IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 20–0464
Submitted February 23, 2022—Filed March 18, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JUSTICE MATHIS,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Decatur County, Dustria A. Relph,
Judge.
The defendant appeals his convictions for sexual abuse in the second
degree, claiming the evidence was insufficient and the district court erred in
instructing the jury the testimony of the complainant witnesses need not be
corroborated to be accepted as true. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
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McDONALD, Justice.
Justice Mathis was convicted of three counts of sexual abuse in the second
degree, a class “B” felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1(3) and
709.3(1)(b) (2017). Mathis raises two claims in this direct appeal. First, Mathis
claims there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Second, Mathis
claims the district court erred in instructing the jury that “[t]here is no
requirement that the testimony of an alleged victim of sexual offenses be
corroborated.” The court of appeals affirmed Mathis’s convictions, and we
granted Mathis’s application for further review.
I.
We first address Mathis’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions for sexual abuse in the second degree. This court
reviews sufficiency of evidence claims for the correction of errors at law. State v.
Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict. The jury’s verdict binds
this court if it is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d
653, 692 (Iowa 2017). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to convince a
rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In
determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all “legitimate
inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from
the record evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa
2005)).
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The trial record reflects the following. Mathis resided in a house with his
grandmother, Brenda Atkins, and Brenda’s husband (Mathis’s stepgrandfather),
Mickie Atkins. Mathis was raised by Brenda from birth and often referred to her
as his mother. Brenda’s daughter, Stephenie, lived near the Atkinses. Stephenie
has five children, including a daughter, B.T., and a son, L.S. Between
approximately October 2015 and November 2017, B.T. and L.S. visited the
Atkins’ home three to five days per week. During this time, B.T. was between
seven and nine years old, and L.S. was between five and seven years old. Their
visits to the Atkins’ home often occurred after school or when Stephenie had to
work evening shifts. Some of the visits were overnight.
The allegations of abuse surfaced in November 2017 when Stephenie
walked in on L.S. and his younger sibling engaged in inappropriate sexual
behavior. Upon inquiry, L.S. stated he learned the behavior from Mickie.
Eventually B.T. and L.S. reported to their mother that both Mickie and Mathis
had sexually abused them during their visits to their grandparents’ house.
Stephenie reported the sexual abuse allegations to the local police. The children
were taken to a child protection center where they underwent forensic interviews
and physical examinations. No physical evidence of abuse was found during the
examinations.
Mickie and Mathis were both charged with sexual abuse in the second
degree. Mathis was seventeen at the time the trial information was filed. He
initially moved to transfer the case to the juvenile court but later withdrew the
request. Although the allegations against Mickie and Mathis were different, and
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although there were no allegations they acted in concert, Mickie and Mathis
elected to be tried together. B.T. and L.S. were the primary witnesses at trial.
Most of the testimony at trial related to Mickie’s abuse of the children, and we
see no need to discuss that testimony here.
With respect to Mathis, B.T. testified that on one occasion between October
2015 and November 2017, Mathis engaged in vaginal intercourse with her in
Mathis’s bedroom. B.T. could not identify the specific date when this occurred,
but she testified it was sometime before she turned eleven. L.S. testified that
Mathis “made [him] come upstairs a lot” to Mathis’s bedroom. L.S. testified that
when he was in Mathis’s bedroom, Mathis engaged in anal intercourse with him.
Although L.S. could not specify the exact number of times the abuse occurred or
specify the exact dates upon which the abuse occurred, he testified that it
occurred on more than one occasion between October 2015 and November 2017.
Based on L.S.’s birthdate, the abuse occurred sometime before L.S. turned eight
years old. L.S. testified he did not disclose the abuse sooner because Mathis
threatened to punch him if he said anything.
Mathis testified, and he denied any inappropriate conduct with B.T. or L.S.
