Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 30, 2004
PATRICK MANN, SR., AND GAYLE MANN,
INDIVIDUALLY and as next friend of
PATRICK MANN, JR., MINOR,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v No. 122845
ST. CLAIR COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
WEAVER, J.
The sole issue before the Court is whether the safety
belt use statute’s cap on the reduction of damages, MCL
257.710e(6), applies when suit is brought against a county
road commission under the highway exception to governmental
immunity. MCL 257.710e(6) provides that a plaintiff’s
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or
operation of a motor vehicle can be reduced by no more than
five percent because of a plaintiff’s failure to wear a
safety belt. We adopt Justice Boyle’s concurrence in
Klinke v Mitsubishi Motors Corp, 458 Mich 582; 581 NW2d
272 (1998), and hold that MCL 257.710e(6) by its express
terms limits application of its cap on the reduction of
damages to cases arising under the no-fault act, MCL
500.3101 et seq. Here the plaintiffs’ claim is not brought
under the no-fault act; instead, the suit is based on the
civil liability of a county road commission for its
maintenance of a highway under the highway exception to
governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402. Thus, the safety
belt statute’s cap on reduction of damages does not apply.
We reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
trial court and remand to the trial court for entry of an
order consistent with this opinion.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 26, 1997, Patrick Mann, Sr., lost control
of his pickup truck after he left the roadway and attempted
to bring his vehicle back onto the paved surface. Mann
collided with a tree on the side of the roadway, resulting
in injures to both himself and Patrick Mann, Jr. There is
a dispute over whether the Manns were wearing their safety
belts during the accident.
Patrick Mann, Sr., and Gayle Mann, for herself and as
next friend of Patrick Mann, Jr., a minor, brought suit,
alleging that the accident was caused by a roadway “edge
drop,” and that defendant, the county road commission, is
2
liable under the highway exception to governmental immunity
for failing to keep the roadway in reasonable repair.1
Defendant seeks to offer at trial testimony of a
biomechanical expert that the vehicle occupants
(plaintiffs) were not wearing safety belts at the time of
the accident and that they would have escaped with minor,
superficial injuries had they been wearing safety belts.
Before trial, defendant brought a motion in limine,
asking that the circuit court enter an order holding that
the safety belt statute’s cap on the reduction of damages,
MCL 257.710e(6), does not apply. If the safety belt
statute’s cap were to apply, then plaintiffs’ negligence in
failing to wear a safety belt could reduce their damages by
no more than five percent. Defendant sought to have
plaintiffs’ damages reduced by more than that amount under
common-law comparative negligence. Following argument on
defendant’s motion in limine, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion. The trial court declined to extend the
rationale of Klinke, beyond a products liability action,
and held that the safety belt statute’s cap on reduction of
damages does apply.
1
For purposes of this appeal, we accept plaintiffs’
allegations as true.
3
The Court of Appeals granted defendant’s application
for leave for an interlocutory appeal and affirmed. 254
Mich App 86; 657 NW2d 517 (2002). This Court granted leave
to appeal, limiting the grant to “whether the limitation on
the reduction of damages based on a plaintiff’s negligence
established by MCL 257.710e(6) applies in this case.” 468
Mich 942 (2003).
ANALYSIS
The issue before us is whether the safety belt
statute’s cap on the reduction of damages, MCL 257.710e(6),
applies to a suit against a county road commission brought
under the highway exception to governmental immunity, MCL
691.1402. This case presents a question of statutory
interpretation, which is reviewed de novo. Stozicki v
Allied Paper Co, Inc, 464 Mich 257, 263; 627 NW2d 293
(2001).
A
Before 1985, evidence of a plaintiff’s failure to use
a safety belt was not admissible in any tort action.
Romankewiz v Black, 16 Mich App 119; 167 NW2d 606 (1969).
In 1985, the Legislature adopted a safety belt law, MCL
257.710e, requiring front safety passengers in automobiles
to wear safety belts and providing that failure to use a
safety belt “may be considered evidence of negligence and
4
may reduce the recovery for damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.”
MCL 257.710e(6). The safety belt law limits the amount by
which recovery for damages may be reduced to no more than
five percent of the damages: “such negligence shall not
reduce the recovery for damages by more than five percent.”
MCL 257.710e(6).
