Slip Op. 04-53
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
BEFORE: SENIOR JUDGE NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS
________________________________________
:
LUOYANG BEARING CORP. (GROUP), :
ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT :
CORP., and CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY :
IMPORT & EXPORT CORPORATION, :
:
Plaintiffs, :
:
and :
:
WAFANGDIAN BEARING COMPANY, LTD., :
:
Plaintiff and :
Defendant-Intervenor, : Consol. Court No.
: 01-00036
v. :
:
UNITED STATES, :
:
Defendant, :
:
and :
:
THE TIMKEN COMPANY, :
:
Defendant-Intervenor :
and Plaintiff. :
________________________________________:
This consolidated action concerns the claims raised by
plaintiffs, Luoyang Bearing Corp. (Group) (“Luoyang”), Zhejiang
Machinery Import & Export Corp. (“ZMC”), and China National
Machinery Import & Export Corporation (“CMC”), and plaintiff and
defendant-intervenors, Wafangdian Bearing Company, Ltd.
(“Wafangdian”) and The Timken Company (“Timken”), who move pursuant
to USCIT R. 56.2 for judgment upon the agency record challenging
the Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration’s
(“Commerce”) final determination, entitled Final Results of 1998-
1999 Administrative Review, Partial Rescission of Review, and
Determination Not To Revoke Order in Part on Tapered Roller
Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the
People’s Republic of China (“Final Results”), 66 Fed. Reg. 1,953
(Jan. 10, 2001), as amended by Amended Final Results of 1998-1999
Administrative Review and Determination To Revoke Order in Part on
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 2
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished,
From the People’s Republic of China (“Amended Final Results”), 66
Fed. Reg. 11,562 (Feb. 26, 2001).
Specifically, CMC and ZMC contend that Commerce improperly
rejected a market economy price of imported steel for the
production of People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) tapered roller
bearings (“TRBs”) based upon a “reason to believe or suspect” that
the price was subsidized. CMC further argues that Commerce erred
in: (1) holding an ex parte meeting with counsel for Timken; (2)
including employer welfare and provident fund expenses in the
selling, general and administrative expenses (“SG&A”) ratio; and
(3) adding ocean freight and insurance costs to the export price of
Japanese steel to determine the surrogate value. Luoyang,
Wafangdian and ZMC maintain that Commerce erred in: (1) rejecting
ZMC’s input value for steel bought from a PRC supplier and paid for
with PRC currency; (2) disregarding actual ocean freight charges
paid in market economy currency to PRC freight forwarders rather
than to the exporter; and (3) using aberrational data in
calculating the surrogate value for wooden cases and the steel used
to make rollers.
Timken contends that: (1) Commerce improperly applied the PRC
rate to all Premier Bearing & Equipment Ltd. (“Premier”) United
States sales; (2) the administrative record does not support the
use of other producers’ factors data to calculate Premier’s normal
values; (3) the upward post-sale price adjustments to certain
Wafangdian sales were unlawful; (4) Commerce failed to account for
defective parts in calculating normal value for Wafangdian; and (5)
Commerce acted contrary to law in revoking the order relating to
Wafangdian imports.
Held: China National’s 56.2 motion is denied. Luoyang’s 56.2
motion is granted in part and denied in part. Timken’s 56.2 motion
is granted in part and denied in part. This case is remanded to
Commerce to: (1)(a) further explain why the surrogate values it
chose for wooden cases and the steel used to produce TRBs for
Wafangdian constitute the “best available information,” and (b)
address the aberrational record data that Luoyang, Wafangdian and
ZMC point to; and (2) conduct the separate rates analysis with
respect to Premier and apply the PRC rate to all of Premier’s
United States sales if Commerce finds that Premier is not
independent of government control.
[China National’s motion is denied. Luoyang’s motion is granted in
part and denied in part. Timken’s motion is granted in part and
denied in part. Case remanded.]
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 3
Dated: May 18, 2004
Hume & Associates PC (Robert T. Hume) for Luoyang and ZMC,
plaintiffs and Wafangdian, plaintiffs and defendant-intervenors.
Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, LLP (Lindsay B. Meyer
and Kristin K. Woody) for CMC, plaintiff.
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen,
Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United
States Department of Justice (Henry R. Felix); of counsel: John F.
Koeppen, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration,
United States Department of Commerce, for the United States,
defendant.
Stewart and Stewart (Terence P. Stewart, Wesley K. Caine and
Amy A. Karpel) for Timken, defendant-intervenor and plaintiff.
OPINION
TSOUCALAS, Senior Judge: This consolidated action concerns
the claims raised by plaintiffs, Luoyang Bearing Corp. (Group)
(“Luoyang”), Zhejiang Machinery Import & Export Corp. (“ZMC”), and
China National Machinery Import & Export Corporation (“CMC”), and
plaintiff and defendant-intervenors, Wafangdian Bearing Company,
Ltd. (“Wafangdian”) and The Timken Company (“Timken”), who move
pursuant to USCIT R. 56.2 for judgment upon the agency record
challenging the Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration’s (“Commerce”) final determination, entitled Final
Results of 1998-1999 Administrative Review, Partial Rescission of
Review, and Determination Not To Revoke Order in Part on Tapered
Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From
the People’s Republic of China (“Final Results”), 66 Fed. Reg.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 4
1,953 (Jan. 10, 2001), as amended by Amended Final Results of 1998-
1999 Administrative Review and Determination To Revoke Order in
Part on Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and
Unfinished, From the People’s Republic of China (“Amended Final
Results”), 66 Fed. Reg. 11,562 (Feb. 26, 2001).
Specifically, CMC and ZMC contend that Commerce improperly
rejected a market economy price of imported steel for the
production of People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) tapered roller
bearings (“TRBs”) based upon a “reason to believe” or suspect that
the price was subsidized. CMC further argues that Commerce erred
in: (1) holding an ex parte meeting with counsel for Timken; (2)
including employer welfare and provident fund expenses in the
selling, general and administrative expenses (“SG&A”) ratio; and
(3) adding ocean freight and insurance costs to the export price of
Japanese steel to determine the surrogate value. Luoyang,
Wafangdian and ZMC maintain that Commerce erred in: (1) rejecting
ZMC’s input value for steel bought from a PRC supplier and paid for
with PRC currency; (2) disregarding actual ocean freight charges
paid in market economy currency to PRC freight forwarders rather
than to the exporter; and (3) using aberrational data in
calculating the surrogate value for wooden cases and the steel used
to make rollers.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 5
Timken contends that: (1) Commerce improperly applied the PRC
rate to all Premier Bearing & Equipment Ltd. (“Premier”) United
States sales; (2) the administrative record does not support the
use of other producers’ factors data to calculate Premier’s normal
values; (3) the upward post-sale price adjustments to certain
Wafangdian sales were unlawful; (4) Commerce failed to account for
defective parts in calculating normal value for Wafangdian; and (5)
Commerce acted contrary to law in revoking the order relating to
Wafangdian imports.
BACKGROUND
This case concerns the antidumping duty order on TRBs and
parts thereof, finished and unfinished (“subject merchandise”),
from the PRC for the period of review covering June 1, 1998,
through May 31, 1999 (“POR”).1 See Final Results, 66 Fed. Reg. at
1,953. In 1987, Commerce published an antidumping duty order on
TRBs from the PRC. See Antidumping Duty Order on Tapered Roller
Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished or Unfinished, From the
People’s Republic of China, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,667 (June 15, 1987).
1
Since the administrative review at issue was initiated
after December 31, 1994, the applicable law is the antidumping
statute as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”),
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (effective January 1,
1995). See Torrington Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1347, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing URAA § 291(a)(2), (b) (noting effective
date of URAA amendments)).
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 6
Commerce initiated an administrative review of the subject
merchandise on July 23, 1999. See Initiation of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Request for
Revocation in Part, 64 Fed. Reg. 41,075 (July 29, 1999).
On July 7, 2000, Commerce published the preliminary results of
the subject review. See Preliminary Results of 1998-1999
Administrative Review, Partial Recission of Review, and Notice of
Intent to Revoke Order in Part for Tapered Roller Bearings and
Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the People’s Republic
of China (“Preliminary Results”), 65 Fed. Reg. 41,944. Commerce
published the Final Results on January 10, 2001. See Final
Results, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,953. The Issues and Decision Memo2 which
accompanied the Final Results, is dated January 3, 2001. See Final
Results, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1,954. Commerce later published the
Amended Final Results on February 26, 2001. See Amended Final
Results, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,562.
JURISDICTION
2
The full title of this document is Issues and Decision
Memo for the 1998-99 Administrative Review of Tapered Roller
Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, from the
People’s Republic of China; Final Results, compiled as an appendix
to the Final Results, 66 Fed. Reg. at 11,562. The Court, in the
interest of clarity, will refer to this document as Issues &
Decision Mem. and match pagination to the printed documents
provided by the parties. See e.g., Luoyang’s App. 8.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 7
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a challenge to Commerce’s final determination in
an antidumping administrative review, the Court will uphold
Commerce’s determination unless it is “unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law .
. . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
I. Substantial Evidence Test
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence “is something less
than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620
(1966) (citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the [agency] when the choice is
‘between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 8
it de novo.’” American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 8 CIT
20, 22, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (1984) (quoting Penntech Papers,
Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1983) (quoting, in turn,
Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488)).
II. Chevron Two-Step Analysis
To determine whether Commerce’s interpretation and application
of the antidumping statute is “in accordance with law,” the Court
must undertake the two-step analysis prescribed by Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Under the first step, the Court reviews Commerce’s
construction of a statutory provision to determine whether
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”
Id. at 842. “To ascertain whether Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue, [the Court] employ[s] the ‘traditional
tools of statutory construction.’” Timex V.I., Inc. v. United
States, 157 F.3d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843 n.9). “The first and foremost ‘tool’ to be used is the
statute’s text, giving it its plain meaning. Because a statute’s
text is Congress’ final expression of its intent, if the text
answers the question, that is the end of the matter.” Id.
(citations omitted). Beyond the statute’s text, the tools of
statutory construction “include the statute’s structure, canons of
statutory construction, and legislative history.” Id. (citations
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 9
omitted); but see Floral Trade Council v. United States, 23 CIT 20,
22 n.6, 41 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 n.6 (1999) (noting that “[n]ot all
rules of statutory construction rise to the level of a canon,
however”) (citation omitted).
If, after employing the first prong of Chevron, the Court
determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the Court becomes whether
Commerce’s construction of the statute is permissible. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Essentially, this is an inquiry into the
reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation. See Fujitsu Gen. Ltd.
v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Provided
Commerce has acted rationally, the Court may not substitute its
judgment for the agency’s. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States,
36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that “a court must
defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute even if
the court might have preferred another”); see also IPSCO, Inc. v.
United States, 965 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The “[C]ourt
will sustain the determination if it is reasonable and supported by
the record as a whole, including whatever fairly detracts from the
substantiality of the evidence.” Negev Phosphates, Ltd. v. United
States, 12 CIT 1074, 1077, 699 F. Supp. 938, 942 (1988) (citations
omitted). In determining whether Commerce’s interpretation is
reasonable, the Court considers the following non-exclusive list of
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 10
factors: the express terms of the provisions at issue, the
objectives of those provisions and the objectives of the
antidumping scheme as a whole. See Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. v.
United States, 22 CIT 541, 545, 15 F. Supp. 2d 807, 813 (1998).
DISCUSSION
I. Commerce Properly Selected Surrogate Values for Imported
Steel Used to Produce TRBs
A. Background
1. Statutory Background
Commerce determines the antidumping duty margin by taking the
difference between the normal value (“NV”) and the United States
price of the merchandise. When merchandise is produced in a non-
market economy country (“NME”), such as the PRC, there is a
presumption that exports are under the control of the state.
