SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-10-0154-PR
Appellee, )
) Court of Appeals
) Division One
v. ) No. 1 CA-CR 08-0651
)
) Maricopa County
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL REGENOLD, ) Superior Court
) No. CR2005-135187-001 DT
)
Appellant. ) O P I N I O N
_________________________________ )
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Jaime B. Holguin, Commissioner
________________________________________________________________
Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One
Filed Mar. 18, 2010
REVERSED AND REMANDED
________________________________________________________________
THOMAS C. HORNE, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel,
Capital Litigation Section
Aaron J. Moskowitz, Assistant Attorney General
Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney General Tucson
Attorneys for State of Arizona
JAMES J. HAAS, MARICOPA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER Phoenix
By Tennie B. Martin, Deputy Public Defender
Colin F. Stearns, Deputy Public Defender
And
MARICOPA COUNTY OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVOCATE Phoenix
By Consuelo M. Ohanesian, Deputy Legal Advocate
Attorneys for Christopher Michael Regenold
________________________________________________________________
B E R C H, Chief Justice
¶1 A defendant in a noncapital case “may not appeal from a
judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea
agreement or an admission to a probation violation.” Ariz. Rev.
Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13–4033(B) (2010). We have been asked to
decide whether a defendant who pleads guilty but later contests
an alleged probation violation may appeal the resulting
sentence. We hold that A.R.S § 13–4033(B) does not limit the
right of appeal in such circumstances.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Christopher Michael Regenold was indicted for one count
of luring a minor for sexual exploitation. He accepted a plea
agreement that provided a sentencing range of five to fifteen
years. The judge suspended imposition of the sentence and
placed Regenold on lifetime probation.
¶3 More than a year later, the State petitioned to revoke
Regenold’s probation. After a contested hearing, the judge
revoked probation and sentenced Regenold to six and one-half
years in prison. Regenold appealed. Citing A.R.S. § 13-
4033(B), the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, finding that Regenold’s sentence had been imposed
pursuant to his plea agreement and, therefore, rather than
appealing, he should have filed a petition for post-conviction
relief pursuant to Rule 32. State v. Regenold, 1 CA–CR 08–0651,
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2010 WL 987063 (Ariz. App. Mar. 18, 2010).
¶4 We granted review of Regenold’s petition for review
because the court of appeals decision in this case conflicts
with the opinion of the court of appeals in State v. Ponsart,
224 Ariz. 518, 233 P.3d 631 (App. 2010), and the issue presented
is of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, section 5, clause 3 of the Arizona Constitution.
II. DISCUSSION
¶5 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 provides the
review process for defendants who plead guilty. State v. Smith,
184 Ariz. 456, 458, 910 P.2d 1, 3 (1996). It authorizes review
through an of-right post-conviction relief proceeding for those
defendants who “admitted a probation violation, or whose
probation was automatically violated based upon a plea of guilty
or no contest.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1. Those found guilty
after trial retain the right to appeal.
¶6 Arizona Revised Statutes § 13–4033(B) similarly
precludes those who enter plea agreements or admit to a
probation violation from filing a direct appeal. It provides
that “[i]n noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a
judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea
agreement or an admission to a probation violation.” Id. We
must resolve whether a defendant who pleads guilty to the
underlying crime, but later has probation revoked following a
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contested probation revocation hearing, may appeal the resulting
sentence or must instead file a Rule 32 petition.
¶7 Regenold argues that because § 13-4033(B) precludes an
appeal only from an “admission to a probation violation,” a
defendant may appeal from a judgment or sentence entered after
the defendant contests or refuses to admit to a probation
violation. The State responds that a pleading defendant who is
put on probation, later unsuccessfully contests a probation
violation and is thereafter sentenced, receives punishment
“pursuant to a plea agreement” for purposes of § 13-4033(B) and
thus may not appeal. It also argues that Regenold waived his
right to appeal when he entered the plea agreement. For these
reasons, the State maintains, Regenold cannot pursue a direct
appeal, but must instead seek review under Rule 32. We disagree
with the State’s contentions.
¶8 A defendant who receives punishment following a
contested probation violation proceeding does not receive a
“sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement” as that
phrase is used in § 13-4033(B). Rather, a pleading defendant
who is sentenced to prison or jail or placed on probation
receives punishment “pursuant to [the] plea agreement” when the
probation or other sanction for the underlying crime is imposed.
At that time, the defendant learns his punishment, which may
include a combination of prison or jail time and restitution,
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along with any probationary period and terms. If the defendant
fulfills those terms, this is the only sentence he will ever
receive for the underlying crime. If the defendant fails to
comply with the terms of probation, however, a different and
more severe consequence may result. Any punishment imposed
after a probation revocation hearing is a consequence that would
not exist but for the defendant’s violation of probation.
Therefore, although the range of punishment for a probation
violation may be constrained by a plea agreement, the sentence
imposed after a contested probation revocation is not entered
“pursuant to [the] plea agreement” for purposes of § 13–4033(B).