Two years later, in deciding an automobile products
liability action, this Court held that under the common-law
a plaintiff’s failure to wear a safety belt could be used
at trial for purposes of comparative negligence. Lowe v
Estate Motors Ltd, 428 Mich 439; 410 NW2d 706 (1987). In
Lowe the accident occurred before the effective date of MCL
257.710e, and the Court’s decision was not based on the
statute.
As a result, in a tort suit there are two alternative
grounds for admitting evidence of the failure to use a
safety belt—the safety belt statute or common-law
comparative negligence.2 The primary difference between the
2
In this case, if the evidence of plaintiffs’ failure
to wear safety belts were not admitted under the safety
belt statute, it would be admitted under the common law for
the purpose of comparative negligence. MCL 691.1412 of the
governmental immunity act provides that “[c]laims under
5
two is that when evidence of the failure to use a safety
belt is admitted under the safety belt statute, there is a
five percent cap on the reduction of damages; when evidence
of the failure to use a safety belt is admitted under
common-law comparative negligence, the safety belt statute
and its cap do not apply.
B
The question here is whether the safety belt statute’s
cap on the reduction of damages, MCL 257.710e(6), applies
to a suit brought under the highway exception to
governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402.
The safety belt statute, MCL 257.710e, requires the
use of safety belts in an automobile.3 It allows evidence
of the failure to use a safety belt to be admitted in court
(…continued)
this act are subject to all of the defenses available to
claims sounding in tort brought against private persons.”
3
MCL 257.710e(3) states:
Each driver and front safety passenger of a
motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in
this state shall wear a properly adjusted and
fastened safety belt, except that a child less
than 4 years of age shall be protected as
required in section 710d. If there are more
passengers than safety belts available for use,
and all safety belts in the motor vehicle are
being utilized in compliance with this section,
the driver of the motor vehicle is in compliance
with this section.
6
to prove comparative negligence, while limiting the
reduction for recovery of damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle to
no more than five percent:
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation
of this section may be considered evidence of
negligence and may reduce the recovery for
damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.
However, such negligence shall not reduce the
recovery for damages by more than five percent.
[MCL 257.710e(6).]
We hold that the safety belt statute’s cap on the
reduction of damages is applicable only to tort actions
brought under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.
By its own terms, § 710e(6) is limited to “damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of
a motor vehicle.” A loss involving the ownership,
operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a
motor vehicle is a “motor vehicle accident” under the no-
fault act.4 Tort liability arising from the ownership,
4
MCL 500.3101(2)(f) provides:
“Motor vehicle accident” means a loss
involving the ownership, operation, maintenance,
or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle
regardless of whether the accident also involves
the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of
a motorcycle as a motorcycle.
7
maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle within Michigan has
been abolished, allowing for certain exceptions within MCL
500.5135(3).5 Thus, the cap on reduction of damages for
(…continued)
The no-fault act applies to motor vehicle accidents
occurring on or after October 1, 1973. MCL 500.3179.
5
MCL 500.3135(3) provides:
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, tort liability arising from the ownership,
maintenance, or use within this state of a motor
vehicle with respect to which the security
required by section 3101 was in effect is
abolished except as to:
(a) Intentionally caused harm to persons or
property. Even though a person knows that harm to
persons or property is substantially certain to
be caused by his or her act or omission, the
person does not cause or suffer that harm
intentionally if he or she acts or refrains from
acting for the purpose of averting injury to any
person, including himself or herself, or for the
purpose of averting damage to tangible property.
(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided
and limited in subsections (1) and (2).
(c) Damages for allowable expenses, work
loss, and survivor's loss as defined in sections
3107 to 3110 in excess of the daily, monthly, and
3-year limitations contained in those sections.
The party liable for damages is entitled to an
exemption reducing his or her liability by the
amount of taxes that would have been payable on
account of income the injured person would have
received if he or she had not been injured.
(d) Damages for economic loss by a
nonresident in excess of the personal protection
insurance benefits provided under section
8
failure to wear a safety belt, § 710e(6), can only apply in
those limited tort suits allowed under the no-fault act.6
As Justice Boyle stated in her concurrence in Klinke, supra
at 594 “[t]he fact that the safety belt statute tracks the
language of the no-fault act demonstrates the Legislature’s
clear intent to apply the five-percent limitation on
reduction of damages for a plaintiff’s negligence within
the context of the no-fault act.”