Section 1677b(c) of Title 19 of the United States Code provides
that, “the valuation of the factors of production shall be based on
the best available information regarding the values of such factors
in a market economy country or countries considered to be
appropriate by [Commerce].” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (1994). The
statute, however, does not define the phrase “best available
information,” it only provides that, “[Commerce], in valuing
factors of production . . . shall utilize, to the extent possible,
the prices or costs of factors of production in one or more market
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 11
economy countries that are--(A) at a level of economic development
comparable to that of the nonmarket economy country, and (B)
significant producers of comparable merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. §
1677b(c)(4). Consequently, Commerce is given broad discretion “to
determine margins as accurately as possible, and to use the best
information available to it in doing so.” Lasko Metal Prods., Inc.
v. United States, 43 F.3d 1442, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The antidumping duty statute authorizes, but does not mandate,
that Commerce use surrogate countries to estimate the value of the
factors of production (“FOP”). In legislative history, Congress
provided Commerce with guidance by stating that, “[i]n valuing such
[FOP], Commerce shall avoid using any prices which it has reason to
believe or suspect may be dumped or subsidized prices.” H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 100-576, at 590 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1623 (“House Report”). The House Report further states that,
“the conferees do not intend for Commerce to conduct a formal
investigation to ensure that such prices are not dumped or
subsidized, but rather intend that Commerce base its decision on
information generally available to it at that time.” H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 100-576, at 590-91, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1623-24. In addition, Commerce has promulgated regulations
regarding the valuation of FOP in the NME context. The relevant
regulations state that “where a factor is purchased from a market
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 12
economy supplier and paid for in a market economy currency,
[Commerce] normally will use the price paid to the market economy
supplier.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1) (1999).
2. Factual Background
In the Preliminary Results, Commerce valued the steel used to
produce the subject TRBs by using the actual import prices paid by
CMC. In particular, Commerce noted:
Certain producers in this review purchased steel from
market economy suppliers and paid for the steel with
market economy currency. Thus, in accordance with
[Commerce’s] regulations, [Commerce] valued all
appropriate steel inputs using the actual price reported
for directly imported inputs from a market economy. For
all other steel inputs, we used a surrogate to value that
steel.
Preliminary Results, 65 Fed. Reg. at 41,948. Commerce later used
surrogate values to determine NV upon a determination that there
was “reason to believe or suspect” that the market economy prices
of imported steel used to produce the subject merchandise sold by
CMC and ZMC was dumped or subsidized. See Final Results, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 1,955; see also CMC’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Under R. 56.2 J.
Agency R. Action Under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(C) (“CMC’s Mem.”) at App.
7. Commerce premised its “reason to believe or suspect,” in part,
on the availability and use of general subsidies in the subject
industry. See CMC’s Mem. at App. 7.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 13
B. Contentions of the Parties
1. CMC’s Contentions
CMC argues that Commerce exceeded its statutory discretion by
rejecting market economy prices paid for steel inputs in a market-
based currency by NME producers to market economy suppliers.3 See
id. at 17-18. According to CMC, “these market-driven prices
constitute the ‘best available information.’” Id. at 30. Commerce
relied on two United States countervailing duty investigations
involving steel material inputs not used in the production of cups
and cones.4 See id. at 19. CMC argues, therefore, that Commerce
is not entitled to Chevron deference in this determination because
“[t]here is no statutory or regulatory provision that requires the
rejection of either surrogate or actual prices based on a ‘reason
to believe or suspect’ standard that the prices are dumped or
subsidized.” Id. Even Commerce’s regulations are silent on this
3
Specifically, CMC maintains that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) held that “the cost of
raw materials paid in convertible currencies to a market economy
supplier provide Commerce with the most accurate approximation of
the cost of producing the goods in a market economy.” CMC’s Mem.
at 28. Thus, when Commerce “can determine that an NME producer’s
input prices are market determined[,] accuracy, fairness, and
predictability are enhanced by using those prices.” Id. (quoting
Lasko, 43 F.3d at 1446).
4
To make cups and cones, CMC and ZMC used hot-rolled steel
bar that was imported from a market economy country and sold to
ZMC’s supplier factory, which paid for the steel in local market
economy currency. See Mot. Pls. Luoyang, Wafangdian & ZMC J.
Agency R. (“Luoyang’s Mot.”) at 7; CMC’s Mem. at 7.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 14
issue and Commerce relied “exclusively on a statement in
legislative history–-which was neither enacted in the statute nor
codified in the regulations–-to support its novel position.” See
id. at 20. CMC also asserts that the relevant statute does not
directly address the issue of a particular methodology that
Commerce must employ to value the FOP in an NME. See id. at 21
(citing Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works,
Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 479, 481, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357
(1999)). “[W]hen there is a third country countervailing duty
order [“CVD”] on a different product from the source country[,]”
Commerce’s regulations do not address the use of “actual price to
value an input. See id. at 21. “‘[T]he Court’s task is to assess
the reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation to allow for
valuation based on the actual value of the inputs imported from a
market economy.’” Id. at 21 (quoting Shakeproof Assembly Div. of
Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 24 CIT 485, 489, 102 F.
Supp. 2d 486, 491 (2000)).
Since the statute is silent with respect to the issue at bar,
CMC argues that Commerce should not be accorded Chevron deference.
See id. Instead, the Court should analyze the validity,
thoroughness, persuasiveness, formality and consistency of
Commerce’s decision in accordance with the test delineated in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). See CMC’s
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 15
Mem. at 22 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001)). CMC further contends that Commerce’s analysis is not
persuasive under Skidmore since Commerce expanded its statutory
authority by rejecting the actual prices for two reasons. First,
the “‘reason to believe or suspect’ language applied by [Commerce]
is drawn not from the statute or regulations but from the
legislative history.” Id. Second, Commerce’s determination is not
supported by substantial evidence, but rather depends upon CVD on
different products manufactured by different suppliers than those
at issue in this review. See id. at 23.
CMC also argues that Commerce’s decision to reject actual
prices was a change in methodology that was made without sufficient
notice to the affected parties or public. See id. Chevron
deference, therefore, is not applicable here because Commerce’s
“new course was undertaken through informal rulemaking and without
public deliberation.” Id. at 24. Furthermore, Commerce’s reliance
on the term “subsidies” in the relevant legislative history is
misplaced since the meaning of the term is not clearly defined.
See id. at 24-25. Commerce’s authority to reject actual prices is
limited to situations where specific countervailing subsidies are
in place, and not general subsidies on products different than
those at issue. See id. CMC also argues that Commerce’s proposed
methodology does not promote transparency or predictability and
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 16
mandates respondents to monitor antidumping and countervailing duty
decisions across an entire industry. See id. at 25-26.
CMC distinguishes the determination that Commerce depends
upon5 in its analysis to “support the application of the ‘reason to
believe or suspect’ standard to actual market economy import
prices.” Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). CMC also cites
Tehnoimportexport, UCF Am. Inc. v. United States, 16 CIT 13, 783 F.
Supp. 1401 (1992), and China National Arts and Crafts Import and
Export Corp. v. United States, 15 CIT 417, 771 F. Supp. 407 (1991),
to support its argument that no post-1998 case on point supports
the application of the “reason to believe or suspect” standard to
market economy imports. See CMC’s Mem. at 33-34. CMC contends that
use of this standard to reject an actual price “is akin to
speculation, since the evidence required to ‘suspect’ is very
little,” id. at 34, and that Commerce’s assumption that market
economy inputs were dumped or subsidized is not based on
substantial evidence. See id. at 35.
2. ZMC’s Contentions
ZMC supports the arguments made by CMC with respect to
5
Specifically, Commerce relies on Final Results of
Antidumping Administrative Review of Certain Helical Spring Lock
Washers From The People’s Republic of China, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,255,
66,257 (Dec. 17, 1996), which CMC claims concerned only the
application of surrogate values.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 17
Commerce’s rejection of market economy prices paid for steel
inputs. See Luoyang’s Mot. at 17-19. Zhejiang adds:
The legislative history on which Commerce relied to
disregard the direct steel sales to the PRC should have
been read in context. As Commerce noted, there was no
countervailing duty imposed on imports of the steel by
the PRC and there was no evidence that any other country,
including the United States, had imposed countervailing
duties on the specific steel.
Id. at 17. Thus, when Commerce avoids using prices it has a
“reason to believe or suspect” may be dumped or subsidized prices,
such a decision must be premised on the fact that injury to the
domestic injury actually occurred. See id. at 17-18. ZMC argues
that Commerce did not provide sufficient evidence to show that
there was injury to the specific domestic industry, and that “if
the sole evidence is . . . the existence of ‘general subsidies’ .
. . [then this] is a standard Commerce should set forth in the form
of rule-making and not a case decision.” Id. at 18.
3. Commerce’s Contentions
Commerce argues that Chevron deference is applicable with
respect to the statutory provision at issue. See Commerce’s Mem.
Opp’n Pls. Mot. J. Upon Agency R. (“Commerce’s Mem.”) at 46 (citing
Shakeproof Assembly Components, Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v.
United States (“Shakeproof III”), 268 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 18
2001)).6 Commerce responds to CMC and ZMC’s argument regarding
notice by stating that Shakeproof III and other cases “recognize[]
that Commerce routinely announces through administrative
determinations different interpretive reasons for accepting or
rejecting a particular market-based or surrogate value.” Id.
(citing Lasko, 43 F.3d at 1445 (affirming Commerce’s valuation of
a factor of production by use of surrogate country and actual cost
values)); Baoding Yude Chem. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 25
CIT ___, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (2001)). Commerce contends that it
is mandated by statute to base FOP valuation on the “best available
information” and to assess antidumping margins accurately. See
Commerce’s Mem. at 47 (citing Shakeproof III, 268 F.3d at 1382).
Commerce does not agree with CMC’s argument that market-based
prices are normally preferred by the agency’s regulations since
Commerce’s primary goal is to use the best available information to
6
The Court agrees that this determination is afforded
Chevron deference. The CAFC in Shakeproof III recognizes that
Commerce has “special expertise” and is granted “‘substantial
deference to its construction of pertinent statutes.’” Shakeproof
III, 268 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States,
117 F.3d 1386, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Contra CMC’s Reply Mem.
Supp. Mot. R. 56.2 J. Agency R. Act. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(C)
(“CMC’s Reply”) at 11 (stating that “[i]n light of Congress’ intent
that Commerce not engage in adjudicatory proceedings . . . the
Court should not apply Chevron deference”). The CAFC further
states that “[e]ven where Commerce has not engaged in notice-and-
comment rulemaking, its statutory interpretations articulated in
the course of antidumping proceedings draw Chevron deference.”
Shakeproof III, 268 F.3d at 1381 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 218).
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 19
value FOP. See Commerce’s Mem. at 47-48 (citing 19 C.F.R. §
351.408(a) & (c)(1)). In this review, Commerce contends that it
had a viable “reason to believe or suspect” that the market economy
prices were subsidized and, accordingly, resorted to using
surrogate values. See id. at 48. Commerce argues that its
decision was in line with Chevron since the agency is accorded wide
discretion in the valuation of FOP. See id. at 49. Moreover,
Commerce states that its Issues & Decision Mem. sets forth that
the obligatory language of the pertinent legislative
history most likely refers to surrogate prices as opposed
to actual market economy input prices. However,
Commerce’s approach in this case is a permissible
construction, read in conjunction with the legislative
history, that gives effect to the first principle of the
statute as set out in Shakeproof[III]. That is, Commerce
shall avoid using prices (surrogate or market-based) that
may be dumped or subsidized in order to use the best
available information to value factors.
Id. at 49-50.
Commerce argues that it based its “reason to believe or
suspect” on substantial evidence as required by this Court’s
relevant standard of review and that the agency’s reasoning is set
forth in its Market Economy Steel Memorandum.7 See id. at 50-51.
7
Commerce recognizes the conflicting nature of the
evidence in its Market Economy Steel Memorandum and the Issues and
Decision Memo. Commerce adds that it was “fully cognizant that this
issue was one that had evidence to support a decision either way.
Because the record demonstrates this fact, [Commerce argues that]
this Court should not interfere with Commerce’s legitimate choice
between two conflicting views, each of which is supported by
(continued...)
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 20
Commerce mentions that the “reason to believe or suspect”
requirement merely required “some specific, particularized
evidence, taking into account all the circumstances before the
administrative decision maker at the time of the decision.” Id. at
50-51. According to Commerce, “[t]his is especially true in light
of the congressional statement that Commerce need not investigate
to ensure that prices are actually subsidized.” Id. at 51
(emphasis in original).
4. Timken’s Contentions
Timken generally agrees with Commerce that its decision to
decline market prices was reasonable. See Timken’s Mem. Opp’n
Mots. J. Agency R. CMC, Luoyang, Wafangdian & ZMC (“Timken’s
Opp’n”) at 21. Timken first argues that Chevron and not Skidmore
deference applies in antidumping determinations. See id. at 22.
