IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 15, 2009
No. 07-10433
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
LESTER JON RUSTON
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
Before DAVIS, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:
Lester Jon Ruston was charged with threatening to assault and murder
a federal magistrate judge with intent to intimidate and retaliate against the
judge in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115 and was found not guilty by reason of
insanity. The district court committed Ruston to the custody of the Attorney
General under 18 U.S.C. § 4243(a). Prior to a § 4243(c) hearing to determine
whether Ruston could establish that his release would not create a substantial
risk of bodily injury to another due to a present mental disease or illness,
Ruston’s counsel filed a request for the court to hold a hearing to determine if
Ruston was competent to waive his right to counsel. After holding a hearing, a
No. 07-10433
magistrate judge found Ruston competent to waive counsel. The district court
then conducted a two-day § 4243(c) hearing where Ruston proceeded pro se. The
district court found that Ruston failed to prove that he did not pose a substantial
risk of bodily injury to others, and ordered that he remain in the custody of the
Attorney General until he could be safely released to the community. Ruston
appeals the district court’s failure to sua sponte hold a competency hearing after
observing Ruston’s behavior at the § 4243(c) hearing and the court’s
determination that Ruston was competent to waive his right to counsel. For
reasons discussed below, we REVERSE and REMAND.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 21, 2004, Ruston called the chambers of the Honorable Irma
Ramirez, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Texas.
Ruston left a threatening and profanity-ridden message on Judge Ramirez’s
answering machine. Ruston was arrested the following day and charged with
threatening a federal official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115. Ruston then began
filing erratic pro se motions in the district court.
On August 20, 2004, the Federal Public Defenders office was appointed to
represent Ruston. Subsequently, the district court granted an unopposed Motion
for Psychiatric and Psychological Consultation. Ruston, however, continued to
engage in erratic pro se filings that contained allegations similar to the
following: “[n]othing alleged in [the] indictment has anything to do with Irma
Ramirez’s capacity as a Federal Official. It has to do with a murder for hire plot,
which the Northern District Court is attempting to cover up.”
On May 4, 2005, the court held a competency hearing where a forensic
psychologist with the U.S. Bureau of Prisons testified that Ruston suffered from
a mental disorder, specifically delusional disorder prosecutorial type, that
impaired his ability to assist counsel. The district court found Ruston suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to assist
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No. 07-10433
properly in his defense. Ruston was remanded to the custody of the Attorney
General for purposes of attempting to restore Ruston to competency. Despite
being represented by court-appointed counsel, Ruston continued to file
nonsensical pro se motions with the court.
On September 13, 2006, Ruston’s attorney submitted a motion entitled
“Memorandum of Competency and Opposition to Involuntary Medication.” On
September 19, 2006, the district court held a competency hearing and found
Ruston competent to stand trial. Dr. James Wolfson testified at the hearing and
stated that Ruston had “present capacity to proceed to adjudication,” but that
“delusional material continue[d] to be present in Ruston’s thinking and could
impair his future capacity for entirely independent strategic legal decision
making.” Dr. Wolfson urged the district court to “prosecute [the] case quickly
because [he] could give no assurance that [Ruston’s] level of remission or at least
rational strategizing might continue.” On September 25, 2006, Ruston’s
attorney provided a Notice of Insanity Defense. On October 2, 2006, a Joint
Stipulation of Fact was submitted where all parties agreed that Ruston was not
guilty by reason of insanity. On October 12, 2006, the district court found
Ruston not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered Ruston committed to the
custody of the Attorney General. However, at the hearing his attorney stated:
Mr. Ruston . . . seems to many times be competent and rationally
interact with me, but there are other times where he seems to act
irrationally. So I realize we are on - I’m trying to find the right
words. Sort of the knife’s edge of competency I guess on a day-to-
day basis which makes things very difficult. So at this point in time
this morning I feel he is interacting with me on a rational basis and
making rational decisions, and I must say that he is rational. But
since the [c]ourt found him competent and today[,] I think there are
moments that he has become so irrational that he cannot be
considered competent.
