IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-EC-01682-SCT
BILLY G. RAYNER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS CIRCUIT CLERK OF JASPER COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI, AND AS A QUALIFIED MEMBER
OF THE VOTING ELECTORATE OF THE
THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT COURT DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; CINDY JENSEN,
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CIRCUIT
CLERK OF SIMPSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
AND AS A QUALIFIED MEMBER OF THE
VOTING ELECTORATE OF THE THIRTEENTH
CIRCUIT COURT DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI; ANTHONY GRAYSON, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CIRCUIT CLERK OF
SMITH COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, AND AS A
QUALIFIED MEMBER OF THE VOTING
ELECTORATE OF THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT
COURT DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI, AND RICHARD FELTON
AULTMAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF COVINGTON
COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, AND AS A QUALIFIED
MEMBER OF THE VOTING ELECTORATE OF
THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT COURT DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
v.
HALEY BARBOUR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
AND AS A MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF
ELECTION COMMISSIONERS; DELBERT
HOSEMANN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI, AS THE CHIEF ELECTION
OFFICER OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, AND
AS A MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF
ELECTION COMMISSIONERS; AND JIM HOOD,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI AND
AS MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF
ELECTION COMMISSIONERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/13/2010
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. HENRY L. LACKEY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: S. WAYNE EASTERLING
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: HAROLD EDWARD PIZZETTA, III
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - ELECTION CONTEST
DISPOSITION: ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED. ON
CROSS-APPEAL: AFFIRMED - 10/27/2010
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC
CHANDLER, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The circuit clerks of Jasper, Simpson, and Smith Counties and an election
commissioner of Covington County have filed a petition for an expedited appeal of an order
entered by the Circuit Court of Hinds County, First Judicial District. The order, entered on
October 13, 2010, denied their complaint to enjoin the November 2, 2010, election for circuit
court judge for the Thirteenth Circuit Court District. The defendants are Governor Haley
Barbour, Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann, and Attorney General Jim Hood, in their
official capacities and in their capacities as members of the State Board of Election
Commissioners (the Board). The Board had ordered a write-in election for the position of
circuit court judge for the Thirteenth Circuit Court District after the death of the only
candidate who had qualified for the position, incumbent Honorable Judge Robert Evans.
Judge Evans’s demise occurred after the qualifying deadline had passed. The plaintiffs argue
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that the write-in election ordered by the Board will contravene the election laws pertaining
to judicial offices, and that the election properly should be conducted as a special election
to be held in November 2011. The defendants cross-appeal the circuit court’s assessment of
costs against them.
¶2. We grant the petition for an expedited appeal. Finding that the Board’s interpretation
of the governing statutes was permissible, we affirm the denial of the complaint. We also
affirm the issue on cross-appeal.
FACTS
¶3. On July 13, 2010, a vacancy arose in the office of circuit court judge for the
Thirteenth Circuit Court District upon the death of Judge Robert Evans. Judge Evans’s four-
year term was set to expire on December 31, 2010. Upon Judge Evans’s death, Gov. Barbour
appointed the Honorable Eddie H. Bowen to fill the vacancy. Prior to his death, Judge Evans
had been the only candidate who had qualified as a candidate to the office in the general
election to be held on November 2, 2010.
¶4. On September 7, 2010, the Board declared that, under state law, the election for circuit
court judge for the Thirteenth Circuit Court District must occur according to its appropriate
election schedule on November 2, 2010. The Board’s order stated, “[b]ecause Judge Evans
was the only candidate to qualify for the position and died after the qualifying deadline, this
election will be determined by write-in candidate.” The order further stated that nonpartisan
judicial elections require a majority of lawful votes cast, and a lawful vote is considered a
vote for an individual qualified to serve as a circuit court judge, specifically, one who: (1)
has been a practicing attorney for five years; (2) is at least twenty-six years old; (3) has been
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a five-year citizen of the State of Mississippi; and (4) is a resident of the particular judicial
district. See Miss. Const. art 6, § 154; Miss. Code Ann. § 9-7-1 (Rev. 2002). The order
stated that, if a majority was not reached in the write-in election, the two candidates with the
most votes would participate in a run-off election to be held on November 23, 2010.
Accordingly, several candidates began campaigning as write-in candidates for election to the
position of circuit court judge for the Thirteenth Circuit Court District.
¶5. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Circuit Court of Jasper County, Second
Judicial District, on September 23, 2010, followed by an amended complaint on September
28, 2010. They requested injunctive and declaratory relief. The defendants filed a motion
to dismiss or to transfer venue. The circuit court, Judge Henry Lackey presiding by special
appointment by this Court, transferred the action to the Circuit Court of Hinds County.
