SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-04-0435-PR
Appellee, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CR 03-0728
PABLO ARCINIEGA MARTINEZ, )
) Maricopa County
Appellant. ) Superior Court
) No. CR 2000-014823(B)
)
__________________________________) O P I N I O N
Appeal from the Superior Court of Maricopa County
No. CR 2000-014823(B)
The Honorable Eileen S. Willett, Judge
SENTENCES AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
209 Ariz. 280, 100 P.3d 30 (App. 2004)
AFFIRMED IN PART
________________________________________________________________
TERRY GODDARD, ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel
Criminal Appeals Section
Michael T. O’Toole, Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Section
Attorneys for the State of Arizona
JAMES J. HAAS, MARICOPA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER Phoenix
By Stephen Whelihan, Deputy Public Defender
Attorneys for Pablo Arciniega Martinez
OFFICE OF COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL Phoenix
By Mark Kennedy
Treasure VanDreumel
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Maricopa County Office of Contract Counsel
________________________________________________________________
M c G R E G O R, Chief Justice
¶1 We granted review in this case to resolve a single
issue: Does the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a right to jury
trial, as applied to Arizona’s general felony sentencing scheme,
require that a sentencing judge consider only those aggravating
factors found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in determining
whether to impose an aggravated sentence, or may the judge find
and consider additional aggravating factors once a single
aggravating factor has been found by the jury, is inherent in
the jury’s verdict, or has been admitted by the defendant? We
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5.3 of the
Arizona Constitution and Rule 31.19 of the Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
I.
¶2 A jury convicted Pablo Arciniega Martinez of murder in
the first degree, burglary, and theft of a means of
transportation, all in connection with the brutal killing of
Martinez’ 69-year-old landlord. The State sought the death
penalty for the murder conviction, alleging two aggravators:
Martinez committed the murder for pecuniary gain, Ariz. Rev.
Stat. (A.R.S.) § 13-703.F.5 (Supp. 2000), and committed the
murder in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, id. §
13-703.F.6. The jury found neither of these aggravators, and
2
the trial judge imposed a sentence of natural life for the
murder conviction.
¶3 In determining the sentences for the burglary and
theft convictions, the trial judge, acting pursuant to A.R.S. §
13-702.C (Supp. 2000), found by a preponderance of the evidence
the following aggravating factors: (1) the presence of an
accomplice; (2) the use of a knife as a weapon; (3) the severe
injuries and death of the victim; (4) the emotional and physical
pain suffered by the victim; (5) the emotional and financial
harm to the victim’s family; (6) the brutal nature of the crime;
(7) pecuniary gain; and (8) the victim’s age. The trial judge
then imposed consecutive aggravated sentences of seven years
each for the burglary and theft convictions.
¶4 Martinez timely appealed both his convictions and the
imposition of aggravated sentences.1 In a supplemental brief to
the court of appeals, Martinez argued for the first time that
his aggravated sentences violate the United States Supreme
Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.
Ct. 2531 (2004), because the trial court improperly considered
aggravating factors not found by the jury. Because Martinez
failed to raise this issue at trial, the court of appeals
1
The court of appeals affirmed Martinez’ convictions in a
separate, unpublished memorandum decision. State v. Martinez, 1
CA-CR 03-0728 (Ariz. App. Nov. 4, 2004) (mem. decision).
Martinez did not seek review of that decision.
3
concluded that he had waived the claim.2 Nevertheless, the court
reviewed the sentencing procedure for fundamental error. State
v. Martinez, 209 Ariz. 280, 283 ¶ 9, 100 P.3d 30, 33 (App.
2004). Finding no fundamental error, the court affirmed
Martinez’ sentences, holding that they comport with the Sixth
Amendment as interpreted in Blakely. Id. at 281-82 ¶ 1, 100
P.3d at 31-32.
¶5 The court of appeals held that if a jury finds, or a
defendant admits, at least one aggravating factor, the defendant
becomes eligible to receive an aggravated sentence under A.R.S.
§ 13-702, and the trial judge may consider additional facts not
found by the jury in determining the actual sentence to impose.
Id. at 284 ¶ 16, 100 P.3d at 34. “[A] judge’s imposition of an
aggravated sentence that falls within the range authorized by a
jury’s verdict comports with Blakely; a jury need not find every
aggravator upon which a sentencing judge relies.” Id. at 281-82
¶ 1, 100 P.3d at 31-32. In Martinez’ case, the court concluded
that the finding that Martinez caused the death of the victim,
see A.R.S. § 13-702.C.1, was implicit in the jury’s guilty
2
Defendants who fail to object to error at trial do not,
strictly speaking, “waive” their claims. Rather, defendants who
fail to object to an error below forfeit the right to obtain
appellate relief unless they prove that fundamental error
occurred. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993);
State v. Henderson, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ ¶ 19, ___ P.3d ___, ___
(2005).
