Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED MARCH 12, 2002
LAPEER COUNTY CLERK and MICHIGAN
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY CLERKS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v 118091
LAPEER CIRCUIT JUDGES,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
LAPEER COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
LAPEER COUNTY CLERK and MICHIGAN
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY CLERKS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v 118102
LAPEER CIRCUIT JUDGES,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
LAPEER COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________
PER CURIAM
The plaintiffs filed this superintending control action
challenging the Lapeer Circuit Court’s plan for the operation
of the family division of the circuit court. The Court of
Appeals granted part of the relief sought, finding that the
plan improperly denied the county clerk the right and duty to
function as clerk of the court for the family division. We
conclude that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction of the
superintending control action, and reverse.
I
In 1996 PA 388, the Legislature created the family
division of the circuit court. See MCL 600.1001 et seq.,
effective January 1, 1998. The act consolidated in the family
division jurisdiction of many types of proceedings formerly
heard in the circuit court and the probate court. See
MCL 600.1021.
MCL 600.1011(1) provides for the development of a plan
for the operation of the family division in each judicial
circuit:
Not later than July 1, 1997, in each judicial
circuit, the chief circuit judge and the chief
probate judge or judges shall enter into an
agreement that establishes a plan for how the
family division will be operated in that circuit
. . . .
On February 25, 1997, this Court issued Administrative
Order No. 1997-1, entitled “Implementation of the Family
Division of the Circuit Court.” The order required all chief
2
circuit and probate judges to “develop a plan for the
implementation and operation of the family division, and to
identify the manner in which services will be coordinated to
provide effective and efficient services to families by the
family division of the circuit court.” Chief judges were
required to seek input from judges, court staff, and other
entities providing service to families within the jurisdiction
or who will be affected by the operation of the family
division. The order required filing of plans with the State
Court Administrative Office and approval by that office before
implementation.
According to the affidavit of the chief judge of the
Lapeer Circuit Court, he followed the implementation directive
and met with the judges in the circuit. It was agreed that
the family division would be staffed with the employees of the
probate court, who were trained in and accustomed to dealing
with juvenile cases and other matters formerly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court. To implement the plan,
Local Administrative Order No. 2000-1 was adopted on
February 2, 2000, providing:
In order to implement the changes required by
the legislation creating the Family Division of the
Circuit Court (PA 374 and 388 of 1996), to enhance
and clarify the procedures to be followed in the
new Family Court, to clarify the role of the County
Clerk in the operations of the Family Court, to
merge the procedures previously followed in
juvenile, child protective proceedings and
ancillary proceedings into the Family Court, to
maintain the Court’s data entry system, and to
3
adopt new procedures for efficient administration
of the Family Court, the Court issues the following
administrative order:
1. The County Clerk will continue to accept
pleadings, maintain files and complete entries into
the Court’s data system in all domestic cases and
PPOs and shall be responsible for the care and
maintenance of those records.
2. The Family Court staff will continue to
accept filings, maintain files, prepare orders and
complete entries into the Court’s data system in
all juvenile cases, child protective proceedings,
name changes, adoptions, and ancillary proceedings
and shall be responsible for the care and
maintenance of those records.
3. The Family Court staff will be responsible
for scheduling all juvenile cases, child protective
proceedings, name changes, adoptions, and ancillary
proceedings. In addition, the Family Court staff
will be responsible for making referrals,
scheduling hearings, preparation of orders and
arranging pretrials and trials in domestic cases.
The Family Court staff will make appropriate
entries into the Court’s data systems of these
proceedings.
4. The County Clerk staff will continue to
manage the motion day dockets, no-progress docket
and non-service dismissals in domestic cases. The
County Clerk staff will continue to attend the
domestic motion docket sessions of the Family Court
and make appropriate entries into the Court’s data
system of those proceedings.
5. The Family Court staff shall continue to
be responsible for all filing fees, receipts,
disbursements and accountings for support payments,
restitution, administrative and program fees, and
child care funds received in juvenile cases, child
protective proceedings, name changes, adoptions and
ancillary proceedings. The County Clerk shall
continue to accept all filing fees in domestic
cases for the Family Court.
6. Local Administrative Order 1999-02 is
hereby rescinded and replaced by this order.