Second, Timken maintains that Commerce’s determination to reject
subsidized prices passes the Chevron reasonableness test. See id.
at 22-23. Third, Timken contends that CMC’s assertion regarding 19
C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1) is in error because the relevant statue is
silent on the issue of using prices of inputs from market sources.
See id. at 23. “Therefore, there is no statutory ‘mandate’
precluding Commerce’s action here.” Id. at 23. CMC misreads the
(...continued)
evidence that detracts fairly from the other.” Commerce’s Mem. at
53-54.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 21
regulation’s “direction” since it merely states that “‘where a
factor is purchased from a market economy supplier and paid for in
a market economy currency, [Commerce] normally will use the price
paid to the market economy supplier.’” 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1).
Timken asserts that the word “normally” contemplates exceptions, so
that the question becomes whether Commerce, in this particular
review, reasonably invoked an exception to the rule. See id. at
23-24.
C. Analysis
1. Commerce’s Changes of Policy or Methodology
Agency statements provide guidance to regulated industries.
While “‘an agency does not act rationally when it chooses and
implements one policy and decides to consider the merits of a
potentially inconsistent policy in the very near future,’”
Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 24 CIT 1333, 1342, 123 F. Supp. 2d
1372, 1381 (2000) (quoting ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC,
725 F.2d 732, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1984)), Commerce, in view of the
rapidly-changing world of global trade and Commerce’s limited
resources, should be able to rely on its “unique expertise and
policy-making prerogatives.” Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. United
States, 226 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “‘The power of an
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . .
. program necessarily requires the formulation of policy . . . .’”
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 22
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974)).
An agency decision involving the meaning or reach of a statute
that reconciles conflicting policies “‘represents a reasonable
accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency’s care by the statute, [and a reviewing court] should not
disturb [the agency decision] unless it appears from the statute or
its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that
Congress would have sanctioned.’” Id. at 845 (quoting United
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)). Furthermore, an
agency must be allowed to assess the wisdom of its policy on a
continuing basis. Under the Chevron regime, agency discretion to
reconsider policies is inalienable. See id. at 843. Any
assumption that Congress intended to freeze an administrative
interpretation of a statute would be entirely contrary to the
concept of Chevron which assumes and approves the ability of
administrative agencies to change their interpretations. See,
e.g., Maier, P.E. v. United States EPA, 114 F.3d 1032, 1043 (10th
Cir. 1997), J.L. v. Social Sec. Admin., 971 F.2d 260, 265 (9th Cir.
1992), Saco Defense Sys. Div., Maremont Corp. v. Weinberger, 606 F.
Supp. 446, 450-51 (D. Me. 1985). In sum, underlying agency
interpretative policies “are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 23
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
Moreover, “‘[a]n [agency] announcement stating a change in the
method . . . is not a general statement of policy.’” American
Trucking Assns, Inc. v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 464 n.49 (5th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 701
(5th Cir. 1979) (internal quotations omitted)). While a policy
denotes “the general principles by which a government is guided” by
laws, BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added),
methodology refers only to the “mode of organizing, operating or
performing something, especially to achieve [the goal of a
statute].” Id. at 1005 (defining mode) (emphasis added); accord
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1983); Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of Am. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 716 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Hooker Chems. &
Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976).
Consequently, the courts are even less in the position to question
an agency action if the action at issue is a choice of methodology,
rather than policy. See, e.g., Maier, P.E., 114 F.3d at 1043
(citing Professional Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier
Safety, 706 F.2d 1216, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Similarly, an
agency decision to change its methodology should be examined under
the Chevron test and sustained if the new methodology is
reasonable. See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co., v. United States, 24 CIT
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 24
364, 374, 110 F. Supp. 2d 934, 942 (2000) (stating that the use of
different methods of calculation does not mean there is a conflict
with the statute). Therefore, Commerce’s rejection of actual
market economy prices and use of a surrogate value for bearing
quality steel bar was a justifiable change of methodology so long
as such change in position was reasonably supported by the record.
2. Commerce’s Determination at Bar
The CAFC has reasoned that the purpose of 19 U.S.C. §
1677b(c)(1) and (4) “is to determine antidumping margins ‘as
accurately as possible.’” Shakeproof III, 268 F.3d at 1382
(quoting Lasko, 43 F.3d at 1446); see also Olympia Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 22 CIT 387, 390, 7 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1000-01 (1988)
(noting that “accuracy is the touchstone of the antidumping
statute” and citing Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v United States, 899 F.2d
1185, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Additionally, Commerce’s “task in
[an NME] investigation is to calculate what . . . [the] costs or
prices would be [in the NME] if such prices or costs were
determined by market forces.” Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v.
United States, 16 CIT 931, 940, 806 F. Supp. 1008, 1018 (1992).
The Court recognizes that the House Report concerns the
selection of surrogate values to determine NV in the NME context.
Neither the statute nor the House Report address the use of market
value in the calculation of NV. The Court has established,
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 25
however, that “nothing in the antidumping duty statute directs
Commerce to employ actual prices paid to a market economy supplier
by an NME producer in NV calculations.” China Nat’l Mach. Imp. &
Exp. Corp. v. United States, 27 CIT ___, ___, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1229,
1236 (2003). Furthermore, in Lasko, the CAFC recognized that the
purpose of the statute “is to prevent dumping, an activity defined
in terms of the marketplace.” 43 F.3d at 1446. Therefore, the use
of suspect prices to calculate NV, even when paid to a market-
economy supplier, would be contrary to Congress’ intent.
The Court finds that when Commerce has reason to believe or
suspect that a market-economy supplier’s prices are subsidized,
Commerce may reject market prices paid to the supplier in favor of
surrogate prices for its calculation of NV.8 The Court is
unconvinced by CMC’s argument that Commerce’s regulations prefer
that Commerce use actual prices paid whenever available. The Court
finds that the applicable regulations do not require Commerce to
use the market value over a surrogate value. The regulations state
8
The Court notes that the use of surrogate values by
Commerce has been determined to be contrary to the intent of the
law “‘where we can determine that a[n] NME producer’s input prices
are market determined, accuracy, fairness, and predictability are
enhanced by using those prices.’” Lasko, 43 F.3d at 1446 (quoting
Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value for
Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans From the People’s Republic of
China, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,271, 55,275 (Oct. 25, 1991) (emphasis
added)). If the prices paid are not market determined, however,
Commerce in pursuit of the law’s intent may reject actual prices
paid.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 26
that Commerce “normally will value the factor using the price paid
to the market economy supplier.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1). The
regulation merely advises Commerce to use actual market values to
calculate NV for an NME supplier in certain circumstances. As the
Court has previously stated, “while Commerce will use market values
under normal circumstances, under certain circumstances Commerce
may choose not to do so.” China Nat’l, 27 CIT at ___, 264 F.
Supp. 2d at 1237 (noting that the regulation “merely indicates a
preference for market prices”); see also Anshan Iron & Steel Co.,
Ltd. v. United States, 27 CIT ___, ___, 2003 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS
109, at *40 (CIT 2003) (stating that the language “merely suggests
a particular methodology, but does not impose upon Commerce the
requirement of selecting the market-economy price of a respondent’s
purchases to the exclusion of more appropriate values”).
While the Court recognizes that surrogate country values are
only an estimation of what the product’s NV would have been if the
NME were a market-economy country, see Rhodia, Inc. v. United
States, 25 CIT ___, ___, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1351 (2001),
Commerce’s decision to use actual prices paid or surrogate values
is predicated on which values provide a more accurate NV. See
Lasko, 43 F.3d at 1446 (noting that the purpose of the statute is
to prevent dumping and that it “sets forth procedures in an effort
to determine margins ‘as accurately as possible’”) (quoting Rhone
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 27
Poulenc, 899 F.2d at 1191). When Commerce has substantial evidence
that prices paid to a market-economy supplier are not market
determined, then the “use of such prices would undermine ‘accuracy,
fairness, and predictability,’ in the calculation of margins and
contravene the antidumping and countervailing duty statute . . . .”
China Nat’l, 27 CIT at ___, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (quoting Lasko,
43 F.3d at 1446). The overarching principle of the statute
prevents the Court from concluding “that Congress would condone the
use of any value where there is ‘reason to believe or suspect’ that
it reflects dumping or subsidies.” China Nat’l, 27 CIT at ___, 264
F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
Section 1677b(c)(1) of Title 19 of the United States Code
directs Commerce to use “the best available information” concerning
the values for FOP from a market-economy when calculating the NV
for a product exported from an NME country, such as the PRC. See
China Nat’l, 27 CIT at ___, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1234. The CAFC has
reasoned that “there is much in the statute [19 U.S.C. §
1677b(c)(1) and (4)] that supports the notion that it is Commerce’s
duty to determine margins as accurately as possible, and to use the
best information available to it in doing so.” Lasko, 43 F.3d at
1443; see also Shakeproof III, 268 F.3d at 1382. The Court’s role
in this case is not to evaluate whether the information Commerce
used was the best available, but rather whether Commerce’s choice
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 28
of information is reasonable.9 See China Nat’l, 27 CIT at ___, 264
F. Supp. 2d at 1236. Commerce’s discretion in choosing its
information is limited by the statute’s ultimate goal “to construct
the product’s normal value as it would have been if the NME country
were a market economy country.” Rhodia, 25 CIT at ___, 185 F.
Supp. 2d at 1351. While Commerce enjoys broad discretion in
determining what constitutes the best information available to
calculate NV, Commerce may not act arbitrarily in reaching its
decision. If Commerce’s determination of what constitutes the best
available information is reasonable, then the Court must defer to
Commerce.
The Court must determine whether Commerce had “reason to
believe or suspect” that the market economy prices were distorted
by subsidies. In China Nat’l, 27 CIT at ___, 264 F. Supp. 2d at
1239, the Court recognized that the applicable standard has no
statutory definition. The Court noted, however, that “in order for
reasonable suspicion to exist there must be ‘a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting’ the existence of certain proscribed
9
The statute’s silence regarding the definition of “best
available information” provides Commerce with “broad discretion to
determine the ‘best available information’ in a reasonable manner
on a case-by-case basis.” Timken Co. v. United States, 25 CIT ___,
___, 166 F. Supp. 2d 608, 616 (2001). Furthermore, in evaluating
the data, the statute does not require Commerce to follow any
single approach. See Luoyang Bearing Factory v. United States, 26
CIT ___, ___, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1284 (2002).
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 29
behavior, taking into account the totality of the circumstances,
the whole picture.” Id. (quoting Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v.
United States, 6 CIT 245, 247, 575 F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (1983)).
While Commerce must support its determinations with “substantial,
specific and objective evidence,” China Nat’l, 27 CIT at ___, 264
F. Supp. 2d at 1240, the Court recognizes that the antidumping duty
statute does not require Commerce to initiate a formal
investigation. Congress did not intend for Commerce to undertake
an investigation to determine whether prices were in fact
subsidized. Rather, the statute and House Report merely require
Commerce to have a “reason to believe or suspect” that prices are
being subsidized. Consequently, to determine whether there is a
“reason to believe or suspect” that prices are subsidized, Commerce
may rely on information generally available to it to support its
determination.
The Court finds that Commerce based its determination to
reject the prices CMC and ZMC paid its suppliers on evidence that
adequately supports its decision. Commerce’s reason to believe or
suspect that the supplier prices were subsidized was explained in
the Market Economy Steel Memo where Commerce examined eleven
antidumping orders or investigations and three CVD orders.
Specifically, Commerce states:
The bearing quality steel used by the PRC producers of
TRBs is not covered by any of these orders. . . .
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 30
Although the most recent findings do not cover the
specific products [Commerce] need[s] to value, these
findings may have broader implications for [the] steel
[at issue] . . . . Based on the information submitted by
the PRC producers who import steel from [the subject
countries] . . . we discovered certain subsidies that are
not company specific. For these general subsidies that
were used . . . we believe it is reasonable to infer that
[certain producers] would also use them.
CMC’s Mem. at App. 7 (confidential information omitted). In it’s
opposition memorandum, Commerce further explains that it
considered the evidence and rejected all the [United
States antidumping] orders and the oldest CVD order as a
basis to believe or suspect that the market economy steel
may be unfairly priced because the evidence was either
not applicable to the type of steel used by CMC and ZMC
or the order was not the most current information.