4
verdict on the first degree murder charge. Once the jury found
this aggravator, Martinez became eligible for an aggravated
sentence, and the trial judge could then consider other
aggravating factors in determining what sentence to impose
within the statutory range for an aggravated sentence.
Martinez, 209 Ariz. at 284 ¶ 16, 100 P.3d at 34.
¶6 Martinez petitioned for review, asking this Court to
consider whether the aggravated sentences for burglary and theft
comply with Blakely.3 We granted review because this is an issue
of first impression and a question of statewide importance. In
addition, we granted review to resolve a split in authority
within the court of appeals. Compare Martinez, 209 Ariz. at
281-82 ¶ 1, 100 P.3d at 31-32, and State v. Estrada, 210 Ariz.
111, 112 ¶ 1, 108 P.3d 261, 262 (App. 2005), with State v.
Munninger, 209 Ariz. 473, 480 ¶ 21, 104 P.3d 204, 211 (App.
2005), and State v. Alire, 209 Ariz. 517, 520-21 ¶ 14, 105 P.3d
163, 166-67 (App. 2005).
II.
¶7 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a trial by jury.
3
The court of appeals also held that the trial court’s
consideration of aggravating factors not found by a jury in
imposing a natural life sentence for the murder conviction did
not violate Blakely. Martinez, 209 Ariz. at 283 ¶ 12, 100 P.3d
at 33; see also State v. Fell (Sanders), ___ Ariz. ___, ___
5
Every criminal defendant has a right to “demand that a jury find
him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is
charged.” United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 748 (2005)
(Stevens, J., for the Court (constitutional majority)) (internal
quotations omitted). This right to jury trial is not confined
to the determination of guilt or innocence, but continues
throughout the sentencing process. Thus, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees to a defendant the right to demand that a jury find
the existence of any specific fact that the law makes essential
to his punishment. Id. at 749 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at ___,
124 S. Ct. at 2536). It is equally true, however, that “judges
in this country have long exercised discretion . . . in imposing
sentence within statutory limits in the individual case.”
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000).
¶8 In a series of decisions interpreting modern criminal
statutes and sentencing procedures in light of the Sixth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that
the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirement does not entirely
remove from the purview of judges any consideration of
aggravating factors. The Court has repeatedly distinguished
between those facts that are legally essential to increase the
punishment for a crime, and must therefore be found by a jury,
___________________
¶ 19, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (2005). Martinez does not challenge
that holding.
6
and those facts that a sentencing judge may, in his or her
discretion, consider in sentencing a defendant within the range
prescribed by statute and authorized by the jury’s verdict. See
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999); Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 494; Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002);
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 604-05 (2002) (Ring II); Blakely,
542 U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2537; Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750.
A.
¶9 The Supreme Court first addressed the application of
the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirement to the determination
of aggravating factors in Jones. There, the Court expressed
concern that “diminishment of the jury’s significance by
removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing
range would resonate with the claims of earlier controversies,
to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled.”
Jones, 526 U.S. at 248. The Court noted that prior cases
suggested the following constitutional principle: “[A]ny fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 243 n.6.
Prior case law did not suggest, however, that the Sixth
Amendment requires that a jury find every fact related to a
sentencing decision; rather, the case law indicated that
removing from the jury the consideration of facts that increase
7
a sentencing range may run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at
248. Jones did not decide whether the Sixth Amendment requires
juries to decide facts related to sentencing, however, because
the Court ultimately interpreted the statute before it so as to
avoid this constitutional issue. Id. at 251-52.
¶10 One year later, in Apprendi, the Court answered the
question left open in Jones, by holding that “[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530
U.S. at 490. Once again, the Court explained that “nothing in
[the history of the right to jury trial] suggests that it is
impermissible for judges to exercise discretion—taking into
consideration various factors relating both to offense and
offender—in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by
statute.” Id. at 481. Importantly, the Apprendi decision also
noted that labeling a specific fact as an “element” or a
“sentencing factor” is irrelevant to the Sixth Amendment
analysis: “[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of
effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a
greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty
verdict?” Id. at 494. If so, that fact is functionally an
“element” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment jury right. A
“sentencing factor,” by contrast, is “a circumstance, which may
8
be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports
a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s
finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense.”
