UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4455
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY COMPTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00365-TDS-1)
Submitted: November 19, 2012 Decided: November 21, 2012
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eugene E. Lester, III, SHARPLESS & STAVOLA, PA, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States
Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In accordance with a written plea agreement, Michael
Compton pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by
a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). He was
sentenced to 110 months in prison. Compton now appeals his
sentence, raising one issue. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.
We first determine whether the district court correctly
calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, considered
the applicable § 3553(a) factors, analyzed the arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-76
(4th Cir. 2010). If the sentence is free of procedural error,
we then review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
Id. at 575.
Compton contends that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the kidnapping cross reference, U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines §§ 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), 2X1.1(a) (2011), was
incorrectly applied to him. The cross reference applies “[i]f
the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in
connection with the commission . . . of another offense.” USSG
2
§ 2K2.1(c)(1). Compton argues that “another offense” includes
only conduct that violates federal law. The conduct in this
case -- a home invasion in which the occupants were bound with
duct tape, robbed, and locked in a closet -- does not, he
asserts, constitute a violation of the federal kidnapping
statute. Instead, the conduct is kidnapping under North
Carolina state law. Accordingly, because the conduct is not a
federal offense, the cross reference should not have been
applied.
We reject this argument. First, the commentary to
USSG § 2K2.1 states that “‘[a]nother offense’ . . . means any
federal, state, or local offense, other than the explosive or
firearms possession or trafficking offense, regardless of
whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction
obtained.” USSG § 2K2.1, cmt. n.14(C). Additionally, we have
held that the cross reference in USSG § 2K2.1 applies to conduct
amounting to a violation of state law. United States v.
Carroll, 3 F.3d 98, 103 (4th Cir. 1993).
We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3