4
This order is issued pursuant to MCR 8.112 and
will be effective upon approval by the State Court
Administrator. The matters covered in this order
will be reviewed on an ongoing basis and this order
will expire on December 31, 2000, unless extended
by order of the Court.
On February 9, 2000, the Acting Director of Trial Court
Services for the State Court Administrative Office advised the
circuit court that
we have reviewed the above referenced
Administrative Order and find that it conforms with
the requirements of MCR 8.112(B). This order is
being accepted and filed until advised by your
court of any change.
II
The Lapeer County Clerk and the Michigan Association of
County Clerks filed this original action in the Court of
Appeals requesting a writ of superintending control. Their
complaint alleged, among other things:
17. The Court’s Administrative Order, No.
2000-01 violates Michigan’s Constitution, laws, and
court rules by preventing the Clerk from performing
her constitutional and statutorily mandated duties.
Specifically, by issuing and implementing
Administrative Order No. 2000-01, the Court
usurped the Clerk’s constitutional and statutory
duties with respect to Paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of
the Order.
* * *
18. Both family division judges in Lapeer
County (Judges Preisel and Higgins) prohibit the
County Clerk from performing her circuit court
duties with respect to juvenile matters by
preventing her from opening new cases, maintaining
the care and custody of the court records, entering
data into the Court’s JIS system, performing court
room functions, preventing the Clerk from assisting
5
the public as well as other judicial staff and
employees, and accounting for the court’s finances.
* * *
20. Judges Higgins and Preisel further refuse
to allow the County Clerk to perform as Clerk of
the circuit court with respect to trials.
Plaintiffs’ complaint requested the Court of Appeals to
declare unlawful the Lapeer Circuit Court administrative
order, and to direct the judges of the family division of the
Lapeer Circuit Court to comply with Const 1963, art 6, § 14,
statutes, and court rules by permitting the county clerk to
perform her legal authorized duties as clerk of the court for
the family division of the circuit court.1
Lapeer County intervened as a party defendant, and the
defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the Court of
Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court
also claimed that the clerks’ association lacked standing and
that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim on which
relief could be granted.
The Court of Appeals rejected defendants’ argument that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and granted
superintending control. The Court of Appeals declared
unlawful those portions of Local Administrative Order No.
2000-01 that direct family court staff, rather than the county
clerk, to perform the duties assigned to the county clerk by
1
MCL 600.1007 designates the county clerk as the clerk
of the court for the family division.
6
statute or court rule, and directed the judges of the family
division to permit the county clerk to perform those duties
assigned her by statute or court rule as a clerk of the court
for the family division. It declared lawful the remaining
portions of the administrative order, and dismissed the
clerks’ association’s claims for lack of standing.2
The circuit court and the county filed applications for
leave to appeal. After staying the precedential effect of the
Court of Appeals opinion, we granted leave to appeal, limited
to the issue: “[W]hether the Court of Appeals had subject
matter jurisdiction over the complaint for superintending
control . . . .”3
III
In this case, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
turns on questions of interpretation of statutes and court
rules, which we review de novo. Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464
Mich 456, 461; 628 NW2d 515 (2001); Brown v Michigan Health
Care Corp, 463 Mich 368, 374; 617 NW2d 301 (2000); McAuley v
General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998).
2
In re Lapeer Co Clerk, 242 Mich App 497; 619 NW2d 45
(2000).
3
463 Mich 969 (2001). The order held the remaining
issues raised in the applications in abeyance pending
resolution of the jurisdictional question. In light of our
conclusion that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction, it
is unnecessary to reach those issues, and in those respects
the applications are denied as moot.
7
IV
Const 1963, art 6, § 10, provides the basis for the
jurisdiction of and procedure in the Court of Appeals:
The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall
be provided by law and the practice and procedure
therein shall be prescribed by rules of the supreme
court.
In addition to the appellate jurisdiction granted by
MCL 600.308, the Court of Appeals is authorized to hear
certain original actions. MCL 600.310 provides:
The court of appeals has original jurisdiction
to issue prerogative and remedial writs or orders
as provided by rules of the supreme court, and has
authority to issue any writs, directives and
mandates that it judges necessary and expedient to
effectuate its determination of cases brought
before it.