Following the recusal of the judges of the Circuit Court of Hinds County, First Judicial
District, this Court specially appointed Judge Lackey to adjudicate the case.
¶6. After a hearing, Judge Lackey entered an order denying the request for injunctive and
declaratory relief. The order stated:
Having considered the applicable law the court finds that Mississippi
Code Section 23-15-1015 clearly mandates that an election occur on
November 2, 2010, to select a circuit court judge for the new four-year term
of office beginning January 1, 2011. The court further finds that the
legislature has, through Code Section 23-15-365, provided that write-in
candidates are appropriate in the event of the death of any candidate who has
qualified to run for a particular office. Accordingly, the court finds that the
Complaint and the request for injunctive and declaratory relief are not well
taken.
Judge Lackey assessed costs to the defendants.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
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A. Standard of review
¶7. “[W]hen a statute is not ambiguous, this Court applies the statute according to its plain
meaning and need not apply principles of statutory construction.” Barbour v. State ex rel.
Hood, 974 So. 2d 232, 240 (Miss. 2008) (quoting Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Cole, 954 So.
2d 407, 412-13 (Miss. 2007)). But if there is ambiguity, the interpretation afforded by the
State Board of Election Commissioners must be upheld if it is “based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. at 241 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 702 (1984)).
This Court affords considerable weight to the construction given to a statutory scheme by the
agency entrusted to administer it. Id.
B. Analysis
¶8. The plaintiffs in this case rely on Mississippi Code Section 9-1-103 and Mississippi
Code Section 23-15-849(1) to support their argument that the regular election scheduled for
November 2, 2010, should be postponed until November 2011. Section 9-1-103 states, in
relevant part:
Whenever a vacancy shall occur in any judicial office by reason of death of an
incumbent, resignation or retirement of an incumbent, removal of an
incumbent from office, or creation of a new judicial office in which there has
not heretofore been an incumbent, the Governor shall have the authority to
appoint a qualified person to fill such vacancy to serve for the unexpired term
or until such vacancy is filled by election as provided in Section 23-15-849,
Mississippi Code of 1972.
Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-103 (Rev. 2002) (emphasis added). Section 23-15-849(1) provides:
(1) Vacancies in the office of circuit judge or chancellor shall be filled for the
unexpired term by the qualified electors at the next regular election for state
officers or for representatives in Congress occurring more than nine (9)
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months after the existence of the vacancy to be filled, and the term of office of
the person elected to fill a vacancy shall commence on the first Monday in
January following his election. Upon the occurring of such a vacancy, the
Governor shall appoint a qualified person from the district in which the
vacancy exists to hold the office and discharge the duties thereof until the
vacancy shall be filled by election as provided in this subsection.
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-849(1) (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added). Additionally, Mississippi
Code Section 23-15-365 states:
There shall be left on each ballot one (1) blank space under the title of each
office to be voted for, and in the event of the death, resignation, withdrawal
or removal of any candidate whose name shall have been printed on the
official ballot, the name of the candidate duly substituted in the place of such
candidate may be written in such blank space by the voter.
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-365 (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added). Under Article 6, Section 153
of the Mississippi Constitution and Mississippi Code Section 9-7-1, circuit court judges shall
hold office for a term of four years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 9-7-1 (Rev. 2002). Mississippi
Code Section 23-15-1015 provides for an election to be held in every county every four
years, concurrently with the election for representatives in Congress, for judges of the several
chancery and circuit court districts. See Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-1015 (Rev. 2007).
¶9. The plaintiffs argue that, because the election scheduled for November 2, 2010, will
take place fewer than nine months from when the vacancy occurred, the election must be
postponed until November 2011 so that nine months may pass before the election as required
by Section 23-15-849(1). The Board counters that Section 23-15-849(1) is not implicated
by the facts of this case. The Board contends that Section 23-15-849(1) applies only when
a special election is required to fill a vacancy; in this case, the vacancy will end upon the
expiration of Judge Evans’s four-year term on December 31, 2010, and the new four-year
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term will begin on January 1, 2011. Thus, the November 2, 2010, election will be to elect
a new judge for the regular four-year term; it will not be a special election to fill a vacancy
in an unexpired term. And, because Judge Evans died after qualifying for the November 2,
2010 election, Section 23-15-865 applies, mandating a write-in election.