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No. 07-10433
On February 13, 2007, Ruston’s attorney filed a motion requesting that the
Court hold a hearing to determine if Ruston waived his right to counsel, because
Ruston wished to proceed pro se in a scheduled § 4243(c) hearing. On March 7,
2007, a magistrate judge held a hearing to determine whether Ruston was
competent to waive counsel. The magistrate judge concluded that Ruston had
“the ability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings to determine
if he is a danger to society and underst[ood] the significance and consequences
of his decision to waive counsel.” Ruston, however, made the following telling
statement at the hearing:
I’ve been competent since the day I was arrested. I have a stack of
medical records that have been suppressed this entire case that
show no mental illness and complete competence. Every document
filed by the government in this case has been a fraud. I’ve been
denied a suppression hearing, I’ve been denied all my constitutional
rights for almost three years and I’m tired of it.
The court granted Ruston’s motion to proceed pro se, stating that the court
would not force counsel on Ruston. Ruston, pro se, then filed additional
nonsensical motions with the court.
On March 27-28, 2007, Ruston represented himself pro se in an 18 U.S.C.
§ 4243(c) hearing. A § 4243(c) hearing is held to determine whether the
individual is a danger to himself or others. Ruston had the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that his release would not pose a substantial risk
of bodily injury to others or damage to property. At the hearing, Ruston’s
demeanor demonstrated a lack of understanding regarding the nature of the
proceedings against him.
Dr. Wolfson’s Testimony
Dr. Wolfson testified that Ruston was unwilling to accept a diagnosis of
mental illness and refused treatment. Dr. Wolfson also testified to reviewing a
report of a forensic evaluation completed by Dr. Maureen Burris, and stated that
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No. 07-10433
he disagreed with Dr. Burris’s diagnosis that Ruston suffered from delusional
disorder and instead diagnosed Ruston with paranoid schizophrenia. Dr.
Wolfson also testified that it was possible that Ruston was bipolar or suffered
from a personality disorder. Dr. Wolfson explained that regardless of whether
Ruston suffered from paranoid schizophrenia or delusional disorder, both could
be treated with medication, which Ruston was currently refusing.
The Government then asked Dr. Wolfson to testify regarding his review
of letters and filings Ruston made over the few weeks and months preceding the
§ 4243(c) hearing. Dr. Wolfson testified that the recent filings were “getting a
little stranger than what Ruston had been filing before” and that they were
consistent with a diagnosis of Ruston suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.
For example, the material included a filing where Ruston alleged that Katie
Couric tampered with Dr. Wolfson. Dr. Wolfson stated that while previous
filings were irrational, one could follow Ruston’s reasoning. Dr. Wolfson found
the more recent filings to appear “to be an expansion of [Ruston’s] delusional
system.” Finally, Dr. Wolfson testified that he believed that without treatment
Ruston posed a risk of dangers to others, and that Dr. Wolfson was less
concerned about the risk to others’ property.
During the course of Dr. Wolfson’s testimony, Ruston objected repeatedly
to properly given testimony on the grounds that (1) Dr. Wolfson was not a
qualified expert under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 702 (at least
eight objections), (2) a previously filed motion to suppress should have be
granted (at least six objections), (3) District Court Judge Fish should be
disqualified (at least six objections), (4) he was denied his rights to confront
witnesses, (5) the United States Attorney suppressed evidence from expert
witnesses who would testify that Ruston did not suffer from mental illness, and
(6) he had the right to speak his mind under the First Amendment.
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No. 07-10433
Ruston then began his cross-examination of Dr. Wolfson. Ruston’s
questioning did not relate to whether he would pose a substantial risk of harm
to others or property. Instead, Ruston asked Dr. Wolfson if:
• Dr. Wolfson’s testimony was tampered with by the Washington, D.C.
Capital Police;
• complaints Ruston filed with the Attorney General in Washington, D.C.
were sent to Dr. Wolfson;
• Dr. Wolfson failed to respond in writing to “cop-outs” Ruston sent to Dr.
