Tassi v. Holder

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CORETHA AMUZANG TASSI, 
Petitioner,
v.  No. 10-2194
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Argued: September 21, 2011

Decided: November 7, 2011

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition for review granted; vacated and remanded by pub-
lished opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which Judge
Niemeyer and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Danielle L. C. Beach-Oswald, BEACH-
OSWALD IMMIGRATION LAW ASSOCIATES, PC,
Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Franklin M. Johnson, Jr.,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washing-
ton, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Tony West, Assistant
2 TASSI v. HOLDER
Attorney General, Civil Division, Douglas E. Ginsburg,
Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washing-
ton, D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Coretha Amuzang Tassi, a native and citizen of the Repub-
lic of Cameroon, petitions for review of the final order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA") affirming the
denial of her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture (the "CAT"). As explained below, we grant the petition
for review, vacate the BIA’s order, and remand for further
proceedings.

I.

On February 22, 2002, Tassi entered the United States on
a thirty-day visitor visa. She overstayed her visa and filed an
asylum application on March 28, 2002. On May 29, 2002, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS") referred
her application to an immigration judge (the "IJ").1 At the IJ’s
initial hearing on June 25, 2002, Tassi conceded removability
but sought relief through asylum, withholding of removal, and
the CAT (collectively, the "asylum application"). Evidentiary
hearings concerning the asylum application were held before
the IJ on May 17, 2004, June 12, 2006, September 6, 2006,
and June 23, 2008. The evidence submitted with the asylum
application and adduced at the IJ hearings, as well as the find-
1
Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the INS ceased to
exist as part of the Department of Justice on March 1, 2003. See 6 U.S.C.
§ 251. The enforcement functions of the INS have been transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security.
 TASSI v. HOLDER 3
ings and conclusions of the IJ and the BIA, are summarized
below.

A.

Tassi, an Anglophone citizen of the Francophone-dominant
Republic of Cameroon (hereinafter "Cameroon"), became a
student at the University of Buea in the Anglophone South
West Province of Cameroon in 1994, and she was a graduate
student there before entering the United States in 2002.2 As
editor and assistant publisher of the University’s student
newspaper, Tassi circulated information about the Southern
Cameroon independence movement and featured articles on
Anglophone marginalization. Tassi testified that, to support
the Southern Cameroon independence movement, she joined
the Southern Cameroon(s) National Council ("SCNC") in
1994 and the Southern Cameroon(s) Youth League ("SCYL")
in 1996, serving as the public relations officer for SCYL.

According to Tassi and her husband, Reeves Ade, Tassi
was arrested in Cameroon three times because of her involve-
ment with the student newspaper and her affiliations with
2
According to the evidence, the German "Kamerun Protectore" was par-
titioned between France and Great Britain following World War I. See
J.A. 442. The partitioning "laid the foundation for the construction of
Anglophone [English speaking] and Francophone [French speaking] iden-
tities in the territory and the populations of each sphere came to see them-
selves as a distinct community, defined by differences in language and
inherited colonial traditions of education, law, public administration and
worldview." Id. In the early 1960s, British "Northern Cameroons" inte-
grated with bordering Nigeria, while British "Southern Cameroons" reuni-
fied with Francophone Cameroon to form the "Republic of Cameroon." Id.
at 442-43. Anglophones in the unified Cameroon constituted a minority
that was marginalized politically and economically. See id. at 443-44.
Thereafter, "[t]o reduce the danger of any future united Anglophone
action" in support of independence for Southern Cameroons, the former
Southern Cameroons was divided into the "South West Province" and the
"North West Province." Id. at 443. (Citations herein to "J.A.___" refer to
the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this matter.)
4 TASSI v. HOLDER
SCNC and SCYL. First, on January 15, 1997, she was
arrested for publishing an edition of the newspaper that was
critical of school authorities for expelling the student union
president. On that occasion, four men in plain clothes took
Tassi to a "brigade" in Buea where she was stripped to her
underwear, beaten all over her body, and locked in a cell.3
Tassi was released on January 18, 1997, after her lawyer, Sam
Ekontang Elad, and her uncle intervened, and after students
had threatened to boycott exams. Tassi was arrested a second
time on April 7, 1997, because of her leadership position in
SCYL. Two gendarmes took her to the brigade in Buea where
she was beaten and interrogated for five hours, and she was
released only after signing a document denouncing her SCYL
membership.

Tassi’s third arrest occurred on January 8, 2000, while she
was attending a demonstration in the city of Limbe celebrat-
ing the announced independence of Southern Cameroon.
Tassi was initially detained at a police station in Limbe, then
transferred to the brigade in Buea where she was again beaten
and locked in a cell for twelve days. Tassi was released once
more with the help of lawyer Elad and her uncle, after signing
a statement agreeing to report to the brigade every other Mon-
day. Tassi’s "Release Order" from the "Central Prison Buea"
is dated January 20, 2000. See J.A. 619. According to Reeves
Ade and Tassi’s mother-in-law, Anastasia Ade, when Tassi
was released, she had a gash on her left check and bruises on
her body, so they rushed her to the hospital. Upon her admis-
sion to the hospital, Tassi’s doctors completed a "Medico-
Legal Certificate" on government letterhead, also dated Janu-
3
According to a report of the Medical Foundation for the Care of Vic-
tims of Torture, the "Anti-gang Brigade" and the "gendarmerie," the
paramilitary police (singular member, "gendarme"), are security forces
whose members tend to "dress in plain clothes, are heavily armed and act
outside the law with total impunity: detaining, torturing and executing
people suspected of highway robbery and sometimes to settle personal
scores." J.A. 726-27. They also operate "unnamed" police cells, prisons
and "gendarmerie bases" in Buea, among other places. Id. at 737.
 TASSI v. HOLDER 5
ary 20, 2000, stating that her injuries "presumed to be due to
police battery." Id. at 606. Tassi testified that she remained in
the hospital for three days. Reeves confirmed that Tassi there-
after reported to the brigade for a few Mondays, but ceased
the practice because she was not requested to do anything and
sometimes was told simply to return home.

