J-A07011-22
2022 PA Super 122
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.K.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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:
APPEAL OF: C.K.M. :
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:
: No. 1973 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered August 20, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Juvenile Division at
No(s): 48 JUV 2016
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 15, 2022
Appellant, C.K.M., appeals from the August 20, 2021 Order that denied
Appellant’s oral motion for release from juvenile placement on the basis that
Appellant had been in placement beyond the time limitations set forth in
Section 6353 of the Juvenile Act. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6353(a). Upon careful
review, we affirm.
The factual and procedural history of this case is undisputed. Relevant
to this appeal, on April 5, 2016, Appellant made an admission to one count of
Indecent Assault as a misdemeanor of the first degree. On April 25, 2016,
the juvenile court held a Dispositional Hearing and ordered Appellant to be
placed at the Mathom House, which the court concluded was the least
restrictive type of placement that was consistent with the protection of the
public and best suited to Appellant’s treatment, supervision, rehabilitation,
and welfare. The juvenile court has held regularly scheduled review hearings
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in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Act and Appellant has
remained in placement, at various facilities, since the Dispositional Hearing.
Appellant is currently placed at Adelphoi Village’s Middle Creek Secure Sexual
Offender Program.
On July 1, 2021, at a dispositional review hearing, Appellant made an
oral motion for release from placement on the basis that his continued
placement exceeded the statutory maximum for the same adult crime in
violation of Section 6353 of the Juvenile Act. After reviewing submitted briefs,
the juvenile court denied the motion for release. In its Order, the juvenile
court found, “[t]he time limitation stated in Section 6353(a) applies only to
the initial placement[,]” and the court found it was allowed to extend and
modify Appellant’s commitment after conducting timely dispositional and
placement review hearings. Order, dated 8/20/21, at 1.
Appellant timely appealed.1 Appellant filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement and the juvenile court relied on the reasoning in the August 20,
2021 Order in lieu of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal: “Does the Juvenile Act
authorize a juvenile court to continue a juvenile’s placement beyond the
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1 We find the order in question to be appealable as a collateral order pursuant
to Rule 313 because it “is an order separable from and collateral to the main
cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review
and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final
judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost." Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
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statutory maximum for the same adult crime?” Appellant’s Br. at 4 (some
capitalization omitted).
In his sole issue, Appellant is asking this Court to interpret and apply
Section 6353 of the Juvenile Act. The interpretation and application of a
statute is a question of law. C.B. v. J.B., 65 A.3d 946, 951 (Pa. Super. 2013).
As with all questions of law, we must employ a de novo standard of review
and a plenary scope of review to determine whether the court committed an
error of law. Id.
When interpreting a statute, this court is constrained by the rules of the
Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (the “Act”). 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. The
Act makes clear that the goal in interpreting any statute is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly while construing the statute
in a manner that gives effect to all its provisions. Id. at § 1921(a). The Act
provides: “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity,
the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”
Id. at § 1921(b). “It is well settled that the best indication of the General
Assembly's intent may be found in a statute's plain language.” Cagey v.
Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 458, 462 (Pa. 2018). Additionally, we must
presume that the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd,
impossible of execution, or unreasonable. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Moreover,
the Act requires penal provisions of statutes to be strictly construed and any
ambiguity in the language of a penal statute should be interpreted in the light
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most favorable to the accused. Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1212
(Pa. 2013); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1).
As stated above, Appellant challenges the juvenile court’s interpretation
of Section 6353 of the Juvenile Act, which states, in relevant part:
No child shall initially be committed to an institution for a period
longer than four years or a period longer than he could have been
sentenced by the court if he had been convicted of the same
offense as an adult, whichever is less. The initial commitment
may be extended for a similar period of time, or modified, if the
court finds after hearing that the extension or modification will
effectuate the original purpose for which the order was entered.
The child shall have notice of the extension or modification hearing
and shall be given an opportunity to be heard. The committing
court shall review each commitment every six months and shall
hold a disposition review hearing at least every nine months.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6353(a) (emphasis added).
Appellant avers that the juvenile court erred by finding that Section
6353 was unambiguous and then concluding that Section 6353 only placed a
time limitation on a juvenile’s initial period of commitment rather than a
juvenile’s total period of commitment. Appellant’s Br. at 8. Appellant asserts
that, contrary to the juvenile court’s finding, the language of Section 6353 is
ambiguous. Id. at 10-12. Appellant argues that it is ambiguous because it
can be interpreted as either 1) limiting the total period of juvenile commitment
or 2) limiting individual extensions of juvenile commitment. Id. at 12.
