Hall v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
__________________________

DAWN HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________

2011-5119
__________________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
Claims in Case No. 09-CV-239, Senior Judge Bohdan A.
Futey.
__________________________

Decided: April 30, 2012
__________________________

RICHARD A. REGNIER, Law Offices of Richard A.
Regnier, of Camarillo, California, argued for plaintiff-
appellant.

ELIZABETH ANNE SPECK, Trial Attorney, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Depart-
ment of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-
appellee. With her on the brief were TONY WEST, Assis-
tant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director,
and FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR., Assistant Director.
__________________________
HALL v. US 2

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge WALLACH.
Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge LOURIE.
WALLACH, Circuit Judge.
Dawn Hall, a Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(“NCIS”) engineer who was terminated from her employ-
ment for voluntary grand jury service over a two year
period, appeals a decision of the United States Court of
Federal Claims (“Claims Court”). The Claims Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Government
with regards to her pre-removal back pay claim and
granted the Government’s motion to dismiss for a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction with regards to her post-
removal claims for back pay, reinstatement, and other
forms of compensation. Because the Claims Court erred
in interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 6322(a) on summary judgment
and because we have already decided the Claims Court’s
jurisdiction with regard to Ms. Hall’s post-removal claims,
we reverse and remand in part, and affirm in part.
I.
The Department of the Navy hired Ms. Hall as an en-
gineer in 1984. In 2002, she agreed to a transfer that
would move her from California to Washington, D.C. The
Navy agreed to delay Ms. Hall’s transfer until July 2003
because of her mother’s poor health. In March 2003, Ms.
Hall voluntarily completed and submitted a Prospective
Grand Jury Nominee Questionnaire to serve as a grand
juror for the Superior Court of California, County of
Ventura. On June 20 of that year, Ms. Hall was “sum-
moned by the court” to appear on July 1 where she was
3 HALL v. US

selected from a pool of nominees and sworn to serve as a
grand juror for the next twelve months. 1
Ms. Hall contacted her naval supervisor after she was
selected to serve as a grand juror, writing, “I was selected
and sworn in for the Ventura County Grand Jury today.
Starting today, 01JUL03, I will be on court leave until
01JUL04. I will provide a confirmation letter from the
Grand Jury when it is available.” The Navy described
Ms. Hall’s conduct as “troubling,” but notwithstanding
paid her while she served as a grand juror in accordance
with 5 U.S.C. § 6322(a), which entitles federal employees
to take court leave without any loss in pay.
In May 2004, the Navy ordered her to report to Wash-
ington no later than July 14, 2004 and specifically “di-
rected [Ms. Hall] not to seek or accept extension of [her]
grand jury duties.” At some point prior to that order,
however, Ms. Hall had discussed serving a second year as
a foreman on the grand jury with presiding Judge Bruce
Clark and the current Grand Jury foreman. After receiv-
ing the Navy’s order, Ms. Hall contacted the Office of
Personnel Management (“OPM”) and asked whether her
employer could direct her not to serve on the grand jury.
On June 21, 2004, Ms. Hall was again “summoned by the
court” and sworn to serve as a grand juror for a second
and final year. 2 On June 28, 2004, Ms. Hall informed the

1 Grand juries do not, “like trial juries, decide guilt
or innocence, but instead perform primarily investigative
functions.” Hall v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 223, 226
(2011). “The panels that Hall served on prepared reports
on health care, elder abuse, jail closures, and more.” Id.
2 In California, a grand jury may be comprised of
randomly selected jurors as well as holdover jurors from
the previous grand jury term. See Cal. Penal Code §
901(b) (“If the superior court so decides, the presiding
judge may name up to 10 regular jurors not previously so
HALL v. US 4