In October 2001, while Tassi and Reeves were attending a
celebration for independence in Buea, they received a tip from
a policeman that Tassi’s name was on a list of persons who
were to be arrested that very day. They promptly fled to the
Chumba village in Bamenda, the capital of the North West
Province, where Tassi remained in hiding for several months,
until February 2002. Tassi’s father then made arrangements
with a family friend named Chief Fomuki to get Tassi out of
Cameroon. Chief Fomuki, who was travelling to the United
States on business, agreed that Tassi could accompany him,
posing as his wife. They obtained a visa and passport for
Tassi at the American embassy, listing her surname as
Fomuki. Reeves testified that, in early March 2002, after
Tassi had left for the United States, the Cameroonian authori-
ties came to their home looking for Tassi and served him with
a "Convocation" ordering Tassi to report at the "Gendar-
merie." J.A. 639. Reeves explained that the police also
searched the house, closed his stores, and threatened to put
him in jail. Consequently, Reeves also fled to the United
States, using a fake passport, and, according to Tassi, arrived
in September 2002.

In addition to her own testimony and that of Reeves and
Anastasia Ade, Tassi presented the evidence of Justice Aloy-
sius Mbu, whom the IJ accepted as an expert on "human
rights and politics in Cameroon." See J.A. 144.4 Justice Mbu
4
The IJ refers to Tassi’s expert as "Chief Mbu." We refer to him as "Jus-
tice Mbu," as do the parties in their briefs in this Court. Mbu’s curriculum
vitae reflects that he had received four magistrate court appointments in
Cameroon and that he also served, inter alia, as senior state counsel to a
court called the High Court, and as advocate-general to another court cal-
led the Court of Appeal. The curriculum vitae details Justice Mbu’s publi-
cations on various topics, including human rights. See J.A. 1181-85.
6 TASSI v. HOLDER
had reviewed Tassi’s asylum application and affidavit, and
explained that active members of SCNC and SCYL, like
Tassi, are routinely persecuted in Cameroon. Mbu elaborated
on the daily arrests and disappearances in Cameroon of SCNC
and SCYL members. He stated that he believed Tassi to be
credible, especially since he had confirmed her story with her
Cameroonian attorney, Elad. According to Justice Mbu, Tassi
remained active in SCNC in the United States, and would
therefore be arrested, detained, or even killed if she were to
return to Cameroon.

Tassi also submitted several documents in support of her
asylum application, including: (1) a letter from Ebenezer
Derek Mbongo Akwanga, Jr., founder and national chairman
of SCYL, explaining that Tassi was "extremely active" in
SCYL, that she had been "blacklisted" by the Cameroonian
authorities because of her political involvement and ties to
him, and that her life would thus be in danger if she returned
to Cameroon, see J.A. 394-98; (2) a letter from Charles Mbide
Kude, SCNC’s assistant secretary general, describing Tassi as
an "activist of the SCNC" who had "contributed enormously
to the struggle for self determination of the Southern Camer-
oons as an independent country" and had "suffered serious
torture" in support of such efforts, id. at 625-26; (3) an affida-
vit of John Fomunyoh, chairman of the "Southern Cameroons
Restoration Movement," specifying that Tassi is an "active
member of the Southern Cameroons Peoples Conference in
the United States" and would be arrested again if she were to
return to Cameroon, id. at 1220-21; (4) a letter from lawyer
Sam Elad, Tassi’s attorney and the "pioneer chairman" of
SCNC, detailing Tassi’s involvement in SCNC and SCYL
and confirming her arrests, id. at 622-23; (5) a handwritten
January 2003 letter from a clinical psychologist, Dr. Jean
Francis Ladkin, acknowledging Tassi’s claims of past perse-
cution and her self-reported symptoms, and concluding that
Tassi’s "psychological state strongly points to a very severe
state of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder" ("PTSD"), id. at 628-
30; and (6) a September 2005 article published in The Guard-
 TASSI v. HOLDER 7
ian Post of Yaounde, Cameroon, relating that the police in
Cameroon were looking for persons connected with SCNC,
including "Tassi Coretha, a fire-brand activist . . . who was
arrested and reportedly tortured on several occasions," and
who was "suspect[ed]" of having "sneaked back" into the
country to "foment trouble," id. at 582-83. Additionally, Tassi
submitted other supporting documents to the IJ, including
marriage and birth certificates; a Cameroonian passport;
membership cards for SCNC, SCYL, and the Association of
Student Journalists; an arrest warrant dated January 7, 2000;
the Release Order of January 20, 2000; the Medico-Legal
Certificate, also dated January 20, 2000; the Convocation
dated March 12, 2002; the 2000 and 2004 State Department
country reports on human rights practices in Cameroon; plus
other reports and articles on Cameroon.