¶10. We find that the Board’s interpretation of the statutory scheme was permissible. It
is plain that Sections 9-1-103 and 23-15-849 promulgate a procedure to fill judicial
vacancies. Upon the occurrence of a vacancy, the Governor must appoint a qualified person
from the district to serve until the vacancy is filled by special election. Miss. Code Ann. §
23-15-849 (Rev. 2007). A special election to fill the vacancy must take place more than nine
months after the occurrence of the vacancy. Id. However, the use of the word “or” in
Section 9-1-103 means that an election under Section 23-15-849(1) need not occur if there
is so little time in the unexpired term that the appointee may legally “serve for the unexpired
term.” Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-103 (Rev. 2002), Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-849(1) (Rev.
2007). Here, Judge Evans passed away five months prior to the expiration of his term. The
Governor, pursuant to Section 25-15-849(1), appointed Judge Bowen to fill the vacancy.
This “vacancy” will end on December 31, 2010, the date of the expiration of Judge Evans’s
term, which is fewer than nine months after the vacancy occurred. The election for the new
term of office is scheduled to occur on November 2, 2010, and Judge Evans already had
qualified for that election. Because Judge Evans died fewer than nine months before the
expiration of his term, Section 9-1-103 permitted the appointee, Judge Bowen, to “serve for
the unexpired term” with no requirement of a special election. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-103
(Rev. 2002). Under Section 23-15-365, “in the event of the death, resignation, withdrawal
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or removal of any candidate whose name shall have been printed on the official ballot, the
name of the candidate duly substituted in the place of such candidate may be written in such
blank space by the voter.” Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-365 (Rev. 2007). Because Judge Evans
passed away after qualifying for the November 2, 2010, election, a write-in election was
proper. Id.
¶11. The plaintiffs argue that this interpretation of the governing statutes is incorrect as
applied to judicial candidates. They contend that, because the Legislature has imposed
unique qualification requirements upon candidates for judicial office, a write-in election in
which voters might supply names of unqualified persons is improper. See Miss. Code Ann.
§§ 23-15-974 to 23-15-985 (Rev. 2007). The Court observes that all Mississippi elections,
except for run-off elections, permit voters to vote by write-in. Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-365
(Rev. 2007). The issue here is that, under Section 23-15-365, due to the death of the only
candidate who had qualified before the qualifying deadline had passed, no name will be
printed on the ballot, and the election will be only by write-in. In that circumstance, the
election will proceed in the same manner as if no one had qualified to run as a candidate
before the qualifying deadline. Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-365 (Rev. 2007).
¶12. This Court has ruled that “the application of the ‘write-in candidate’ provisions are
appropriate in the event of a death of a candidate who has qualified to run for a particular
office.” Upton v. McKenzie, 761 So. 2d 167, 175 (Miss. 2000) (citing McKenzie v. Boykin,
111 Miss. 256, 71 So. 382 (1916)). As the Board contends, qualifications are not exclusive
to judicial office; all offices in the State of Mississippi have qualifying deadlines that require
certain documentation. A write-in candidate naturally enters the race after the qualifying
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deadline has passed. The Legislature has provided for a write-in election to occur in the
event of the death of “any candidate” who has qualified. Although the Legislature has
imposed unique qualifications upon judicial candidates, it did not exclude judicial candidates
from its provision for a write-in election in the event of a qualified candidate’s death. Miss.
Code Ann. § 23-15-365 (Rev. 2007). Therefore, we find the Board’s interpretation of
Section 23-15-365 was permissible. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of injunctive and
declaratory relief.
ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL
¶13. We turn to the Board’s cross-appeal of the assessment of costs against it. The
assessment of costs is a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion. United S. Bank v.
Bank of Mantee, 680 So. 2d 220, 224 (Miss. 1996). Judge Lackey assessed costs against the
Board in his bench ruling and instructed counsel for the Board to draft an order that reflected
the bench ruling. The Board did not object to the cost assessment, nor did the Board file a
motion to reconsider the cost assessment. Therefore, we find that this issue was not
preserved for appeal. See Johnson v. Gray, 859 So. 2d 1006, 1015 (Miss. 2003).
¶14. ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED. ON CROSS-APPEAL: AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., LAMAR AND KITCHENS,
JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITH SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY PIERCE, J. PIERCE, J., CONCURS IN
RESULT ONLY WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY
RANDOLPH, J. DICKINSON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
RANDOLPH, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY:
¶15. The plaintiffs/appellants offer credible evidence that some voters (absentee ballots)
in their various counties have been, and other voters (election day) will be, denied the right
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to timely and effective instructions on how to utilize write-in ballots; and that the manner in
which the election will be held will result in mass confusion, thus thwarting the will of the
people.
¶16. By application of two statutes dealing with vacancy and vacancy in office (including
the holding of elections), the dilemma now being faced could have been prevented.
