Slip Op. 03-133
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Before: Judge Judith M. Barzilay
---------------------------------------------------------------x
:
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY
IMPORT & EXPORT CORPORATION, :
Plaintiff, :
v. : Court No. 01-01114
UNITED STATES, : Public Version
Defendant, :
and :
THE TIMKEN COMPANY, :
Defendant-Intervenor. :
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[United States Department of Commerce antidumping duty remand determination sustained.]
Decided: October 15, 2003
Crowell & Moring L.L.P., (Jeffrey L. Snyder), Alexander H. Schaefer, for Plaintiff.
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, David M.
Cohen, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant
Director, (Ada E. Bosque), Trial Attorney; Amanda L. Blaurock, Office of the Chief Counsel for
Import Administration, United States Department of Commerce, of Counsel, for Defendant.
Stewart and Stewart, Terence P. Stewart, (Wesley K. Caine), for Defendant-Intervenor.
Ct. No. 01-01114 Page 2
OPINION
BARZILAY, Judge: This case is before the court following remand to the United States
Department of Commerce (“Commerce” or “Defendant” or “Department”). In China National
Machinery Import & Export Corp. v. United States, 27 CIT __, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (2003)
(“CMC I”), familiarity with which is presumed, the court sustained in part and remanded in part
the Department’s determination with respect to Plaintiff China National Machinery Import and
Export Corporation (“CMC” or “Plaintiff”) in Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof,
Finished and Unfinished, from the People’s Republic of China; Final Results of 1999-2000
Administrative Review, Partial Rescission of Review, and Determination Not to Revoke Order in
Part, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,420 (Nov. 15, 2001) (“Final Results”).
Plaintiff CMC is an exporter of the subject merchandise, tapered roller bearings
(“TRBs”), from the People’s Republic of China, a non-market economy (“NME”) country. The
dispute involves the prices of a steel input, hot-rolled alloy steel bar, which CMC purchased from
its supplier in [[ ]], a market economy country, and used in the production
of TRBs sold to the United States.1 In CMC I, the court held that, if Commerce had “reason to
believe or suspect” that the supplier’s prices were subsidized, Commerce could employ surrogate
values instead of actual prices in normal value (“NV”) calculations of dumping margins where it
determines that such prices are best information available under the statute. See CMC I at 1238;
see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (2000) (providing the use of “the best available information”
1
The identity of CMC’s supplier [[ ]] and the name of the exporting
country where the supplier is located are confidential, and therefore set in double brackets in the
confidential version of this opinion and deleted from the public version.
Ct. No. 01-01114 Page 3
concerning the values for factors of production of an exporter in an NME country); H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 100-576, at 590 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1623 (“House Report”)
(instructing Commerce to avoid using any price “which it has reason to believe or suspect may be
dumped or subsidized”) (emphasis supplied). In CMC I, the court stated that it will “affirm
Commerce’s actions if, given the entire record as a whole, there is substantial, specific, and
objective evidence which could reasonably be interpreted to support a suspicion that the prices
CMC paid to its market economy supplier were distorted.” CMC I at 1240. Applying the
standard to the facts of the case, the court found that Commerce did not sufficiently explain and
highlight evidence in support of its determinations in the Final Results. Id. Consequently, the
court remanded the case to Commerce to review and augment the administrative record and
explain its determinations further. See id. at 1243.
Pursuant to the court’s order, Commerce issued its Final Results of Redetermination
Pursuant to Remand (May 13, 2003) (“Remand Results”). Plaintiff CMC and Defendant-
Intervenor The Timken Company (“Timken”) timely responded to the Remand Results. In this
matter the court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). The court must uphold
Commerce’s determination if it is supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise in
accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). After reviewing the parties’ submissions,
the administrative record, and all other papers and proceedings, the court is satisfied that the
Remand Results are in adequate compliance with the court’s order. Accordingly, the court
sustains the Remand Results.
Ct. No. 01-01114 Page 4
I.
Commerce has a duty to calculate dumping margins as accurately as possible and should
typically refrain from using surrogate values (which in themselves are imperfect substitutes) in
dumping margin calculations where market-determined values are available. See Lasko Metal
Prods., Inc. v. United States, 43 F.3d 1442, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Consistent with this mandate,
the applicable regulation advises Commerce to employ actual market values, where available, for
NV calculations of an NME exporter, under normal circumstances. See 19 C.F.R. §
351.408(c)(1) (2000). On the other hand, as this court pointed out in CMC I, Commerce cannot
be compelled to use actual prices where it has reason to believe or suspect that such prices are
subsidized. See CMC I at 1238. The court must look to the facts of record in the case to
determine whether Commerce has sufficient reasons to suspect that actual prices are distorted
such that the substitution of actual prices with surrogate values is warranted.