B.

By decision of January 2, 2009 (the "IJ Decision"), the IJ
denied the asylum application, explaining that Tassi’s "testi-
mony contained numerous internal inconsistencies that cast
doubt on her overall credibility." IJ Decision 15.5 The IJ Deci-
sion emphasized six such inconsistencies:

• Tassi testified that SCYL was a part of SCNC.
When shown a printout of SCYL’s website stat-
ing that SCYL was not part of SCNC, however,
Tassi stated that SCYL was created separately.
The IJ found this inconsistency went to the
"heart" of Tassi’s claims since she had suppos-
edly served as SCYL’s public relations officer
and faced persecution, in part, due to her involve-
ment with SCYL;6
5
The IJ Decision is found at J.A. 48-69.
6
Under the legal standard applicable in these proceedings, minor dis-
crepancies, inconsistencies, or omissions that do not go "to the heart" of
8 TASSI v. HOLDER
• Tassi testified that she was a student in Camer-
oon, but her marriage certificate listed her occu-
pation as "Business." The IJ found Tassi’s
explanation that the certificate either refers to her
husband Reeves Ade’s occupation or to Tassi’s
part-time business ("bought and sold stuff") to be
unconvincing;

• Tassi testified that Chief Fomuki told the Ameri-
can embassy that they were travelling to the
United States to visit relatives; however, her visa
application indicates that the purpose of her visit
was to sell clothing to Africans and African
Americans and listed her occupation as "Busi-
ness." Tassi’s explanation was that "nothing on
the application was real" and that the information
was provided simply to obtain the visa;

• Tassi testified that the surname Fomuki was
added to her name on her passport and visa appli-
cation to disguise her identity. The IJ found it
"implausible" that a person fearing detection
"would do so little to disguise her identity on
travel documents";

• When asked if she had any relatives in the United
States, Tassi initially identified only her brother,
and not her mother who had also applied for asy-

an applicant’s claims are not necessarily sufficient to support an adverse
credibility determination. See Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 122
(4th Cir. 2007). That standard was modified by the REAL ID Act of 2005,
which now authorizes an IJ to base credibility determinations on any
inconsistency "without regard to whether [it] goes to the heart of the appli-
cant’s claim." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The Real ID Act does not
apply in these proceedings, however, because Tassi’s asylum application
was filed prior to the Act’s effective date. See Marynenka v. Holder, 592
F.3d 594, 600 n* (4th Cir. 2010).
 TASSI v. HOLDER 9
lum. The IJ found Tassi’s explanation that it "did
not occur to her" to mention her mother to be
unconvincing, particularly since Tassi was sched-
uled to serve as a witness at her mother’s asylum
hearing. Although the IJ observed that "this error
does not go the heart of [Tassi’s] claim," the IJ
nevertheless found Tassi’s initial failure to men-
tion her mother to be "significant in assessing
[Tassi’s] overall credibility"; and

• Tassi initially testified that Reeves Ade did not
come to the United States until 2002 but subse-
quently acknowledged that he had been to the
United States in the 1980s. Tassi also admitted
that Reeves was in the United States between
2000 and 2002 and returned to Cameroon on two
or three occasions. The IJ found these inconsis-
tencies "raise the issue of whether [Tassi’s] true
motive in coming to the United States was to
reunite with her husband."

See IJ Decision 17-19.

Furthermore, the IJ Decision identified ten concerns with
Tassi’s documentary evidence:

• The January 7, 2000 arrest warrant contained
several blank spaces for dates after which the
year 2001 is preprinted. Tassi was "unable to
explain why a document issued in 2000 would
reference the year 2001." Furthermore, the arrest
warrant was not authenticated pursuant to 8
C.F.R. § 287.6 (establishing procedures in immi-
gration proceedings for authenticating, inter alia,
official records of foreign countries);

• Two dates on the March 12, 2002 Convocation
had possibly been changed from 2001 to 2002.
10 TASSI v. HOLDER
Tassi offered no explanation for such possible
alterations;

• The January 20, 2000 Release Order was not
authenticated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6, and
there was no alternative form of authentication;

• The January 20, 2000 Medico-Legal Certificate
was not authenticated pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.6, and there was no alternative form of
authentication. Furthermore, the Certificate was
printed on government letterhead and reflects that
Tassi’s injuries were caused by the police. The IJ
characterized this recitation as "highly unusual,"
in that Tassi was treated at a government hospi-
tal. The Certificate also does not confirm that
Tassi was in the hospital for three days;

• Akwanga’s letter discusses the dangers posed to
Tassi in Cameroon but fails to mention her three
arrests or other difficulties. Fomunyoh’s affidavit
also fails to mention Tassi’s past arrests;

• Elad’s letter describes Tassi’s arrests but does not
identify the source of that information. Nor does
Elad’s letter explain how he learned the details of
a search of Tassi’s home where policemen sup-
posedly took documents relating to SCNC and
SCYL;

• Kude’s letter similarly indicates that Tassi was
arrested but does not disclose the source of that
information;

• Dr. Ladkin’s report was unsigned, and he was not
available for cross-examination. Moreover, the
report mentions only Tassi’s self-reported PTSD
symptoms, does not state that tests were con-
 TASSI v. HOLDER 11
ducted, and there is no closing statement, thereby
suggesting the report is incomplete;

• According to the IJ, the September 2005 newspa-
per article states that "the police in Yaounde are
seeking Tassi Coretha, who they believe has
‘sneaked back into town to foment trouble.’"
Tassi testified otherwise, however, confirming
she had not returned to Cameroon since she left
in 2002; and

• Tassi’s SCYL membership cards bear the title
"Southern Cameroon Youth League." The IJ
found that the name of the organization is cor-
rectly spelled in the plural, that is, "Southern
Cameroons Youth League." Tassi, who had been
the public relations officer for SCYL, "provided
no explanation for this discrepancy."

