Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Chief Justice Justices
Opinion
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED APRIL 14, 2004
HIGHLAND-HOWELL DEVELOPMENT CO, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 122843
TOWNSHIP OF MARION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CAVANAGH, J.
The Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.701 et seq., defines the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax
Tribunal as review of a final decision “of an agency
relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special
assessments, allocation, or equalization under property tax
laws.” MCL 205.731(a). Plaintiff’s complaint contained a
count alleging that defendant breached a promise to
construct a sewer line through plaintiff’s property. The
issue before us is whether the circuit court has
jurisdiction to hear this claim or whether it lies within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. We affirm
the Court of Appeals holding that plaintiff’s claim for
breach of promise falls outside the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Tax Tribunal.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Count I of plaintiff’s first amended complaint sought
damages for an alleged breach of promise and for the
adoption of “a special assessment roll which allocated a
disproportionate share of the cost of the sewer
improvements to Plaintiff’s property.” Plaintiff’s
complaint alleged that defendant promised to construct a
sewer line through certain property and plaintiff relied on
that promise in making several decisions, including
purchasing the property and declining sewer service from
the city of Howell. Count II of the complaint challenged
the validity of the special assessment.
Defendant’s motion for summary disposition argued that
plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(4) because it was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax Tribunal, as well as under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) because count I failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The trial court
granted defendant’s C(4) motion and dismissed both counts.
2
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of count I. The
Court of Appeals considered the scope of the Tax Tribunal’s
exclusive jurisdiction and concluded that because count I
of plaintiff’s complaint fell outside the Tax Tribunal’s
jurisdiction, the trial court’s grant of summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) was premature.1
Defendant sought leave to appeal, claiming that the Court
of Appeals erred.2 We granted defendant’s application for
leave.3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary
disposition on the basis of its interpretation of the
jurisdictional provisions of the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL
205.731. The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in this
case turns on the interpretation of the provisions of a
statute. Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed
1
Unpublished opinion per curiam issued November 19,
2002 (Docket No. 231937).
2
The trial court did not rule on defendant’s MCR
2.116(C)(8) motion, having instead ruled in favor of
defendant on its C(4) motion. However, the Court of
Appeals examined defendant’s C(8) motion because it
“present[ed] an alternate basis for affirming the trial
court’s decision.” Slip op at 3. The Court of Appeals
held that summary disposition pursuant to defendant’s C(8)
motion likewise would have been premature, but defendant
did not appeal that decision to this Court. Defendant only
appealed the C(4) jurisdictional issue.
3
468 Mich 942 (2003).
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de novo. American Federation of State, Co & Municipal
Employees v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d 695
(2003). Likewise, this Court reviews the grant or denial
of summary disposition de novo. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
We must determine whether plaintiff’s claim for
damages resulting from defendant’s alleged breached promise
to construct a sewer line is within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal, as delineated
in the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.731. We follow the
analysis employed by the Court of Appeals to determine the
scope of the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Section 31 of the Tax Tribunal Act provides:
The tribunal’s exclusive and original
jurisdiction shall be:
(a) A proceeding for direct review of a
final decision, finding, ruling, determination,
or order of an agency relating to assessment,
valuation, rates, special assessments,
allocation, or equalization, under property tax
laws.
(b) A proceeding for refund or
redetermination of a tax under the property tax
laws.
The language of the statute limits the Tax Tribunal’s
exclusive jurisdiction to matters “relating to assessment,
valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or
equalization, under property tax laws.” Plaintiff’s claims
for breaches of promise or contract are not within the
4
scope of the statutory provision, and therefore are within
the circuit court’s jurisdiction.4
In 1982, this Court examined the scope of the Tax
Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction in two cases: Wikman v
Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), and Romulus City
Treasurer v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 413 Mich 728; 322 NW2d
152 (1982).
In Wikman, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in
the circuit court, alleging that the special assessments
imposed on them had been determined in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. This Court ruled, inter alia, that the
challenge to the special assessments was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal because the
action was one “seeking direct review of the governmental
unit’s decision concerning a special assessment for a
public improvement.” Wikman at 626.
Unlike the direct challenge to the special assessment
in Wikman, the plaintiffs in Romulus City Treasurer filed a
constructive fraud claim in the circuit court, challenging
the drain commissioner’s use of funds collected through
special assessments. This Court held that the circuit
4
Paragraph 9 of plaintiff’s first amended complaint
alleges that the special assessment roll allocated a
“disproportionate” share of the cost of improvements to
plaintiff’s property. This allegation is within the Tax
Tribunal’s exclusive and original jurisdiction pursuant to
Wikman v Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982).
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court had jurisdiction to hear the case because the
question was whether the drain commissioner could pay
administrative costs with special assessment funds and,
therefore, this question was outside the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.
In reaching the decision in Romulus City Treasurer,
this Court noted that MCL 205.721 designates the Tax
Tribunal as a “’quasi-judicial agency’” comprised of seven
members; only two must be attorneys with experience either
in property tax matters or in the discharge of a judicial
or quasi-judicial office. Romulus City Treasurer at 737.
In addition,
[o]ne member must be a certified assessor; one,
an experienced professional real estate
appraiser; and one, a certified public accountant
with experience in state-local tax matters. Not
more than three of the seven members are to be
members of any one professional discipline and
persons who are not members of any of the
enumerated disciplines are required to have
experience in state or local tax matters.
The expertise of the tribunal members can be
seen to relate primarily to questions concerning
the factual underpinnings of taxes. [Id.]
This Court also noted that the Tax Tribunal’s membership is
qualified to resolve disputes concerning assessments,
valuations, rates, allocation, and equalization, as well as
to determine whether special assessments are levied
according to the benefits received. Id.
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While the Tax Tribunal’s membership is particularly
competent to resolve disputes related to the basis for and
amounts of taxes, its membership is not qualified to
resolve common-law tort or contract claims. Clearly, this
supports our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend
the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction to encompass
matters outside the realm of those tax matters specified in
the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
While we express no opinion on whether plaintiff’s
claim can withstand a summary disposition motion on the
basis of MCR 2.116(C)(8), we do find that, except for the
allegations contained in paragraph 9, count I of
plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleged issues of law
outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.
Common-law tort and contract claims are not within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal, as
defined by MCL 205.731. We affirm the ruling of the Court
of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
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