The court notes that, until the twelfth administrative review of this antidumping duty
order, Commerce employed actual prices paid in its dumping margin calculations. During the
twelfth review, Commerce determined that such prices were likely to be distorted by subsidies
and should therefore be abandoned in favor of surrogate values. Commerce based its
determination on a generally available and countervailable subsidy program in the exporting
country, uncovered in countervailing duty investigations from the 1999-2000 period involving
subject merchandise other than hot-rolled alloy steel bar and companies other than CMC’s
supplier. After remand, Commerce supplemented the record with an Office of Policy
Memorandum (dated February 2002), which memorializes Commerce’s decision to abandon
Ct. No. 01-01114 Page 5
steel-related factor input prices from the exporting country, as well as two other countries. In this
memorandum, Commerce explains that these countries maintain “broadly available, non-industry
specific export subsidies,” and adds that, where Commerce already conducted a countervailing
duty investigation, “the facts of the underlying investigation must be examined and taken into
account.” In the Remand Results, Commerce maintains that the exporting country provides
“industry specific subsidies and non-industry specific export subsidies.” Remand Results at 8.
In CMC I, this court articulated three specific grounds in finding Commerce’s offered
reasons insufficient. First, neither the subject merchandise in question, nor CMC’s supplier was
ever specifically investigated in a countervailing duty investigation. Accordingly, the level of
distortion, if any, in the price of hot-rolled alloy steel bar by reason of subsidies was never
determined. Second, in the Final Results Commerce relied on an internal confidential
memorandum, Market Economy Steel Memo (Nov. 7, 2001), as justification for its change of
methodology. The court was concerned that numbers tabulated (without explanation in that
memorandum) as the level of subsidies for steel products from the exporting country appeared to
be very low. In other words, it seemed to the court that, even in affirmative countervailing duty
determinations for other steel products, the range of subsidy values barely exceeded de minimis
amounts at the upper limit. Specifically, [[
]]. Third, one of the
countervailing duty investigations from the 1999-2000 period pertaining to the exporting country
yielded a negative result. See [[
]]. That is,
Ct. No. 01-01114 Page 6
Commerce found with respect to the merchandise subject to that investigation that the
countervailable subsidy rate was de minimis. In sum, the court was reluctant to allow Commerce
to choose imprecise surrogate values over actual prices without further justification where
evidence of distortion in prices CMC paid to its market economy supplier fell short of
substantial, specific evidence.
In the Remand Results, Commerce emphasizes that CMC’s supplier is a “member of a
subsidized industry” and “could have benefitted” from subsidies generally available in the
exporting country for exporters of steel products, regardless of the type of product or company,
and further emphasizes that such subsidies were specifically found to be utilized by several steel
producers.2 Remand Results at 9, 12-13. The existence of these subsidies was confirmed in the
Department’s 1999-2000 countervailing duty determinations. Commerce offers that there is no
evidence in the record that CMC’s supplier “was not eligible to participate” in subsidy programs.
Id. at 14. Commerce points to its long standing agency policy to disregard suspected distorted
prices. Id. at 9-10. Commerce and Defendant-Intervenor Timken further point out that the
company subject to the negative countervailing duty determination constitutes an “anomaly” in
that it is the largest steel producer in the exporting country and is government-controlled. Id. at
14-15 n.16; Def.-Intervenor’s Rebuttal to Pl.’s Comments on Commerce Dep’t’s Remand
Redetermination (“Timken Br.”) at 4; see also CMC I at 1240 (dictating Commerce to explain
why this producer’s case is an anomaly). That company is also known to participate in the
2
In particular, Commerce found that [[
]] Remand Results at 12.
Ct. No. 01-01114 Page 7
subsidy programs as a provider, such as engaging in [[ ]]. Commerce further states
that companies that were recipients of the subsidy programs and that were subject to the
Department’s positive countervailing duty determinations are more representative of CMC’s
supplier. Remand Results at 9.
Commerce explains that it is reasonable to believe that “a market company operating
under normal [i.e., competitive] market principles would take advantage of . . . benefits” that are
made available to it. Id. at 9, 13. Commerce stresses that export subsidy programs in the steel
industry of the exporting country were “contingent on a company’s export performance” and
were not otherwise restricted. Id. at 13. Commerce argues that “[u]nless a particular market
supplier has been found to have de minimis subsidy benefits, . . . the specific level of
subsidization is not a relevant consideration in [its] analysis of whether there is reason to believe
or suspect that prices may be subsidized.” Id. at 15.
With respect to level of subsidization, Defendant-Intervenor Timken adds that “[n]othing
in the statute or regulation, or even the legislative history, speaks in terms of subsidy sizes so far
as input values are concerned.” Timken Br. at 5-6 (emphasis in the original). Timken therefore
avers that Commerce’s interpretation of which values to use in the calculation of NV in an NME
country context is “subject only to reasonableness review.”3 Id. at 6. Timken contends that the
agency acted reasonably because it “looked to legislative history to construe and administer the
statute and regulation.” Id. As the House Report speaks of discarding “any” distorted price,
3
As noted, a preference for market values appears in the Department’s regulation. See 19
C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1).