Navy that she would be serving an additional year on the
grand jury.
Shortly after beginning her second term on the grand
jury, the Navy placed Ms. Hall on absent without leave
(“AWOL”) status and withheld her pay. Ms. Hall ap-
pealed the Navy’s AWOL determination to the Merit
Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) and then, in March
2005, applied to the OPM for a determination as to
whether she was entitled to court leave. 3 Just as Ms.
Hall’s second, and final, term on the grand jury was to
expire, and while her request to the OPM was still pend-
ing, the Navy removed Ms. Hall from her position effec-
tive June 29, 2005 because of her (1) failure to report to
duty in Washington, D.C. on July 14, 2004; (2) failure to
obey a letter from the Navy directing Ms. Hall not to seek
or accept an extension of her grand jury duties; and (3)
AWOL status since July 14, 2004. Ms. Hall appealed the
Navy’s decision to the MSPB, although that appeal was
later dismissed. 4

named, who served on the previous grand jury and who so
consent, to serve for a second year.”).
3 The MSPB Regional Office in Washington, D.C.
dismissed Ms. Hall’s claim for lack of jurisdiction because
the Navy’s “placement of an employee in an AWOL status
is not by itself an action appealable to the [MSPB].” Hall
v. Dep’t of the Navy, Initial Decision, No. DC-3443-05-
0138-I-1, 2005 MSPB LEXIS 1253, at *3 (M.S.P.B. Feb. 7,
2005).
4 On September 9, 2005, the MSPB dismissed Ms.
Hall’s appeal without prejudice pending the outcome of
the March 2005 OPM proceeding. Hall v. Dep’t of the
Navy, Initial Decision, No. DC-0752-05-0629-I-1, 2005
MSPB LEXIS 5828, at *2 (M.S.P.B. Sept. 9, 2005). The
MSPB stated Ms. Hall could re-file her appeal “within 30
days after the date of receipt of a final OPM decision
regarding her pending claim of entitlement to court leave,
but in no event . . . later than December 2, 2005.” Id. On
5 HALL v. US

On April 20, 2009, Ms. Hall filed suit in the Claims
Court seeking back pay for the time the Navy listed her
as AWOL and withheld pay prior to her removal pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. § 6322(a) and the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. §
5596. Additionally, with regards to her post-removal
claims, Ms. Hall sought reinstatement and other forms of
compensation as a result of her removal and various
alleged constitutional violations. The Claims Court
dismissed Ms. Hall’s claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that the Civil Service Reform Act
(“CSRA”), 5 U.S.C. § 7512, provides the MSPB with
exclusive jurisdiction over removal actions and that all of
Ms. Hall’s claims stemmed from her removal. Hall v.
United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 102, 108 (2009). Ms. Hall
appealed to this court.
We reversed and remanded the case back to the
Claims Court, finding that Ms. Hall’s claims arose from
two discrete actions. Hall v. United States, 617 F.3d 1313,
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Hall I”). The first, Ms. Hall’s
claim for pre-removal back pay, “became ripe as soon as
she was placed on AWOL status and deprived of pay.
That claim did not arise from or turn on her removal from
service. Nor did the fact of her removal, once it occurred,
change any aspect of her claim to pre-removal pay.” Id.
Thus, we held, the Claims Court had jurisdiction over Ms.
Hall’s pre-removal back pay claim. Id. The second, Ms.
Hall’s claims for post-removal back pay and reinstate-
ment, we held, “were predicated on the removal action.
As to those ancillary claims, we agree with the Court of
Federal Claims that it lacked jurisdiction.” Id.