Wolfson;
• Dr. Wolfson was aware of an alleged case between Ruston and Plano
Independent School District;
• Dr. Wilson was familiar with an individual, undergoing care at the facility
Dr. Wolfson worked, who murdered another patient;
• Dr. Wolfson was aware if the duties of a United States Magistrate Judge
include conspiracy to commit murder;
• Dr. Wolfson was aware that Ruston accused Judge Ramirez of being
involved in an attempt to murder him, and accused her of that in the
message he left;
• Dr. Wolfson reviewed handwritten notes sent to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) as part of an investigation about an attempted
murder plot against Ruston, as well as handwritten notes of a United
States Marshal and member of the United States Secret Service;
• Dr. Wolfson had contact with a Secret Service agent;
• Dr. Wolfson reviewed records connected to an individual allegedly
discharged from the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) for
embezzlement, explaining that:
Jeffrey Don Elmore was discharged from the Central
Intelligence Agency for embezzlement, and I have the right to
United States 4247(d), and I have been denied that right. I
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No. 07-10433
have the right to confront James Ellis, who conspired to
arrest me. I believe under the Sixth Amendment I have the
right to confront him, and I have subpoenaed him, and he’s
not in the courtroom as far as I can see;
• Dr. Wolfson was testifying that the Government suppressed medical
records from Dr. Wolfson (Dr. Wolfson explained that he was not stating
that);
• Dr. Wolfson reviewed a FBI report that referenced a black, former marine,
hit man who was hired to murder Ruston, and any 911 records from the
Carrollton Police Department on or about May 18, 2004, responding to a
stalking and murder threat by the alleged hit man; and
• Dr. Wolfson “investigated Mr. Ruston’s family lineage or looked at any of
his family charts to determine whether he is descended from” Scottish
royalty.
None of these questions involved the potential risk of danger Ruston posed
to individuals or property if released. Ruston did ask at least two questions that
were relevant. First, Ruston asked Dr. Wolfson if he was aware of an improper
2001 hospitalization that resulted in Ruston’s release after a doctor in Plano
diagnosed Ruston with no mental illness and without providing treatment or
medication. Second, Ruston questioned Dr. Wolfson about his testimony at the
earlier competency hearing, and asked how Ruston could have been miraculously
restored to competence without medication or treatment. Dr. Wolfson stated
that those spontaneous remissions are rare, but they occur, based
upon my fairly lengthy interview at Seagoville the day before [the
competency hearing you] appeared more rational. And you were not
free of persecutorial delusions, but you were able to strategize and
rationalize about your case . . . and you appeared to be able to do
that. . . . [A]s I explained at length during that prior hearing, and I
voiced a concern that since I hadn’t done anything to make it
happen – that it hadn’t happened through treatment but
spontaneously – the Court would be advised to prosecute your case
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No. 07-10433
quickly because I could give them no assurance that level of
remission or at least of rational strategizing might continue.
During the course of the cross-examination, Dr. Wolfson also testified
regarding letters Ruston sent to Katie Couric, but stated that he was more
concerned with letters written “under a Secret Service letterhead or some law
enforcement agency, a fictitious letterhead.” In response, Ruston asked whether
Dr. Wolfson had ever been in contact with Katie Couric or NBC Television
Networks. Dr. Wolfson answered in the negative. Ruston also asked whether
Ruston ever claimed to know Katie Couric. Dr. Wolfson testified that Ruston
never told Dr. Wolfson that Ruston knew her, and that Ruston indicated that his
writings to Katie Couric were “comedy.” Ruston then asked Dr. Wolfson if he
was aware that Ruston was a comedy writer and appeared on local stations as
a comedy character and professional actor, specifically on CBS television. Dr.
Wolfson testified that he had heard Ruston state this before, but had no
independent verification of Ruston’s claims. Ruston concluded his questioning
of Dr. Wolfson.
Testimony of Dr. Lisa Clayton
Ruston then called Dr. Clayton to testify. Dr. Clayton evaluated Ruston
for competency to stand trial and met with Ruston on August 14, 2004, and
September 23, 2004, as required in a court order issued by Judge Mary Miller.
Ruston’s examination of Dr. Clayton was also unrelated to the issue of whether
Ruston’s release would pose a substantial risk of harm to others and property.
