Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 9, 2002
DENNIS BRIGHT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 119111
LT. LITTLEFIELD, SGT. MEYERS,
OFFICER JOHN DOE #1, OFFICER
JOHN DOE #2, JOHN DOE #3
also known as “ERIC,” and
CHESTER F. WATERHOUSE,
Defendants,
DOROTHY AILSHIE, TIM MOORE
and A-ABLE BAIL BONDS,
a Missouri company,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleged defendants
were liable to him under theories of assault and battery,
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and negligence as a result of his being illegally
arrested by a bounty hunter and taken to Missouri. In
Missouri it was confirmed that the actual person who should
have been sought was plaintiff’s brother, who had been
arrested on a drug charge there. The trial court granted
summary disposition for defendants pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal,
holding the existence of the facially valid Missouri arrest
warrant provided authority to arrest plaintiff. We reverse
the grant of summary disposition and remand for further
proceedings.
I
The pertinent facts are not in dispute. We borrow the
Court of Appeals statement of facts:
Plaintiff’s brother Vincent Bright was
arrested by Missouri police on a drug charge.
Vincent identified himself as plaintiff Dennis
Bright, using plaintiff’s address, date of birth
and social security number. Vincent entered into a
bond agreement with defendant, A-Able Bail Bonds,
which was issued in plaintiff’s name and which
Vincent signed using plaintiff’s name. When
Vincent subsequently absconded on the bond, an
arrest warrant was issued in plaintiff’s name,
again using plaintiff’s address, date of birth and
social security number. Defendant Tim Moore
apprehended plaintiff in Detroit and returned him
to the Missouri court, where he was later released
and the arrest warrant was amended to name Vincent.
Plaintiff brought this action, alleging assault and
battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction
of emotional distress and negligence. The trial
court granted summary disposition to defendants,
finding that the facially valid Missouri warrant
2
provided the authority to arrest plaintiff.[1]
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Plaintiff has applied for
leave to appeal.
II
The Court of Appeals held that, given probable cause, a
private citizen may make an arrest for a felony committed in
the person’s presence or otherwise. MCL 764.16; People v
Bashans, 80 Mich App 702, 713; 265 NW2d 170 (1978). It
further noted that a warrant provides probable cause for an
arrest, and an arrest on a facially valid warrant is not a
basis for a claim of false imprisonment. Gooch v Wachowiak,
352 Mich 347, 351-354; 89 NW2d 496 (1958). It reasoned that
the facially valid warrant provided the authority needed to
execute it. People v Rowe, 95 Mich App 204, 208-209; 289 NW2d
915 (1980). The Court concluded that because the Missouri
warrant was facially valid and the erroneous identification
was not caused by defendants, the trial court did not err in
granting summary disposition.
III
This case concerns the interpretation of MCL 764.16. In
construing statutes, “[t]he primary goal of judicial
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the Legislature.” McJunkin v Cellasto Plastic Corp, 461
1
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 10, 2001
(Docket No. 219182), p 1.
3
Mich 590, 598; 608 NW2d 57 (2000). To do that we examine the
“language of the statute itself.” In re MCI
Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
If the language is unambiguous, the Court applies the statute
as written.
IV
We deal with a plainly written statute in this matter.
MCL 764.16 provides:
A private person may make an arrest in the
following situations:
(a) For a felony committed in the private
person’s presence.
(b) If the person to be arrested has
committed a felony although not in the private
person’s presence.
(c) If the private person is summoned by a
peace officer to assist the officer in making an
arrest.
(d) If the private person is a merchant, an
agent of a merchant, an employee of a merchant, or
an independent contractor providing security for a
merchant of a store and has reasonable cause to
believe that the person to be arrested has violated
section 356c or 356d of the Michigan penal code,
Act No. 328 of the Public Acts of 1931, being
sections 750.356c and 750.356d of the Michigan
Compiled Laws, in that store, regardless of whether
the violation was committed in the presence of the
private person.
The plain language of subsection (b) provides authority
for a private person to arrest another, if the other has
committed a felony. The statute does not grant arrest
authority where the other has not committed a felony even if
4
the private person has probable cause to believe the other has
committed a felony.2 Notwithstanding the clarity of the
Michigan statute, the Court of Appeals in Bashans incorrectly
read a probable cause qualification into MCL 764.16. This may
not be done. Although such authority may have existed at
common law, that authority was abrogated by our Legislature in
1927. 1927 PA 175. Thus, an arrest is only justified by
subsection (b) if the person to be arrested has actually
committed a felony.3 To proceed to arrest, no matter how
2
While numerous states have similar statutes, several
are more expansive and essentially grant authority to private
parties to arrest on the basis of reasonable cause. For
example, Cal Penal Code 837 provides:
A private person may arrest another:
1. For a public offense committed or
attempted in his presence.
2. When the person arrested has committed a
felony, although not in his presence.
3. When a felony has in fact been committed,
and he has reasonable cause for believing the
person arrested to have committed it.
3
It is noteworthy that the key phrase in subsection b is
“committed a felony” (emphasis added). Of course, a felony is
“committed” when a person engages in the conduct that
constitutes a felony. Thus, an arrest by a private person of
another person who has actually committed a felony would be
valid regardless of whether the arrested person is ever tried
for or convicted of the felony. In the present case, it is
undisputed that plaintiff is innocent of the alleged Missouri
felony underlying his purported arrest. Accordingly, we need
not consider the proper allocation of the burden of proof with
regard to whether a person committed a felony in a case where
that is a disputed issue. Likewise, we assume without
deciding for purposes of our analysis that MCL 764.16(b)
5
manifest the likelihood the seized person is the felon, is
outside the scope of subsection (b) if the seized person did
not commit the felony.4 In such circumstances, subsection (b)
does not shield the party making the “arrest” from liability.5
provides authority for a private person to arrest for the
commission of a felony under the laws of another state.