The question in this case is whether the safety belt
statute’s cap on the reduction of damages applies when suit
is brought against a county road commission under the
(…continued)
3163(4). Damages under this subdivision are not
recoverable to the extent that benefits covering
the same loss are available from other sources,
regardless of the nature or number of benefit
sources available and regardless of the nature or
form of the benefits.
(e) Damages up to $500.00 to motor vehicles,
to the extent that the damages are not covered by
insurance. An action for damages pursuant to this
subdivision shall be conducted in compliance with
subsection (4).
6
Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, our holding is
not based solely on the similarity of language in the
safety belt statute and the no-fault act. Rather, as
explained above, we recognize that the terms of the safety
belt statute limit its applicability to motor vehicle
accidents under the no-fault act. Thus, the only tort
suits to which the safety belt statute will apply are those
allowed under the no-fault act.
9
highway exception to governmental immunity. We hold that
because the plaintiff’s suit was not brought under the no-
fault act, the safety belt statute’s cap on the reduction
of damages, § 710e(6), does not apply.7
C
The safety belt statute’s cap on the reduction of
damages is also inapplicable in this case because the
plaintiffs do not allege that their damages arose out of
the “ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor
vehicle.” Rather, plaintiffs allege that the accident and
their damages were caused by a roadway “edge drop,” and
7
Because we conclude that this cap only applies to
cases arising under the no-fault act, and that since this
case does not arise under the no-fault act the safety belt
statute’s cap on the reduction of damages does not apply,
we do not address whether the application of the cap in
this case would violate the Title-Object Clause.
But we note that in its analysis the Court of Appeals
applied the wrong test to determine whether the Title-
Object Clause was violated. The Court of Appeals panel
reasoned that applying the safety belt cap in a suit for a
defective highway did not violate the scope of the title of
the Vehicle Code because “there is a natural correlation or
connection between governmental liability for failing to
maintain a highway in reasonable repair and the Michigan
Vehicle Code, which governs the operation of vehicles on
those same public highways.” 254 Mich App 99. The proper
test for determining whether a statute violates the Title-
Object Clause is whether it contains “subjects diverse in
their nature and having no necessary connection,” People ex
rel Drake v Mahaney, 13 Mich 481, 494-495 (1865), Pohutski
v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 691; 641 NW2d 219
(2002), not whether there is a “natural correlation or
connection.”
10
that defendant is liable under the highway exception to
governmental immunity for failing to keep the roadway in
reasonable repair. Plaintiffs allege that their damages
arose from the failure to keep the roadway in reasonable
repair, not from the ownership, maintenance, or operation
of a motor vehicle.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals panel held that
the safety belt statute’s cap on the reduction of damages
applied here, in a suit under the highway exception to
governmental immunity, because the damages did arise out of
the operation of a motor vehicle.8 This is an incorrect
8
The Court of Appeals opinion stated:
Subsection 710e(6) does not provide that
“liability” must arise out of the operation of a
motor vehicle, but rather that “damages” must so
arise, and subsection 710e(6) does not provide
that damages must arise out of the operation of a
particular party’s motor vehicle, but rather only
that the damages arise out of the operation of a
motor vehicle. Therefore, the clear language of
subsection 710e(6) required only that plaintiffs
suffered damages arising out of the operation of
a motor vehicle as alleged here. If plaintiffs
had not been operating a motor vehicle, there
would not have been an accident, injuries, and
damages. The operation of a motor vehicle was a
necessary component giving rise to plaintiffs’
cause of action, and there was a nexus between
their damages and the operation of a motor
vehicle. [254 Mich App 86, 103; 657 NW2d 517
(2002).]
11
interpretation of “damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.”
This Court has construed almost identical language,
“tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or
use within this state of a motor vehicle,” as referring to
liability caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of a
motor vehicle. Citizens Ins Co of America v Tuttle, 411
Mich 536, 544; 309 NW2d 174 (1981). In Tuttle, the
liability arose from the defendant’s improper keeping of
his cow, not the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle. Here the damages arose from the improper
maintenance of the highway, not the ownership, maintenance,
or operation of a motor vehicle.
This interpretation is in accord with the Court of
Appeals decision in Klinke v Mitsubishi Motors Corp, 219
Mich App 500; 556 NW2d 528 (1996), written by Judge
Markman, and with Justice Boyle’s concurring opinion in
Klinke, 458 Mich 595 n 5, which recognized that there
“[t]he only damages ‘arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle’ in this
litigation are the damages caused by plaintiff’s fault. To
the extent that plaintiff’s damages were caused by a
product defect, they do not arise out of ‘ownership,
12
maintenance, or operation.’ Thus, the five-percent cap
would not apply.”