As he did with Dr. Wolfson, Ruston consistently asked questions in an
effort to demonstrate that law enforcement organizations and others were
involved in an attempt to murder Ruston. Specifically, Ruston
• filed a motion to recuse Judge Miller;
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No. 07-10433
• asserted that he was barred from attending the October 2004 competency
hearing despite the fact that he never gets agitated and had no problem
maintaining court decorum;
• questioned why Dr. Clayton’s notes from her evaluations of him had been
“suppressed”;
• continued to make references regarding Katie Couric, and asserted that
Dr. Clayton was lying when she testified that during the August 2004
evaluation Ruston told her that Katie Couric came to Dallas to meet
Ruston and that Couric rented an apartment to be in the Dallas area to
meet Ruston;
• asserted, contrary to Dr. Clayton’s testimony, that he told her that a white
female who appeared to be Katie Couric lured Ruston to meet him in
person in July 2002 at an apartment;
• asked Dr. Clayton if she had been in contact with the United States
Attorney’s office in Plano, Texas;
• asked Dr. Clayton if he told her that he was assaulted and attacked by a
black, male ex-marine and she testified that he did not;
• asked Dr. Clayton if she was aware that a judge conspired to have three
inmates attack Ruston; and
• stated that Dr. Clayton was tampered with and ordered to perjure herself
at the § 4243(c) hearing.
Ruston also asked whether Dr. Clayton testified at the October 2004
competency hearing that Ruston was filthy, dirty, and the most insane human
being Dr. Clayton ever evaluated. Dr. Clayton stated that she did not know if
she said that, but that when she saw Ruston he was very disheveled, agitated,
started beating on a glass wall, and was “very psychotic” in her opinion. Ruston
then asked if Dr. Clayton had evidence of his alleged beating on the glass wall.
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No. 07-10433
When Dr. Clayton testified that others did not witness Ruston’s behavior, he
announced that he “didn’t beat on any wall.”
The Government then cross-examined Dr. Clayton. The Government
asked Dr. Clayton to state her qualifications for the record, and Ruston objected
stating “[s]tand on our motion to suppress, our Daubert better motion, 702 and
our motion to disqualify Judge Fish.” The court overruled the objection. Dr.
Clayton testified that Ruston suffered from a severe mental illness. Ruston
objected, stating “[w]e will stand on our motion to suppress, our Daubert motion
under 702 and our motion to disqualify A. Joe Fish.” The court again overruled
the objection. Dr. Clayton continued testifying, and stated that Ruston suffered
from a combination of schizophrenia and bipolar which is called schizo-effective
disorder. The Government asked whether Ruston sounded agitated when he left
Judge Ramirez the threatening voice mail, and she stated that he did. This
concluded the Government’s cross-examination.
Ruston conducted redirect. Ruston asked Dr. Clayton if she considered it
mental illness to be agitated when someone attempts to murder you. She stated
that she did not. Ruston then asked whether Dr. Clayton considered “it
mentally ill to be agitated when you are kidnaped on fraudulent paperwork and
denied all of your Constitutional rights.” Dr. Clayton stated that she did not.
This concluded Ruston’s redirect.
Testimony of Dr. George Trapp
Ruston then called Dr. Trapp, a physician and psychiatrist. Dr. Trapp
testified that he conducted a series of interviews of Ruston in August 2006 and
prepared a forensic report for the court. Trapp testified that Ruston never
appeared agitated during the examination, that Ruston never referred to Katie
Couric as his fiancee, and that Dr. Trapp confirmed that Ruston was cast in an
episode of Walker Texas Ranger to drive Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson who
made a guest appearance. Ruston then asked whether Dr. Trapp thought
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No. 07-10433
Walker Texas Ranger would cast a “crazy maniac to drive Senator Hutchinson
on a national program.” Dr. Trapp stated that he did not know.
Dr. Trapp further testified that after his interviews with Ruston he
concluded that Ruston was competent to stand trial. Dr. Trapp testified that he
believed Ruston suffered from a diagnosable mental illness, but that it was in
remission at the time sufficient to provide for competence for trial.
Ruston then asked whether he told Dr. Trapp that Ruston requested
political asylum in Scotland and expressed a desire to leave the country. Dr.
Trapp stated that Ruston had in fact told him this. Ruston then stated “[s]o is
it your testimony that the defendant would not prevent any danger to this
society since he has no intention of living in this society.” Dr. Trapp agreed that
if Ruston was living outside of the United States, he would not be a danger to
those living in the United States. This concluded Dr. Trapp’s testimony.
Remainder of § 4243(c) Hearing Proceedings
The court then inquired as to other witnesses Ruston wanted to present.
