RENDERED: JUNE 24, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-1230-MR
TAWAIIN LEWIS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JUDITH MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-002874
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GOODWINE, TAYLOR, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: Tawaiin Lewis appeals from an order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court denying his motion for relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42. In his motion, Lewis made multiple claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel but on appeal only argues that counsel erred by failing to
interview co-defendant Seaundre Horsley as part of his investigation, and failing to
call him to testify. The trial court denied Lewis’s motion without conducting an
an evidentiary hearing. We vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing on these
issues.
Lewis was found guilty by a jury of two counts of intentional murder,
two counts of assault in the first degree, and one count of wanton endangerment in
the first degree. Consistent with the jury’s recommendation, the trial court
sentenced Lewis to life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years on
the murder convictions, twenty years on each of the assault convictions, and five
years on the wanton endangerment conviction, all sentences to run concurrently.
Lewis filed a direct appeal and his conviction was affirmed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Lewis v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 26 (Ky. 2015).
We adopt the facts from Lewis, as follows:
On September 23, 2009, Lewis approached an apartment
building on Saddlebrook Lane in Louisville, Kentucky.
As they often did, Jonte Johnson (Jonte); his cousins,
Dejuan Johnson (Dejuan) and Demarcus Johnson
(Demarcus); and his friends Quinntin Knighton
(Knighton) and Terry Matthews (Matthews) were sitting
on the building’s porch. When Lewis approached, he had
a handgun in his hand and had a short verbal
confrontation with the men on the porch. During that
confrontation, Seaundre Horsley (Horsley), who was
carrying an assault rifle, came around the corner of the
building and began firing at the men on the porch. Jonte
and Knighton suffered multiple gunshot wounds and died
as a result. Demarcus, Dejuan, and Mathews [sic] were
wounded, but not fatally. The evidence at trial indicated
that the fatal wounds to Jonte and Knighton were from
bullets fired by the assault rifle. As to the non-fatal
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wounds, it was clear that some resulted from assault rifle
bullets; however, the source of others was unclear.
Following an investigation, the police arrested both
Horsley and Lewis, and charged them with two counts of
murder, two counts of attempted murder, two counts of
first degree assault, and one count of first degree wanton
endangerment. Horsley claimed that he began firing the
assault rifle because he thought someone on the porch
had a gun and was about to start shooting.
Id. at 29-30.
The prosecutions of Lewis and Horsley later diverged. Despite the
fact that it was bullets from Horsley’s rifle, not Lewis’s pistol, that caused the two
deaths, the Commonwealth offered to reduce Horsley’s charges down to two
counts of second-degree manslaughter and two counts of second-degree assault in
exchange for a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. The Commonwealth
explained the basis for its offer stating that “it entered into the plea, in part,
because it believed it had some evidentiary problems with identifying Horsley.”
Id. at 30 n.2. As part of his plea agreement, Horsley set forth the following
statement of facts:
I was standing in the yard in front of the apartment
building at 4908 Saddlebrook Lane on September 23,
2009, around 10:00 pm at night, here in Jefferson
County, Kentucky. I was armed with a loaded Assault
rifle. Tawaiin “Chum/Chub” Lewis was also standing in
the yard. There were individuals on the stoop/porch at
that address who were facing out into the yard where I
was. When some or all of the five (5) individuals sitting
or standing on the stoop/porch made sudden movements,
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I panicked and thought someone on the stoop/porch
might be armed and have the intention of firing at me. I
fired my weapon in the direction of the individuals on the
porch. Although I did not know who was all on the
porch at the time, I am now aware that the firing of the
weapon by me caused the death of Quinntin Knighton
and Jonte Johnson and injury to Demarcus Johnson and
Dejuan Johnson. I am also now aware that Terry
Matthews was the fifth individual on the stoop/porch that
was put in danger by the firing of my weapon. I left the
area after the shooting.
Id. at 30.
Besides placing Lewis at the scene, the statement does nothing to
implicate Lewis in the shootings or in any conspiracy with Horsley. At Lewis’s
jury trial, his counsel sought to introduce Horsley’s plea statement. The
Commonwealth objected but agreed to stipulate that Horsley had fired the assault
rifle and had pled guilty. The trial court accepted the stipulation but would not
admit the plea documents into evidence. Curiously, neither the Commonwealth
nor Lewis’s counsel called Horsley to testify. The Kentucky Supreme Court would
later specifically affirm the trial court’s decision to exclude the written statement.
Id. at 30-32. The Court also stated:
We note that the trial court only ruled that Lewis could
not introduce into evidence Horsley’s plea agreement.