January 12, 2006, the OPM dismissed Ms. Hall’s applica-
tion, finding that Section 6322(a) only applied to compul-
sory, and not voluntary, jury duty. Ms. Hall did not
attempt to re-file her claim with the MSPB.
HALL v. US 6

On remand to the Claims Court, Ms. Hall and the
Government each filed a motion for summary judgment
with respect to the pre-removal back pay claim. The
Government additionally filed a motion to dismiss Ms.
Hall’s post-removal claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Claims Court granted the Government’s
motion for summary judgment, denied Ms. Hall’s motion
for summary judgment, and granted the Government’s
motion to dismiss. Hall v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 223,
234 (2011). Ms. Hall filed a timely Notice of Appeal; we
have jurisdiction over the present appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
II.
We review the Claims Court’s statutory interpretation
de novo. W. Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1024,
1029 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We also review de novo the Claims
Court’s decision to dismiss a claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Brown v. United States, 86 F.3d 1554,
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
This case centers on the proper meaning of the word
“summoned” in 5 U.S.C. § 6322(a). That law, in its rele-
vant part, states:
(a) An employee [with limitations not here appli-
cable] is entitled to leave, without loss of, or re-
duction in, pay, leave to which he otherwise is
entitled, credit for time or service, or performance
of efficiency rating, during a period of absence
with respect to which he is summoned, in connec-
tion with a judicial proceeding, by a court or au-
thority responsible for the conduct of that
proceeding, to serve--
(1) as a juror; or
7 HALL v. US

(2) . . . as a witness on behalf of any party in con-
nection with any judicial proceeding to which the
United States, the District of Columbia, or a State
or a local government is a party; . . . .
5 U.S.C. § 6322(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (c) of the
statute permits the OPM to prescribe regulations to
administer Section 6322, although it has not yet done so.
Id. § 6322(c).
The Claims Court interpreted Section 6322(a)(1) as
not applying to a grand juror who voluntarily applied for
service even where a court issued a summons requiring
that juror to appear in court. The Claims Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Government, holding
that:
In light of the legislative history, the absurd re-
sult of potentially limitless service on voluntary
juries, and [the Government Accountability Of-
fice’s] limitations imposed on section 6322(a)’s
witness leave, the Court finds it is “unreasonable
to believe that the legislat[ure] intended to in-
clude” service such as Hall’s.
Hall, 99 Fed. Cl. at 233 (quoting Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). The
Claims Court correctly began its analysis with the plain
language of Section 6322(a), acknowledging that it sug-
gests any juror who receives a summons, whether com-
pulsory or voluntarily obtained, is entitled to court leave.
Id. at 228. The Claims Court then employed the canon of
statutory construction in pari materia, which instructs
courts to “interpret statutes with similar language that
generally addresses the same subject matter together, as
if they were one law,” interpreting the section at issue
with Section 6322(a)(2), which concerns court leave for
serving as a witness. Id. at 229 (quoting Strategic Hous.
HALL v. US 8

Fin. Corp. of Travis Cnty. v. United States, 608 F.3d 1317,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted)). 5 The
Claims Court then found that “the bare text of section
6322(a) contains overbroad language that could produce
an absurd result, such as allowing an employee unlimited
court leave.” Id. at 231. Thus, the Claims Court turned to
the legislative history regarding the original version of
the court leave statute enacted in 1940, legislative history
regarding an amended version of the statute enacted in
1970, as well as administrative interpretations of Section
6322(a) by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
Comptroller General to find support for the court’s inter-
pretation that Section 6322(a)(1) was not intended to
cover voluntary service. Id. at 231-32. 6
Additionally, the Claims Court found it lacked sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction over Ms. Hall’s post-removal
claims for back pay, reinstatement, and ancillary claims.
Id. at 233-34. With regards to our previous opinion that
found the Claims Court did not have jurisdiction over
these claims, the Claims Court stated: “Regardless of
whether or not the Federal Circuit’s statement was dic-
tum, it was correct.” Id. at 233.
Ms. Hall brings two general arguments before this
court on appeal. First, she argues that the Claims Court
erred in its reading of the Section 6322(a) and as a result
improperly granted the Government’s motion for sum-
mary judgment. Second, Ms. Hall argues that the Claims