Ruston stated that he subpoenaed Katie Couric, who was not in the courtroom,
in an effort to question her about a July 2006 incident which “they continue to
call a delusion.” The court informed Ruston that only three subpoenas had been
authorized, and continued the hearing until the next morning.
When court resumed the next morning, March 28, 2007, Ruston informed
the court that he had additional evidence to present, but that he did not have an
additional witness. Ruston then asked the court to take judicial notice of
Ruston’s application for asylum in Scotland and his intention to leave America.
The Government stated that it had no additional evidence, and argued
that Ruston failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his release
would not create a substantial risk to others. Ruston objected to all the
“testimony just presented,” stating that he stood on his motion to disqualify,
motion to suppress, and Rule 702 motion. Ruston also stated that he had
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No. 07-10433
additional evidence that the United States Attorney suppressed, and that the
evidence consisted of doctors’ reports that demonstrated that Ruston suffered
from no mental illness and that it was all fabricated by a FBI agent. The court
overruled the objection. Ruston then submitted what he referred to as “medical
records” to the court. The court accepted the documents and described each
document. The court then asked Ruston if he had any argument he wished to
present, and Ruston stated that he wanted to call himself as a witness.
Ruston testified to a January 2001 arrest that took place in a bank lobby.
Ruston stated that he did not have a hand-held crossbow at the time of his
arrest, and that he did not attempt to shoot any Secret Service agents. He
stated that the video from multiple security cameras would verify his testimony.
Ruston then testified that he was denied all rights to present this evidence up
to this point, and he wanted to state it for the record. Ruston continued to
testify about other arrests, reports, and records he wanted to present, and again
referenced a hit man who attempted to murder Ruston on three separate
occasions and provided the court with the hit man’s address. Ruston stated that
he suspected the Carrollton Police and Plano Police of hiring the hit man.
Ruston then testified that two judges committed judicial misconduct against
him, and that he was a witness against one of those judges.
Ruston then testified that he never stated to Dr. Clayton that Katie Couric
moved into an apartment to meet him. He testified that he was lured to the
apartment where he viewed a female who appeared to be Katie Couric. Ruston
stated that he felt uncomfortable with the situation and left the scene. Ruston
explained that he was not aware if Katie Couric was the person at the
apartment, but that he did not tell Dr. Clayton that he was engaged to Katie
Couric or knew her because he had never met her. Ruston testified that he and
Katie Couric communicated with each other through the mail. Ruston then
testified to being the victim of an assault while in Dallas County Jail.
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No. 07-10433
Ruston then alleged that he was kidnaped by a Secret Service Agent in
conspiracy with two judges, taken to Parkland Hospital, and injected with
medication without a warrant or court order. Ruston testified that they sent
him to Terrell State Hospital, and that the agent told the hospital that Ruston
was noncompliant with medication and out-patient treatment. Ruston continued
testifying about records he requested and did not receive, and a tort suit he filed
with the Deputy Director of the Secret Service. Ruston also testified that it was
his belief that the FBI continued “to engage in witness tampering and
obstruction of justice.” Ruston went on to testify that he did not believe he
suffered from a mental illness or needed medication.
Ruston maintained that he was not a danger or threat to anyone, but
recognized that he had used bad judgment. Ruston stated that he was an
alcoholic, and testified that he was “in remission.” Ruston also stated that he
said things in anger that he should not have said “because of the criminal act
perpetrated against him.”
Ruston then testified that he had no intention to continue living in the
United States. Ruston explained that he applied for asylum in Canada and
Scotland, and intended to leave the United States immediately upon release.
Ruston stated that he would not be providing a forwarding address because he
was “tired of the government stalking [him] and trying to murder [him].”
The Government cross-examined Ruston. Ruston testified that he left the
threatening message for Judge Ramirez. The Government asked Ruston to
verify that he signed a statement verifying that he said the words left on Judge
Ramirez’s answering machine. Ruston admitted that he signed it, but contended
that he was blackmailed into signing the document as a result of the malpractice
of his attorney. The Government then questioned Ruston about the various
persons Ruston testified were conspiring to hurt Ruston. These persons included
several judges and the “criminal element” of the FBI and Secret Service.
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No. 07-10433
The Government asked Ruston if he believed the doctors who testified that
he suffered from mental illness were a part of the conspiracy against Ruston.