Commerce’s Mem. at 51. Commerce focused on two CVD orders and
found that although the market economy suppliers were not covered
by the specific CVD orders, general nation-wide subsidies that were
not company or product specific were available to any subject steel
producer. See id. at 51-52. Such subsidies were significant and
“all were calculated using recent information generally
contemporaneous with the POR [at issue].” Id. at 52. The Court
finds, therefore, that Commerce made a logical inference that CMC
and ZMC suppliers may have benefitted from the generally available
subsidies.
Once Commerce presents adequate evidence to support its
“reason to believe or suspect” that prices are subsidized, a
rebuttable presumption is established that the prices paid are
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 31
distorted. See Luoyang Bearing Factory v. United States, 27 CIT
___, ___, 2003 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 142 at *10 (CIT 2003). The
presumption is that the market-economy supplier benefitted from
subsidies. Based on this presumption, Commerce may choose to
discard the prices paid and use surrogate values to calculate NV.
The presumption, however, is not conclusive. The presumption
shifts the burden to the party challenging Commerce’s determination
to present evidence demonstrating that its supplier did not benefit
from such subsidies.10
The Court finds that CMC and ZMC did not present sufficient
evidence to rebut this presumption. Both plaintiffs complain that
Commerce did not afford the parties the opportunity to submit
evidence to rebut this presumption during the review. See Reply
Br. Pls. Luoyang, Wafangdian & ZMC at 6-7; CMC’s Mem. at 23-24.
However, the parties do not present any new evidence to rebut
Commerce’s “reason to believe or suspect” in their briefs, but
rather focus on unconvincing arguments regarding what deference
Commerce should be afforded. Since no significant financial data
or other information indicating that the supplier prices were not
subsidized was brought to light, the Court can only conclude that
10
Sufficient evidence that the prices paid were market-
determined, for example, would satisfy the manufacturer’s burden.
Additionally, credible evidence that the supplier did not
participate in any subsidies programs would satisfy the burden.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 32
no such evidence exists. If there was conclusive evidence to
support the statements that the suppliers at issue did not benefit
from subsidies, CMC and ZMC would certainly have placed such
evidence on the record. Therefore, the Court affirms Commerce’s
determination to deviate from its decision to value the steel used
to produce the subject TRBs upon actual import prices articulated
in the Preliminary Results, and instead to base its FOP valuation
on the “best available information” that Commerce concluded was
surrogate values.
II. Commere’s Ex Parte Meeting With Counsel for Timken
A. Contentions of the Parties
CMC argues that Commerce held an improper ex parte meeting
with Timken “after the briefing and formal hearing on the matter
and after the record had closed to the submission of information.”
CMC’s Mem. at 44 (emphasis in original). CMC complains that this
ex parte meeting, held on October 4, 2000, prevented the plaintiffs
from participating in the discussion of “methodological issues”
pertinent to the Final Results. See id. at 45-46. CMC also argues
that 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(g) affords parties an “‘opportunity to
comment on the information obtained by’” Commerce and that the
regulations “further restrict the time[]frame and manner within
which interested parties may submit arguments during the course of
an antidumping duty proceeding including those for consideration in
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 33
the final results of an administrative review.” Id. at 47. CMC
further complains that only a “truncated recordation” of the
meeting was filed and that such action contradicts the agency’s
“goal of transparency.” See id. at 47-48. Finally, CMC contends
that “Timken’s discussion [fails to] meet the requirements
concerning the submission of information to value factors under” 19
C.F.R. § 351.408(c) because Timken improperly submitted publically
available information in an untimely fashion. Id. at 48.
Commerce argues that CMC improperly relied on Kao Hsing Chang
Iron & Steel Corp. v. United States, 25 CIT ___, ___, 140 F. Supp.
2d 1379 (2001), and Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 24 CIT
1158, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, 337 F.3d
1373 (2003), to support the argument that the agency erred in the
manner in which the ex parte meeting with Timken was memorialized.
Specifically, Commerce contends that the Court in Kao “required
Commerce to place on the record affidavits of persons that attended
an ex parte meeting with Commerce analysts and supervisors, which
meeting had not been otherwise memorialized on the record.”
Commerce’s Mem. at 54. Commerce further argues that the facts of
this case are distinguishable from those in Nippon because the
meeting memorandum was placed on the record immediately. “The
memorandum [summarizing the meeting] was drafted the same day by a
person in attendance and placed on the record.” Id. at 55.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 34
Commerce also argues that it is not mandated to place a verbatim
transcript on the record, nor is it obligated to initiate a notice
and comment period for an ex parte meeting. Timken generally
agrees with Commerce and adds that Commerce is only required to
maintain an appropriate record of the meeting, which Commerce did.
See Timken’s Opp’n at 29-31.
B. Analysis
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(A), the administrative
record consists of
(i) a copy of all information presented to or obtained
by the Secretary, the administering authority, or the
Commission during the course of the administrative
proceeding, including all governmental memoranda
pertaining to the case and the record of ex parte
meetings required to be kept by section 1677f(a)(3) of
this title; and
(ii) a copy of the determination, all transcripts or
records of conferences or hearings, and all notices
published in the Federal Register.
The statute also requires Commerce to “maintain a record of any ex
parte meetings between--(A) interested parties or other persons
providing factual information in connection with a proceeding, and
(B) the person charged with making the determination, or any person
charged with making a final recommendation to that person, in
connection with that proceeding . . . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(a)(3).
The record reflects that Commerce properly documented the ex
parte meeting with Timken in a timely fashion. The Court agrees
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 35
with Commerce that the agency followed the letter and spirit of the
applicable statute, and that in no way is Commerce required to
place a verbatim account of the meeting on the record. The record
properly identified the attendees, date, time and place of the
meeting and summarized the matters discussed in accordance with 19
U.S.C. § 1677f(a)(3). Compare Commerce’s Mem. at 54-56, with CMC’s
Mem. at 45-46. Commerce argues that all of the issues raised at
the ex parte meeting were briefed by Timken. See Commerce’s Mem.
at 55. CMC, however, contends that this argument overlooks the
inherent problem in that the meeting served as a second hearing on
important methodological issues pertaining to the Final Results.
CMC’s Reply at 19-20. Nonetheless, Commerce did not act beyond its
authority and CMC has not demonstrated that Commerce’s ex parte
meeting was improper or that CMC was denied the opportunity to
meaningfully participate in this review.
III. Commerce Properly Adjusted the Regression-Based Wage Rate To
Include Employer Welfare and Provident Fund Expenses
A. Background
During the POR, Commerce, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. §
351.408(c)(3), used a regression-based wage rate to value labor
costs. See Preliminary Results, 65 Fed. Reg. at 41,948. In the
Final Results, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1,953, Commerce valued the PRC labor
costs by utilizing the wage rates reported in Chapter 5 of the 1999
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 36
Yearbook of Labour Statistics (“YLS”). According to Commerce:
[The] regulations at section 351.408(c)(3) state that
“[Commerce] will use regression-based wage rates
reflective of the observed relationship between wages and
national income in market economy countries.” These same
regulations also require [Commerce] to determine the
“wage rate to be applied in nonmarket economy proceedings
each year” and make it publicly available. Therefore, to
value the labor inputs in this review, [Commerce] applied
the PRC regression-based wage rate established by
[Commerce] and published by the Import Administration on
its website, which was last revised in May 2000.
App. Timken’s Mem. Opp’n Pls. J. Agency R. CMC, Luoyang, Wagangdian
& ZMC (“Timken’s App.) at Tab 15 p. 15.
B. Contentions of the Parties
CMC contends that Commerce erred in adjusting Chapter 5 wage
rate data to account for provident funds and welfare expenses. See
CMC’s Mem. at 49. Specifically, Commerce added such expenses to
the NV calculation of the surrogate SG&A expenses, which CMC argues
resulted in a double count of a component of labor. See id. at 49-
50. CMC argues that Congress “intended labor to be valued based
upon production hours worked, which are appropriately reflected in
the application of the unadjusted Chapter 5 wage rate data applied
by” Commerce. Id. at 50.
According to CMC, Commerce’s past “practice has been to
include provident fund and welfare expenses as components of total
labor cost and not as part of overhead or SG&A expenses.” Id. at
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 37
51 (citing Final Results of Antidumping Duty New Shipper
Administrative Review of Pure Magnesium From the People’s Republic
of China, 63 Fed. Reg. 3,085, 3,091 (Jan. 21, 1998); Notice of
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value on Polyvinyl
Alcohol From the People’s Republic of China, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,057,
14,061 (Mar. 29, 1996)). CMC adds that Timken’s arguments
challenging Commerce’s treatment of labor in past reviews have
consistently been rejected. See id. (citations omitted).
Commerce argues that substantial evidence demonstrates that
the surrogate companies incurred all of the labor expenses included
in Commerce’s calculation. See Commerce’s Mem. at 56. According
to Commerce, the instant review differs from past reviews because
current evidence shows that it “is undisputed and clear[] . . .
that the provident fund and welfare expenses are a part of labor
expenses incurred by the selected surrogates.” Id. at 57.
Commerce points out that the antidumping statute does not direct
Commerce to use a particular method to value labor expenses and
that in accordance with the evidence submitted by Timken, Commerce
properly valued all of its FOP and based this valuation on record
evidence. Such evidence, according to Commerce, did not exist in
prior reviews. See id. at 58. Accordingly, “Commerce was
justified in including these expenses in the SG&A ratio, and, thus,
departing from its practice in the previous review.” Id. Commerce
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 38
further contends that “[t]his change from the previous review is an
interpretation of Commerce’s regulation that should be given
deference by this Court.” Id. Commerce notes “[t]he expenses for
provident fund and welfare incurred by the surrogate companies are
different from those listed in Chapter 5 of the YLS.” Id.
Timken generally argues that Commerce made the appropriate
adjustments with respect to the valuation of labor and explains
that the agency relied on annual reports of a certain Indian
bearing producer to calculate SG&A expenses. See Timken’s Opp’n at
31-32. Timken maintains that Commerce “specifically identified
those labor costs in the Indian annual reports that were above and
beyond mere wages . . . and added them to” SG&A expenses. Id. at
32. This methodology, according to Timken, was reasonable and
logical and CMC’s arguments lack merit. Timken contends that “CMC
misstates the issue when it asserts that ‘Commerce erred in
adjusting the regression-based wage rate to include employer
welfare and provident fund expenses.’” Id. at 33. Timken claims
that Commerce merely adjusted SG&A expenses, “leaving the
regression-based wage rates intact.” Id. Moreover, with regards
to the issue raised by CMC that Commerce “double counted” the
expenses in question, Timken claims that Commerce “merely re-
categorized the expenses to mesh the two sources of data and
thereby account for all factor costs.” Id.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 39
C. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Commerce’s
decision to add employer welfare and provident fund expenses to the
NV calculation of the surrogate SG&A expenses was a justifiable
change of methodology as long as such change in position was
reasonably supported by the record. See discussion supra Part
I.C.1.
The applicable statute provides that, when dealing with
imports from an NME such as the PRC, Commerce shall determine the
NV of the subject merchandise based on FOP utilized in producing
the merchandise and Commerce shall value the reported FOP based on
the best available information regarding the values of FOP in an
appropriate market economy. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1).
According to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(3), the FOP utilized in valuing
merchandise from an NME include, but are not limited to: “(A) hours
of labor required, (B) quantities of raw materials employed, (C)
amounts of energy and other utilities consumed, and (D)
representative capital cost, including depreciation.” The relevant
regulation provides:
[f]or labor, [Commerce] will use regression-based wage
rates reflective of the observed relationship between
wages and national income in market economy countries.
[Commerce] will calculate the wage rate to be applied in
nonmarket economy proceedings each year. The calculation
will be based on current data, and will be made available
to the public.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 40
19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(3).
In the case at bar, Commerce used the wage rates reported in
Chapter 5 of the 1999 YLS, which were made available to the public
by means of the Import Administration’s website, to value the PRC
labor costs. See Timken’s App. at Tab 15 p. 15 (referring to the
Issues & Decision Mem.) The data in Chapter 5 provides the most
comprehensive wage rates since such figures include “overtime,
bonuses and gratuities, holiday pay, incentive pay, pay for
piecework, and cost-of-living allowances.” Id. However, in this
particular review, Commerce was also presented with specific and
undisputed evidence that demonstrated that additional expenses were
incurred by employers in the PRC. See id. at Tab 15 p. 16.