5 The Claims Court, however, rejected the Govern-
ment’s arguments that Section 6322(a) and 5 U.S.C. §
7106(a) should be interpreted in pari materia. Hall, 99
Fed. Cl. at 229.
6 The Claims Court did not afford any deference to
OPM’s January 2006 decision nor previous administrative
decisions from the GAO that interpreted 5 U.S.C.
§ 6322(a). Hall, 99 Fed. Cl. at 230-31.
9 HALL v. US

Court erred in granting the Government’s motion to
dismiss her post-removal and ancillary claims.
Ms. Hall argues that the word “summoned” in Section
6322(a) applies to any grand juror who receives a sum-
mons, regardless of whether the juror voluntarily applied
for service, for as long as a summons is in effect. Appel-
lant reasons that the Claims Court’s reading of the stat-
ute effectively nullifies Cal. Penal Code § 901(b), which
allows grand jurors to serve a second year, by imposing a
de facto one-year limitation on court leave for grand jury
service. Ms. Hall further faults the Claims Court for
venturing beyond the plain meaning of Section 6322(a),
for incorrectly applying the absurdity doctrine, and for
misapplying the canon of in pari materia. Moreover, Ms.
Hall avers that the legislative history cited by the Claims
Court does not suggest Section 6322(a) is limited only to
those jurors who do not volunteer for service.
In response, the Government argues that the term
“summoned” is not defined in the statute and is ambigu-
ous. It contends that Section 6322(a) does not permit Ms.
Hall “to take a two-year vacation from work at taxpayer
expense,” Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 18, and that
permitting Section 6322(a) to apply to “voluntary” grand
jury service would “permit an employee to draw a nearly
six-figure salary for two years and possibly in other
circumstances for a potentially indefinite duration,” id. at
23. The Government further avers that “Congress [could
not] possibly have intended for 5 U.S.C. § 6322 to serve as
a license for Federal employees to voluntarily disregard
their work obligations for such an extended period.” Id. at
36. As a result, the Government concludes that the
Claims Court properly applied the absurdity doctrine and
that legislative history demonstrates that Congress
intended Section 6322(a) to apply only to non-voluntary
juror service.
HALL v. US 10

We reject the Government’s argument; the Claims
Court wrongly interpreted the term “summoned” in
Section 6322(a). The statute is clear on its face and
entitles a grand juror to court leave when summoned,
regardless of whether the grand juror volunteered to be
summoned. Additionally, a plain reading of Section
6322(a) would not lead to an absurd result that would
prevent us from reading the statute according to its
terms.
When interpreting a statute, we start with its lan-
guage. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000).
“[H]owever, courts must consider not only the bare mean-
ing of each word but also the placement and purpose of
the language within the statutory scheme.” Barela v.
Shinseki, 584 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Section
6322(a) states that a Government employer must pay
court leave to an employee “during a period of absence
with respect to which he is summoned, in connection with
a judicial proceeding, by a court or authority responsible
for the conduct of that proceeding . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 6322(a)
(emphasis added). The statute reflects a singular concern
that a court or similar authority, through use of its sum-
mons power, orders an individual to appear as a juror or
witness before that individual may receive court leave. 7

7 The term “summoned” is unambiguous in Section
6322(a), although it is undefined in the statute. “A
phrase appearing in the context of a statute may be
unambiguous where it ‘has a clearly accepted meaning in
both legislative and judicial practice’ . . . .” Gardner v.
Brown, 5 F.3d 1456, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting W.V.
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991)). In the
context of grand juror selection, an individual is “sum-
moned” when a court issues a summons, which requires
the individual by the force of law to appear before the
court. See Cal. Penal Code § 907. When Ms. Hall submit-
ted her Prospective Grand Jury Nominee Questionnaire
11 HALL v. US

