UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4343
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ARMON LEWIS PINION, a/k/a Tony Faison,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:09-cr-00019-F-1)
Submitted: October 13, 2011 Decided: October 31, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Samuel A. Forehand, LAW OFFICE OF SAMUEL A. FOREHAND, P.A.,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, John H. Bennett,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Armon Lewis Pinion was convicted by a jury of being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006), for his July 9, 2008 possession of an Uzi
semi-automatic rifle and a .45 caliber revolver. The district
court sentenced Pinion to 120 months in prison. Pinion timely
appeals, and we affirm.
Pinion raises three issues on appeal, alleging that
the district court erred by (1) excluding portions of his
testimony as hearsay; (2) allowing testimony by Wilson, an
informant, that he had in the past observed firearms in Pinion’s
possession; and (3) failing to place an individualized
assessment on the record in imposing the sentence.
We review the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
discretion and “will only overturn an evidentiary ruling that is
arbitrary and irrational.” United States v. Cole, 629 F.3d 146,
153 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), hearsay is defined as “a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” Hearsay is generally not admissible in evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 802. Pinion contends that the disputed testimony
was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather,
Pinion asserts that the statements provided context for his
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testimony. However, even if this was so, the jury would have
had to accept the statements as true in order to either bolster
Pinion’s credibility or provide a factual basis for his
testimony. Therefore, our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the testimony as hearsay.
Next, Pinion contends that the district court erred in
admitting Wilson’s testimony regarding Pinion’s prior possession
of firearms. Again, this court reviews such evidentiary rulings
for an abuse of discretion, and we assess these rulings by
viewing the evidence in the “light most favorable to its
proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
prejudicial effect.” Cole, 631 F.3d at 153 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Rule 401 provides for the admission of relevant
evidence, which is “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.
“[R]elevance typically presents a low barrier to admissibility.”
United States v. Leftenant, 341 F.3d 338, 346 (4th Cir. 2003).
Thus, evidence is relevant if it is “worth consideration by the
jury” or has a “plus value.” United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d
991, 998 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Wilson’s testimony regarding Pinion’s prior possession of
firearms provides a “plus value” in that it establishes a basis
for Wilson’s testimony that he believed that Pinion would have
firearms for sale. Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the evidence in question was relevant and the
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Wilson’s
testimony. Moreover, any error in admitting the testimony was
harmless to Pinion because the district court gave the jury a
proper limiting instruction. See United States v. Byers, 649
F.3d 197, 210-11.
Lastly, Pinion claims that his sentence was
procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to
place on the record an adequate individualized assessment based
on the facts of the case. We review a sentence for
reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v.
Clay, 627 F.3d 959, 964 (4th Cir. 2010). In so doing, we first
examine the sentence for “significant procedural error,”
including “failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court “must place on the
record an ‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular
facts of the case before it. This individualized assessment
need not be elaborate or lengthy, but it must provide a
rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate
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to permit ‘meaningful appellate review.’” United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552
U.S. at 50) (footnote and citation omitted). While a district
court must consider the statutory factors and explain its
sentence, it need not discuss every factor on the record,
particularly when the district court imposes a sentence within a
properly calculated Guidelines range. United States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
Our review of the records indicates that the district
court did place a sufficient assessment of the facts of the case
on the record, focusing on Pinion’s criminal history, which
spanned a fifty-year period and included many serious offenses.
Therefore, the court did provide an adequate explanation for its
within-Guidelines sentence. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 356-59 (2007); United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267,
271-72 (4th Cir. 2010). We conclude that Pinion’s sentence is
procedurally reasonable.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid in the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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