persons who do not have a permissible use, there is
no suggestion in the plaintiffs’ complaint that the states
are failing as “gatekeepers.” See Taylor, 612 F.3d at
338 (addressing the same question at issue here and noting
that “the plaintiffs could not articulate, and we could
not find, any reason why Congress would require
resellers to actually use the records before selling
the records”).
Perhaps what the plaintiffs were suggesting by arguing
that Congress intended the states to be “gatekeepers”
was simply that Congress wanted to limit the number
of people with access to the personal information because
the greater the number of people with access, the greater
the risk that personal information will be disseminated
to those who do not have valid uses for the personal
information. However, the plaintiffs’ cramped interpreta-
tion of the DPPA would undermine the statute’s counter-
vailing purpose, which is to allow legitimate users
No. 10-1193 11
to access the records. As the plaintiffs conceive of
the DPPA, each time a person needs information stored
in DMV records (for one of the uses listed in
section 2721(b)) that person would have to send a
request to the DMV for the information. In many cases,
this process would be so cumbersome that it would
be virtually impossible for ultimate users to take advantage
of the exceptions listed in section 2721(b). Many busi-
nesses, for example, have “to verify the accuracy of per-
sonal information submitted by [an] individual to
the business or its agents” on a fairly regular basis.
See Taylor, 612 F.3d at 338 (noting that credit card compa-
nies may approve more than nineteen million credit
card applications a year for which they need to
verify personal information). If these business had to
send a request to the DMV every single time they
needed to verify an individual’s information, the
process would become unwieldy for both the companies
and the state. We do not interpret statutes to lead
to absurdities or to defeat Congressional intent. City
of Chicago v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 423 F.3d 777, 781
(7th Cir. 2005).
At least one of our sister circuits has addressed precisely
the question at issue here and has concluded that
the DPPA does not prohibit a reseller, such as
West Publishing, from reselling personal information
to others with permissible uses. Taylor, 612 F.3d at 338-
339. The Department of Justice, in an unpublished
letter, has also concluded that states may release
personal information to commercial distributors
that disseminate the information only to entities that
12 No. 10-1193
use the information solely for authorized purposes.
Unpublished Letter of October 9, 1995 from Robert C.
McFetridge, Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney
Gen., to Peter Sacks, Office of the Attorney Gen. for the
Commonwealth of Mass. (on file with this court). Another
circuit has held that the DPPA permits DMVs to release
records to those who vouch for their lawful uses under
section 2721(b). Roth v. Guzman, ___ F.3d ___, No. 10-3542,
2011 WL 2306224, at *9-11 (6th Cir. June 13, 2011). And
the Ninth Circuit has held that it is lawful for
private individuals to store records obtained pursuant
to one of the exceptions in section 2721(b). See Howard,
2011 WL 3559940, at *3. In line with these cases, we
hold the DPPA does not prohibit West Publishing
from reselling records it obtains from state DMVs
to persons with permissible uses under section 2721(b).
It was therefore proper for the district court to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ claim under the DPPA. Further, since
the plaintiffs’ claims for unjust enrichment and for injunc-
tive relief are premised on West Publishing’s
alleged violation of the DPPA, we also conclude that
the district court properly dismissed these claims.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is A FFIRMED.
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