See IJ Decision 15-17.

The IJ Decision gave "no weight" to Reeves Ade’s testi-
mony due to inconsistencies therein about when he purport-
edly entered and left the United States. See IJ Decision 18.
The IJ observed that Reeves "initially testified that he entered
the United States in September 2002, but Reeves later admit-
ted that he had been [in the United States] on numerous occa-
sions since the 1980s." Id. Although Reeves denied living in
the United States continuously since November 1986, his
"Form I-485 Application . . . states that he has continuously
resided in the United States since November 1981." Id. The
IJ also gave little or no weight to the testimony of Anastasia
Ade, Tassi’s mother-in-law, finding it to be "self-serving" and
otherwise failing to overcome the problems with Tassi’s testi-
mony. Id. at 19. Notably, even though the IJ "appreciate[d]"
Justice Mbu’s expert testimony, she gave his evidence virtu-
ally no weight because Mbu lacked any firsthand knowledge
of Tassi’s alleged past persecution in Cameroon. Id.
12 TASSI v. HOLDER
C.

On January 2, 2009, Tassi appealed the IJ Decision to the
BIA, seeking appellate relief through the administrative pro-
cess. By its September 24, 2010 order (the "BIA Order"), the
BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ Decision.7 The BIA con-
cluded that the IJ’s adverse credibility findings were not
clearly erroneous and were supported by specific and cogent
reasons. The BIA discussed a few of the inconsistencies that
the IJ deemed significant. In rejecting Tassi’s argument that
apparent errors on certain of her Cameroonian documents did
not justify the IJ’s discrediting of the balance of her documen-
tary evidence, the BIA explained that, "where there is prima
facie evidence that a document may have been forged, [the IJ]
may reasonably rely on that as material negative evidence
regarding a claim; the fact that other evidence does not appear
to be prima facie forged does not compel a conclusion that all
documents are genuine." BIA Order 2.

The BIA also rejected Tassi’s contentions that the occupa-
tion listed on her visa application was immaterial and that the
IJ had no reason to find implausible Tassi’s explanation that
she had altered her surname as a disguise when fleeing Cam-
eroon. The BIA concluded that the IJ’s "assessment that these
implausibilities tended to show that [Tassi] is not credible is
a permissible view of the evidence [and that Tassi’s] other
arguments regarding other discrepancies and inconsistencies
merely provide an alternative view of the evidence but do not
show clear error." BIA Order 2.

Finally, the BIA confronted Tassi’s assertion that none of
the discrepancies identified by the IJ were central to her
claims. The BIA again disagreed, observing that discrepancies
regarding the SCYL membership card, the affidavits lacking
personal knowledge of Tassi’s past persecution, and Tassi’s
motive for travelling to the United States were "legitimate
7
The BIA Order is found at J.A. 3-5.
 TASSI v. HOLDER 13
bases on which to make an adverse credibility finding because
they are neither trivial nor unrelated to the core of [her] asy-
lum claim." BIA Order 2. The BIA further determined that
Tassi had not shown that the IJ committed clear error in
doubting Reeves Ade’s credibility. Additionally, the BIA
ruled that Tassi was unable to demonstrate that the IJ failed
to consider her other evidence, since the IJ had made an "as-
sessment of many relevant documents" and was "not required
to address in detail every aspect of a case." Id. at 2-3. There-
fore, the BIA Order dismissed Tassi’s appeal from the IJ
Decision. Tassi has filed a timely petition for review in this
Court, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252.

II.

Where, as here, a BIA decision has adopted and supple-
mented an IJ decision, we are obliged to review both rulings.
See Jian Tao Lin v. Holder, 611 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir.
2010). In so doing, we are bound to uphold the BIA’s deter-
minations unless they are manifestly contrary to the law and
an abuse of discretion, and we must treat findings of fact as
conclusive unless the evidence was such that any reasonable
adjudicator would have been compelled to a contrary view.
See Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 444 (4th Cir. 2011). The
BIA may be held to have abused its discretion if it failed to
offer a reasoned explanation for its decision, or if it distorted
or disregarded important aspects of the applicant’s claim. See
Jian Tao Lin, 611 F.3d at 235. Nevertheless, the BIA’s asy-
lum eligibility and withholding-of-removal decisions must
remain undisturbed if they are supported by reasonable, sub-
stantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as
a whole. See id.

