Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
October 9, 2009 Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice
138785 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
AMERISURE INSURANCE COMPANY, Diane M. Hathaway,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Justices
v SC: 138785
COA: 276384
Tuscola CC: 05-023320-NF
RAE LOUISE PLUMB,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________/
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 10, 2009
judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not
persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
While the Court of Appeals reached the correct result, it did so for the wrong
reasons. The correct reason why defendant is not entitled to no-fault personal protection
insurance benefits (PIP) is that the words “take” and “use” in the applicable statute, MCL
500.3113(a), must be read together - “take and use” - and not analyzed as two separate
and distinct components. Defendant concedes that she knew that she was intoxicated
and that she had a suspended license at the time of the incident. Thus, defendant cannot
claim that she reasonably believed she was entitled to “take and use” the vehicle for
purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Therefore, defendant is not entitled to PIP benefits as
provided by the statute. There is no need to read additional words into the statute in order
to reach this result.
KELLY, C.J. (dissenting).
2
I dissent from the Court’s order denying defendant’s application for leave to
appeal. I believe leave should be granted to explore whether the Court of Appeals
decision improperly imported into MCL 500.3113(a) a requirement that it does not
contain.
An unidentified man gave defendant the keys to an automobile, presumably his
own, and asked her to drive it. Defendant obliged, despite the fact that her driver’s
license was suspended and she was intoxicated. She sustained severe injuries in an
ensuing accident. Plaintiff, the assigned claims carrier, argued that defendant was
disqualified from receiving no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. It
asserted that she took the vehicle unlawfully and could not have reasonably believed that
she was entitled to use it, given her intoxication and lack of a valid driver’s license. The
trial court agreed and granted summary disposition to plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in a published opinion, although Judge O’Connell dissented in part.
Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals decision wrongfully imports into MCL
500.3113(a) the requirement that the claimant must have a reasonable belief that she was
entitled to take and legally use the vehicle. MCL 500.3113 provides, in pertinent part:
A person is not entitled to be paid [PIP] benefits for accidental
bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following
circumstances existed:
(a) The person was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle
which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably
believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.
[Emphasis added.]
The Court of Appeals reasoned that defendant could not have believed that she
was entitled to use the vehicle because she was legally prohibited from doing so.
However, it may have been counterintuitive for the Court of Appeals to have discussed
factors such as intoxication and the lack of a driver’s license in this context. Here, MCL
500.3113(a) serves as an exception to the general rule precluding coverage for one who
has unlawfully taken a vehicle. As defendant persuasively notes, it seems as if the
exception is designed to provide a safe harbor for a claimant who had a reasonable belief
that she was not taking the car unlawfully.
Furthermore, defendant claims that the Court of Appeals failed to focus on the
operative word of the statute, “entitled.” “Entitle” means “to give a right or claim to
something.”1 In the context of MCL 500.3113(a), the owner of a vehicle has the capacity
to “give a right or claim to something” to another person. Indeed the Legislature enacted
1
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).
3
a statute that speaks merely of a person’s reasonable belief that he or she is entitled to
take and use a vehicle. MCL 500.3113(a) makes no mention of the legality of the taking.
Citizens are presumed to know the law, and it would be no defense that one reasonably
believed that one’s unlawful actions were lawful. Thus, because MCL 500.3113(a) does
not contain the word “legally” before “use,” it is difficult to imagine that the Legislature
intended the statutory construction employed by the Court of Appeals majority.
Finally, defendant contends that the Court of Appeals opinion is irreconcilable
with Bronson Methodist Hosp v Forshee.2 Bronson noted that the purpose of MCL
500.3113(a) is to preclude PIP benefits for someone who has unlawfully taken a motor
vehicle. The Bronson Court explicitly held, “[I]t is the unlawful nature of the taking, not
the unlawful nature of the use that forms the basis for exclusion under the statute.”3 The
Court further stated:
“In [MCL 500.3113], the Legislature excluded from [PIP] benefits
individuals who unlawfully take motor vehicles and those who have not
procured the automobile insurance required under the no-fault act. If the
Legislature had desired to also exclude from coverage those individuals
who operate a motor vehicle without a valid operator’s permit, it could
have included that class of individuals within the purview of the statute. It
did not.”[4]
Because the Court of Appeals decided that defendant’s use of the vehicle was unlawful in
light of her intoxication and lack of licensure, its decision appears to conflict with
Bronson.
Defendant raises several persuasive arguments indicating that the Court of
Appeals erred in its interpretation of MCL 500.3113(a). For that reason, I would grant
her application for leave to appeal.
CAVANAGH and HATHAWAY, JJ., would grant leave to appeal.
2
Bronson Methodist Hosp v Forshee, 198 Mich App 617 (1993).
3
Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
4
Id. at 627-628.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
October 9, 2009 _________________________________________
p1006 Clerk