Nowhere does the statute distinguish between those who
welcome or even encourage a court to issue a summons
from those who must begrudgingly accept it.
“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is com-
plete.’” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254
(1992) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430
(1981)); see Norfolk Dredging Co., Inc. v. United States,
375 F.3d 1106, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that it is
“unnecessary to seek clarification in the admittedly
sparse legislative history” when the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous absent extraordinary circum-
stances). 8 The Claims Court felt it appropriate to go
beyond the plain meaning of Section 6322(a) because it
believed application of the statute’s plain text would
cause an “absurd result, such as allowing an employee
unlimited court leave.” Hall, 99 Fed. Cl. at 231. However,
no “absurd result” stems from a plain reading of Section
6322(a). Neither the Claims Court nor the Government
could cite a single state or federal court where grand
jurors are permitted to serve indefinitely. See, e.g., Fed. R.
Crim. P. 6(g) (grand jury may serve more than 18 months

and was subsequently sworn as a juror, she did not re-
ceive anything other than a valid summons to appear in
court, nor could she have been “summoned” in a manner
different than that described in Section 6322(a).
8 The dissent examines legislative history stating,
“it is unclear whether this term encompasses only a
compulsory summons or extends to a voluntary sum-
mons—that is, a summons that one volunteers to receive.”
Dissent Op. at 4-5. The term “summoned,” has a well
defined, specific and unambiguous meaning in the context
of grand jury service. It is a legislative, not a judicial
prerogative to insert modifiers such as “compulsory” or
“voluntary” into Section 6322(a).
HALL v. US 12

only if a court extends service, but an extension may be
granted for no more than 6 months). Indeed, Ms. Hall
served on the grand jury pursuant to a California law that
caps consecutive service at two years. See Cal. Penal Code
§ 901(b).
Moreover, it is not “absurd” to offer court leave to ex-
perienced grand jurors, such as Ms. Hall. The grand jury,
as well as the petit jury, serves a “vital function” in
American society. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.
625, 634 (2002); Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors at 3
(grand jury protects “citizens from unwarranted or inap-
propriate prosecutions”). Contrary to the Government’s
current argument, sitting on a grand jury is a valuable
public service not a “vacation from work at taxpayer
expense,” Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 18, nor can it fairly
be described as “voluntarily disregard[ing]” an employee’s
workplace duties, id. at 36. The experience Ms. Hall
gained during her first year of service could do nothing
but benefit the public during her second and final term as
grand jury foreman, and Congress did not intend a federal
employee summoned as a juror to incur financial ruin for
public service.
Thus, we hold that Section 6322(a) applies to a grand
juror who voluntarily applied for grand jury service and
was subsequently “summoned” to serve by a court. Al-
though Ms. Hall may not have acted responsibly, she
served as a grand juror pursuant to a valid court sum-
mons, which under the statute entitles her to court leave. 9

9 The dissent articulates several facts from the re-
cord, and from those facts concludes that because Ms.
Hall was not coerced to join the grand jury her service
does not fall within Section 6322. Dissent Op. at 2-4.
There is no disagreement that Ms. Hall served as a grand
juror pursuant to a valid court-issued summons, the only
statutory requirement.
13 HALL v. US

Therefore, we reverse the Claims Court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the Claims
Court’s summary judgment determination with regard to
Ms. Hall’s pre-removal claims and remand the issue for a
decision in accordance with our opinion. We affirm the
Claims Court’s dismissal of Ms. Hall’s post-removal
claims. The issue has already been decided by this court.
Hall I, 617 F.3d at 1317 (holding that the Claims Court
lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Hall’s post-removal claims).

REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART, AND
AFFIRMED IN PART

No costs.
 United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
__________________________

DAWN HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________

2011-5119
__________________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
Claims in Case No. 09-CV-239, Senior Judge Bohdan A.
Futey.
__________________________

LOURIE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.
While I join the portion of the majority’s opinion that
dismisses Hall’s post-removal claims, I respectfully dis-
sent from the majority’s decision to reverse the grant of
summary judgment by the Court of Federal Claims.
Contrary to the majority’s opinion, Hall was not “termi-
nated from her employment for voluntary grand jury
service,” Majority Op. at 2; she was terminated for being
absent without leave (“AWOL”). Therein lies the crux of
this dispute.
HALL v. US 2