Id. at 494 n.19. Thus, Apprendi established that only those
facts that expose a defendant to a penalty greater than the
prescribed statutory maximum applicable by virtue of a guilty
verdict are facts “legally essential” to the punishment.
¶11 The Court reinforced this conclusion two years later
in Harris. In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Kennedy,
the Court stated that while a jury must find those facts that
establish the outer limits of a sentence, facts that limit a
judge’s sentencing discretion within the prescribed statutory
range, such as those that compel imposition of a mandatory
minimum sentence, may be found by judges rather than juries.
Harris, 536 U.S. at 567. Thus, “[j]udicial factfinding in the
course of selecting a sentence within the authorized range does
not implicate the indictment, jury-trial, and reasonable-doubt
components of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” Id. at 558.
¶12 In Blakely, the Supreme Court applied these principles
to a Washington state sentencing scheme and further clarified
the import of the term “statutory maximum.” “Our precedents
make clear . . . that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
9
by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at
2537. In so holding, the Court continued to proclaim that the
Sixth Amendment does not prohibit all judicial factfinding:
Of course indeterminate [sentencing] schemes involve
judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like a parole
board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems
important to the exercise of his sentencing
discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether
the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence—
and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial
impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is
concerned.
Id. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2540.
¶13 Recently, the Supreme Court applied its Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(the Guidelines). Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738. In Booker, the
defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute
at least fifty grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (1999). 125 S. Ct. at 746 (Stevens, J., for the
Court (constitutional majority)). The jury heard evidence that
he possessed ninety-two and one-half grams and found him guilty.
That determination established a minimum sentence of 120 months
in prison and a maximum sentence of life in prison. Taking into
account Booker’s criminal history and the quantity of drugs
found by the jury, the Guidelines directed the district court
judge to select a sentence of not less than 210 nor more than
262 months in prison. After holding a post-trial sentencing
proceeding, the sentencing judge concluded by a preponderance of
10
the evidence that Booker had possessed an additional 566 grams
of crack and that he was guilty of obstructing justice. Under
the Guidelines, those findings directed the judge to impose a
sentence between 360 months and life imprisonment; the judge
imposed the minimum sentence permitted by the Guidelines. Thus,
rather than the sentence of 262 months that the judge could have
imposed solely on the basis of the facts proved to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, Booker received a 360 month sentence,
based in part upon the additional aggravating facts found by the
judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
¶14 The Court, applying Apprendi and its progeny, held
that mandatory Guidelines would violate the Sixth Amendment.
Once again, the Court emphasized that its decision would not
limit the discretion of a judge to determine a defendant’s
sentence within a prescribed range permitted by a jury verdict:
If the Guidelines as currently written could be read
as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather
than required, the selection of particular sentences
in response to differing sets of facts, their use
would not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have
never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise
broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a
statutory range. . . . For when a trial judge
exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence
within a defined range, the defendant has no right to
a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems
relevant.
Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
11
¶15 In a separate part of the opinion, authored by Justice
Breyer, the Court struck only those provisions of the Guidelines
that made them mandatory, thus permitting the Guidelines to
remain in place as advisory. Id. at 756-57 (Breyer, J., for the
Court (remedial majority)). Justice Stevens dissented from the
Breyer majority’s remedial holding because he concluded that the
Guidelines could continue to be applied constitutionally in the
vast majority of cases. Id. at 771-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part). This is so, Justice Stevens asserted, because “the
Guidelines as written possess the virtue of combining a
mandatory determination of sentencing ranges and discretionary
decisions within those ranges, . . . allow[ing] ample latitude
for judicial factfinding that does not even arguably raise any
Sixth Amendment issue.” Id. at 772. Thus, Justice Stevens’
dissent also reinforces the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment
permits judicial discretion in imposing a sentence within a
statutory range authorized by the jury’s verdict.
¶16 The Supreme Court’s recent Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, from Jones through Booker, leads inexorably to
the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does not remove from a
trial judge the traditional sentencing discretion afforded the
judge, so long as the judge exercises that discretion within a
sentencing range established by the fact of a prior conviction,
facts found by a jury, or facts admitted by a defendant. Once a
12
jury finds the facts legally essential to expose a defendant to
a statutory sentencing range, the sentencing judge may consider
additional factors in determining what sentence to impose, so
long as the sentence falls within the established range.
B.
¶17 We recently recognized that Blakely implicates
Arizona’s general felony sentencing scheme as well. State v.