In several court rules, we have exercised that statutory
authority to enable the Court of Appeals to exercise
superintending control jurisdiction.4 MCR 3.302 is the
general jurisdictional provision applicable to all courts with
superintending control jurisdiction:
4
MCR 3.302 makes superintending control the general form
of proceeding for control of lower courts and tribunals:
(A) Scope. A superintending control order
enforces the superintending control power of a
court over lower courts or tribunals.
* * *
(C) Writs Superseded. A superintending
control order replaces the writs of certiorari and
prohibition and the writ of mandamus when directed
to a lower court or tribunal.
8
(D) Jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
and the circuit court have jurisdiction to issue
superintending control orders to lower courts or
tribunals. In this rule, the term “circuit court”
includes the Recorder’s Court of the City of
Detroit[5] as to superintending control actions of
which that court has jurisdiction.
(2) When an appeal in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the circuit court, or the
recorder’s court is available, that method of
review must be used. If superintending control is
sought and an appeal is available, the complaint
for superintending control must be dismissed.
MCR 7.203 is the specific provision regarding the Court
of Appeals authority to issue such orders:
(C) Extraordinary Writs, Original Actions, and
Enforcement Actions. The [C]ourt [of Appeals] may
entertain an action for:
(1) superintending control over a lower court
or a tribunal immediately below it arising out of
an action or proceeding which, when concluded,
would result in an order appealable to the Court of
Appeals . . . . [Emphasis added.]
This limitation on the superintending control authority
of the Court of Appeals is in contrast to the far broader
superintending control power given by the constitution to the
Supreme Court and the circuit court:
The supreme court shall have general
superintending control over all courts; power to
issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial
writs; and appellate jurisdiction as provided by
rules of the supreme court. The supreme court
shall not have the power to remove a judge. [Const
1963, art 6, § 4 (emphasis added).]
5
The Recorder’s Court for the city of Detroit was
abolished by 1996 PA 374.
9
The circuit court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law;
appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and
tribunals except as otherwise provided by law;
power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and
remedial writs; supervisory and general control
over inferior courts and tribunals within their
respective jurisdictions in accordance with rules
of the supreme court; and jurisdiction of other
cases and matters as provided by rules of the
supreme court. [Const 1963, art 6, § 13 (emphasis
added).]
The case law interpreting the predecessor court rules had
recognized this distinction between the superintending control
authority of the Supreme Court and circuit court on the one
hand, and the Court of Appeals on the other. As we said in
Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672,
680-681; 194 NW2d 693 (1972):
The Supreme Court has by GCR 1963, 711
provided that the Court of Appeals has the power to
issue superintending control orders which are in
the nature of certiorari, mandamus and
[6]
prohibition.
6
Later in the Genesee Prosecutor opinion we briefly
explained the nature of these common-law writs, which
contemplate intervention by the higher court in a particular
action or proceeding:
The writ of certiorari is for review of errors
of law and our inquiry is limited to determining
“if the inferior tribunal, upon the record made,
had jurisdiction, whether or not it exceeded that
jurisdiction and proceeded according to law.” In
re Fredericks, 285 Mich 262, 267 [280 NW 464]
(1938). In [People v] Flint Municipal Judge [383
Mich 429; 175 NW2d 750 (1970)], we noted that
mandamus would lie to require the magistrate to
perform a clear legal duty. Here it is contended
that the judge acted without jurisdiction and
therefore has a clear legal duty to vacate the
(continued...)
10
This superintending control has nothing to do
with the general supervisory superintending control
over all courts given to the Supreme Court by
art 6, § 4 of the 1963 Constitution or the
supervisory and general control over inferior
courts and tribunals within their respective
jurisdictions in accordance with rules of the
Supreme Court, given the circuit courts by art 6,
§ 13 of the 1963 Constitution.
No general control of inferior courts exists
in the Court of Appeals.[7]
That principle was also recognized in Morcom v Recorder’s
Court Judge, 15 Mich App 358, 360; 166 NW2d 540 (1968):
[W]e are persuaded that the Supreme Court has
delegated to us only the power to issue such writs
in respect of a particular error in an actual case
and controversy, and that we have not been
delegated superintending control over the general
practices of an inferior court or any judge
thereof.
In sum, then, this Court has general system-wide
superintending control over the lower courts, whereas, in
contrast, the Court of Appeals only has superintending control
in an actual case.
