UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4140
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
SANCHEZ R. HORLBECK.
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:02-cr-00821-PMD-1)
Submitted: August 16, 2012 Decided: August 20, 2012
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cameron J. Blazer, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Peter Thomas
Phillips, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sanchez R. Horlbeck appeals from his thirty-month
sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release.
Horlbeck admitted two Grade A, one Grade B, and two Grade C
violations related to distribution and possession of illegal
drugs, associating with persons engaged in criminal activity,
and failure to submit complete monthly reports. On appeal,
counsel has filed an Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
brief stating that there are no meritorious issues, but raising
whether Horlbeck’s sentence was plainly unreasonable. Although
advised of his right to do so, Horlbeck has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. We affirm.
A district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a revocation
sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence
for reasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and
substantive considerations that we employ in our review of
original sentences.” Id. at 438. A supervised release
revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
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court considered the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory
policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors
that it is permitted to consider in a supervised release
revocation case. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Although the
court need not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation
sentence in as much detail as when it imposes an original
sentence, “it still must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively
unreasonable will we “then decide whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439.
After review of the record, we conclude that the
revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable. The
thirty-month prison term does not exceed the applicable maximum
allowed by statute. The district court considered the argument
of Horlbeck’s counsel, the Guidelines advisory range, the
recommendation of the Government, and addressed on the record
Horlbeck’s significant criminal history and inability to comply
with supervised release even after participation in work
readiness and drug treatment programs. See 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(C); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
Ch. 7, Pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (2011). The district court
adequately explained its rationale for imposing sentence, and
the reasons relied upon are proper bases for the sentence
imposed.
Accordingly, we conclude that Horlbeck’s sentence was
reasonable, and we affirm the district court’s judgment. In
accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. This court
requires that counsel inform Horlbeck, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Horlbeck requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Horlbeck.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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