Mississippi Code Section 9-1-103 is the first statute which should be examined under the
facts presented. It establishes the procedure to be followed “[w]henever a vacancy shall
occur in any judicial office by reason of death of an incumbent,” inter alia, granting “the
Governor the authority to appoint a qualified person to fill such vacancy to serve for the
unexpired term or until such vacancy is filled by election as provided in Section 23-15-849
. . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-103 (Rev. 2002) (emphasis added). Applying that statute as
written would have avoided the conflict posed herein and allowed all judicial candidates to
abide by the Nonpartisan Judicial Election Act. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-15-974 to 23-15-
985 (Rev. 2007). However, compliance with other statutes is now impossible, given the
election is less than one week away. Appellants are concerned that there is a distinct
likelihood that the will of a majority of the people will not be expressed in this election.
¶17. Using the authority granted by Section 9-1-103 would have allowed all of the judicial
candidates time to fulfill other statutory and judicial code obligations and requirements;1
provided each of the candidates an opportunity to conduct a meaningful campaign; and, most
importantly, allowed the electorate ample time to vet the credentials and qualifications of the
1
See Canon 5 of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct.
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respective candidates before being required to express their will at the ballot box. Rather,
the electorate has been issued a mandate by the State Board of Election Commissioners
(“Board”) that expressing their will must be accomplished by writing in a candidate’s name.
¶18. The “Write-in Space” statute, Mississippi Code Section 23-15-365, requires leaving
“on each ballot one (1) blank space under the title of each office to be voted for, and in the
event of the death, . . . of any candidate whose name shall have been printed on the official
ballot, the name of the candidate duly substituted in the place of such candidate may be
written in such blank space by the voter.” Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-365 (Rev. 2007)
(emphasis added). Based on the pleadings and briefs filed, the name of the deceased
incumbent, the Honorable Robert Evans, is not printed on the ballot. The Write-in Space
statute passed by the Legislature was designed to offer all voters an alternative to the
candidate whose name is listed. In the case before us, there is no other name on the official
ballot. Therefore, Section 23-15-365 should not apply.
¶19. Nonetheless, the Board interpreted its duties and responsibilities contrary to the
interpretation advocated by the appellants. Although I disagree with the decision of the
Board, I cannot disregard that my esteemed colleagues, charged with analyzing the same
issues, have, after a spirited debate of the pros and cons of each parties’ position, reached a
different disposition. Thus, one issue becomes abundantly clear (beyond all dispute), that
being that the decision of the Board was “fairly debatable,” which is “the antithesis of
arbitrary and capricious.” Edwards v. Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 22 So. 3d 268,
274 (Miss. 2009) (quoting Town of Florence v. Sea Lands, Ltd., 759 So. 2d 1221, 1223
(Miss. 2000)).
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¶20. Perhaps, if faced with a similar dilemma in the future, the Board should consider the
positions advocated by the local elected officials who brought this action. However, our
standard of review does not allow reversal of an administrative decision simply based upon
whether we agree or disagree with the branch or agency empowered to make the decision.
Therefore, I acquiesce in the Court’s opinion dubitante on the question of whether the proper
statutes were utilized.
PIERCE, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.
PIERCE, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN RESULT:
¶21. Our decision today is troubling because its immediate result may be chaos. However,
I agree that the Election Commission’s interpretation is permissible under our limited review.
¶22. The Majority notes that, effectively, no person qualified to run in this election and
finds that in such a circumstance, the “write-in” provisions of Mississippi Code Section 23-
15-365 are applicable. This section is implicated only when a candidate is removed from
contention but whose name remains printed on the ballot.2 So, I cannot agree with the
Majority that Section 23-15-365 mandates a write-in election.
¶23. However, Mississippi Code Section 23-15-1015 mandates that a regular election
occur. Miss. Code Ann. § 23-12-1015 (Rev. 2007) While no statutory process may
specifically address the rare circumstances of having no person has qualified to have his or
her name printed on the ballot, we still face the question of whether the Election Commission
reasonably interpreted the mandate in Section 23-15-1015 that an election be held. Giving
2
See Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-365 (Rev. 2007).
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the Election Commission the appropriate deference (and despite my reservations about the
instant result of this decision) I cannot call its determination unreasonable.
¶24. Judge Evans’s death has left a void in Mississippi’s judicial system. Compounding
this misfortune, the petitioners have no good way to select his replacement. Post-election
challenges ranging from candidate qualifications to misspelled names 3 will be no surprise.
However, the law requires a general election to occur, and the Election Commission has
chosen this method in their particularized wisdom. So, I concur in the result.
RANDOLPH, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.
3
This possibility is not likely lost on our Secretary of State with his notoriously
mispronounced first name.
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