Mathis testified that he did not want the children in his bedroom and asked them
not to enter his bedroom because it was a “pigsty.” He testified there were empty
soft drink cans and bottles on the floor along with “fantasy blades,” or swords,
he collected. Because of the messy conditions, he believed the room would be
dangerous to the children. Mathis testified that the children only spent any
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length of time in his bedroom on one occasion, when Mathis and a friend were
playing video games in the bedroom.
Brenda (Mathis’s grandmother) also testified at trial. She testified that
Mathis would become “annoyed” if the children tried to enter his bedroom. To
the best of her knowledge, the children were never alone with Mathis. She was
not always in the home, however. She testified that on at least five occasions
between October 2015 and November 2017, she was hospitalized. She testified
that it was possible B.T. and L.S. could have been alone with Mathis, without
her knowledge, during these hospitalizations. She also testified that she had
limited mobility that prevented her from ascending the stairs to Mathis’s
bedroom, meaning anything happening in Mathis’s bedroom was out of her view.
Considered in the light most favorable to the State, substantial evidence
supports the jury’s verdict that Mathis committed sexual abuse against B.T. and
L.S. Where, as here, the defendant does not object to the marshaling
instructions, the marshaling instructions are the law of the case for purposes of
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 530
(Iowa 2009). In this case, the marshaling instructions required the State to prove
(1) that Mathis “performed a sex act upon” B.T. and L.S., and (2) that Mathis
“performed the sex act while [the victim] was under the age of 12.” The definition
of “sex act” in the jury instructions included vaginal or anal penetration. Both
B.T. and L.S. testified to specific instances where Mathis performed sex acts
against them while they were under the age of twelve. The victims’ testimony
itself is sufficient to constitute substantial evidence of Mathis’s guilt. See Iowa
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R. Crim. P. 2.21(3); State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 10–11 (Iowa 2021); State v.
Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Iowa 1998). While Mathis flatly denied
committing any of the alleged abuse, it was for the jury to resolve the conflicts
between the testimony of Mathis on the one hand and B.T. and L.S. on the other.
See State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 803 (Iowa 2021) (“Inherent in our standard
of review of jury verdicts in criminal cases is the recognition that the jury [is] free
to reject certain evidence, and credit other evidence.” (quoting State v. Nichter,
720 N.W.2d 547, 556 (Iowa 2006))).
Citing State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993), Mathis
contends this is the rare case in which the testimony of the victims is so absurd
that it must be rejected as a matter of law. We disagree. In Smith, the court of
appeals found the testimony of a sexual abuse victim was “inconsistent,
self-contradictory, lacking in experiential detail, and, at times, border[ed] on the
absurd” and held the testimony was insufficient as a matter of law to support
the conviction. Id. at 103. Smith is an outlier case. It has been criticized in the
commentary, and it has not been followed in any sexual abuse case in Iowa since.
The primary flaw in Smith is that it is inconsistent with the standard of appellate
review of jury verdicts, which requires that the evidence be viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict and which requires deference to the jury’s
resolution of disputed factual issues. In any event, unlike Smith, there are no
fatal contradictions or deficiencies in either B.T.’s or L.S.’s testimony. Smith does
not afford Mathis any relief.
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Mathis’s remaining attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence are
unavailing. Mathis argues that B.T.’s and L.S.’s testimony regarding Mickie’s
abuse was equivocal or contradictory at times. Even if true, this has no bearing
on the children’s testimony regarding Mathis’s abuse. Mathis also posits that
B.T. and L.S. could have erroneously attributed the abuse perpetrated by Mickie
to Mathis. There is no evidence in the record, however, that the children
conflated Mickie’s and Mathis’s actions, and Mathis did not even make such a
claim during trial. Mathis also points to Brenda’s testimony to support his
argument that B.T. and L.S. did not spend any time in his bedroom. But Brenda
also testified she was hospitalized on five occasions during the time the abuse
occurred.
Regardless, all of these disputed fact issues were for the jury to resolve,
and they did resolve them, adverse to Mathis. Appellate review of the jury’s
verdict is not the trial redux. In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, “[i]t is not the province of the court . . . to resolve conflicts in the
evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility
of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.” State v.