Commerce, therefore, added provident and welfare fund expenses to
its valuation of labor specifically because these two types of
expenses are not expressly included in Chapter 5 data. See id.
Commerce added such expenses in order to calculate the costs that
the PRC producer would incur if its factory were located in the
surrogate country, India as accurately as possible. See id. Tab 4.
Since the relevant statute does not direct Commerce to use a
specific method in its valuation of labor, see 19 U.S.C. §
1677b(c)(3), and given the evidence provided to Commerce by Timken,
the Court upholds Commerce’s valuation of labor. Commerce properly
collected new evidence, analyzed it and reasonably determined that
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 41
the provident and welfare fund expenses must be added to the SG&A
ratio in order to accurately value labor.
IV. Commerce’s Decision to Add Ocean Freight and Marine Insurance
Expenses to Japanese Export Prices to Determine the Surrogate
Value for Cups and Cones
A. Background
The relevant section of the statute provides that Commerce,
“in valuing factors of production . . . shall utilize, to the
extent possible, the prices or costs of factors of production in
one or more market economy countries that are--(A) at a level of
economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket economy
country, and (B) significant producers of comparable merchandise.”
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). In its determination of values for steel
used to produce cups and cones, Commerce chose India as the primary
surrogate for China. See Timken’s App. at Tab 15 (citing the
Issues & Decision Mem. at 24-25). Commerce then relied on export
values of relevant Japanese steel exports to ascertain comparable
Indian values, that is to determine an appropriate value of steel
in India available to Indian TRB producers. See id. Commerce also
adjusted data on Japanese exports to India to include ocean freight
and marine insurance costs to determine the surrogate value. See
id. Commerce explained that since no Indian producer could
produce Indian TRBs with steel located in Japan, ocean freight and
insurance costs must be added to determine an accurate value of
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 42
Indian steel. See id.
B. Contentions of the Parties
CMC contends that Commerce’s policy “suggests that the
adjustment to add a freight and marine insurance expense was
erroneous for two reasons. First, this practice is inconsistent
with [Commerce’s past] practice . . . [and s]econd, . . . a
containerized freight and insurance value . . . does not effectuate
the statutory purpose of ‘calculating accurate dumping margins.’”
CMC’s Mem. at 52-53. CMC also argues that Commerce’s adjustment
was arbitrary and should not be sustained.
Luoyang argues that Commerce “did not provide parties a
meaningful opportunity to comment on the adjustment for ocean
freight and marine insurance.” See Mot. Luoyang’s Mem. at 32.
Luoyang also contends that in previous reviews, Commerce used
Japanese export data as a surrogate for steel, however, Commerce
did not make adjustments for additional ocean freight and insurance
expenses. See id. at 32-33. Moreover, Luoyang argues that the
record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that Commerce made any
attempt to determine what most closely approximated the distance
between Japan and India. See id. at 33-34.
Commerce maintains that CMC and Luoyang’s arguments are
without merit. Commerce states that it provided a reasonable
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 43
explanation for its adjustment and that its decision was not
inconsistent with Commerce’s practice in the last administrative
review. See Commerce’s Mem. at 59. Timken generally agrees that
Commerce acted in accordance with law by adding “reasonable” values
for ocean freight and insurance to the Japanese steel values. See
Timken’s Opp’n. at 37-38.
C. Analysis
Commerce added ocean freight and insurance expenses from Japan
to the United States to the Japanese export values in order to
determine usable values for India. See Timken’s App. Tab 15
(referencing Issues & Decision Mem.). Commerce made this
adjustment because it lacked information on such costs from Japan
to India, and found that the data to the United States was the
“best available information.” Id. CMC argues that this adjustment
was inconsistent with Commerce’s past practice. However, the
record of the eleventh administrative review does not indicate that
this precise issue was raised or that there was evidence of freight
and insurance costs that Commerce could have used or actually
rejected. See Final Results of 1997-1998 Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review and Final Results of New Shipper Review on
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished,
From the People’s Republic of China, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,837, 61,839-
40.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 44
The Court agrees with Commerce. Although CMC complains that
the ocean freight and insurance expenses relied upon were not
accurate, CMC points to no other information on the record that
Commerce could have used or that Commerce rejected. The Court
finds that Commerce properly included the cost of freight and
insurance to get the steel from Japan to India. Moreover, the
Court rejects Luoyang’s argument that the record does not reflect
any attempt by Commerce to closely approximate the distance between
Japan and India, and draws Luoyang’s attention to the Issues and
Decision Memo where Commerce explained that “[o]f the available
freight cost data on the record, the PRC to [United States] West
coast data most closely approximates the shipping distance between
Japan and India.” Timken’s App. at Tab. 15 p. 25.
V. Commerce Properly Rejected ZMC’s Input Value for Steel Bought
From a PRC Supplier and Paid For With PRC Currency
A. Contentions of the Parties
ZMC argues that Commerce departed from past practice and used
surrogate values for the steel used by ZMC’s factory as opposed to
the actual price paid for the steel in United States currency. See
Luoyang’s Mot. at 20. According to ZMC, “[t]here is no evidence on
the record to show that the prices paid by ZMC’s factory . . . were
aberrational. . . Commerce completely disregarded the possibility
that the actual steel price data might in fact constitute the best
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 45
available information that would lead to the most accurate margin
calculation.” Id. at 21.
ZMC adds that Commerce’s regulations “do not limit the use of
import prices to imports made by the manufacturer only.” Id. at
22. As a result, Commerce is free to use import prices paid by
trading companies as surrogate values so long as such prices
constitute the “best available information.” Id. at 23.
Therefore, the question becomes whether “it is reasonable for
Commerce to ignore what is purportedly the best information
available when it employs a[n] NME factors of production analysis.”
Id. (citation omitted). ZMC maintains that the answer to the
question is no. “‘Commerce has an obligation to review all data
and then determine what constitutes the best information available
or, alternatively, to explain why a particular data set is not
methodologically reliable.’” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original). ZMC maintains that although Commerce had adequate data
reflecting actual prices paid, Commerce rejected this data and used
surrogate value. ZMC contends that this practice was illogical and
that “[t]his methodology cannot possibly be characterized as one
based on the ‘best available information.’” Id. at 24.
Commerce argues that this case is distinguishable because it
involves a sale in a market that is defined by statute as not
reflecting the fair value of merchandise. See Commerce’s Mem. at
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 46
63. Commerce further argues that the very “fact that the PRC
seller obtained the input in a market economy currency from a
market economy producer does not negate the fact that the next
transaction, the sale to ZMC’s factory considered by Commerce,
occurred wholly within a[n NME].” Id. Timken generally agrees
with Commerce and adds that the Court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the agency. See Timken’s Opp’n at 53-55.
B. Analysis
The Court agrees with Commerce that by definition, ZMC’s
purchase price of steel from a PRC supplier in PRC currency is
unreliable. The Court in Olympia, 22 CIT at 390-92, 7 F. Supp. at
1001, held that Commerce’s conclusion that “[p]rices paid by
trading companies do not represent prices paid by manufacturers”
failed to explain why trading company data is never reliable for
the purpose of FOP analysis. In Olympia, the rejected data
consisted of market-based prices paid by PRC trading companies to
suppliers in market economies. See id. The facts of this review
differ in that the price paid by ZMC’s factory, a PRC producer, was
in PRC currency and was remitted to another PRC producer. See
Luoyang’s Mot. at 7-8 (stating that the steel was purchased and
imported by a certain producer and later purchased by ZMC’s factory
in PRC currency).
Section 1677(18) of Title 19 of the United States Code defines
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 47
an NME as “any foreign country that [Commerce] determines does not
operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that
sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value
of the merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (emphasis added). The
transaction at issue involves a sale in an NME, and this fact is
not negated by ZMC’s argument that the PRC seller obtained the
input by using a market economy currency. Commerce explained in
ZMC’s verification report its reasons for rejecting this value.
Commerce’s Mem. at App. p. 8.; see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1)
(stating that “[f]or purposes of valuing the factors of production,
. . . where a portion of the factor is purchased from a market
economy supplier and the remainder for a[n NME] supplier,
[Commerce] normally will value the factor using the price paid to
the market economy supplier.”) Essentially, the sale occurred in
a market that is defined, by statute, as not reflecting the fair
value of merchandise. The whole transaction, therefore, was
tainted and without evidence showing that the actual prices paid
reflected fair market prices, Commerce reasonably disregarded ZMC’s
steel input and used surrogate values.
VI. Commerce Properly Disregarded Actual Ocean Freight Charges
Paid in Market Economy Currency to PRC Freight Forwarders
A. Background
In the present review, Wafangdian paid its shipping charges to
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 48
a PRC freight forwarder. Commerce found, however, that the record
evidence does not link the amount Wafangdian claims to have paid
for these services to the amount charged by the market economy
supplier. See CMC’s Mem. at App. 8 p. 22. As a result of this
finding, Commerce used surrogate values to calculate the ocean
freight charges Wafangdian incurred using a PRC freight forwarder.
See id.
B. Contentions of the Parties
Luoyang, Wafangdian and ZMC (“Luoyang et al.”) argue that
Commerce improperly disregarded ocean freight charges paid in
market economy currency for shipments on market economy carriers.
See Luoyang’s Mem. at 29. Luoyang et al. also contend that
Commerce’s rejection of Wafangdian’s expenses as a result of absent
documentation is erroneous since “Commerce never asked for any such
documentation. There was no evidence on the record to show that
the price charged was different than that quoted in [United States]
dollars.” Id. at 30. According to Luoyang et al., Commerce
provided no legitimate reasoning to support why the market economy
supplier would not have been paid in market economy currency or why
the supplier would charge the freight forwarder a higher price.
Luoyang et al. further maintain that Commerce’s decision was
contrary to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1), which provides that “the
valuation of the factors of production shall be based on the best
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 49
available information regarding the values of such factors in a
market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by
[Commerce.]” Therefore, Commerce should have used the prices
reported by Wafangdian and ZMC, which represented the actual prices
paid for ocean freight and, accordingly, constituted the best
available information. See Luoyang’s Mem. at 31. “The underlying
surrogate values used were not contemporaneous and were much less
specific to the transactions involved.” Id.
Commerce asserts that the record “is entirely devoid of
documentation demonstrating the actual cost of Wafangdian’s ocean
freight.” Commerce’s Mem. at 64. Accordingly, Commerce properly
used a surrogate to value this expense. Commerce also maintains
that the surrogate value for marine insurance was directly related
to the value of the TRBs at issue. See id. at 65. “Commerce
specifically based its marine insurance upon value, consistent with
this Court’s holding in Peer Bearing [Company v. United States, 22
CIT 472, 495,] 12 F. Supp. 2d 445, 458 (1998).” Commerce adds
that it did not violate the statue by not using a surrogate value
for steel shipped in containers. See Commerce’s Mem. at 66.
C. Analysis
The Court in Yantai Oriental Juice Co. v. United States, 2002
Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 56 *30 (CIT June 18, 2002), explains that
“Commerce has [never] accepted a transaction between two nonmarket
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 50
entities as proof of the cost of ocean freight expenses.” Section
351.408(c)(1) of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that an
input be (1) “purchased from a market economy supplier” and (2)
“paid for in a market economy currency.” Given that Wafangdian,
ZMC and the freight forwarders do business in an NME which “does
not operate on market principles,” see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A), it
hardly seems unreasonable that proof of what was paid to a market
economy supplier should be used to substantiate that the amount
paid for this factor was “determined by market forces.” See
Yantai, 2002 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS at *29-*30. Absent such
evidence, Commerce “is justified in its use of a surrogate freight
price.” Id. at 31. Therefore, Commerce's use of surrogate values
to determine ocean freight expenses is in accordance with law.
VII. Commerce’s Use of Surrogate Values for Wooden Cases and for
the Steel Used to Make Rollers
A. Background
In the Final Results, Commerce selected certain surrogate
values for wooden cases and for the steel used to make rollers and
explained its determination as follows:
[Commerce] examined the newer, more contemporaneous data
from India that was placed on the record of this review
by [Luoyang, Wafangdian and ZMC] following the
publication of the Preliminary Results. [Commerce’s]
analysis of this data indicates that the new Indian value
is consistent with the [United States] benchmark.
