UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4005
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES MORANI KARGBO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga,
District Judge. (1:10-cr-00177-AJT-1)
Submitted: February 16, 2012 Decided: February 24, 2012
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Brian Donnelly, PRICE, PERKINS, LARKEN & DONNELLY, Virginia
Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States
Attorney, Jonathan L. Fahey, Assistant United States Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Morani Kargbo appeals the district court’s
judgment following his conviction by a federal jury of
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (2006) (Count 1), attempted Hobbs Act robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 2 (2006) (Count 3); and two
counts of use and carry of a firearm during and in relation to a
crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 2
(2006) (Counts 4 and 6). ∗ We affirm.
Kargbo contends that his arrest was an unlawful
seizure and therefore that the district court erred by not
suppressing the statements he made to law enforcement officers
at an interview following his arrest. We review the factual
findings underlying a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011).
When evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, we construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Id.
Kargbo was arrested without a warrant. “Police
officers can make warrantless arrests as long as they act on the
∗
The jury further found Kargbo guilty of another count of
Hobbs Act robbery and use and carry of a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence, but the district court granted
Kargbo’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to those two
counts.
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basis of probable cause.” United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d
1070, 1073 (4th Cir. 1993). Probable cause sufficient to
support such a warrantless arrest is present when the
facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge
that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or
one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed,
is committing, or is about to commit an offense. The
evidence needed to establish probable cause is more
than a mere suspicion, rumor, or strong reason to
suspect but less than evidence sufficient to convict.
United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (4th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Such was the case here. Based on an eyewitness
identification during one incident and striking similarities
with incidents that occurred shortly thereafter, law enforcement
had reason to believe that Kargbo had been involved in the
commission of a string of both attempted and completed armed
robberies at the time of his arrest. His warrantless arrest was
supported by probable cause. Thus, we find no merit in Kargbo’s
argument that his post-arrest statements were “fruit of the
poisonous tree.”
Kargbo also claims error in the district court’s
denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts 3 and
6. We review the denial of such a motion de novo. United
States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy
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burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir.
1997). The verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
verdict is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Smith, 451
F.3d at 216. Substantial evidence is “evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
We are mindful that “the jury, not the reviewing court, weighs
the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in
the evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). “Reversal for
insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
A conspirator’s “acts in furtherance of the conspiracy
are ‘attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them
responsible for the substantive offense,’ when those acts are
reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the
unlawful agreement.” United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 557
n.16 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640, 647 (1946)). “The Pinkerton doctrine makes a person
liable for substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator
when their commission is reasonably foreseeable and in
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furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Ashley, 606
F.3d 135, 142-43 (4th Cir. 2010).
We find that the district court properly upheld the
jury’s finding of guilt under a Pinkerton theory of conspirator
liability. The attempted robbery at issue was within the scope
of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to Kargbo given the
almost identical robbery of a similar business the previous day.
The use of a gun was likewise foreseeable because the conspiracy
involved the commission of armed robberies. Thus, we find no
error.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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