IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
NEVADA COLLECTORS No. 81930
ASSOCIATION, A NEVADA NON-
PROFIT CORPORATION,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND JUN 1 7 2022
INDUSTRY FINANCIAL
-.Y.•.;:r.
INSTITUTIONS DIVISION; AND CLEP.K F
BY . 6.
JUSTICE COURT OF LAS VEGAS DEpt.,
TOWNSHIP,
Res • ondents.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a final judgment in an action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief in challenging the constitutionality of a
statute and a court rule. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
Nancy L. Allf, Judge.
Appellant Nevada Collectors Association (NCA) sued
respondents the State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry
Financial Institutions Division (FID); its Commissioner, Sandy O'Laughlin;
and Justice Court of Las Vegas Township (Justice Court). NCA alleged in
its complaint that, when combined, NRS 97B.160 and Local Rules of
Practice for the Justice Court of Las Vegas Township Rule 16 (JCRLV 16)
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effectively restricted NCA's members access to the courts.' Justice Court
moved to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5) and FID also moved to dismiss
under NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(1). The district court granted both
motions, finding that NCA lacked standing. We agree.
Questions of standing are reviewed de novo. Morency v. Dep't
of Educ., 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 63, 496 P.3d 584, 588 (2021). Constitutional
"[sltanding is a self-imposed rule of restraine in Nevada; however,
cases for declaratory relief, and where constitutional matters arise, this
court has requirecr it. Stockmeier v. Nev. Dep't. of Corr. Psychological Rev.
Panel, 122 Nev. 385, 393, 135 P.3d 220, 225-26 (2006) (first alternation in
original) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated
on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224,
228 n.6, 181 P.3d 670, 672 n.6 (2008). Constitutional standing requires a
justiciable controversy between parties with adverse legal interests. Doe v.
Bryan, 102 Nev. 523, 525, 728 P.2d 443, 444 (1986). A legal interest means
an actual injury—one that is personal and not general. Schwartz v. Lopez,
132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016) ("Generally, a party must show
a personal injury and not merely a general interest . . . ."). For example, in
Doe we concluded that plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of a
criminal statute lacked an actual injury because they could not show any
1The parties refer to NRS 97B.160 as Assembly Bill (A.B.) 477. A.B.
477 was codified as NRS Chapter 97B. See A.B. 477, 80th Leg. (Nev. 2019);
2019 Nev. Stat., ch. 368, §§ 2-19, at 1-6. NRS 97B.160 places a cap on
attorney fees for certain plaintiffs (which includes NCNs niembers) in
actions to collect on debt. JCRLV 16 requires that Iclorporations and
limited liability corporations (LLC) shall be represented by an attorney" in
Las Vegas Justice Court. NCNs argument is that the two rules, in
combination, render the pursuit of certain debts in the justice court cost-
prohibitive to its corporate members.
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enforcement efforts made against them under that statute. 102 Nev. at 526,
728 P.2d at 445.
Here, we similarly conclude that NCA has failed to demonstrate
a legitimate legal interest. While NCA claims its members declarations
demonstrate actual injury, it never claims that any member received an
adverse ruling regarding attorney fees in justice court. Rather, it merely
argues that its members could spend more on attorney fees than they would
be able to recoup, because of NRS 97B.160 and JCRLV 16. We need not
resolve the issue of whether FID could pursue a disciplinary action against
an NCA member for requesting excess attorney fees, because even if FID
could, it has not. See, e.g., Doe, 102 Nev. at 526, 728 P.2d at 445
(deterrnining that no actual injury existed because there was nothing in the
record to "reflect any enforcement efforts [for violation of the relevant
statute] by the State against appellants or others").
Even if NCA had overcome these barriers, we lack jurisdiction
to consider controversies brought on a non-party's behalf absent statutory
permission. See, e.g., High Noon at Arlington Ranch Horneowners Ass'n v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. 500, 511, 402 P.3d 639, 648
(concluding that a homeowners' association's representational standing was
governed by statute and High Noon lacked standing under the statute at
issue). NCA does not raise, and we are not aware of, any statutory authority
giving NCA representational standing here. While NCA relies on federal
authority in support of its standing argument, this authority is unavailing
because "[s]tate courts are not bound by federal standing principles, which
derive from the case or controversy component of the United States
Constitution." Heller v. Legislature of Nev., 120 Nev. 456, 461 n.3, 93 P.3d
746, 749 n.3 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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(0) I947A alber.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
It is so ORDERED.
Hardesty
Stiglich
(74'ef--• J.
Herndon
cc: Hon. Nancy L. Allf, District Judge
Lansford W. Levitt, Settlement Judge
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP/Las Vegas
Attorney General/Carson City
Attorney General/Las Vegas
Olson, Cannon, Gormley, & Stoberski
Gesund & Pailet, LLC
Fennemore Craig P.C./Reno
Eighth District Court Clerk
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Ith I947A 6411ges.