Ultimately, in reviewing agency decisions in immigration
matters, it is "our responsibility to ensure that unrebutted,
legally significant evidence is not arbitrarily ignored by the
factfinder." Baharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir.
14 TASSI v. HOLDER
2009). Hence, an IJ is not entitled to "base [a] decision on
only isolated snippets of [the] record while disregarding the
rest." Id. Nor may the IJ "distort[ ] or disregard[ ] important
aspects of the alien’s claim," make rulings that are based "on
an inaccurate perception of the record," or "rely on specula-
tion, conjecture, or an otherwise unsupported personal opin-
ion to discredit an applicant’s testimony or her corroborating
evidence." Jian Tao Lin, 611 F.3d at 237 (citations, internal
quotation marks, and alterations omitted). The deference we
accord credibility findings supported by substantial evidence
is broad but not absolute. See id. at 235. An IJ must offer a
specific, cogent reason for rejecting evidence, whether testi-
monial or documentary, because it lacks credibility. See
Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 241 (4th Cir. 2009).
Importantly, even if the IJ determines that the applicant’s tes-
timony itself is incredible, "he must nevertheless evaluate the
applicant’s independent evidence." Jian Tao Lin, 611 F.3d at
236.

III.

In her petition for review, Tassi contends that the IJ’s
adverse credibility determinations were predicated on discrep-
ancies not actually present in the record, or on minor inconsis-
tencies that were not central to the claims made in the asylum
application. She further maintains that the BIA and the IJ
erred by failing to credit or consider any of her corroborating
evidence. In analyzing Tassi’s petition, we first review the eli-
gibility criteria for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the CAT. We then identify multiple errors in the IJ’s
methodology and assess whether they are harmless.

A.

To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant bears the
burden of showing either past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution "on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or politi-
 TASSI v. HOLDER 15
cal opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). If the applicant is
able to demonstrate past persecution, she is "presumed to
have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the
original claim." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).

To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant "must
establish that, if removed, a clear probability exists that h[er]
freedom or life would be threatened on account of a protected
ground." Jian Tao Lin v. Holder, 611 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Whereas both asy-
lum and withholding of removal require an applicant’s fear of
persecution to be based on an enumerated ground, protection
under the CAT is available for those who can prove that,
whatever the motivation, it is more likely than not that he or
she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

B.

With the foregoing principles in mind, our analysis of
Tassi’s petition for review exposes several categories of error.
For example, the IJ contravened the principle that corrobora-
tive evidence supporting an asylum application cannot be
rejected solely because it does not strictly comport with the
rules of evidence or because it lacks its own corroborating
evidence. The IJ also discredited key documentary evidence
because it was not authenticated pursuant to immigration reg-
ulations, without providing Tassi an opportunity to authenti-
cate by other means. Another category of error arises from
and implicates the IJ’s inaccurate perceptions of relevant
aspects of the record. Lastly, the IJ improperly relied on spec-
ulation and assumption.

1.

First, the IJ discredited certain of Tassi’s corroborative evi-
dence because it did not adhere to the rules of evidence. It is
well-established, however, that "[t]he Federal Rules of Evi-
16 TASSI v. HOLDER
dence do not apply in immigration proceedings." Anim v.
Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir. 2008). Although such
rules "may guide an immigration judge in determining admis-
sibility," they cannot be employed as the sole basis for reject-
ing corroborative evidence, as the IJ did here. See Kourouma
v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 241-42 (4th Cir. 2009). Even though
hearsay is admissible as corroborating evidence, see Anim,
535 F.3d at 257, the IJ rejected Justice Mbu’s expert testi-
mony, as well as the letters of Elad and Kude, because they
did not demonstrate firsthand knowledge. Our scrutiny of the
IJ Decision begins with some of Tassi’s most crucial evi-
dence, Justice Mbu’s testimony.

a.

Ironically enough, in assessing Justice Mbu’s evidence, the
IJ misapplied the inapplicable rules of evidence. Although the
IJ accepted Justice Mbu as an expert on human rights and pol-
itics in Cameroon, she discredited his expertise on those very
subjects, explaining that "he has no first-hand knowledge of
[Tassi’s] problems in Cameroon." IJ Decision 19. Even when
the rules of evidence strictly apply, however, an expert is enti-
tled to rely on factual underpinnings — including those based
on hearsay — that are "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject." Fed. R. Evid. 703. It is unclear, how-
ever, that Justice Mbu relied on hearsay when he testified
about the daily arrests and disappearances of members of
SCNC and SCYL, or when he explained that activists who
return to Cameroon face persecution or death. Justice Mbu
certainly was not relying on hearsay when he confirmed
Tassi’s active involvement in SCNC in the United States,
because he had seen her in attendance at SCNC meetings. Nor
was Mbu relying on hearsay when he predicted that, because
of Tassi’s current support of SCNC, she would be arrested —
and possibly killed — if she were forced to return to Camer-
oon. Indeed, Justice Mbu’s expertise was not contested with
respect to Tassi’s account of past persecution, which Mbu had
 TASSI v. HOLDER 17
verified with her lawyer Elad.8 And, to the extent that hearsay
may have supported Justice Mbu’s opinion that Tassi would
face persecution in Cameroon because of her past involve-
ment with SCYL, his reliance thereon would not be objection-
able under the rules of evidence. Accordingly, the IJ
erroneously rejected probative aspects of Justice Mbu’s expert
testimony.