The court did not rule that Horsley could not testify as to
the contents of that agreement or as to his mental state at
the time of the shooting. Furthermore, as noted by the
Commonwealth, Horsley was available to testify and
wanted to do so on behalf of Lewis. However, counsel
for Lewis never called Horsley to testify.
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Id. at 34 n.5 (emphasis added).
Following the affirmance of his convictions by the Kentucky
Supreme Court, Lewis filed his RCr 11.42 motion alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel on multiple grounds.1 The basis for Lewis’s appeal only concerns his
counsel neither interviewing Horsley as part of trial preparation, nor calling
Horsley to testify at trial. Lewis’s position is supported by an affidavit executed by
Horsley. We quote this affidavit verbatim and without correction:
That on september 23, 2009, about 10:00pm in Jefferson
County, Kentucky. That I had been in a altercation with
Terry Mathews and some of his friends. Terry is part of
the Crips gang and I was a part of the Bloods. I had
came by the residence where the altercation happeded
earlier, just in case I was jumped, I brough a weapon with
me. When I got to the house were he was, there were
five people of the porch and Tawaiin Lewis had just
walked up. Some one on the porch made a sudden
movement, and I thought that they may be reaching for a
gun; and that they may have been firing on me. So I
fired my weapon in the direction of the individuals on the
porch. On the day of this incedent, I was not with, nor
was my action in collaboration with, nor in concert with
Tawaiin Lewis. I acted alone with out the assistance of
Mr Lewis or any other person in this misfortunate
incedent which took the lives of two people; Quinntin
Kinghton and Jonte Johnson, and also injuring Demarcus
Johnson and Dejuan Johnson.
1
Lewis’s motion alleged that counsel was ineffective in (a) failing to investigate and prepare
Horsley to testify; (b) failing to seek a continuance when the trial court determined that
Horsley’s plea statement was inadmissible; (c) failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct; (d)
failing to retain an expert to testify as to impact of his intoxication on his culpability; and (e)
cumulative error.
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The trial court, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, denied the
motion in a written opinion and order entered on January 23, 2019. A subsequent
motion to alter, amend, or vacate that opinion was denied by an order entered on
February 22, 2019.
“In reviewing an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the appellate court reviews
the trial court’s factual findings for clear error while reviewing the application of
its legal standards and precedents de novo.” Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d
147, 156 (Ky. 2021). “To prevail on an RCr 11.42 motion, the movant must
convincingly establish he was deprived of some substantial right justifying the
extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceeding.” Bratcher v.
Commonwealth, 406 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Ky.App. 2012).
Our standard of review of a motion alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel is governed by rules set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Court prescribed a two-pronged test setting forth the defendant’s burden of
proof in these cases:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984), adopted in Kentucky by Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39-40
(Ky. 1985). Both criteria must be met in order for the test to be satisfied.
The Strickland Court emphasized that reviewing courts should assess
the effectiveness of counsel in the light of the totality of the evidence presented at
trial and the fundamental fairness of the challenged proceeding. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 695-696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. The Court further noted that, “[a] fair
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the
time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
Where, as here, an RCr 11.42 hearing is denied, appellate review is
limited to “whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively
refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.” Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967).
In reviewing the record in this matter, certain elements of the trial
bear scrutiny. As noted, Horsley’s plea statement, while certainly confirming
Lewis’s presence at the crime scene, did not implicate Lewis whatsoever in the
crimes charged. Second, and most importantly, Lewis was found guilty of
intentional murder pursuant to a complicity instruction under KRS 502.020. The
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trial court defined both “intentional murder” and “complicity” for the jury as
follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 1: MURDER (INTENTIONAL)
You will find the defendant, TAWAIIN LEWIS, guilty
of Intentional Murder under this Instruction if, and only
if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt all of the following:
A. That in Jefferson County on or about the 23rd day of
September, 2009, the defendant, acting alone or in
complicity with another, killed Jonte Johnson;[2]
AND
B. That in so doing, he caused the death of Jonte
Johnson intentionally.
(A) Complicity: Means that a person is guilty of an
offense committed by another person when, with the
intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of
the offense, he solicits, commands, or engages in a
conspiracy with such other person to commit the offense,
or aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in
planning or committing the offense.
Means that a person is guilty of an offense committed by
another person when, while acting wantonly with regards
to the result of another’s conduct, he solicits, commands,
or engages in a conspiracy with such other person to
engage in that conduct, or aids, counsels, or attempts to
aid such person in planning or committing such conduct.
Lewis, 475 S.W.3d at 33 (footnote omitted).
2
The instruction for victim Quinntin Knighton was the same.