4
While the plain language of subsection (b) is
dispositive, it is noteworthy that subsection (d) of MCL
764.16 authorizes a merchant (and certain affiliated parties)
to make an arrest merely on the basis of “reasonable cause” to
believe that a person has committed retail fraud in violation
of MCL 750.356c or MCL 750.356d in the merchant’s store. The
absence of any such “reasonable cause” language in subsection
(b) underscores that it means what it states in providing
authority to arrest only if the person to be arrested has
committed a felony.
5
We note that this opinion is consistent with the result
and basic analysis of our recent decision in People v
Hamilton, 465 Mich 526; 638 NW2d 92 (2002). In Hamilton, a
city police officer stopped a vehicle outside his jurisdiction
and eventually arrested the driver, the defendant in Hamilton,
for the misdemeanor of operating under the influence of liquor
(OUIL). It was later discovered that the defendant had two
prior OUIL convictions, which led to him being charged with
the felony of OUIL, third offense (OUIL-3d). However,
importantly, the police officer was unaware of the prior OUIL
convictions at the time of the arrest. This Court concluded
that the police officer lacked authority under Michigan
statutes, including the statute at issue in this case, MCL
764.16, to make the arrest for the misdemeanor of simple OUIL.
Id. at 530-532. However, we also concluded that the arrest
did not involve a constitutional violation under the Fourth
Amendment because the police officer had probable cause to
suspect the defendant committed OUIL. Id. at 533. The
essential holding of Hamilton was that there is no
exclusionary rule requiring suppression of evidence flowing
from an arrest by a police officer that is only “statutorily
illegal,” but does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
532-535. Obviously, the present civil case does not implicate
any concerns about suppression of evidence in a criminal
prosecution on the basis of police misconduct. Accordingly,
there is no conflict between the dispositive holding of
6
Further, the Court of Appeals opinion in Rowe, which was
cited by the Court of Appeals as support in this case, does
not support the lower courts’ conclusions. In that case, two
Hamilton and the present opinion.
However, Hamilton did include the following language that
may warrant further explanation:
Under MCL 764.16, a private person has the
authority to make a felony arrest, but lacks the
authority to make a misdemeanor arrest except in
nonapplicable circumstances. “‘No one without a
warrant has any right to make an arrest in the
absence of actual belief, based on actual facts
creating probable cause of guilt.’” People v
Panknin, 4 Mich App 19, 27; 143 NW2d 806 (1966),
quoting People v Bressler, 223 Mich 597, 600-601;
194 NW 559 (1923), paraphrasing People v Burt, 51
Mich 199, 202; 16 NW 378 (1883). Here, the officer
only had probable cause to make an arrest for a
misdemeanor, i.e., OUIL. The fact that defendant
may have committed a felony, i.e., OUIL, third
offense, was only discovered after the arrest.
Accordingly, the officer lacked the statutory
authority to make the arrest under MCL 764.16.
[Id. at 531-532 (emphasis added).]
The critical point was that the police officer in Hamilton did
not realize that the defendant in that case may have committed
the felony of OUIL-3d. Accordingly, the officer in that case
plainly did not even purport to arrest the defendant for a
felony, but only for the misdemeanor of simple OUIL. Thus,
MCL 764.16 did not provide authority for the misdemeanor
arrest made in Hamilton. To the extent that the language from
prior cases in the above quotation from Hamilton suggests that
the existence of probable cause is relevant to determining
whether a private person’s arrest of another person for a
felony is permitted by subsection (b) of MCL 764.16, it is
incorrect. Rather, as explained in this opinion, the plain
language of subsection (b) means that the question is whether
the seized person actually committed a felony. Of course,
regardless of MCL 764.16, a police officer or other state
actor acting as such is constitutionally precluded by the
Fourth Amendment from making an arrest without probable cause.
Hamilton, supra at 533.
7
city police officers arrested a defendant on a warrant outside
their city, but inside the county where the city was located.
It was claimed that they had no jurisdiction to effect the
arrest outside the city. The Court disagreed, holding that
they had the statutory authority to execute the warrant
anywhere in the state. The Court further held that, “Pursuant
to the statutes cited, when a warrant is directed to a law
enforcement officer, the warrant itself provides the authority
needed to execute it.” Id. at 208-209. The present case is
distinguishable because it does not involve an arrest by a law
enforcement officer. Thus, while a warrant may give a law
enforcement officer authority to execute it, it should not be
construed as extending such authority to a private person.
The authority for a private person to arrest in certain
limited situations comes from MCL 764.16. Under its
subsection (b), authority is given only when the person to be
arrested has actually committed a felony.
Therefore, because it is undisputed that plaintiff had
not committed a felony, defendants did not have authority to
arrest him. The facially valid Missouri warrant did not,
under these facts, provide the authority to arrest plaintiff.6
6
Defendants argue that Moore’s status as a bounty hunter
insulates him from liability because of alleged wide-ranging
common-law powers based in part on the bail bond contract. It
is not necessary to determine the extent of those powers, if
any, since plaintiff was not a party to the contract.
8
The trial court erred in granting summary disposition.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the circuit court and
Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the circuit court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. MCR
7.302(F)(1).
CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
9