¶9 The State also argues that Regenold waived his right to
appeal by signing a plea agreement that provided, “By entering
this agreement, the Defendant further waives and gives up the
right to appeal.” Although we agree that Regenold waived his
right to direct appeal by pleading guilty, instead implicitly
consenting to review by petition for post-conviction relief, see
Smith, 184 Ariz. at 458, 910 P.2d at 3, he did not waive his
right to appeal later rulings in the case.
¶10 We find support for our conclusion in the language of
Rule 32.1, which permits a defendant who “admit[s] a probation
violation, or whose probation was automatically violated based
upon a plea of guilty or no contest” to file a petition for
post-conviction relief. As noted, Regenold did not admit that
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he violated probation; he contested that he had done so. In
short, Regenold’s situation is not squarely covered by language
of Rule 32.1 that would require him to seek review by filing a
petition for post-conviction relief. On the other hand, he is
not prohibited from appealing the revocation of probation by the
language of A.R.S. § 13-4033(B) because he did not admit to a
probation violation.
¶11 A contrary construction of § 13–4033(B) may lead to
multiple hearings involving the same facts. See Ponsart, 224
Ariz. at 520-21 ¶ 8, 233 P.3d at 633-34. For example,
precluding a pleading defendant from appealing a sentence
imposed following a contested probation violation hearing would
require the defendant to appeal from the finding of a probation
violation, but to file a separate Rule 32 petition for post-
conviction relief to contest the resulting sentence. See id.
Requiring parallel proceedings contravenes § 13-4033(B)’s
purpose of reducing the burden on the appellate courts. See
Hearing on H.B. 2481 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 40th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Feb. 24, 1992); accord Arizona State
Senate, Fact Sheet for H.B. 2481, 40th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mar.
19, 1992). Permitting the defendant to combine the finding of a
violation and the sentence imposed following a finding of a
probation violation in one appeal better serves the legislative
intent.
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III. CONCLUSION
¶12 Because Regenold appealed a sentence entered after a
contested hearing on a probation violation, § 13-4033(B) does
not bar his appeal. We reverse the decision of the court of
appeals and remand to that court for further proceedings.
__________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice
CONCURRING:
_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice
_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
_____________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice (Retired)
P E L A N D E R, Justice, dissenting
¶13 I respectfully dissent, but not because the majority
does violence to the wording of A.R.S. § 13-4033. In fact, the
majority’s interpretation of that statute is plausible and
perhaps preferable for the policy reasons set forth in ¶ 11,
supra. In my view, however, the more reasonable and logical
interpretation of § 13-4033(B) precludes Regenold’s appeal
because, at bottom, he is appealing from a sentence “entered
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pursuant to a plea agreement.” Indeed, in the only issue raised
on appeal, Regenold directly challenges his plea agreement’s
prescribed sentencing range under which the trial court
sentenced him, as it was required to do. Therefore, because the
appeal is prohibited under § 13-4033(B), the proper avenue of
review is by petition for post-conviction relief under Arizona
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.
¶14 The majority bases its contrary conclusion on one of
the two exceptions set forth in § 13-4033(B) – “an admission to
a probation violation.” But subsection (B) is framed in the
disjunctive and clearly precludes defendants in noncapital cases
from appealing “from a judgment or sentence that is entered
pursuant to a plea agreement.” On its face, that prohibition is
neither qualified nor limited to situations in which the
defendant is initially (or contemporaneously) sentenced to a
prison term, rather than initially being placed on probation,
after the trial court accepts the plea; nor is the prohibition
tied to whether or not the defendant ultimately admits to a
probation violation, a situation in which appellate jurisdiction
also is foreclosed under the second, independent clause of
subsection (B).
¶15 Nonetheless, I acknowledge that the language of § 13-
4033(B) has no “plain meaning” and, on its face, does not
clearly answer the appellate jurisdiction issue presented here.
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But when statutory words do not lend themselves to a plain
meaning or yield an obvious result, we may refer “to an
established, widely respected dictionary for the ordinary
meaning” of the words. State v. Wise, 137 Ariz. 468, 470 n.3,
671 P.2d 909, 911 n.3 (1983); see also A.R.S. § 1-213 (“Words
and phrases shall be construed according to the common and
approved use of the language.”).
¶16 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “pursuant to,” the key
phrase in this case, as “[i]n compliance with; in accordance
with; under[;] . . . [a]s authorized by.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1356 (9th ed. 2009). After accepting Regenold’s
plea, the trial court was bound by its terms, including the
sentencing range Regenold now claims is illegal. See Mejia v.
Irwin, 195 Ariz. 270, 273 ¶ 17, 987 P.2d 756, 759 (App. 1999)
(“Once the State made the agreement with Mejia and the court
accepted and acted upon it, all parties were bound by it.”);
State v. Druke, 128 Ariz. 604, 605, 627 P.2d 1102, 1103 (App.