Musser, 721 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Williams, 695 N.W.2d at 28).
II.
Mathis contends the district court committed reversible error when it
instructed the jury, over his objection, that “[t]here is no requirement that the
testimony of an alleged victim of sexual offenses be corroborated.” This court
reviews challenges to jury instructions for the correction of legal error. State v.
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Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). In conducting our review, we
review the instructions “as a whole to determine their accuracy.” Donahue, 957
N.W.2d at 10. A challenged instruction is “judged in context with other
instructions relating to the criminal charge, not in isolation.” State v. Liggins,
557 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Iowa 1996). An incorrect or improper instruction can be
cured “if the other instructions properly advise the jury as to the legal principles
involved.” Thavenet v. Davis, 589 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Iowa 1999) (en banc).
Mathis first contends the noncorroboration instruction violated Iowa Code
section 709.6. That Code provision states, “No instruction shall be given in a trial
for sexual abuse cautioning the jury to use a different standard relating to a
victim’s testimony than that of any other witness to that offense or any other
offense.” In State v. Kraai, we recently resolved this issue contrary to the
defendant’s contention. 969 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Iowa 2022). In Kraai, we held a
materially indistinguishable noncorroboration instruction did not violate Iowa
Code 709.6 because the instruction did not actually caution the jury to use a
different standard relating to the victim’s testimony than that of any other
witness. Id. Kraai is controlling on this point.
Mathis argues the instruction was nonetheless improper because the
instruction unduly and unfairly emphasized the testimony of B.T. and L.S. On
this point, we agree. In Kraai, we explained that “instructions that set apart,
highlight, or accentuate the testimony of a particular witness or a particular
piece of evidence are improper.” Id. at 492. We held the noncorroboration
instruction was improper in two respects. First, the noncorroboration instruction
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set apart the victim’s “testimony as not requiring corroboration in the absence
of a symmetrical instruction regarding the noncorroboration of [the defendant’s]
testimony.” Id. at 493. Second, the noncorroboration instruction particularized
the victim’s “testimony as not requiring corroboration in the absence of a
universal instruction regarding the noncorroboration of all other witness
testimony.” Id. The same rationales apply in this case.
The remaining instructions in this case did not cure the error. “Jury
instructions are not considered separately; they should be considered as a
whole.” Id. at 496 (quoting State v. Davis, 951 N.W.2d 8, 17 (Iowa 2020)). “If a
particular instruction ‘was given improperly, the error is cured if the other
instructions properly advise the jury as to the legal principles involved.’ ” Id.
(quoting Thavenet, 589 N.W.2d at 237). As in Kraai, the other instructions in this
case did not cure the taint of the improper instruction. See id. For instance, the
jury in this case was instructed that it could believe “all, part or none of any
witness’s testimony,” but in deciding which testimony to believe, the jury
evaluated B.T.’s and L.S.’s testimony “in light of the noncorroboration
instruction that uniquely accentuated [their] testimony over all others.” Id. The
instruction regarding the State’s burden to prove Mathis’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt also did not cure the error since the jury was “determining
whether the State satisfied its burden in light of the noncorroboration instruction
that uniquely accentuated” the children’s testimony over all others. Id.
As in Kraai, we hold the district court erred in instructing the jury that
“[t]here is no requirement that the testimony of an alleged victim of sexual
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offenses be corroborated.” In the absence of any other instruction regarding the
uncorroborated testimony of other witnesses, the instruction unduly and
improperly emphasized the complainant witnesses’ testimony.
III.