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The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that “evidence at trial indicated”
the bullets which killed Jonte Johnson and Quinntin Knighton were from Horsley’s
rifle and not from any weapon allegedly fired by Lewis. Therefore, the evidence at
trial did not support finding that Lewis was “acting alone” in committing
intentional murder, but that he could only have been acting “in complicity with
another.” If Horsley had been called to testify, and testified in conformity with his
affidavit, his testimony would have wholly refuted the Commonwealth’s allegation
that Lewis had been involved in a conspiracy that resulted in murder. Lewis’s
alleged involvement in a conspiracy was the only means by which he could be
convicted of intentional murder.
In denying Lewis’s motion, the trial court noted that Horsley had pled
guilty to second-degree manslaughter,3 examined the definition of complicity, and
determined that “Horsley’s intent is irrelevant since both he and Lewis fired
indiscriminately at the porch. This simultaneous firing is sufficient to charge
Complicity.” We disagree.
While Horsley’s own mens rea may have been irrelevant, the real
issue presented is much more elemental. At issue in regard to Lewis’s intentional
murder conviction, is whether or not there was any conspiracy at all between
3
While Lewis was found guilty of “intentional” murder, Horsley’s plea to manslaughter in the
second degree only requires a mens rea of “wantonly” causing the death of another person. KRS
507.040.
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Horsley and Lewis. We already know that no bullets from Lewis’s firearm were
found in either of the deceased victims and it was “unclear” whether or not any
bullets from Lewis’s firearm injured the other victims. Lewis, 475 S.W.3d at 29-
30.
The fact that “several witnesses stated that both Lewis and Horsley
fired their guns at the men on the porch[,]” Lewis, 475 S.W.3d at 34, does not
necessarily mean that the parties, who did not arrive on the scene together,
conspired together to ambush and assault the victims. Regardless of the extent to
which Horsley and Lewis knew each other, there was no evidence of a conspiracy
among them other that testimony that both discharged firearms during the
engagement. The Kentucky Supreme Court has noted that our complicity statute
contains two types of complicity; “complicity to the act” or “complicity to the
result.” See Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356 (Ky. 2000). Horsley’s
affidavit undermines both. Without another witness testifying that the two
defendants staged or otherwise planned a combined assault on the victims
beforehand, Lewis’s and Horsley’s mutual denials would have posed a significant
defense to the charged offenses of intentional murder by conspiracy.
The importance of the denial of a conspiracy found in Horsley’s
affidavit should be self-evident. As it now stands, both alleged parties to a
conspiracy affirmatively deny any such plan or comity of action. The evidence
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presented at trial, while implicating a conspiracy, does not on its own necessarily
prove one. While we cannot know how the jury would have reacted to Horsley’s
denial, the ultimate question is why a man, who could offer a corroborating denial
of the conspiracy and had already pled guilty to firing the deadly shots, was not
called by Lewis’s counsel. We cannot rule upon the reasonableness of defense
counsel’s actions or defer to defense counsel’s strategic decisions when we do not
even know whether or not conscious decisions were made.
The record in this matter does not show us whether or not Lewis’s
counsel interviewed Horsley or attempted to discover how he would testify at the
time of the trial. Perhaps most importantly, we do not know what Lewis told his
counsel about his involvement with Horsley which might have led counsel to avoid
having Horsley anywhere near the witness stand. As noted in Strickland,
The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be
determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s
own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are usually
based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made
by the defendant and on information supplied by the
defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are
reasonable depends critically on such information.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.
We do know however, that Lewis’s counsel wished to submit
Horsley’s plea statement. Conversely, the record does not indicate why, after
being denied entry of the plea statement into evidence, Lewis’s counsel did not call
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Horsley to testify himself. Any judge or trial counsel can presume numerous
reasons why a defense counsel might, as effective trial strategy, seek to submit
information to a jury without having to do so through the testimony of an admitted
gang member and killer who would also be subject to cross examination. While
such explanations are inviting, they are not contained in the record before us and
should not be explained away by conjecture.
Additionally, our analysis recognizes that the Commonwealth had
already acquired Horsley’s guilty plea and could have, as a condition of such,
required him testify against Lewis if such testimony would have supported the
allegation of a conspiracy. For reasons unknown and absent from the record,
neither the prosecution nor the defense called the one person who could
affirmatively confirm or deny the most significant debated element of Lewis’s
charged offense.
Without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court could not properly
conclude from the record alone that the decisions made by Lewis’s counsel were
the result of trial strategy. Likewise, without the benefit of testimony provided at
such a hearing, we are presently denied the ability to “evaluate the conduct from
[defense] counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Thus,
on appellate review, we cannot determine from the record whether counsel’s
decision to not call Lewis to testify “was trial strategy, or ‘an abdication of
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advocacy.’” Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338, 345 (Ky. 2001)
(quoting Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Accordingly, we vacate the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court and
remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Andrea Reed Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
James Havey
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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