In Klinke the Court of Appeals concluded that the five
percent cap on the reduction of damages for failure to wear
a safety belt found in the Vehicle Code does not apply to
products liability actions against automobile
manufacturers. “[B]y its plain meaning, this provision is
expressly limited to damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle.’” 219 Mich
App 509. “Conspicuously absent is any reference to the
design or construction of a motor vehicle. Even the most
liberal interpretation of the words ‘ownership,’ ‘common
maintenance’ and ‘operation’ cannot stretch far enough to
include design and construction.” Id., quoting LaHue v Gen
Motors Corp, 716 F Supp 412 (WD Mo, 1989).
Likewise, even the most liberal interpretation of the
words “ownership,” “common maintenance,” and “operation”
cannot stretch far enough to include maintenance of a
highway. Plaintiffs here are attempting to recover damages
arising out of the road commission’s failure to maintain
the highway; they are not attempting to recover damages
arising out of “the ownership, maintenance, or operation of
a motor vehicle.” In other words, plaintiffs are not
seeking damages for the “operation of a motor vehicle”;
13
rather, they are seeking damages for the road commission’s
failure to maintain the highway in a condition reasonably
safe and fit for travel.
Because the plaintiffs’ suit is based on the civil
liability of a county road commission for its maintenance
of a highway, the safety belt statute’s cap on reduction of
damages does not apply.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion in
limine to preclude application of the five percent damage
reduction cap in MCL 257.710e(6). We reverse the decisions
of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and remand the
case to the trial court for entry of an order granting
defendant’s motion, consistent with this opinion.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
14
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PATRICK MANN, SR., and GAYE MANN,
individually and as next friend of
PATRICK MANN, JR., minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v No. 122845
ST. CLAIR COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
I would find that the five percent cap on damage
reduction for failure to wear one's safety belt applies to
a suit brought under the highway exception to governmental
immunity. This would be consistent with my dissenting
opinion in Klinke v Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, 458 Mich
582; 581 NW2d 272 (1998).
Statutory Analysis
The safety belt statute provides:
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation
of this section may be considered evidence of
negligence and may reduce the recovery for
damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.
However, such negligence shall not reduce the
recovery for damages by more than 5%. [MCL
257.710e(6).]
The majority holds that, in an action pleaded in
avoidance of governmental immunity premised on the highway
exception, plaintiff's damages do not "arise out of the
ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle."
It bases this conclusion on the fact that the Legislature
used similar language in the no-fault act.1 That act
provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
tort liability arising from the ownership,
maintenance, or use within this state of a motor
vehicle . . . is abolished . . . . [MCL
500.3135(3).]
Although similarity exists in the language of the two
statutes, it is deceptive and should not be taken to
indicate that the Legislature intended identical results
when applying them. A comparison of the two reveals that
they are not identical. The difference in the
Legislature's choice of language is telling.
1
The majority maintains that its holding is not based
solely on the similarity in the language of the safety belt
statute and the no-fault act. It insists instead that "the
terms of the safety belt statute limit its applicability to
motor vehicle accidents under the no-fault act." Ante at 9
n 6. However, the safety belt statute makes no reference
to the no-fault act. Therefore, despite its assertion to
the contrary, the majority bases this conclusion solely on
the fact that the Legislature used similar language in the
no-fault act.
2
The no-fault act refers to "liability arising from the
ownership, maintenance, or use . . . of a motor vehicle
. . . ." The safety belt law refers to "damages arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor
vehicle." Here, plaintiffs' damages arose out the operation
of the vehicle. The majority maintains that plaintiffs are
not seeking damages "for" the operation of a motor vehicle.
