Slip-Op 08-49
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Sherri N. Boynton,
Before: Pogue, Judge
Plaintiff, Court No. 06-00095
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
[Plaintiff’s motion for rehearing denied.]
Decided: May 07, 2008
Law Offices of Robert W. Snyder (Robert w. Snyder) for Sherri N.
Boynton, Plaintiff.
Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Barbara S.
Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office,
Aimee Lee, Civil Division, Dept. Of Justice Commercial Litigation
Branch, Maritza Tamayo-Sarver, of council, Office of Associate
Chief Counsel, U.S. Customs and Border Protection for U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pogue, Judge: Plaintiff, Sherri N. Boynton (“Boynton”) moves for
rehearing, claiming that the Defendant’s failure to consider, in
prior proceedings, certain judgments that Boynton obtained against
various importers renders these proceedings fundamentally unfair.
Court No. 06-00095 Page 2
This Court has jurisdiction to grant a rehearing under
USCIT Rule 59(a)(2). See also Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v.United
States, 200 Ct. Int. Trade LEXIS 137, *2 (citing United States v.
Gold Mountain Coffee, Ltd., 8 CIT 336, 336, 601 F. Supp. 202, 214
(1984)); Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. United States, 14 CIT 582, 583
(1990). The purpose of a rehearing is not, however, to retry the
case. See, Belfont Sales Corp. v. United States, 12 CIT 916, 918,
698 F. Supp. 916, 918 (1988). It is, rather, only to correct
significant flaws in the conduct of the proceeding. Am. Nat’l Fire
Ins. Co. at *2. The Court will not upset its prior decision unless
it is “manifestly erroneous.” See, North American Processing Co.
v. United States, 22 CIT 701, 703, 15 F. Supp. 2d 934, 936 (1998);
Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 16 CIT 984, 807
F. Supp. 792 (1992).
Boynton, however, has not presented any evidence that
would warrant the claim that our prior decisions were “manifestly
erroneous.” Boynton’s request for rehearing rests entirely on the
fact that judgments were entered in her favor by state courts
against several importers. These importers were, apparently,
connected to some of the transactions that gave rise to several of
the charges against Boynton. These judgments, however, are not
relevant to this case for two reasons.
First, the judgments Boynton has submitted all concern whether
certain payments were or were not made, as between Boynton and the
Court No. 06-00095 Page 3
importer involved. However, the charges before Customs, which the
Court has sustained, are not about the payment of duties but rather
concern Boynton’s failure to follow proper procedures when payments
are not made for any reason. Customs provides, via its Bulletin 88
procedures, methods for dealing with cases where Customs Brokers
are not paid by importers in a timely manner. Customs Bulletin 88-
30. Boynton v. United States, __ CIT __, Slip-Op 07-146 at 14-5,
n.15 (2007). As noted in Charge III Specification 11 and Charge
VIII, for example, Boynton failed to follow Bulletin 88 procedures
when appropriate. Because this Bulletin provides procedures for
Customs Brokers to follow in situations such as those that gave
rise to the judgments Boynton now submits, and because Boynton did
not follow Customs’ procedures in the situations involved, the
judgments which Boynton has gained are not relevant to the charges.
Therefore, the evidence provided by Boynton gives us no reason to
find that our prior decision contained “manifest error.”
Second, a sub-set of the charges against Boynton which have
been found by this court to be supported by substantial evidence
involve transactions with importers who had nothing to do with and
were not involved in the judgments Boynton now submits. The
Secretary held that any of the charges against Boynton would
individually be sufficient to justify revoking her license.
Because certain of the charges against Boynton are not even
arguably related to the evidence she offers, and because these
Court No. 06-00095 Page 4
charges would be sufficient to justify revoking her license, there
is no reason to grant her motion.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for retrial or rehearing
is DENIED. It is so ORDERED.
/S/ Donald C. Pogue
Donald C. Pogue, Judge
Dated: May 07, 2008
New York, N.Y.