. . .
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 51
[Accordingly, Commerce used] this import data from India
to value the type of steel used in the manufacture of
rollers.
Regarding wooden cases, the amount derived from the
Indian import statistics is $3.46 per kilogram. This
value is not substantially different from the rate based
on the Indian import statistics used in [the tenth
administrative review] ($2.07 per kilogram). Since
[Commerce] ha[s] no Indonesian data to rely upon for
wooden cases, . . . for the Final Results, [Commerce]
continue[d] to value wooden cases using the Indian import
statistics.
Timken’s App. at Tab 8. Cmts. 5, 10.
B. Contentions of the Parties
1. Luoyang, Wafangdian and ZMC’s Contentions
Luoyang et al. contend that Commerce failed to evaluate the
record data when selecting a surrogate value for wooden cases and
the steel used to make rollers. See Luoyang’s Mem. at 35-39. With
respect to the roller steel surrogate value, Commerce based its
calculation on Indian import statistics for the period of April
1998 through January 1999. See id. at 35. Commerce considered
values from thirteen countries, that included Russia and the PRC
(both NME). See id. Imports from these two were disregarded.
From the remaining eleven countries, four countries actually
produced bearing quality steel. See id. at 35-36. Of the
remaining four, Commerce eventually disregarded Indian imports.
See id.
Luoyang et al. complain that Commerce is under an affirmative
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 52
obligation to determine whether Indian imports were the best
available information. Moreover, in accordance with Commerce’s
explanation in the Issues and Decision Memo, the agency should have
also excluded imports from Austria, Germany and the April through
December 1998 imports from France. See id. at 36-37. “These
prices were substantially above the others and above the upper
[United States] benchmark prices. In addition, the Indian import
data showed that the imports from Austria and France (for April
[through] December 1998) represented extremely small quantities.”
Id. at 37. Luoyang et al., therefore, argue that Commerce should
disregard these import figures since they are aberrational.
With respect to the surrogate value of the wooden cases
Wafangdian used to pack some of its TRBs for shipment to the United
States, Luoyang et al. contend that Commerce failed to properly
evaluate the Indian import statistics. A “cursory review of the
figures shows that the values and quantities vary widely. The
shipment of four boxes from the [United Kingdom] should be
disregarded because of the small quantity involved.” Id. at 39.
Similarly, the value for the wooden cases in Spain is very high
when compared to other values. Luoyang et al. further maintain
that “Commerce should evaluate the imports to determine which
constitute the ‘best available information’ and should disregard
those that are non-commercial shipments and those which are so high
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 53
in value that they are not likely to be used for packing alone.”
Id.
2. Commerce’s Contentions
Commerce responds that it has discretion to select appropriate
surrogate values to determine normal value based upon FOP. See
Commerce’s Mem. at 66. Commerce accepted the Indian import
statistics for steel submitted by the parties. After disregarding
the NME countries, Commerce used the information without further
adjustment, and acted within its discretion as articulated by the
Court in Peer Bearing, 22 CIT at 495, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 458.
3. Timken’s Contentions
Timken argues that Luoyang et al.’s contention constitutes an
“impermissible change in position.” See Timken’s Opp’n at 53.
Timken states that Luoyang itself submitted the data used by
Commerce in an early submission to the agency. “It was only after
the Final Results that Luoyang et al. took the position that
Commerce ‘erred’ by not excluding certain portions of the data,
claiming that the values were aberrations and that using them would
be a ‘clerical error.’” Id. at 54. Timken maintains that Commerce
properly rejected this argument and deemed the error to be
methodological, rather than clerical in nature. See id. Timken
adds that the appropriate time has lapsed in which Luoyang et al.
can raise this issue. Finally, Timken claims that Wafangdian fails
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 54
to show that Commerce erred in valuing wooden cases and the steel
used to make rollers.
C. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Timken’s argument
that Luoyang et al. failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies. The exhaustion doctrine requires a party to present its
claims to the relevant administrative agency for the agency’s
consideration before raising these claims to the Court. See
Unemployment Compensation Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143,
155 (1946) (“A reviewing court usurps the agency’s function when it
sets aside the administrative determination upon a ground not
theretofore presented and deprives the [agency] of an opportunity
to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for
its action.”)11 The purpose behind the doctrine of exhaustion is
11
There is however, no absolute requirement of exhaustion in
the Court of International Trade in non-classification cases. See
Alhambra Foundry Co. v. United States, 12 CIT 343, 346-47, 685 F.
Supp. 1252, 1255-56 (1988). Section 2637(d) of Title 28 directs
that “the Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate,
require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” By its use of
the phrase “where appropriate,” Congress vested discretion in the
Court to determine the circumstances under which it shall require
the exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Cemex, S.A. v.
United States, 133 F.3d 897, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Therefore,
because “each exercise of judicial discretion [does] not requir[e]
litigants to exhaust administrative remedies,” the court is
authorized to determine proper exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion. Alhambra, 12 CIT at 347, 685 F. Supp. at 1256 (citing
Timken Co. v. United States, 10 CIT 86, 93, 630 F. Supp. 1327, 1334
(1986), rev’d in part on other grounds, Koyo Seiko Co. v. United
(continued...)
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 55
to prevent courts from premature involvement in administrative
proceedings, and to protect agencies “from judicial interference
until an administrative decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); see also Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. Comm’r, FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 29 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (pointing out that the “exhaustion doctrine . . .
serv[es] four primary purposes: [(1)] it ensures that persons do
not flout [legally] established administrative processes . . .;
[(2)] it protects the autonomy of agency decisionmaking; [(3)] it
aids judicial review by permitting factual development [of issues
11
(...continued)
States, 20 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
In the past, the court has exercised its discretion to obviate
exhaustion where: (1) requiring it would be futile, see Rhone
Poulenc, S.A. v. United States, 7 CIT 133, 135, 583 F. Supp. 607,
610 (1984) (“it appears that it would have been futile for
plaintiffs to argue that the agency should not apply its own
regulation”), or would be “inequitable and an insistence of a
useless formality” as in the case where “there is no relief which
plaintiff may be granted at the administrative level,” United
States Cane Sugar Refiners’ Ass’n v. Block, 3 CIT 196, 201, 544 F.
Supp. 883, 887 (1982); (2) a subsequent court decision has
interpreted existing law after the administrative determination at
issue was published, and the new decision might have materially
affected the agency’s actions, see Timken, 10 CIT at 93, 630 F.
Supp. at 1334; (3) the question is one of law and does not require
further factual development and, therefore, the court does not
invade the province of the agency by considering the question, see
id.; R.R. Yardmasters of Am. v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332, 1337-39
(D.C. Cir. 1983); and (4) plaintiffs had no reason to suspect that
the agency would refuse to adhere to clearly applicable precedent.
See Philipp Bros., Inc. v. United States, 10 CIT 76, 80, 630 F.
Supp. 1317, 1321 (1986).
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 56
relevant to the dispute]; and [(4)] it serves judicial economy by
avoiding [repetitious] administrative and judicial factfinding and
by” resolving sole claims without judicial intervention).
While a plaintiff cannot circumvent the requirements of the
doctrine of exhaustion by merely mentioning a broad issue without
raising a particular argument, plaintiff’s brief statement of the
argument is sufficient if it alerts the agency to the argument with
reasonable clarity and avails the agency with an opportunity to
address it. See generally, Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552
(1941); see also Rhone Poulenc, 899 F.2d at 1191. The sole fact of
an agency’s failure to address plaintiff’s challenge does not
invoke the exhaustion doctrine and shall not result in forfeiture
of plaintiff’s judicial remedies. See generally, B-West Imports,
Inc. v. United States, 19 CIT 303, 880 F. Supp. 853 (1995). An
administrative decision not to address the issue cannot be
dispositive of the question whether or not the issue was properly
brought to the agency’s attention. See, e.g., Allnutt v. United
States DOJ, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4060 (D. Md. 2000).
In the case at bar, Luoyang et al. sufficiently provided
Commerce with the opportunity to address the issue of Commerce’s
failure to disregard aberrational data. The Issues and Decision
Memo sets forth that Luoyang et al. argued, inter alia, that: (1)
“in valuing rollers used in the production of TRBs, [Commerce]
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 57
should utilize more current Indian import data which was placed on
the record subsequent to the Preliminary Results;” (2) Commerce
“should generally avoid using [United States] values as benchmarks,
and should specifically refrain from doing so for roller steel;”
and (3) “in using [United States] values as benchmarks for the
purpose of factor valuation, [Commerce] risks transforming the
United States into the surrogate country even though the record
does not support the use of the United States as the appropriate
surrogate country.” See Luoyang’s App. 8 at 12. The Court,
therefore, concludes that Luoyang et al. properly exhausted their
administrative remedies and have the right to raise this issue.
The Court is not satisfied that Commerce acted within its
discretion in selecting surrogate values for wooden cases used to
ship TRBs to the United States and the steel used to produce
rollers. The Court recognizes that Commerce has wide discretion to
determine what surrogate values constitute such “best available
information,” however, the record must reasonably support the
agency’s determination. The CAFC has reasoned that “the purpose of
the statutory provisions is to determine antidumping margins ‘as
accurately as possible.’” Shakeproof III, 268 F.3d at 1382
(quoting Lasko, 43 F.3d at 1446); see also Olympia, 22 CIT at 390,
7 F. Supp. 2d at 1000-01 (noting that “accuracy is the touchstone
of the antidumping statute” and citing Rhone Poulenc, 899 F.2d at
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 58
1191. Although Commerce claims that its application of the
surrogate values for wooden cases and the steel used to produce
TRBs reflects this administrative goal, the approach followed by
Commerce, in this instance, relieves the agency of this very
responsibility. Commerce has failed to explain to this Court why
the surrogate values it chose constitute the “best available
information,” and to address the aberrational record data that
Luoyang et al. point to. Thus, this issue is remanded to Commerce
for further explanation.
VIII. Commerce’s Decision Not to Apply the “PRC RATE” to All
Premier United States Sales
A. Background
During the POR, Premier was a privately owned Hong Kong
reseller of the subject merchandise. See Mem. Supp. Timken’s Mot.
J. Upon Agency R. (“Timken’s Mem.”) at 6. Premier resold the
subject Chinese TRBs to seventeen unaffiliated Chinese suppliers.
When this review was commenced, Commerce sent Premier its standard
antidumping questionnaire requesting, inter alia, information
regarding FOP, which “required Premier to obtain responsive data
from its suppliers.” Id. Only three of the seventeen suppliers
provided Premier with any information, which was ultimately found
to be inadequate due to incomplete accompanying explanations. See
id. Commerce later sent FOP questionnaires “directly to the
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 59
suppliers themselves, specifically requesting the needed
information,” id. at 7, but this effort yielded no new information.
During the subject review, Timken argued that Commerce should,
as a matter of law, apply the so-called “PRC Rate,” which was 33.18
percent, to all Premier United States sales. See Amended Final
Results, 66 Fed. Reg. at 11,563. The PRC Rate applies to goods
produced by any Chinese producer who has never established an
independent rate in a prior administrative review. Commerce,
ultimately employed two methods for determining Premier’s NV.
Timken’s Mem. at 7. “[W]hen the record contained Section D data
submitted by another Chinese producer for a particular TRB
model—i.e., data of a non-Premier supplier relevant to a common
model—Commerce borrowed that information and used it for Premier’s
‘normal value,’ treating it as non-adverse ‘facts available.’” Id.
at 7-8. If the record lacked such data, Commerce applied a rate of
25.56 percent for Premier, which was the rate determined in the
eleventh administrative review.
In the Issues and Decision Memo, Commerce explained:
The essence of [Timken’s] argument is that a state
controlled producer might sell to a PRC trading company
at artificially low prices, thereby allowing the latter
to resell to the United States at unfair prices without
the discipline of the dumping order. [Timken’s] fear is
unfounded, however. If the PRC trading company reselling
the supplier’s TRBs in the United States had a separate
rate, we would compare its [United States] prices to
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 60
normal value based on the supplier’s FOP data, and
determine a dumping margin as appropriate. If the
trading company did not have a separate rate, then its
sales to the United States would be subject to the PRC-
wide rate. Either way, the TRBs produced by the supplier
and resold through the trading company are subject to the
discipline of the dumping order. Any “unfair” prices
would be offset by the appropriate amount of the
antidumping duty.