Just as the right to trial by jury is the cornerstone of
our nation’s justice system, jury service is one of the
highest duties of citizenship. Jurors thus deserve our
utmost commendation. Hall’s insubordinate behavior,
however, does not merit such praise. As the facts of this
case demonstrate, Hall exploited the California jury
service system as a means of shirking another important
civic obligation—her duties as a federal employee.
Hall’s employer, the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service (“NCIS”) of the Department of the Navy, informed
Hall in November 2002 that her position would be trans-
ferred from California to Washington, D.C., that Decem-
ber. Hall notified her supervisors that for personal
reasons she would be unable to report for duty. Hall’s
employer granted her five months of unpaid leave and
requested that she report to work in Washington on July
14, 2003.
While on unpaid leave, and aware of the federal gov-
ernment’s practice of providing paid leave to employees
serving on a jury, Hall completed a questionnaire in
March 2003 to be considered for grand jury service in
Ventura County, California. J.A. 206. Hall testified that
submitting the questionnaire was entirely voluntary. J.A.
205. (“I voluntarily submitted the questionnaire.”). De-
spite receiving at least three e-mails from her then sec-
ond-level supervisor, Claude Baldwin, regarding her
upcoming move to Washington, Hall never once men-
tioned that she had volunteered for the grand jury pool.
On July 1, 2003, two weeks before she was scheduled
to report for duty in Washington, Hall notified Baldwin
via e-mail that “[s]tarting today” she would be serving a
one-year term on the Ventura County Grand Jury—from
July 1, 2003, through June 30, 2004. J.A. 207. Baldwin
expressed to Hall his displeasure that she had accepted a
3 HALL v. US

voluntary one-year term on the grand jury. Baldwin also
threatened to have Hall considered AWOL.
On July 30, 2003, Louis Beyer, the Assistant Director
for Administration at NCIS, wrote to the Honorable Bruce
Clark, the presiding judge of the Ventura County Grand
Jury, requesting that Judge Clark release Hall from
grand jury service “at the earliest possible date” on ac-
count of “an extensive backlog of critical work.” J.A. 251.
In response, Judge Clark informed Beyer that that
“Grand Jury service is completely voluntary” and that
“the Court will approve any request by Mrs. Hall to resign
from her duties on the Grand Jury.” J.A. 252. Judge
Clark noted, however, that the Court would not release
Hall from Grand Jury duty “against her expressed desire
to continue her service.” Id. Judge Clark nonetheless
pointed out that Hall’s failure to resign from her duties on
the grand jury “could be grounds for disciplinary action”
by NCIS. Id. Despite being “continuously aware that the
[NCIS] did not want me to serve on the grand jury”
throughout her service, J.A. 212, Hall never requested to
resign from the grand jury, J.A. 210. Hall was granted
paid leave for her first year of grand jury service, even
though she served contrary to the wishes of her Navy
employer.
Hall not only volunteered for a year of grand jury ser-
vice against the express wishes of her employer, she did
so again a year later. On May 26, 2004, Joseph Vann,
then the Deputy Assistant Director for the Cyber Division
at NCIS and Hall’s second-level supervisor, wrote to Hall
directing her to report for duty in Washington no later
than July 14, 2004. The letter also stated: “You are
directed not to seek or accept appointment for an addi-
tional term on the Ventura County Grand Jury.” J.A.
254. Despite this clear directive, Hall responded to Vann
on June 28, 2004—about two weeks before she was sched-
HALL v. US 4