Ante at 14. However, that misconstrues the safety belt
statute. By definition, the liability arising from an act
and the damages caused by it are not identical. I agree
with the Court of Appeals analysis:
[MCL 257.710e(6)] does not provide that
"liability" must arise out of the operation of a
motor vehicle, but rather that "damages" must so
arise, and subsection 710e(6) does not provide
that damages must arise out of the operation of a
particular party's motor vehicle, but rather only
that the damages arise out of the operation of a
motor vehicle. Therefore, the clear language of
subsection 710e(6) required only that plaintiffs
suffered damages arising out of the operation of
a motor vehicle as alleged here. If plaintiffs
had not been operating a motor vehicle, there
would not have been an accident, injuries, and
damages. The operation of a motor vehicle was a
necessary component giving rise to plaintiffs'
cause of action, and there was a nexus between
their damages and the operation of a motor
vehicle. [254 Mich App 86, 103; 657 NW2d 517
(2002) (emphasis added).]
The premise upon which the majority builds its
analysis is that the safety belt statute applies only in
conjunction with the no-fault act. MCL 500.3135. I
3
continue to believe that the Legislature intended the
broadly based, tort damage recovery limitation of the
safety belt statute to be applicable in any action
involving a motor vehicle accident.
At common law, the failure to use a safety belt was
not admissible to prove contributory negligence. When the
safety belt statute was enacted, it was intended as a
punishment for plaintiffs who did not use their safety
belts, reducing their available damages. The statute
encouraged drivers to wear their safety belts. By
contrast, the purpose of the five percent cap was "to
prevent the injured party from recovering substantially
less based solely on the failure to wear a safety belt," as
I noted in Ullery v Sobie, 196 Mich App 76, 80; 492 NW2d
739 (1992). Similarly, as the Court of Appeals observed in
this case2 and in Thompson v Fitzpatrick,3 the five percent
cap was "intended by the Legislature to protect plaintiffs
against drastic reduction in damage awards." Id. at 8.
The Legislature apparently concluded that limiting
recovery for those who fail to wear safety belts would
2
254 Mich App 103-104.
3
199 Mich App 5; 501 NW2d 172 (1993).
4
further both goals. The Court of Appeals agreed with this
observation:
The Senate Bill Analysis regarding
supporting arguments for the 1985 amendment of
MCL 257.710e indicated that "seat belt use saves
lives and reduces the number and severity of
injuries. Experience has shown that mandatory
seat belt laws produce a significant and lasting
increase in the use of seat belts, even when
enforcement is relaxed." Senate Analysis, SB 6,
February 26, 1985. It is abundantly clear that
the Legislature intended to encourage all drivers
to wear their seat belts for purposes of public
safety and to limit attacks on damage awards
based on comparative negligence where a defendant
is negligent. [254 Mich App 104-105.]
Thus, the more legal actions in which the damage cap
applies, the more effective the act will be. The fact that
the state of the law has changed does not retroactively
alter the Legislature's intent in passing the safety belt
statute.
The majority acts to frustrate this legislative
intent. The language of the safety belt statute reduces
one's damages by five percent. Nothing suggests that the
Legislature wanted to reduce damages by five percent in a
two-car accident, but set no limit where only one car was
involved. Absent some indication of such intent, it is
illogical to conclude that the Legislature intended such
disparate results from the same negligence, failing to wear
a safety belt.
5
For example, if a motorist whose only negligence is
his failure to wear a safety belt is hit by a truck, his
damages will be reduced by five percent under the statute.
However, if, instead, the accident involves a negligent
bicyclist, applying the majority's interpretation, the same
injured motorist could experience a much greater damage
reduction for failing to wear a safety belt.
The Legislature enacted a standard of care, the
wearing of safety belts, that carries a limited penalty for
its violation. The majority frustrates the Legislature's
intent and limits its power by finding a clear indication
of intent that the statute be applied only to no-fault
cases. This is despite the fact that the safety belt
statute itself contains no such limitation. The majority
extrapolates the limitation from the Legislature's use of
the same string of words in the no-fault act as in the
Vehicle Code. I interpret the use of the phrase
"ownership, maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle" as
a convenient description for the common uses of motor
vehicles, not a limitation of the damage cap to no-fault
claims.
Conclusion
I would find that the five percent cap on damages
reduction for failure to wear a safety belt applies to a
6
suit brought under the highway exception to governmental
immunity. It is apparent that the intent of the
Legislature in passing the safety belt act was twofold: to
foster public safety and to limit attacks on damage awards
based on a motorist's comparative negligence in failing to
wear a safety belt. Subsequent changes in the law cannot
affect the Legislature's intent at the time that the cap
was enacted. Applying the cap only to no-fault cases
defies the Legislature's intent and reads into the statute
a limitation not written there.
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals and of the trial court.
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
7