Of significance, Justice Mbu’s testimony pertains directly
to one of the IJ’s primary credibility findings against Tassi.
Tassi initially testified that SCYL "[w]as" "part of" SCNC.
J.A. 207. But when the government provided Tassi a printout
from the SCYL website purportedly disclaiming that SCYL
"is not, and has never been part of" SCNC, Tassi conceded
that SCYL was "created independently from the Southern
Cameroon." Id. at 208. The IJ then determined that this was
an inconsistency going to the heart of Tassi’s claim, because
she served as SCYL’s public relations officer and was alleg-
edly persecuted because of her involvement with that group.9
But Justice Mbu’s evidence lends substantial credence to
Tassi’s understanding. Mbu explained that SCNC "was
formed to control . . . subgroups that were a part for the same
purpose," and that SCYL is "like the militia wing, in essence,"
"the youth wing" that "carr[ies] information and . . . pass[es]
it back to the SCNC." J.A. 145, 155.10 It was erroneous, then,
for the IJ to fail to provide any specific, cogent reason for dis-
8
As he explained to the IJ, Justice Mbu believed Elad to be "very credi-
ble" because Mbu had known Elad since law school and they were "called
to the bar the same day." J.A. 154. Justice Mbu had also spoken to Elad
to confirm Tassi’s version of the relevant events. See id. at 157, 159.
9
On this record, there may well be no inconsistency between Tassi’s tes-
timony that SCYL was part of SCNC and her acknowledgement that the
two groups were created independently.
10
The record contains two reports submitted by the government that also
characterize SCYL as the "youth organization" of SCNC. See J.A. 1088,
1147. Moreover, as Tassi points out, she submitted an article (not
addressed by the IJ) describing SCYL "as the militant youth wing of the
SCNC," referencing a 2002 SCYL document. Id. at 449. That same article
observes that the two groups eventually fractured over disagreements
about the direction of the independence movement. Id. at 450-51.
Although the IJ stated that she had "considered the entire record care-
fully," IJ Decision 13, the IJ Decision does not reveal how either those
reports or the article factored into her rulings.
18 TASSI v. HOLDER
regarding this aspect of Justice Mbu’s evidence, particularly
when the IJ did not question the Justice’s expertise and the
nature of the SCNC-SCYL relationship contributed to her
credibility determination against Tassi. Indeed, the point con-
cerning that relationship was the only adverse credibility find-
ing against Tassi that, according to the IJ, explicitly went to
the heart of Tassi’s claims.

b.

Next, the IJ faulted the Elad and Kude letters because they
supposedly failed to identify the source of their knowledge
about Tassi’s persecution in Cameroon. In fact, Elad’s letter
indicates that Elad is himself the source. Elad’s letter specifies
that Tassi was "well known" to him and that, as her attorney,
he "had to intervene on her behalf in quite a few instances of
arrest and intimidation" in order "to secure her release." J.A.
622. Thus, the IJ’s basis for discrediting Elad’s letter is not
only unsupportable as a matter of law, it appears to be con-
structed upon an "erroneous perception of the record." See
Jian Tao Lin, 611 F.3d at 238.

Similarly, the IJ discredited Kude’s letter for failing to dis-
close the source of his information that Tassi had "suffered
serious torture . . . ranging from harassment, intimidation,
several arrest [sic] and detention." See J.A. 626. The IJ did not
otherwise assess the probative value of that statement or eval-
uate the reliability of the letter from Kude, who was SCNC’s
assistant secretary general, and who described Tassi as an "ac-
tivist" who had "contributed enormously to the struggle" for
independence. Id. As we have previously observed, however,
a "letter from [a] party leader" on behalf of a party member
seeking asylum can corroborate the applicant’s claims. See
Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 369 (4th Cir. 2004).

2.

Second, implicit in the IJ’s evidentiary rulings rejecting
Justice Mbu’s expert testimony and the Elad and Kude letters
 TASSI v. HOLDER 19
is the notion that corroborative evidence itself "automatically
require[s] corroboration." See Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d
594, 602 (4th Cir. 2010). As we have explained, "[t]here is no
general rule that evidence offered in corroboration requires
independent corroboration." Id. Thus, the IJ erred in summa-
rily rejecting Justice Mbu’s testimony and the Elad and Kude
letters, as well as the testimony of Anastasia Ade. Although
the IJ characterized Anastasia’s testimony as "self-serving," it
was presented on behalf of Tassi — rather than on Anastasia’s
behalf — and there was no showing or contention that Anas-
tasia could benefit from it. Anastasia testified about her
endeavor to visit Tassi in jail in January 2000, Tassi’s physi-
cal condition upon being released from custody on January
20, 2000, and about taking Tassi to the hospital that day for
treatment. The IJ Decision failed to provide a specific, cogent
reason for disregarding this uncontroverted evidence, other
than implying that the evidence lacked its own corroboration.
See Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 602.

3.

Third, the IJ erroneously discredited both the Release Order
and the Medico-Legal Certificate because they had not been
"authenticated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6." IJ Decision 16.
We have heretofore recognized, however, that certification
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6 "is not the exclusive means by
which to authenticate such . . . document[s]." Lin-Jian v. Gon-
zales, 489 F.3d 182, 192 (4th Cir. 2007). The Lin-Jian alter-
native exists, in part, because, as the Third Circuit has
explained, "asylum applicants can not always reasonably be
expected to have an authenticated document from an alleged
persecutor." Gui Cun Liu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 529, 532 (3d
Cir. 2004). Hence, Tassi "ought to have been given an oppor-
tunity to authenticate these documents through another
method." Lin-Jian, 489 F.3d at 192 (citing Gui Cun Liu, 372
F.3d at 533). Although the IJ Decision observes that there was
no "alternative form of authentication" offered for the Release
Order or Medico-Legal Certificate, see IJ Decision 16, Tassi
20 TASSI v. HOLDER
had no cause to defend their authenticity during the IJ hear-
ings. The government and the IJ questioned Tassi — albeit
briefly — solely about the Medico-Legal Certificate, and did
not express any disbelief or disagreement with Tassi’s
responses. More importantly, the government did not object
to the admission of either the Medico-Legal Certificate or the
Release Order in the IJ proceedings. Thus, Tassi could hardly
have foreseen that the IJ would doubt the authenticity of
either of those documents, and Tassi was not thereafter
accorded an opportunity to authenticate them by other means.