App. Timken’s Mem. at Tab 18 p. 28. Commerce further stated that
Premier’s suppliers were unaware of the ultimate destination of the
goods they sold, and based this finding on Premier’s questionnaire
responses. See id. Tab 18 p. 43.
B. Contentions of the Parties
1. Timken’s Contentions
Timken argues that “a rebuttable presumption [exists] that all
producers in a given [NME] country are parts of a single nonmarket
entity—[in this instance,] the ‘PRC entity.’” Timken’s Mem. at 25.
Timken asserts that the only way a producer can avoid this single
country rate is to provide Commerce with sufficient evidence to
show an “absence of governmental control. . . . The successful
showing establishes the producer as an exception to the general
rule.” Id. (emphasis omitted). In this instance, Premier’s
seventeen suppliers have never affirmatively showed that they are
not under governmental control. See id. at 26. “Therefore,
Commerce acted contrary to law by assigning, to [Premier’s] goods,
anything other than the PRC Rate.” Id.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 61
Timken next argues that the subject suppliers’ “outright
refusal” to provide information should have resulted in Commerce’s
drawing of adverse facts available. See id. at 26-27. Timken
explains that “[o]nce a respondent refuses to respond to a
questionnaire or does not supply Commerce with an adequate
explanation for refusing to respond, Commerce no longer focuses on
calculating the ‘true’ margin but instead must focus on determining
an adverse margin that will induce cooperation in the future.” Id.
at 27 (quotation omitted).
Timken further contends that Commerce’s explanation that it
followed past agency practice is inconsistent “with the statute’s
focus on determining values based on actual [FOP] consumed in
producing subject merchandise and on the basic methodological
presumptions underlying nonmarket calculations.” Id. at 31. The
statute requires that Commerce determine nonmarket NV on the basis
of the FOP consumed in producing the subject merchandise. See id.
This determination is independent of who actually exports the
goods. See id. Timken, therefore, asserts that Commerce acted
contrary to law since the basic nonmarket methodology and statute
require Commerce to apply the country-wide PRC rate to all of
Premier’s United States sales.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 62
2. Commerce’s Contention
Commerce responds that this Court “has repeatedly sustained
Commerce’s authority to establish a rate for a non-producing PRC
trading company separate from its PRC producer.” Commerce’s Mem.
at 23. Commerce engages in a separate rates analysis to determine
whether the subject exporter is an independent market participant
as opposed to an entity “closely tied to” a communist government.
See id. According to Commerce, “[t]his principle is in stark
opposition to that offered by Timken, that is, that the focus of
Commerce’s separate rates analysis must always be on the specific
entity that actually produced the subject merchandise.” Id.
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Commerce claims that the refusal of Premier’s suppliers to
fully answer the questionnaires “does not [by itself] negate
Commerce’s correct finding that Premier was entitled to a separate
rate.” Id. at 24. Moreover, the cases Timken relied upon for its
argument actually support Commerce’s application of a separate rate
to Premier’s United States sales. See id. Both cases held “that
it is entirely proper for Commerce to establish separate rates for
a PRC exporter, that is not necessarily the producer of the
merchandise.” Id. at 24-25. Commerce explains that it did not
apply its separate rates analysis to Premier because it is a
privately owned entity that fully participated in the review. See
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 63
id. at 25. “As there is no state ownership and there was full
participation, there was no need to do a separate rates . . . to
determine whether Premier was free from government control.” Id.
at 25-26. Commerce adds that this position was consistent with its
two prior reviews. See id. (citing Preliminary Results of 1997-
1998 Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Partial Recission
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Tapered Roller
Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the
People’s Republic of China, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,853 (July 8, 1999);
Preliminary Results of 1996-1997 Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review and New Shipper Review of Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts
Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the People’s Republic of
China, 63 Fed. Reg. 37,339 (July 10, 1998)).
Commerce also contends that Timken fails to point to any
practice or precedent that “compels this Court to disturb
Commerce’s determination as to whether Premier was the proper
respondent for [this] review.” Id. at 26. Commerce claims that
the PRC suppliers were not responsible for setting United States
sales prices for Premier. See id. Furthermore, even if Premier’s
suppliers were not entitled to a separate rate, such does not
disqualify Premier from receiving its own rate for domestic sales.
See id.
Commerce rejects Timken’s argument that the agency was
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 64
required to apply adverse inferences and the PRC rate to the
margins for those TRBs supplied to and resold by Premier to the
United States. See id. at 27. Adverse inferences are applied to
parties and not to the subject merchandise. Therefore, the statute
does not “impute an adverse inference to an exporter merely because
its supplier refuses to cooperate with Commerce’s requests for
information.” Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)).
Commerce also explains why Premier was the proper respondent
in this review. Commerce states:
If record evidence had demonstrated that a supplier(s)
knew the [United States] destination of its TRBs, then
such supplier(s) may have been the entity that set the
[United States] price and, therefore, it would have been
more appropriate for Commerce to determine whether that
supplier(s) was entitled to a separate rate for purposes
of determining an accurate margin. As set out by
Commerce in the [Issues and] Decision Memo,] however, the
only record evidence concerning this issue is Premier’s
un-rebutted denial that its suppliers had any knowledge
of the destination of the TRBs sold to Premier. Based
upon this evidence, Commerce properly determined that
Premier was the correct entity to consider for review.
Id. at 28-29 (citation omitted). Finally, Commerce asserts that
all of Premier’s statements on the record are not contradicted by
any other record evidence and that Commerce’s determination to
apply a separate rate was consistent with the agency’s past
practice and in accordance with law. See id. at 29.
C. Analysis
It is Commerce’s practice to allow individual exporters in an
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 65
NME to receive separate, company-specific rates upon a showing that
they operate independent of government control. See Final Results
and Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of
Manganese Metal From the People’s Republic of China, 63 Fed. Reg.
12,440, 12,441 (Mar. 13, 1998). A presumption of government
control exists, however, it can be rebutted with specific evidence
showing, inter alia, that the exporter: (1) sets its own prices;
(2) keeps the proceeds from its sales; (3) has authority to
negotiate on its behalf; and (4) is autonomous of government
decisions regarding management. See Coalition for Pres. Am. Brake
Drum & Rotor Aftermarket Mfrs. v. United States, 23 CIT at 88, 101,
44 F. Supp. 2d 229, 243 (1999). Commerce has stated that once a
Chinese exporter demonstrates its autonomy and entitlement to a
separate rate, “it is not necessary for that company to resubmit
data supporting a separate rate.” Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review of Certain Iron Construction Castings
From the People’s Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,245, 24,246
(June 8, 1992).
Some of Premier’s sales did receive a non-PRC rate even though
Commerce did not conduct a separate rates analysis for the company.
Commerce argues that since Premier was a privately owned entity
that fully participated in the review, “there is no state ownership
. . . [and] no need to do a separate rates analysis.” Commerce’s
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 66
Mem. at 25-26. Timken does not dispute Premier’s independence, but
rather contends that Commerce was required to conduct the separate
rates analysis. The Court agrees with Timken.
Fujian Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation
v. United States, explains that “the essence of a separate rates
analysis is to determine whether the exporter is an autonomous
market participant, or whether instead it is so closely tied to the
communist government as to be shielded from the vagaries of the
free market.” 25 CIT ___, ___, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1331 (2001).
Premier has not established such independence; to the contrary,
Premier’s Chinese suppliers failed to reply to Commerce’s
questionnaires in this review. The Court recognizes that such
supplier’s are not interested parties in this review.12 However,
the suppliers’ refusal to submit information prevented Commerce
from determining whether state-controlled producers sold materials
to Premier at state-controlled prices, thus causing Premier to
12
Accordingly, this Court finds Timken’s arguments
regarding the application of adverse facts available to Premier are
without merit. Premier fully participated in the review, and has
no control over it’s suppliers cooperation. Section 1677e(b) of
Title 19 states that when Commerce finds “that an interested party
failed to cooperate . . . [the agency] may use an” adverse
inference. Premier’s suppliers are not interested parties.
Therefore, the Court will not apply adverse facts to Premier as a
result of its suppliers’ deficiencies. See generally Kompass Food
Trading Int’l v. United States, 24 CIT 678, 682-83 (2000) (holding
that once a respondent refuses to supply information, Commerce no
longer focuses on the “true” margin but rather on determining an
adverse margin that will induce future cooperation).
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 67
resell products to the United States at unfair prices, albeit
unknowingly. If such was the case, Premier would not be entitled
to an NME rate.
The CAFC has stated that “[t]he antidumping statute recognizes
a close correlation between a nonmarket economy and government
control of prices, output decisions, and the allocation of
resources.” Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401, 1405-06
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Accordingly, Commerce established the rebuttable
presumption that control exists absent a contrary finding. Such
requires an affirmative demonstration and a specific finding on
point. See Coalition, 23 CIT at 101-103, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 243-46.
Commerce based its finding of Premier’s independence on a statement
made by Premier during the review that “its suppliers had [no]
knowledge of the destination of the TRBs [they] sold to Premier.”
Commerce’s Mem. at 29. The veracity of this statement, however, is
irrelevant. Commerce acted contrary to its responsibility, as
articulated by Coalition, and its finding is not supported by
substantial evidence since Commerce failed to conduct the very
analysis that would have produced the relevant evidence to support
its determination. Thus, this issue is remanded to Commerce to
conduct the separate rates analysis, and apply the PRC rate to all
of Premier’s United States sales if it finds that Premier is not
autonomous.
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 68
IX. Commerce’s Use of Other Producers’ Factors Data to Calculate
Premier’s NV
A. Contentions of the Parties
1. Timken’s Contentions
Timken contends that even if Commerce properly determined not
to apply the PRC rate to Premiers’ suppliers, Commerce should have
applied the Premier “facts available” rate of 25.56 percent to all
reported Premier sales, as opposed to only a limited number of
sales. See Timken’s Mem. at 32. Timken claims that the record
does not support a finding that Premier acted to the best of its
ability to obtain FOP information. See id. Timken cites to
confidential evidence in the record to support its claim that “a
reasonable mind could only conclude that Premier took only
perfunctory steps.” Id. at 34.
Timken also argues that Commerce’s reasons for excusing
Premier’s non-compliance failed the substantial evidence test. See
id. at 35-36. Moreover, Timken asserts that “[b]y resolving all
doubts in Premier’s favor and speculating on Premier’s behalf,
Commerce inappropriately gave priority to that company’s interests
at the expense of [United States] producers.” Id. at 36. Timken
further argues that placing Premier’s interests above every other
interested party goes contrary to the remedial nature of the
antidumping statute. See id. In sum, Timken states that
Commerce’s determination was not supported by substantial record
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 69
evidence and Commerce failed to provide adequate reasons for
excusing Premier’s deficient response. See id. at 38-40.
2. Commerce’s Contentions
Commerce responds that the record evidence actually supports
the agency’s decision in this review. See Commerce’s Mem. at 30.
Commerce explains:
In its original questionnaire, Commerce asked
Premier for its list of suppliers, which Premier
supplied. Commerce also asked whether Premier’s
suppliers knew the ultimate destination of the TRBs sold
to Premier would be the United States.
In its October 15, 1999 response, Premier answered
that its suppliers did not know the ultimate destination,
that Premier’s suppliers did not have access to Premier’s
sales records and that Premier’s suppliers did not
participate in any sales activities related to the United
States.
Commerce next asked Premier to describe the
production process of its suppliers. Premier responded
on November 5, 1999, by providing to Commerce the list of
its suppliers and stated that its suppliers compete with
Premier and have been reluctant to provide such
information in the past. Further, Premier stated that it
was trying to obtain the FOP from its suppliers and
provided a sample letter that was sent to each of its
suppliers. Finally, Premier stated it would attempt to
obtain FOP information from other PRC producers that were
participating in the review, which FOP information would
apply to models sold by Premier during the period of
review. . . .
Commerce next asked Premier to provide the FOP
information Premier had received “at this time,” meaning
the April 2000 deadline for that particular Commerce
supplemental questionnaire. On April 6, 2000, Premier
provided Commerce FOP information for three suppliers and
stated that a fourth supplier (this one participating in
the review) had authorized Premier to use its FOP data.