Ct. No. 01-01114 Page 8
Timken’s argument implies that such mandate includes actual prices paid on market.4
Plaintiff CMC responds that Commerce’s explanations of the Remand Results merely
consist of “a re-argument of the case based on the same record facts that this Court already found
insufficient to justify the initial results.” Pl.’s Comments on the Dep’t of Commerce’s Proposed
Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand at 2. CMC argues that Commerce has
failed to address the negative countervailing duty finding that undermines its conclusion. Id. at
3. CMC contends that Commerce failed to specifically link CMC’s supplier to any subsidy
program. Id. at 5. CMC further points out that the Remand Results “also fail to address the de
minimis issues that the Court raised.” Id. at 6. CMC maintains that “Commerce’s analysis leads
inevitably to a perverse result.” Id. at 7. In particular, actual prices charged by an input supplier
with a de minimis countervailing duty finding would be acceptable while such prices of a
supplier with no countervailing duty finding (whether positive or negative) may be disregarded
based on findings relating to other suppliers.
The “reason to believe or suspect” standard articulated in the House Report by which
Commerce’s actions must be evaluated establishes a lower threshold than what is required to
support a firm conclusion. The clarification of the standard in CMC I, as well as its juxtaposition
with the substantial evidence standard in that opinion, does not modify the standard in terms of
its demands on the agency. Cf. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. United States, 21 CIT 1353, 985 F.
Supp. 1166 (1997) (employing the “reason to believe or suspect” standard). The court in CMC I
4
Timken’s arguments to this court additionally contain a criticism of the court’s
formulation of the “reason to believe or suspect” standard. However, this court believes that the
insistence on specific and objective evidence (even for a “belief” or “suspicion”) is an integral
part of the substantial evidence analysis.
Ct. No. 01-01114 Page 9
maintained that the agency’s actions are entitled to deference as long as the agency points to
substantial, specific, and objective evidence in support of its suspicion that the prices are
distorted. CMC I at 1240 (emphasis added). As Commerce notes in the Remand Results, a
“reason to believe or suspect requires less evidence than an actual finding of subsidies in fact.”
Remand Results at 6. Moreover, the House Report specifically points out that a “formal
investigation” is not necessary. House Report at 590. The statute further allows Commerce to
act given “best available information.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1). Therefore, it is clear that
Congress provided the agency with ample discretion to disregard suspected distorted prices.
The court finds that the Department’s Remand Results sufficiently comply with the
court’s remand order, even though the court acknowledges CMC’s argument that Commerce’s
actions may indeed produce less than ideal results, and the question of whether the suspicion of
subsidization at any level should warrant the use of imperfect surrogate values. The Remand
Results are sufficient in that Commerce further explains the exporting country’s subsidy
programs, and why one negative countervailing duty determination is immaterial to CMC’s case.
It also explains why it could not determine CMC’s particular subsidy level short of a formal
investigation.
Moreover, even though accurate calculation of dumping margins is an overarching goal
of the antidumping duty statute, a recent decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit emphasized that such a goal must necessarily be “within the confines of the
statutes, not in derogation of a statutory provision.” Viraj Group, Ltd. v. United States, 343 F.3d
1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Analogously here, Commerce’s actions are within the confines of
Ct. No. 01-01114 Page 10
the statute, the regulation, and the legislative history despite the fact that such actions may
produce a less than precisely accurate result. As Timken points out, the statute does not specify a
particular level of subsidization at which actual market prices may be discarded. In fact, the
statute does not mention market prices. It is only the Department’s regulation that mentions and
states a preference for market prices.5
Under the applicable standard of review, this court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency as long as the agency’s construction of the statute is reasonable. See Koyo
Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that "a court must defer
to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred
another") (citation omitted). Furthermore, substantial evidence “is something less than the
weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by
substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citation
omitted). Here, Commerce’s actions are reasonable because a company like CMC’s supplier
may have benefitted from a generally available subsidy program given the competitive nature of
the industry and by virtue of having engaged in foreign trade. Commerce specifically found that
such a program existed and companies like CMC’s supplier did indeed utilize the program.
Given the level of deference owed to the agency and the low threshold established by the “reason
5
The court notes that an agency is bound by its own regulations. See United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-96 (1974). However, here the Department’s actions do not contravene
its regulation. The regulation merely dictates that actual prices will be used under normal
circumstances. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1).
Ct. No. 01-01114 Page 11
to belief or suspect standard,” the court accordingly affirms the Remand Results.6
II.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Department’s determination in Tapered Roller Bearings
and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, from the People’s Republic of China; Final Results
of 1999-2000 Administrative Review, Partial Rescission of Review, and Determination Not to
Revoke Order in Part, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 420 (Nov. 15, 2001), as modified by Final Results of
Redetermination Pursuant to Remand (May 13, 2003), is sustained. A separate judgment will be
entered accordingly.
Dated : _______________________ _________________________
New York, New York Judith M. Barzilay
6
Plaintiff raised two additional issues in its original papers to the court. In particular,
CMC argued that Indonesia was a better surrogate than India and further challenged Commerce’s
adding of ocean freight and marine insurance costs to price data. In CMC I, the court found that
these issues were inchoately argued by Plaintiff, and further noted that Commerce’s actions,
without a forceful argument by Plaintiff to the contrary, were a reasonable exercise of the
agency’s discretion. CMC I at 1238 n.14.