6
(...continued)
guilty plea and reinstate the criminal proceedings
as filed in the information. The writ of
prohibition is a common-law remedy designed to
prevent excesses of jurisdiction. It is a proper
remedy where the court exceeds the bounds of its
jurisdiction or acts in a matter not within its
jurisdiction. Hudson v Judge of Superior Court, 42
Mich 239, 248 [3 NW 850] (1879). [386 Mich 681].
7
GCR 1963, 711, the predecessor of MCR 7.203(C), did not
include the limiting language of current subrule (C)(1). The
addition of that language in 1985 incorporates our decision in
Genesee Prosecutor.
11
V
The Court of Appeals opinion cites a number of cases for
the proposition that superintending control is an appropriate
procedure to review the general practices of a lower court.
Some include general language to the effect that the Court of
Appeals, like the Supreme Court and the circuit court, has the
power to issue superintending control orders, e.g., Lockhart
v 36th Dist Judge, 204 Mich App 684; 516 NW2d 76 (1994); In re
Lafayette Towers, 200 Mich App 269; 503 NW2d 740 (1993).
However, none of those cases supports the conclusion that the
Court of Appeals has superintending control jurisdiction over
the general practices of the circuit court.
All the cases cited by the Court of Appeals fall into one
of three categories. Most are cases in which an action was
filed in the circuit court seeking exercise of that court’s
superintending control authority over a lower court or
tribunal, e.g., In re Lafayette Towers, supra; Lockhart,
supra; Saginaw Library Bd v Judges of the 70th Dist Court, 118
Mich App 379; 325 NW2d 777 (1982); Cahill v 15th Dist Judge,
393 Mich 137; 224 NW2d 24 (1974). One of the cases was
brought in the Supreme Court seeking superintending control
over the circuit court. Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n v Wayne
Circuit Court, 443 Mich 110; 503 NW2d 885 (1993). The
remaining cases involved actions filed in the Court of Appeals
seeking to invoke the limited superintending control
12
jurisdiction of that Court over the actions of the circuit
court (or Recorder’s Court) in a particular case, as permitted
by MCR 7.203(C)(1). Frederick v Presque Isle Co Circuit
Judge, 439 Mich 1; 476 NW2d 142 (1991) (an action by an
appointed attorney seeking compensation);8 Genesee
Prosecutor, supra (an action by a prosecuting attorney
claiming the circuit court lacked authority to accept a guilty
plea to an uncharged offense over the prosecutor’s objection);
Wayne Co Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge (On Remand), 167
Mich App 282; 421 NW2d 665 (1988) (an action by a prosecutor
challenging the circuit court’s granting of a new trial in a
criminal case).
8
Both the plaintiffs and the Court of Appeals rely
heavily on language in Frederick, in which we held that the
Court of Appeals should have exercised superintending control
over the circuit court. However, Frederick merely stands for
the proposition that superintending control is an appropriate
remedy for a court with jurisdiction to exercise authority
over a lower court when an appeal is not available. In fact,
Frederick and our decision in Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n well
illustrate the differing superintending control jurisdiction
of this Court and the Court of Appeals. Each case involved a
challenge to action by the lower court regarding the payment
of fees to appointed counsel. In Frederick, the plaintiff
sought payment for the services that he provided in a
particular case. Because the dispute arose out of a
particular action in circuit court, the Court of Appeals had
authority to exercise superintending control under MCR
7.203(C)(1). By contrast, in Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n, the
plaintiffs challenged the fee schedule for appointed counsel
jointly established by the Wayne Circuit and Detroit
Recorder’s Courts. Because the challenge was to the general
practices of the lower courts, only this Court had
jurisdiction, and the case was properly filed here.
13
Despite this consistent line of authority, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it could exercise superintending
control jurisdiction in this case. It said:
Pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 4 "[t]he
supreme court shall have general superintending
control over all courts . . . ." In contrast,
"[n]o general control of inferior courts exists in
the Court of Appeals." Genesee Prosecutor v
Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672, 681; 194 NW2d
693 (1972). Nonetheless, by operation of Const
1963, art 6, § 10, MCL 600.310; MSA 27A.310, MCR
3.302, and MCR 7.203(C) this Court has subject
matter jurisdiction to issue writs of
superintending control to lower courts and
tribunals in those limited cases in which (1) the
general practices of the inferior court or tribunal
are contrary to a clear legal duty, (2) there is no
other adequate remedy, and (3) an action or
proceeding could have been brought in the lower
court or tribunal that, when concluded, would
result in an order appealable to the Court of
Appeals. [242 Mich App 514-515 (emphasis added).]