Furthermore, the IJ gave no other reason for doubting the
authenticity of the Release Order, and her only other bases for
discrediting the Medico-Legal Certificate appear to be predi-
cated on conjecture and personal opinion. Although the IJ
found it "highly unusual" for a government hospital to docu-
ment a "police battery," there was no evidence to support such
a proposition. Cf. Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 601 (rejecting IJ’s
conjecture on absence of letterhead as legitimate reason for
discrediting medical record concerning examination of rape
victim). The IJ also found it suspicious that, even though
Tassi testified that she spent three days in the hospital, the
Certificate did not reflect that fact. Put simply, however, the
Certificate could hardly reflect the length of Tassi’s hospital-
ization, inasmuch as it was completed upon her hospital
admission, rather than on her discharge.

4.

Fourth, the September 2005 newspaper article in the The
Guardian Post of Yaounde, the Akwanga letter, and the
Fomunyoh affidavit were discredited when the IJ misappre-
hended their purposes. Tassi submitted the September 2005
newspaper article to corroborate her claim that she was, and
likely would be again, a target for persecution in Cameroon.
The IJ focused instead on whether Tassi had actually returned
to Cameroon after fleeing to the United States in 2002. The
IJ first described the September 2005 newspaper article as
 TASSI v. HOLDER 21
specifying that "Tassi Coretha has sneaked back" into Camer-
oon. IJ Decision 5 (emphasis added). Later, the IJ more accu-
rately described the article as reflecting that the "police in
Yaounde are seeking Tassi Coretha, who they believe has
‘sneaked back’" into Cameroon. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
The article actually specifies, however, that "[p]olice sources
said they suspect" that Tassi "has sneaked back." J.A. 583
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the IJ discredited the article
because "[Tassi] testified that she has not returned to Camer-
oon since she left in 2002." IJ Decision 17. Thus, the IJ cred-
ited Tassi’s testimony that she had not returned to Cameroon
after 2002, and, as a result, apparently found the September
2005 newspaper article — offered to support Tassi’s position
that she was considered an "activist" in Cameroon and thus
likely to be persecuted — to be a fabrication.11 The IJ failed
to address Tassi’s specific contention that the police suspi-
cions of her presence in Cameroon in 2005 were predicated
on rumors. Cf. Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 510 (4th Cir.
2008) (criticizing IJ for discounting newspaper article due to
government’s suggestion that it was fabricated, explaining
that "we question the appropriateness of speculating about
foreign documents . . . and holding a Cameroonian dissident
newspaper to the same standard as the New York Times or
even the Baltimore Sun").

The Akwanga letter attests to Tassi’s involvement with
SCYL in Cameroon. The Fomunyoh affidavit verifies Tassi’s
membership in the Southern Cameroons Peoples Conference
in the United States. Both the letter and the affidavit thus por-
tend that Tassi would surely face persecution if she were to
return to Cameroon.12 The IJ, nevertheless, discredited the
11
The incongruity here, of course, is that even though the IJ determined
that Tassi lacked credibility, the IJ relied on Tassi’s credibility to find the
September 2005 newspaper article to be incredible. We have recognized,
however, that an "IJ cannot have it both ways, finding an applicant and
h[er] documents incredible for one purpose and yet relying on them for
another." Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 513 (4th Cir. 2008).
12
As spelled out heretofore, Akwanga was the founder and national
chairman of SCYL. His letter explained that Tassi was "extremely active"
22 TASSI v. HOLDER
Akwanga letter and the Fomunyoh affidavit because they
failed to mention any of Tassi’s past arrests in Cameroon. As
Tassi emphasizes, however, the IJ misconstrued the purposes
of the letter and the affidavit. They were not offered to sub-
stantiate past persecution, but to corroborate Tassi’s political
involvement and repression in Cameroon, and to support the
likelihood of her persecution if she returned to Cameroon.
Because an objective fear of future persecution is an element
of Tassi’s claims, the IJ’s rejection of the Akwanga letter and
the Fomunyoh affidavit was unwarranted.

5.