uled to report for duty—stating that she “will be serving a
final year on the Ventura County Grand Jury beginning
on July 1, 2004, and ending on June 30, 2005.” J.A. 261.
Hall later testified that she “had the opportunity to say
no” to the additional year of service, and that she “was not
coerced to serve the following year.” J.A. 211. Hall’s
letter, dated only two days before the end of her first term
of grand jury duty, was the first time that she had in-
formed anyone in her chain of command that she elected
to extend her service for another year. J.A. 156.
Due to Hall’s failure to report for duty on July 14,
2004, she was considered AWOL from that date forward.
Hall filed an action with the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment (“OPM”), which denied her claim for court leave.
The statute that grants leave for federal employees to
serve as jurors, 5 U.S.C. § 6322(a)(1), provides that a
federal employee is entitled to paid leave “during a period
of absence with respect to which he is summoned, in
connection with a judicial proceeding, by a court or au-
thority responsible for the conduct of that proceeding, to
serve as a juror.” Id. (emphases added). That statutory
provision should not, in my view, be stretched to cover
Hall’s decision to freely volunteer for grand jury service
contrary to the clear directive of her federal employer.
Hall’s arguments rest entirely on the fact that, after
volunteering for grand jury service, she received a sum-
mons upon being selected. Despite testifying that she
“was not coerced in any way to join the grand jury,” J.A.
205, Hall contends that she deserves the benefit of court
leave pay because she was “summoned . . . to serve”
within the meaning of § 6322.
Section 6322 does not define “summoned,” and it is
unclear whether this term encompasses only a compul-
sory summons or extends to a voluntary summons—that
5 HALL v. US

is, a summons that one volunteers to receive. The ordi-
nary meaning of “summon,” “[t]o command (a person) by
service of a summons to appear in court,” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1449 (7th ed. 1999), does not resolve the mat-
ter. Accordingly, § 6322 is ambiguous as to whether
“summoned . . . to serve” applies to situations in which a
federal employee freely volunteers to be summoned to
serve on a jury.
When interpreting ambiguous statutory language, we
consult the relevant legislative history. See Koons Buick
Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 62 (2004). Origi-
nally enacted in 1940, the court leave statute was sub-
stantively amended in 1970 to include its present
language, “summoned . . . by a court . . . to serve,” and to
make court leave available not only to jurors but also to
federal employees serving as witnesses in court. As the
Court of Federal Claims held, and as Hall conceded at
oral argument, “summoned . . . by a court . . . to serve” in
§ 6322(a) must have the same meaning as applied to
subsection (a)(1), which applies to jurors, and subsection
(a)(2), which applies to witnesses. See Hall v. United
States, 99 Fed. Cl. 223, 229 (2011); Oral Arg. at 4:30,
available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings/2011-5119/all.
It is therefore relevant that in discussing the addition
of the provision relating to witness leave, the committee
report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated
that an employee who volunteers would not qualify for
court leave:
It should be emphasized that an employee would
be entitled to witness leave only if he is sum-
moned by the court or authority responsible for
the conduct of the proceeding. The employee
would not be entitled to leave if he just volun-
HALL v. US 6

teered; he must be summoned. . . . What is in-
tended is that the summons be an official request,
invitation, or call, evidenced by an official writing.
S. Rep. No. 91-1371, at 8 (1970) (emphasis added). Simi-
lar concerns were expressed by members of the House of
Representatives about employees “volunteering” to serve
as a witness as “an easy way to get out of work for a few
days,” Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and
Civil Serv. of the Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv. on
H.R. 10247, a Bill to Amend Title 5, United States Code,
to Grant Court Leave to Employees of the United States
and the District of Columbia When Called as Witnesses in
Certain Judicial Proceedings on Behalf of State and Local
Governments, 91st Cong. 11 (1969) (statement of Rep.
David Henderson, Vice Chair, H. Comm. on Post Office
and Civil Serv.), and “as a subterfuge for missing work,”
id. at 13 (statement of Rep. Richard White, Member, H.
Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv.).
In my view, the Court of Federal Claims rightly cred-
ited this persuasive evidence of Congress’s intent that
“summoned . . . by a court . . . to serve” should exclude
those employees who freely volunteer for a grand jury
pool. Hall, 99 Fed. Cl. at 232. Hall, in contrast, points to
no legislative history in support of her theory that Con-
gress intended for any employee who freely volunteers to
serve, contrary to the plain directive of her supervisor, to
qualify for the benefit of paid court leave.
The majority holds that “summoned” in the context of
jurors in § 6322(a)(1) is “unambiguous” and applies
“when[ever] a court issues a summons, which requires the
individual by the force of law to appear before the court,”
Majority Op. at 10 n.7. Under the majority’s view, that
term must be equally unambiguous in the context of
witnesses in § 6322(a)(2), for one statutory term cannot
7 HALL v. US