Ruston testified that he believed they were tampered with. Specifically, Ruston
stated that one doctor was “a lesbian who was raped . . . and hates all males.”
The Government asked a few more questions and concluded its cross-
examination.
The district court found that Ruston failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that his release would not create a substantial risk of bodily
injury to a person or property damage to another due to a present mental disease
or defect. The district court ordered that Ruston continue to remain in the
custody of the Attorney General until such time that he could be safely released
to the community.
Ruston appeals from the failure of the district court to conduct a sua
sponte competency hearing and appoint counsel based on Ruston’s conduct
during the § 4243(c) hearing.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Competency Hearing
We have not located controlling precedent as to what a district court must
do when encountered with a defendant of questionable competency during a §
4243(c) hearing; however, “we find that jurisprudence developed . . . and related
[to] competency questions in criminal trial proceedings [to be] instructive.”
Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2000).
1. Standard of Review
Whether the district court erred in not sua sponte holding a competency
hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Messervey,
317 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 2002). “Whether ‘a reasonable cause’ exists to put
the court on notice that the defendant might be mentally incompetent is left to
the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291,
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No. 07-10433
304 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Alden, 527 F.3d
653, 659 (7th Cir. 2008). “The district court is in the best position to determine
the need for a competency hearing.” Alden, 527 F.3d at 659 (citation omitted).
But “[i]f the trial court received evidence, viewed objectively, that should have
raised a reasonable doubt as to competency, yet failed to make further inquiry,
the defendant has been denied a fair” proceeding. Mata, 210 F.3d at 329; see
also Alden, 527 F.3d at 659 (explaining that a district court may sua sponte order
a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant
may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature
and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 814 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding that the appropriate inquiry “is not whether the trial court could
have found the defendant either competent or incompetent, nor whether the
reviewing court would find the defendant incompetent” but instead “the record
is reviewed to see if the evidence of incompetence was such that a reasonable
judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the
defendant’s competence.”) (quotations omitted).
2. Analysis
The statutory requirements for a district court to sua sponte hold a
competency hearing are set out in 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), entitled “[d]etermination
of mental competency to stand trial or to undergo postrelease proceedings.”
Section 4241(a) states that
[t]he court shall . . . order [ ] a [competency] hearing on its own
motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant
may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable
to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him or to assist properly in his defense.
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No. 07-10433
In determining whether the court should order a § 4241(a) hearing, the court
must consider three factors: (1) the existence of a history of irrational behavior,
(2) the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and (3) prior medical opinion on
competency. See Messervey, 317 F.3d at 463. All three factors are “relevant in
determining whether further inquiry is required, but . . . even one of these
factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient. There are, of
course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for
further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult
one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.”
Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 433 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 20
U.S. 162, 172, 180 (1975)). The record reflects that Ruston meets the three
factors as set out in Messervey.
Ruston has an extensive history of irrational behavior paired with multiple
diagnoses documenting his mental illness. It is important to note that the
psychiatrists who examined Ruston found that he suffered from either a
delusional disorder or paranoid schizophrenia. After examining Ruston’s
history, it is apparent to the Court that he has an extensive history of irrational
behavior as a direct result of delusions. Specifically, Ruston believes that
various law enforcement agencies, members of the judiciary, and possibly Katie
Couric are engaged in a plot to murder him.
The instant case arose out of a threat Ruston issued against Judge
Ramirez. In the threatening message, Ruston specifically alleged that Judge
Ramirez was engaged in an attempted murder plot against Ruston. After arrest,
Ruston filed documents with the court asserting that he was indicted not
because he threatened a federal official, but because the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas was attempting to cover up a murder
to hire plot that Judge Ramirez was involved in planning. The Government was
unable to proceed against Ruston because the doctors who examined him found
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No. 07-10433
him to be incompetent. When assessing competency, the court must “ascertain
whether a criminal defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he has
a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’”
Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)).
Specifically, Ruston was diagnosed with a delusional disorder of a prosecutorial
type, which impaired Ruston’s ability to properly assist counsel.
When Ruston was eventually found competent to stand trial, Dr. Wolfson
made it clear to the district court that Ruston was far from cured. Dr. Wolfson
testified that while Ruston was presently capable of proceeding to adjudication,
he still suffered from delusions that could impair his ability to make legal
decisions in the future. After Ruston and the Government agreed that Ruston
was not guilty by reason of insanity, his own attorney explained to the district
court that he did not believe Ruston maintained competency between the time
Ruston was found competent and the date the district court entered judgment.
