Susan Kassebaum v. Commissioner of Social Security

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 27 2013 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SUSAN KASSEBAUM, No. 11-35998 Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 6:08 cv-0433-HO v. MEMORANDUM ** CAROLYN W. COLVIN,* Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael R. Hogan, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 5, 2013 *** Portland, Oregon Before: TASHIMA, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges. * Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. *** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). Susan Kassebaum appeals from the district court’s partial denial of her motion for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. She also appeals the district court’s denial of punitive fees under § 2412(b) for the alleged bad faith arguments of the Commissioner of Social Security. Because the facts are known to the parties, we do not recite them here. We affirm. 1. A district court has significant discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable fees award, and to reduce a requested award to such an amount. See Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990) (“[A] district court will always retain substantial discretion in fixing the amount of an EAJA award.”). It must, however, articulate a “concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee” that it ultimately awards. Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). Here, the district court explanation, although not “elaborate,” was “comprehensible.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court’s reasoning was sufficient to “show [its] work when calculating attorney’s fees,” Padgett v. Loventhal, 706 F.3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013), and thus was not an abuse of discretion. See Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1148. 2 2. We reverse a district court’s finding that a party did not act in bad faith only where it is clearly erroneous. Beaudry Motor Co. v. Abko Prop., Inc., 780 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1986). A district court should impose punitive awards for bad faith only “in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice.” Rodriguez v. United States, 542 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court’s refusal to award punitive fees for bad faith was not clearly erroneous. See id. at 710-11. AFFIRMED. 3