BLD-219 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 22-1997
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RASHIAD SNEAD,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 2:03-cr-00538-001)
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Untimely Filing and
on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 11, 2022
Before: MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR., and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 6, 2022)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Rashiad Snead appeals from the District Court’s order denying his
motion for compassionate release/reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). The
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Government has filed a motion for summary affirmance. For the reasons that follow, we
grant the Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
In 2003, Snead robbed eight grocery stores at gunpoint and was indicted for 18
offenses related to those robberies. Of those charges, Snead agreed to plead guilty to one
count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951), eight counts of
Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 1952), and two counts of using a gun during a
crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). In exchange for the guilty plea, the
Government dismissed the six other § 924(c)(1)(A) counts and one count of firearm
possession by a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). The District Court imposed a sentence of
390 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and a $1,100 special assessment.
Snead’s plea agreement contained an appellate and collateral waiver which was enforced
when Snead filed a direct appeal and a subsequent motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The
Bureau of Prisons expects to release Snead on June 19, 2031.
In December 2020, Snead filed a motion for compassionate release under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), asserting that his underlying health conditions of obesity and
prediabetes placed him at an increased risk of suffering adverse health effects from the
COVID-19 virus; the change in law concerning the stacking of sentences imposed for his
convictions under § 924(c) entitled him to relief; and he had made great progress in his
rehabilitation. He argued that he had provided “extraordinary and compelling” grounds
to grant the motion, and that the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “support[ed] a
significant reduction in sentence.” ECF No. 199 at 2. Snead later supplemented the
grounds for relief, including assertions that the lockdowns imposed at the prison and the
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death of his brother had caused him mental stress; efforts by the Bureau of Prison (BOP)
to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 at FCI- Schuylkill were inadequate; and his violent
offender status rendered him ineligible for First Step Act benefits. See ECF Nos. 211,
213. The Government opposed Snead’s motion.
In its amended order denying relief, the District Court rejected Snead’s asserted
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons for granting the motion. See D. Ct. Order
5/11/2022 (ECF No. 218). The Court concluded that Snead presented no “extraordinary
and compelling” grounds for release. See id. at 7. Further, it reasoned that the factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not weigh in favor of release. See id. at 7-8. Snead filed
this appeal. The Government filed a motion for summary affirmance. Snead did not
respond to that motion, and the time for doing so has closed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
order for an abuse of decision, see United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir.
2021), and we “will not disturb the District Court’s decision unless there is a definite and
firm conviction that it committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached
upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330
(3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). We may summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a
substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
We agree with the Government that the appeal does not present a substantial
question for review. The District Court considered Snead’s arguments, including health
reasons, steps at rehabilitation and good conduct, the non-retroactive changes under the
First Step Act, and the length of Snead’s sentence. See Dist. Ct. Order 5/11/2022 (ECF
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No. 218) at 5-7. It concluded that none provided “extraordinary and compelling”
grounds under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) for granting the motion. Id. at 7. We discern no abuse
of discretion in this conclusion. In addition, the Court also did not abuse its discretion
when it found that the § 3553(a) factors did not weigh in favor of release. In that respect,
the District Court explained that Snead had served approximately 216 months of a 390-
month sentence imposed for committing eight robberies at gunpoint. Id. at 7. The Court
considered the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the history and characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness of the offense, promoting
respect for the law, affording adequate deterrence, protecting the public, avoiding
sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims of the offense. See
id. at 8 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2), (6), and (7)). The District Court highlighted
the violent nature of Snead’s crimes, the need to protect the public, and the importance of
providing just punishment through Snead’s sentence as particularly weighing against
granting Snead any relief. Id. We cannot say that the District Court committed a “clear
error of judgment” in its conclusions. See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330-331.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
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