This response was consistent with Premier’s prior
statement that FOP information was difficult to get from
competing suppliers and also consistent with Premier’s
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 70
attempt to get FOP information from other participating
respondents in the review. . . .
In its next response, Premier told Commerce it was
translating the aforementioned FOP information. Shortly
thereafter, on May 25, 2000 Premier provided translated
FOP information, as requested by Commerce.
Premier timely answered Commerce’s questions,
providing a completely reasonable explanation as to why
it might not be able to obtain suppler FOP information--
it competes with them. Premier provided documentation of
its attempted request for FOP information from its
competing suppliers. Premier timely provided to Commerce
the information it did receive from some of its
suppliers.
Commerce’s Mem. at 30-32 (citations omitted). Commerce contends
that its decision was not based on speculation, but rather on the
record evidence. See id. at 32. Commerce continues that even if
the record evidence may lead Commerce to two inconsistent
conclusions, “this does not mean that Commerce’s findings are not
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus,
Commerce’s inferences regarding Premier, even if inconsistent with
Timken’s conclusion, “are permissible based upon this record.” Id.
at 33.
Commerce also raised issue with Timken’s contention that
Commerce’s determination was inappropriate under Chevron. Commerce
argues that “the cases cited by Timken stand for the general
proposition that exemptions from the antidumping statute are to be
construed narrowly, given the statute’s remedial purpose.” Id.
Accordingly, Commerce made reasonable inferences regarding
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 71
Premier’s effort to obtain FOP data. Commerce also asserts that
Timken’s arguments regarding its factor utilization rate
methodology was at best an alternative methodology. See id. at 34.
C. Analysis
The Court has remanded the issue of whether Commerce properly
applied separate rates to Premier’s United States sales.
Therefore, the Court will not address the issue of whether Commerce
should have applied the Premier “facts available” rate of 25.56
percent to all reported Premier sales until it receives the remand
results.
X. Commerce’s Addition of Wafangdian’s Post Sale Price Adjustment
to United States Price
A. Background
In the Preliminary Results, Commerce did not make an
adjustment for Wafangdian’s claimed credit in its calculation of
Wafangdian’s net export price. See Preliminary Results, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 41,944. On July 11, 2000, Wafangdian claimed that this was
a clerical error and urged Commerce to add the credit to the United
States’ selling price before calculating export price. See App.
Timken’s Mem. at Tab 14. Commerce eventually accepted Wafangdian’s
credit as a post sale price adjustment (“PSPA”) on the subject
merchandise, ultimately increasing United States price, because the
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 72
credit was not reasonably attributable to subject merchandise but
rather to non-subject merchandise.
B. Contentions of the Parties
Timken argues that a reasonable mind would not have accepted
the adjustment submitted by Wafangdian because it was not tied to
specific transactions to which the PSPA was applied. See Timken’s
Mem. at 40-43. Accordingly, Commerce’s allowance of the subject
PSPA is unsupported by substantial evidence and yielded distorted
results. See id. at 43. Timken proclaims that “there must be a
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’
for the Court to sustain Commerce’s determination.” Id. at 44
(referencing confidential information).
Commerce claims that it properly accepted the PSPA because the
record demonstrates that the adjustment was accurately reported
and, therefore, the agency’s increase to the United States price
was in accordance with law. See Commerce’s Mem. at 35. Commerce
also contends that Commerce’s determination focused on calculating
an accurate buyer’s net outlay for the subject merchandise.
“Commerce properly did this by not attributing the credit to the
cost of the subject merchandise.” Id. at 38.
Wafangdian generally agrees with Commerce and argues that the
PSPA accepted by Commerce was “factually supported and fully
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 73
consistent with the pertinent” regulations. See Mem. Wafangdian
Opp’n Mot. J. Agency R. Timken (“Wafangian’s Mem.”) at 8. The
relevant regulation “places the burden on the ‘interested party
that is in possession of the relevant information’ of ‘establishing
to the satisfaction of [Commerce] the amount and nature of a
particular adjustment.’” Id. (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(b)).
Wafangdian claims that it met this burden and that Timken’s
argument is based on the assumption that “price adjustments should
be like expenses and the price net of the expense should be lower.”
Id. at 10. Wafangdian, however, explains that the net price is
exclusive of the price adjustment, and is ultimately higher than
the gross price which includes PSPA. See id.
Wafangdian also claims that it provided Commerce with proper
documentation verifying that the allocation was made on a
“transaction specific basis.” See id. Wafangdian further asserts
that the price adjustments were made without regard to the
“question of dumping duties,” and that Commerce has consistently
made adjustments for PSPA in the past. See id. (citing Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-
Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada, 64 Fed. Reg. 2,173 (Jan. 13,
1999); Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews on
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and
Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania,
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 74
Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,043 (Oct.
17, 1997)).
C. Analysis
Price adjustments, as defined in 19 C.F.R. § 351.102, reflect
any change in the price charged for subject merchandise or the
foreign like product. Examples of price adjustments include, inter
alia, discounts, rebates and PSPA that are reflected in the
purchaser’s net outlay. See id. To calculate export price,
Commerce will use a price, net of any price adjustment, that is
reasonably attributable to the subject merchandise or the foreign
like product. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(c). The purpose of such
price adjustments is to “describe a category of changes to a price
. . . that affect the net outlay of funds by the purchaser. . . .
[S]uch price changes are not ‘expenses’ [as normally described by
Commerce] but rather are changes that [Commerce] must take into
account in identifying the actual starting price.” Antidumping
Duties; Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,296, 27,300 (May 19,
1997).
During the POR, Wafangdian (“seller”) and its domestic
customer (“United States” or “buyer”) agreed that “the seller had
sold the buyer some defective non-subject merchandise and that the
seller owed buyer a sum certain in compensation.” Commerce’s Mem.
at 35 (citing App. Timken’s Mem. at Tab 26). A compensation
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 75
agreement was entered into between Wafangdian and the buyer, which
was presented to Commerce in Wafangdian’s amended questionnaire
response. See id. at 36. Wafangdian presented the agreed upon
compensation as a “credit” to those certain United States sales and
reported the same gross unit price for the certain sales in its
original and amended United States sales report. See id. The
credit in the amended United States sales report had the effect of
reducing the price to the buyer for certain United States sales by
the amount that the seller agreed to compensate the buyer for the
defective non-subject merchandise. See id. (citing Issues &
Decision Mem. at 40).
Although Commerce did not include the PSPA in the Preliminary
Results calculation, Commerce received information by Wafangdian
supporting its argument that it was entitled to an adjustment. See
App. Timken’s Mem. at Tab 14. The credit was added as a PSPA “in
order to reflect the actual amount paid by the buyer because the
credit, while owed to the buyer, was not reasonably attributable to
the subject merchandise.” See Commerce’s Mem. at 37; see also 19
C.F.R. § 351.102(b). Commerce has asserted its authority to make
direct adjustments to any price that is reflected in the buyer’s
outlay. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(a)-(c) (stating that in
“calculati[ng] export price, constructed export price, and normal
value . . . [Commerce] will use a price that is net of any price
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 76
adjustment”). In this review, Commerce made a direct adjustment
“to twice reported identical gross price, based upon [Wafangdian’s]
reporting of a credit on that price that was not related to the
subject merchandise.” Commerce’s Mem. at 37; see 19 C.F.R. §
351.401(b)(2) (stating that Commerce “will not double count
adjustments”). Commerce acted reasonably because the record
evidence clearly demonstrated a valid reason for the PSPA, and
Commerce verified the existence and amount of the debt owed by
Wafangdian. See App. Timken’s Mem. Tab 14. Thus, Commerce is
affirmed.
XI. Commerce’s Refusal to Make Adjustments to Wafangdian’s NV to
Account for the Production of Defective (or Non-Specification)
Parts
A. Contentions of the Parties
Timken argues that it was Commerce’s “duty” to investigate
whether Wafangdian generated defective parts when producing subject
merchandise. See Timken’s Mem. at 45-46. Timken recognizes that
it was Wafangdian’s burden to “provide relevant quantities
information and then to demonstrate the appropriateness of offsets
[requested] . . . for any sold or reworked parts.” Id. at 47.
However, Timken contends that Commerce erred in not pursuing “key
facts and essentially [by giving] Wafangdian the benefit of the
doubt.” Id. Since the substantial evidence rule applies,
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 77
“Wafangdian’s deficient reporting of all factors of production
consumed in producing defective parts” caused Commerce to arrive at
a defective NV calculation. See id. (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original).
Commerce argues that it “specifically asked Wafangdian to
‘demonstrate how the reported figures for scrap and waste account
for parts that do not meet appropriate specifications (defective
parts).’” Commerce’s Mem. at 39. Commerce adds that Wafangdian
gave specific information relating to how the company arrived at
the percentage of steel that it used in non-specification
production. See id. According to Wafangdian, Commerce was aware
of the percentage of steel that was used to produce defective
parts, and that some of those defective parts were re-worked into
subject merchandise. See id. at 40. To adjust NV accurately,
therefore, Commerce requested additional information about
production and sales of those non-specification parts. See id.
Since Wafangdian did not provide the requested information Commerce
chose “not to apply the percentage of steel used in the production
of defective parts.” Id. at 41. Wafangdian generally agrees with
the arguments made by Commerce.
B. Analysis
Timken’s claim is without merit. During this review, Commerce
specifically investigated how much material was used in the
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 78
production of defective parts but received incomplete information
from Wafangdian. See Commerce’s Mem. at 40; App. Timken’s Mem. at
Tab 18. As a result, Commerce chose not to apply the percentage of
steel used in the production of defective parts. Timken claims
that Commerce’s investigation was inadequate and that the agency
erred in not pursuing certain “key facts.” The Court disagrees.
The record clearly demonstrates that Commerce requested Wafangdian
to show “how the reported figures for scrap and waste account for
parts that do not meet appropriate specifications.” App. Timken’s
Mem. at Tab 15 p. 7. In Wafangdian’s report, the company detailed
how it arrived at the reported percentage of steel used in
defective products and provided backup worksheets. See id. Thus,
Commerce properly refused to adjust Wafangdian’s NV calculation
because the record did not support an adjustment for defective, or
non-specification parts.
XII. Commerce Properly Revoked the Antidumping Order With Respect
to Wafangdian
To qualify for partial revocation, a party must show three
years of zero or de minimis dumping margins. See 19 C.F.R. §
351.222(b)(2)(i). In this review, Commerce revoked the antidumping
duty order with respect to Wafangdian because it calculated a zero
margin and applied the revocation conditions. Timken contends that
revocation was arbitrary because “[l]ess than a year before the
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 79
subject revocation . . . Commerce published its five-year ‘sunset’
determination in [Final Results of Full Sunset Review on Tapered
Roller Bearings From the People’s Republic of China, 65 Fed. Reg.
11,550, 11,551 (Mar. 30, 2000) and] . . . determined that
revocation of the China TRB Order ‘would be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of dumping.’” Timken’s Mem. at 48-49.
Timken argues that Commerce’s attempt to rationalize this conflict
was weak. See id. at 49-50.
Commerce may depart from its earlier determinations and its
own prior precedent, “however, [Commerce’s reasoning] must be
clearly set forth [in the record] so that the reviewing court may
understand the basis of the agency’s action and so may judge the
consistency of that action with the agency's mandate.” Atchison,
Topeka & Sante Fe Railwav. Co v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S.
800, 808 (1973). Commerce explained that, inter alia, “a sunset .
. . review examines (a) the weighted-average dumping margins
determined in an investigation and in subsequent reviews, and (b)
the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the period
before and the period after the issuance of an antidumping order.”
App. Timken’s Mem. at Tab 21 p. 6 n.5. By contrast, under the
revocation procedure, Commerce examines company specific dumping
margins for a period of three years. In the prior sunset review
Commerce, therefore, examined Wafangdian’s sales in a different
Consol. Court No. 01-00036 Page 80
time context. Thus, the Court finds Commerce’s explanation
reasonable and affirms its determination to revoke the antidumping
order regarding Wafangdian.
XIII. Other Issues
The Court has considered plaintiffs’ other challenges to the
Final Results, but finds them unpersuasive. Commerce is affirmed
on all remaining issues.
/s/ Nicholas Tsoucalas
NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS
SENIOR JUDGE
Dated: May 18, 2004
New York, New York