UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4927
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER SINGLETARY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-4981
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEFON SMITH, a/k/a Steady,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:10-cr-00267-JFM-2; 1:10-cr-00267-JFM-1)
Submitted: May 22, 2012 Decided: June 12, 2012
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Harry D. McKnett, Columbia, Maryland; Pat M. Woodward, Jr.,
Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Philip S. Jackson, Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Christopher Singletary and Stefon Smith appeal their
convictions. Both Appellants were convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and aiding and abetting such possession,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(g)(1) (2006). Smith was
also convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The Appellants claim that the district
court erred by denying their motion to suppress evidence seized
after a traffic stop. They contend that the traffic stop was
not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity. Finding no error, we affirm.
This court reviews the district court’s legal
determinations de novo and its factual conclusions for clear
error. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir.
2008). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Hall, 664
F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2012). Because the district court
denied the Appellants’ motion, the evidence is construed in the
light most favorable to the Government. Branch, 537 F.3d at
337.
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Police are justified in stopping a vehicle if it is
observed that the driver is violating a traffic law. See United
States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729 (4th Cir. 1993); see also
United States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 2012) (law
enforcement may stop a vehicle that is observed violating a
traffic law). The stop remains justified even if the police
were motivated to stop the vehicle by some subjective,
inarticulable belief that the occupants were engaged in more
egregious criminal behavior. Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730.
The evidence showed that Deputy Parker, who concluded
that Smith was speeding, was sufficiently trained and that he
tested the radar unit prior to the beginning of his shift. We
conclude that the evidence also supports the district court’s
finding that the radar unit was working properly. The evidence
further supports the finding that prior to Deputy Funk stopping
the vehicle, Parker communicated to Funk that Smith was
speeding. Accordingly, the traffic stop was supported by a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle, driven by
Smith, was in violation of a traffic law. *
*
Because the traffic stop was based on a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the car was speeding , the court need
not consider the Appellants’ argument that the authorities erred
in relying on an anonymous tip.
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Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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