1981) (“[I]t is the duty of the court to carry out the terms of
the [plea] agreement.”). Because the plea wholly controlled the
court’s sentence, the sentence was a direct (albeit deferred)
consequence of the plea agreement. See State v. Muldoon, 159
Ariz. 295, 298, 767 P.2d 16, 19 (1988) (stating probation is a
court order “suspend[ing] or defer[ring]” the imposition of
sentence to “some future date” in order to give a defendant “a
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period of time in which to perform certain conditions and
thereby avoid imposition of a sentence”). Therefore, Regenold’s
appeal effectively challenges a term in his plea agreement and,
as such, is disallowed by § 13-4033(B) and Rule 17.1(e)
(providing that defendants in noncapital cases who plead guilty
waive right to direct appeal and may seek review only via post-
conviction proceedings under Rule 32). Cf. State v. Delgarito,
189 Ariz. 58, 59, 61, 938 P.2d 107, 108, 110 (App. 1997)
(allowing appeal from trial court’s designation of offense as
felony, when appeal did not “effectively challenge[] the plea
agreement or sentence,” and defendant had “no other means of
appellate review”).
¶17 I find the majority’s analysis unpersuasive because it
incorrectly assumes that Regenold’s ultimate sentence arose out
of the contested probation violation hearing rather than the
plea agreement. Regardless of when the trial court imposes
sentence on a pleading defendant, and even though the
“consequence” of sentencing resulted only from Regenold’s
probation violation, the inquiry should be whether the plea
agreement controlled the court’s disposition of the matter. The
majority seems to acknowledge that it did. See ¶ 8, supra.
¶18 The majority’s reasoning also suggests that § 13-
4033(B) applies only to sentences entered immediately following
a trial court’s acceptance of a plea agreement and not to
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sentences imposed sometime later, after intervening events have
occurred. But that view effectively inserts into § 13-4033(B)
the word “immediately” before the word “entered,” thereby
applying the statute’s prohibition only to sentences entered
immediately pursuant to a plea agreement. The statute contains
no such requirement and, absent an absurdity or impossibility,
this Court is not free to modify the statute in that way. See
Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242, 250, 204 P.2d 854,
859 (1949).
¶19 Moreover, any temporal limit on § 13-4033(B) is
inconsistent with multiple cases that conclude a sentence was
pursuant to a plea agreement, precluding direct appeal, despite
the presence of intervening events. In State v. Celaya, 213
Ariz. 282, 282-83 ¶¶ 1-2, 7, 141 P.3d 762, 762-63 (App. 2006),
and State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales, 208 Ariz. 198, 199 ¶ 1, 92 P.3d
424, 425 (App. 2004), the intervening event was invalidation of
the original sentence. In State v. Jimenez, 188 Ariz. 342, 342-
43, 935 P.2d 920, 920-21 (App. 1996), the intervening event was
the defendant’s motion to vacate the plea agreement’s probation
conditions. The defendant’s only relief in each of those cases
was by post-conviction relief under Rule 32.1. As those
authorities indicate, the inquiry relevant to § 13-4033(B) is
whether, in the end, an appeal essentially challenges the plea
agreement. If so, as here, a case’s procedural history, or the
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specific timing of sentencing pursuant to the plea agreement,
does not render appealable an otherwise unappealable sentence.
¶20 Also unpersuasive is the majority’s reference to Rule
32.1 in support of its conclusion. See ¶ 10, supra. Appellate
jurisdiction is controlled and limited by statute, not rule.
See Campbell v. Arnold, 121 Ariz. 370, 371, 590 P.2d 909,
910 (1979). To the extent it is pertinent, however, Rule 32.1
provides that “[a]ny person who pled guilty or no contest . . .
shall have the right to file a post-conviction relief
proceeding” under Rule 32, and in that “of-right proceeding,”
the defendant may assert, as Regenold does, that “[t]he sentence
imposed exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law[.]” Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 32.1(c). It is undisputed here that Regenold “pled
guilty,” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, and that fact is unaltered by
his having later contested the probation-revocation petition
filed against him. Thus, having pled guilty, Regenold is
squarely within the category of defendants this Court, by rule,
has diverted to the Rule 32 path for post-conviction relief and
appellate review.
¶21 The majority’s concern about multiplicative
proceedings, though valid in the abstract, is unwarranted here
because Regenold does not challenge the revocation of probation.
More importantly, the hypothetical prospect of multiple
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proceedings does not allow us to override § 13-4033(B). Because
§ 13-4033(B) is a jurisdictional statute, the court of appeals
has no jurisdiction over any claims that fall within the
statute’s prohibitive scope, no matter how or when they arise
and even if the defendant could raise other claims on appeal.
Any multiplication of proceedings created by § 13-4033(B) is
simply a consequence of the legislature’s decision to divert
appeals from pleading defendants to the Rule 32 process, a
phenomenon that regularly occurs in reverse when non-pleading
defendants who appeal are relegated to Rule 32 post-conviction
proceedings for any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 525, 527
(2002).
¶22 For these reasons, the court of appeals lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Regenold’s appeal and, therefore, I
would affirm that court’s memorandum decision dismissing the
appeal.
__________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice
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