Having determined that the noncorroboration instruction in this case was
erroneous, we must determine whether the error warrants reversal. Once again,
we draw the applicable principles from our decision in Kraai:
“Error in giving or refusing to give a jury instruction does not
warrant reversal unless it results in prejudice to the complaining
party.” State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 817 (Iowa 2017) (quoting
State v. Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015)). When a court
erroneously gives or refuses a jury instruction, “we presume
prejudice and reverse unless the record affirmatively establishes
there was no prejudice.” State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Iowa
2010). “When the error is not of constitutional magnitude, the test
of prejudice is whether it sufficiently appears that the rights of the
complaining party have been injuriously affected or that the party
has suffered a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Marin, 788 N.W.2d
833, 836 (Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Gansz, 376 N.W.2d 887, 891
(Iowa 1985)), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l,
Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016). The presumption of prejudice is
overcome when the jury received “strong evidence” of a defendant’s
guilt. See Plain, 898 N.W.2d at 817.
Kraai, 969 N.W.2d at 496–97.
Applying these principles in Kraai, we concluded the instructional error
did not require reversal. Id. at 497–99. The record in Kraai included strong
evidence of the defendant’s guilt in the form of “substantial corroboration” of the
victim’s testimony. Id. at 497. The victim’s testimony was substantially
corroborated by physical evidence found in the home, including a pair of pants
with a hole in the crotch, which the victim testified the defendant wore during
the abuse, as well as a large collection of pornography, which the victim testified
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the defendant showed her during the abuse. Id. at 497–98. The most compelling
evidence in Kraai was the victim’s knowledge of the defendant’s pierced genitalia,
which we stated was “strongly corroborative” of the victim’s testimony since it
was “unlikely [the victim] would know of this intimate detail in the absence of
sexual abuse.” Id. at 498. Because the victim’s testimony was substantially
corroborated, the erroneous noncorroboration instruction “pertained to a moot
point.” Id. at 499 (quoting Garza v. State, 231 P.3d 884, 891 (Wyo. 2010)). We
thus held the improper instruction did not result in prejudice to the defendant.
We cannot reach the same conclusion in this case. While there is sufficient
evidence to sustain the defendant’s convictions, there is not strong evidence of
guilt sufficient to overcome the presumption of prejudice. Indeed, the State does
not even argue harmless error. See, e.g., State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 678–
79 (Iowa 2014) (declining to find an error harmless where the State does not
make the argument). In this case, unlike Kraai, neither B.T.’s nor L.S.’s
testimony is corroborated by other evidence. Both children testified to separate
instances of sex abuse, but neither witnessed nor testified about the sex abuse
allegedly committed against the other child. Both children eventually told their
mother about the sexual abuse, but there is no evidence their mother
independently corroborated the children’s accounts of abuse. And there is no
physical evidence of any sort corroborating the children’s testimony.
The noncorroboration instruction in this case thus did not pertain to a
moot point; instead, the noncorroboration instruction in this case was a focal
point. During closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly referenced the
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noncorroboration instruction in advocating for the convictions. For example, the
prosecutor argued to the jury: “The judge instructed you . . . that you don’t need
anything more than [L.S. and B.T.’s] word. If you believe their testimony . . .
that’s good enough to find [Mathis] guilty.” The prosecutor then argued this case
came down to credibility and who the jury believed. In determining who to
believe, the prosecutor reminded the jury that the children’s testimony did not
need to be corroborated:
But if you believe that I have proved that checklist beyond a
reasonable doubt, those two elements for each of the crimes, the
defendants are guilty. And that I can prove solely with the testimony
of [B.T. and L.S.]. If you believe their testimony, we have proven the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
These were all correct statements of the law, but “[i]n the absence of any other
instruction regarding the uncorroborated testimony of other witnesses, the
instruction unduly emphasized the complainant witness’s testimony.” Kraai, 969
N.W.2d at 496. The instruction prejudiced Mathis’s rights.
IV.
When a court erroneously gives or refuses a jury instruction, “we presume
prejudice and reverse unless the record affirmatively establishes there was no
prejudice.” Hanes, 790 N.W.2d at 551. The record in this case does not
affirmatively establish the absence of prejudice, and the State does not contend
otherwise. While there is sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, there is
not strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt, and the improper instruction was a
focal point of the State’s case. We vacate Mathis’s convictions and remand the
case to the district court for further proceedings.
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DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.