have two distinct meanings. As noted, Hall sensibly
agrees with the government that “summoned” in § 6322(a)
must have the same meaning in both subsections (a)(1)
and (a)(2). See Oral Arg. at 4:30; Br. Def.-Appellee United
States, at 34–35.
If the majority’s opinion is to be read—as I believe it
must—that “summoned” in § 6322(a) invariably means
having received any court-issued summons, then the
majority’s opinion necessarily abrogates those adminis-
trative decisions that interpret “summoned” flexibly to
accommodate the limitations of the court leave system.
See, e.g., In re Entitlement of Emp.-Defendant to Court
Leave, 62 Comp. Gen. 87 (1982) (holding that court leave
under § 6322 is not available to a federal employee who is
summoned to appear as a defendant in the court action
concerned); In re Pasake, 59 Comp. Gen. 290 (1980) (hold-
ing that court leave under § 6322 is not available to a
federal employee who appears in court as a plaintiff in her
own action); In re Court Leave, B-214719, 1984 WL 46229
(Comp. Gen. June 25, 1984) (holding that court leave
under § 6322 is not available to a federal employee sum-
moned to appear in juvenile court in her capacity as the
juvenile’s parent as a party to the proceedings); In re
Sweeney, B-201602, 1981 WL 24203 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 1,
1981) (applying Pasake, 59 Comp. Gen. 290, to deny court
leave to a government employee appearing in court as a
plaintiff).
Moreover, the majority’s opinion precludes OPM, un-
der § 6322(c), from enacting regulations construing
“summoned” to mean anything other than applying to all
summonses, without qualification. The Supreme Court
has held that “a precedent holding a statute to be unam-
biguous forecloses a contrary agency construction.” Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 984 (2005). Just as Hall should not receive the
HALL v. US 8

benefit of paid court leave, nor should a serial litigant
who frequently appears in court by her own design. The
majority’s opinion, however, opens the door to all such
abuses of the court leave system. Under my view, on the
contrary, the meaning of “summoned” is ambiguous, and
OPM would not be foreclosed from prescribing reasonable
regulations for administering the “summoned” provision
of § 6322(a) as it applies to jurors and witnesses. Id. (“[A]
court’s prior interpretation of a statute [may] override an
agency’s interpretation only if the relevant court decision
held the statute unambiguous.”); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 6322(c).
Moreover, although OPM’s decision in Hall’s case is
not binding on this court, it is worth noting that, in decid-
ing whether Hall was entitled to court leave, OPM also
denied Hall’s claim for court leave. Hall, File No. 05-0036
(Office of Pers. Mgmt. Jan. 12, 2006); J.A. 297–303. Like
the Court of Federal Claims, OPM concluded that “sum-
moned” in § 6322 was ambiguous and that the pertinent
legislative history confirmed that only a compulsory
summons to serve as a juror qualified an employee for
court leave.
Finally, in construing a statute, it is important, as the
Court of Federal Claims did, to use common sense. See,
e.g., Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940).
Why would Congress have intended to enact a rule that
entitles a government employee to shirk work over an
extended period of time under the transparent expedient
of purely elective service in furtherance of another public
purpose?
I therefore conclude the Court of Federal Claims cor-
rectly denied Hall paid leave for grand jury service for
which she freely volunteered against the express directive
of her supervisors. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.