Appellant further contends that the rules of statutory interpretation require
that any ambiguity in the statute be resolved in favor of a juvenile. Id. at 14.
Accordingly, Appellant argues, the juvenile court should have interpreted the
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statute as limiting the total period of juvenile commitment and granted his
motion for release. Id.2
Upon review, we discern no ambiguity in the statute. The plain language
of the statute requires that a child’s initial commitment to an institution does
not exceed four years or the maximum sentence if the child had been
convicted of the same crime as an adult, whichever is less. The statute also
allows a court to extend or modify the initial commitment for a similar period
of time—the lesser of four years or the maximum sentence if the child had
been convicted of the same crime as an adult—if the court holds a hearing
and finds that the extension or modification will effectuate the original purpose
of the order. As stated above, we must presume that the General Assembly
does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or
unreasonable. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). The General Assembly would not have
referred to a child’s initial commitment twice within the statute if they did not
intend to distinguish a child’s initial commitment period from the child’s total
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2 In support of his argument, Appellant quotes a sentence of non-binding dicta
from In re S.A.S., 839 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Super. 2003), a case where the
juvenile court imposed an indefinite term of probation. Appellant’s Br. at 11.
In S.A.S., the appellant argued that his probation sentence was illegal
pursuant to the commitment limitations set forth in Section 6353. On appeal,
this Court concluded that Section 6353 did not place a time restriction on
probation. S.A.S., 839 A.2d at 1109. In reaching its conclusion, the S.A.S.
Court discussed the distinction between a term of commitment and a term of
probation. Id. However, since commitment was not at issue in that case, the
Court’s statements regarding commitment are non-binding dicta. See In re.
L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1081 (Pa. 2013). S.A.S., thus, provides no precedential
authority to support Appellant’s argument.
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commitment period. Accordingly, we hold that the time limitation stated in
Section 6353(a) applies to a child’s initial commitment period, rather than a
child’s total commitment period.
Moreover, Section 6353(a) permits a court to extend a child’s initial
commitment beyond four years, or for longer than the child could be
sentenced if convicted of the same offense as an adult, if the court meets
certain requirements outlined in the statute. Recent caselaw supports this
result.
In Commonwealth v. J.C., 199 A.3d 394 (Pa. Super. 2018), an
analogous case, this Court affirmed a juvenile court’s commitment of a
juvenile offender beyond four years. Similar to Appellant, the juvenile in J.C.
admitted to Indecent Assault as a misdemeanor of the first degree, an offense
punishable by up to five years imprisonment.3 Id. at 397 n.3. This Court
found that the juvenile had notice of an extension or modification hearing prior
to his four-year commitment anniversary, the juvenile had an opportunity to
be heard, and the juvenile court made specific findings pursuant to Section
6353(a) and, therefore, concluded the juvenile court did not illegally commit
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3 Section 6353 prohibits a court from detaining a child for more “than four
years or a period longer than he could have been sentenced by the court if he
had been convicted of the same offense as an adult, whichever is less.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 6353(a). Because four years is less than the potential five-year
adult sentence, the statute prohibited the juvenile court from detaining the
juvenile offender for more than four years unless the court met certain
requirements.
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the juvenile when the court extended his initial commitment beyond four
years. Id. at 399-400.
Here, the juvenile court found the statute to be unambiguous and
concluded that Section 6353 did not preclude the court from committing
Appellant for longer than four years if the court followed certain procedures
and made certain findings. The juvenile court opined:
The time limitation stated in Section 6353(a) applies only to the
initial placement, this court has conducted timely dispositional and
placement reviews at which it has consistently and continuously
been demonstrated that the juvenile is in need of continued
treatment and poses a public safety risk until treatment is taken
seriously and completed, and at which required findings were
made and the juvenile’s placements were [] continued, extended,
and changed when necessary. Accordingly, the correct placement
order stands.
Order, dated 8/20/21, at 1-2. We agree and discern no error in the juvenile
court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for release.
In conclusion, our review of the record and relevant legal authority
reveals that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded
that the time limitation imposed in Section 6353(a) only applied to Appellant’s
initial commitment, rather than his total commitment, and denied Appellant’s
motion for release.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/15/2022
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