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiffs could
have brought an action in the circuit court for a declaratory
judgment or could have challenged the local administrative
order in individual actions in the family division:
In regard to the present controversy,
plaintiff Marlene M. Bruns could have filed a
complaint for a declaratory judgment in the circuit
court challenging, in a specific case or cases, her
displacement as clerk of the court for the family
division of the circuit court. See MCR 2.605.
* * *
In the instant action, defendant circuit court
admitted in its answer that "Judges Preisel and
Higgins refused to allow the county clerk to
perform the clerical duties of the circuit court
with respect to trials in the family division" and
have refused to allow the county clerk "to perform
14
duties such as opening new cases, maintaining the
care and custody of court records, entering data in
the court's JIS system, performing other courtroom
functions, and for accounting for the finances with
regard to juvenile matters under the jurisdiction
of the family division of the circuit court." In
view of these admissions, we conclude that
plaintiff Bruns could have challenged, in specific
cases, the refusal of the circuit court to allow
her to perform her legally authorized duties by
filing a complaint for declaratory relief in the
circuit court. [242 Mich App 511-512].
The Court of Appeals concluded:
We hold plaintiffs' complaint for a writ of
superintending control is within the subject-matter
jurisdiction of this Court because the criteria set
forth in the court rules have been met. [242 Mich
App 515].
The Court of Appeals analysis fails on a fundamental
level. It concludes that it is sufficient if the party could
have filed an action that would have been appealable to the
Court of Appeals. However, the Court cited no authority
whatsoever for that proposition, and it is plainly contrary to
MCR 7.203(C)(1), which requires that the Court of Appeals may
entertain an action for superintending control arising out of
an action in the lower court or tribunal. Here, there was no
action pending in the Lapeer Circuit Court.9
9
Moreover, the Court of Appeals conclusion that the
plaintiffs could have sought a declaratory judgment in a
circuit court action is both speculative and highly
questionable. The declaratory judgment rule merely provides
an additional remedy that a party may seek; it does not create
a basis for jurisdiction. MCR 2.605 provides:
(A) Power to Enter Declaratory Judgment.
(continued...)
15
VI
It may well be that an action for superintending control
is the proper means for the county clerk to challenge the
validity of the circuit court’s administrative order. If so,
however, only this Court has jurisdiction to entertain such an
action. That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the
circuit court’s plan for the family division was adopted
pursuant to our Administrative Order No. 1997-1, which
directed that circuit courts prepare implementation plans and
submit them to the State Court Administrative Office for
approval. In these circumstances, the circuit court’s
challenged practices were intertwined with our supervisory
9
(...continued)
(1) In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction, a Michigan court of record may
declare the rights and other legal relations of an
interested party seeking a declaratory judgment,
whether or not other relief is or could be sought
or granted.
(2) For the purpose of this rule, an action is
considered within the jurisdiction of a court if
the court would have jurisdiction of an action on
the same claim or claims in which the plaintiff
sought relief other than a declaratory judgment.
The county clerk could not have brought a circuit court
action on the claim made in this case. Such an action would
have sought superintending control over the general practices
of the circuit court, but, under Const 1963, art 6, § 13, the
circuit court only has superintending control jurisdiction
over lower courts. Also, contrary to the Court of Appeals
suggestion, the county clerk could not have raised the
question of the validity of Local Administrative Order No.
2000-1 in a case pending in the family division because the
clerk would not be an interested party in such a proceeding.
16
control over the court system, making it particularly
inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to intervene to review
the circuit court’s plan.10
The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue an
order of superintending control to the circuit court regarding
its plan for the implementation of the family division.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.11
CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
MARKMAN , JJ., concurred.
10
On its face, the Court of Appeals decision in this case
is limited to the Lapeer circuit plan. However, the
published decision would affect practices in other circuits as
well. See MCR 7.215(C)(2), (I)(1).
11
After oral argument, amicus curiae Michigan Judges
Association filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental
brief. That motion is denied as moot.
17