Finally, the IJ indulged in speculation and assumption in
making an adverse credibility finding against Tassi. More
specifically, the IJ found it "implausible" that Tassi actually
feared detection by airport authorities on leaving Cameroon
when she disguised her identity by using the name "Fomuki"
as her surname on travel documents. See IJ Decision 18. In so
doing, the IJ imposed her own assumptions about the steps
necessary to evade detection and the efficiency of Cameroo-
nian airport officials in identifying wanted student activists.
Cf. Lin-Jian, 489 F.3d at 189 (deeming IJ’s adverse credibility
ruling to rest upon speculation that airport officials would be
"equipped to identify citizens sought by family planning
cadre"). In fact, according to a report submitted into evidence
by the government, there are "[n]o thorough checks . . . made
on departure from Douala [Cameroon] airport," "[t]he police
did not possess an electronic database on wanted people," and
"even a wanted criminal would be able to leave via the air-

in SCYL and had been "blacklisted" by the authorities due to her involve-
ment with SCYL and her ties to him. The Akwanga letter also warned that
Tassi’s life would be in danger if she returned to Cameroon. See J.A. 394-
98. Fomunyoh is the chairman of the Southern Cameroons Restoration
Movement. Fomunyoh’s affidavit explains that government agents track
political activists such as Tassi, who "is a sure government target in this
respect." Id. at 1221.
 TASSI v. HOLDER 23
port. This also applied to those who were active in the politi-
cal opposition." J.A. 1111.

C.

In sum, the IJ committed multiple legal and factual errors.
In the first category, the IJ erroneously (1) applied the rules
of evidence; (2) suggested that corroborative evidence
requires further corroboration; and (3) discredited documents
as unauthenticated under the immigration regulations without
providing Tassi an opportunity to authenticate them by other
means and without otherwise providing sound, cogent reasons
for rejecting them. Of course, an IJ’s errors of law necessarily
constitute an abuse of discretion. See Menghesha v. Gonzales,
450 F.3d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 2006). In the second category,
several of the IJ’s factual findings were not supported by sub-
stantial evidence, but by inaccurate perceptions of the record
or by speculation and assumption. See Jian Tao Lin, 611 F.3d
at 237. The IJ’s legal and factual errors, in turn, thwarted the
necessary weighing of Tassi’s corroborative evidence against
the adverse credibility findings. See id. at 236. For its part, the
BIA erred in failing to recognize the IJ’s multiple errors con-
cerning important aspects of Tassi’s claims, rendering the
BIA Order manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discre-
tion. See id. at 235.13

Having identified a host of erroneous rulings and findings
in the IJ Decision and the BIA Order, we are obliged to apply
a harmless error analysis. See Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
182, 190 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004). Notwithstanding the presence of
error, we are entitled to permit a BIA decision to stand if the
legal and factual infirmities "clearly had no bearing on the . . .
substance of the decision reached." Id. (internal quotation
13
Although the BIA correctly observed that an IJ is "not required to
address in detail every aspect of a case," BIA Order 3; see Tewabe v. Gon-
zales, 446 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2006), the IJ’s given reasons for dis-
crediting Tassi’s evidence were contrary to law and thus untenable.
24 TASSI v. HOLDER
marks omitted). By contrast, we have remanded in immigra-
tion proceedings where, "[w]ithout [the IJ’s] erroneous per-
ception of the record, it is far from clear that the [IJ] would
have" made the inferences and conclusions that she made,
Jian Tao Lin, 611 F.3d at 238, or if "it is likely that the IJ
would have reached a different outcome if he had given due
consideration to the independent evidence that he [improp-
erly] discounted," Anim, 535 F.3d at 261.

Although Tassi’s asylum application was denied largely on
the basis of the IJ’s adverse credibility determinations, those
rulings need not have been fatal to Tassi’s claims if the inde-
pendent evidence was sufficient to overcome them. See
Camara, 378 F.3d at 369-70. Assessed in the totality, the evi-
dence that was improperly discredited — including Justice
Mbu’s expert testimony, the Elad and Kude letters, Anastasia
Ade’s testimony, the September 2005 newspaper article, the
Akwanga letter, the Fomunyoh affidavit, the Release Order,
and the Medico-Legal Certificate — provide potent corrobo-
ration for Tassi’s claims of past persecution and a well-
founded fear of future persecution. Thus, we are unable to say
that the IJ or the BIA would have reached the same result had
that evidence been properly assessed.

We are also skeptical of several of the IJ’s other adverse
credibility findings and bases for discrediting Tassi’s docu-
mentary evidence.14 Nevertheless, even assuming the sound-
14
By way of example, we are unable to ascertain how the mere identifi-
cation of Tassi’s occupation as "Business" on her marriage certificate and
on her visa application is central to her claims. Moreover, too much is
surely made of the missing "s" in Cameroon on the SCYL membership
cards. We have ourselves referred to SCNC, for example, as both the
"Southern Cameroon National Council," Zuh, 547 F.3d at 505, and the
"Southern Cameroons National Council," Anim, 535 F.3d at 248. Hence,
we are hardly suspicious of an omitted "s" on a dissident youth organiza-
tion’s membership card. Finally, although the BIA Order suggests that
"there is prima facie evidence that a document may have been forged,"
BIA Order 2, the IJ made no explicit finding of forgery.
 TASSI v. HOLDER 25
ness of the IJ’s sundry credibility rulings, she was obliged to
"weigh all relevant evidence under the totality of the circum-
stances." Zuh, 547 F.3d at 507. As we have explained,
"[t]hose who flee persecution and seek refuge under our laws
have the right to know that the evidence they present of mis-
treatment in their home country will be fairly considered and
weighed by those who decide their fate." Baharon, 588 F.3d
at 233. In these circumstances — without deciding the ulti-
mate issue — our proper disposition is to grant the petition for
review and vacate and remand.

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we grant Tassi’s petition for
review, vacate the BIA Order, and remand for such other and
further proceedings as may be appropriate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED;
VACATED AND REMANDED