At the § 4243(c) hearing, Dr. Wolfson testified that he reviewed Ruston’s
filings with the district court from the time the district court entered judgment
and the § 4243(c) hearing. Dr. Wolfson specifically testified that Ruston’s ability
to make cogent arguments deteriorated during this time. Further, Dr. Wolfson
explained that the most recent filings appeared to demonstrate “an expansion
of [Ruston’s] delusional system.” Dr. Wolfson’s testimony at Ruston’s
competency hearing warned that Ruston’s level of competency was likely to wane
and based on Ruston’s filings, Dr. Wolfson found that Ruston was suffering just
that sort of deterioration. This testimony, in conjunction with Ruston’s history
of irrational behavior, might have provided a reasonable cause to believe that
Ruston was presently suffering from a mental disease or defect.
This, however, was not the only evidence before the district court of
Ruston’s questionable competency. Ruston’s demeanor and questioning during
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No. 07-10433
the § 4243(c) hearing provided additional reason to believe that Ruston may
have been suffering from a mental disease or defect.
During the magistrate judge’s hearing to determine if Ruston was
competent to waive counsel, Ruston was generally able to answer the magistrate
judge’s questions, although the language quoted above indicated that Ruston
may have still been suffering from “delusional material.” But Ruston’s perceived
level of competency at the magistrate judge’s hearing does not abrogate the duty
of a judge to “always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would
render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to” proceed with
the § 4243(c) hearing. See, e.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at 181.
At the § 4243(c) hearing, Ruston did not demonstrate a “rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” See Drope, 20 U.S. at
172 (citation omitted). Instead, Ruston’s questioning, objections, and behavior
at the hearing provided reasonable cause to believe that Ruston was presently
suffering from a mental disease or defect, specifically a mental disease that
exhibits itself through delusions, rendering Ruston mentally incompetent. See,
e.g., Alden, 527 F.3d at 659. Ruston continued to assert that the government
was engaged in a plot to kill him and that Katie Couric may have been involved
in the plot. He actively insinuated that law enforcement agents tampered with
witnesses. He also alleged that he was attacked by fellow inmates. During the
§ 4243(c) hearing, Ruston largely failed to ask relevant and pertinent questions
regarding the substantive issue of the hearing–whether Ruston’s release posed
a significant risk of bodily injury to others. Ruston’s delusions were readily
apparent throughout the § 4243(c) hearing.
While Ruston was found competent at his most recent competency hearing,
that competency hearing was conducted six months prior to the § 4243(c)
hearing. Dr. Wolfson made it clear at the competency hearing that he did not
believe Ruston’s current competency to be permanent, urging the court to
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No. 07-10433
proceed with prosecution immediately while Ruston could still be considered
competent. Once the § 4243(c) hearing began, it is apparent from the record and
transcripts that Ruston had again descended into irrational behavior.
We hold that the district court abused its discretion when it did not sua
sponte hold a competency hearing upon observing the erratic behavior of Ruston
at his § 4243(c) hearing. The district court was on notice of Ruston’s troubled
history and had a duty to ensure that Ruston was competent before allowing the
§ 4243(c) proceeding to continue.
B. Waiver of Counsel
We decline to reach the issue of whether the district court erred in
allowing Ruston to waive his right to counsel before proceeding with the §
4243(c) hearing in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Indiana v.
Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not forbid
states from insisting upon representation by counsel for those competent enough
to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they
are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Id. at 2387-88.
We note that Edwards involves representation within the context of a criminal
trial, and Ruston’s appeal involves a commitment proceeding. Nonetheless,
Edwards appears directly applicable to the issues presented in this case.
Edwards contemplates a scenario where a criminal defendant is conclusively
competent to stand trial, but may not be competent to conduct trial proceedings
by his or herself. Because this Court has determined that a question remains
as to whether Ruston was competent to proceed with the § 4243(c) hearing, it is
inappropriate to move to the next step outlined in Edwards and make a
determination as to whether Ruston was competent to represent himself at the
§ 4243(c) hearing.
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No. 07-10433
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND to the district
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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