Brown (McMullen), 209 Ariz. 200, 203 ¶ 12, 99 P.3d 15, 18
(2004). In Brown (McMullen), we held that, under Arizona law,
the statutory maximum sentence for Apprendi purposes in a case
in which no aggravating factors have been proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt is the presumptive sentence
established in A.R.S. § 13-701.C.1 (2004). Id. Because of the
unique procedural posture of the Brown (McMullen) case, however,
we declined to address “the full implications of Apprendi and
its progeny for the Arizona sentencing scheme.” Id. at ¶ 15.
Instead, we opted to later address additional questions “in the
context of a case in which [a] relevant issue is squarely
presented, properly briefed, and addressed by the courts below.”
Id. at 203-04 ¶ 15, 99 P.3d at 18-19. The present case provides
an opportunity to address one such question.
III.
¶18 Under Blakley, a jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt any fact that is “legally essential to the punishment.”
13
542 U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2543. This case requires us to
determine what facts are “legally essential” for an aggravated
sentence to be imposed upon a defendant pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-
702.
¶19 In Arizona, a defendant convicted of a felony faces a
presumptive sentence pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-701 (Supp. 2000).
Under the statutes in force at the time of Martinez’ sentencing,
a judge could increase or decrease a defendant’s presumptive
sentence within a range established by A.R.S. § 13-702.A only if
“the circumstances alleged to be in aggravation or mitigation of
the crime are found to be true by the trial judge.” A.R.S. §
13-702.B. After listing the aggravating and mitigating factors
that a court must consider, the statute further provides:
In determining what sentence to impose, the court
shall take into account the amount of aggravating
circumstances and whether the amount of mitigating
circumstances is sufficiently substantial to call for
the lesser term. If the court finds aggravating
circumstances and does not find any mitigating
circumstances, the court shall impose an aggravated
sentence.
Id. § 13-702.D.
¶20 Martinez interprets this statutory scheme to mean that
a defendant is not eligible for an aggravated sentence until all
aggravating factors that will be relied upon in sentencing have
been found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. This is so,
avers Martinez, because the language in section 13-702.D
14
requires a sentencing judge to balance all the aggravators and
mitigators in determining what sentence to impose. According to
Martinez, because the maximum sentence he could have received
depended upon the quantity and quality of the aggravators, each
aggravator relied upon by a judge in sentencing is a fact that
increases the penalty, and all such facts are legally essential
to his punishment. Therefore, Martinez contends, each
aggravating factor must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.
¶21 Martinez’ interpretation of the statutes conflates the
concept of the maximum potential sentence to which a defendant
is exposed with the actual sentence imposed. The Supreme Court
has made clear that only those factors that increase the maximum
potential sentence to which a defendant is exposed are “legally
essential” for Sixth Amendment purposes. Under Arizona’s
sentencing scheme, once a jury implicitly or explicitly finds
one aggravating factor, a defendant is exposed to a sentencing
range that extends to the maximum punishment available under
section 13-702. See Brown (McMullen), 209 Ariz. at 202 ¶ 11, 99
P.3d at 17 (“Section 13-702(A) allows an increase of this
presumptive sentence to a maximum [sentence] . . . upon a
finding of one or more of the aggravating circumstances set
forth in § 13-702(C).”) (emphasis added). Under those
circumstances, a trial judge has discretion to impose any
15
sentence within the statutory sentencing range. Thus, a jury
finding of a single aggravating factor establishes the facts
legally essential to expose the defendant to the maximum
sentence prescribed in section 13-702.
IV.
¶22 We recognize that we rejected a similar argument
proffered by the State in State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 561 ¶
87, 65 P.3d 915, 942 (2003) (Ring III). There, the State argued
that if it established any single aggravating factor under
A.R.S. § 13-703 in conformity with the Sixth Amendment, the
defendant became “death eligible,” and a trial judge could then
find additional aggravating factors. In rejecting the State’s
argument, we stated:
A narrow reading of Ring II may permit a judge to
decide the existence of additional aggravating factors
in the circumstances described by the State. As the
State contends, once the government establishes any
aggravating factor, a defendant becomes “death
eligible” in the strict sense, and establishing
additional aggravating factors does not render a
defendant “more” death eligible. In our view,
however, Ring II should not be read that narrowly.
Although the Court there considered a death sentence
based upon the existence of a single aggravating
factor, we conclude that Ring II requires a jury to
consider all aggravating factors urged by the state
and not either exempt from Ring II, implicit in the
jury’s verdict, or otherwise established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 561-62 ¶ 88, 65 P.3d at 942-43.
16
¶23 We regard our opinion in Ring III as distinguishable
for two reasons. First, in Ring III, we sought to interpret the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ring II and concluded that the Court
intended to require that a jury decide all aggravating factors.
Since our decision in Ring III, we have gained the benefit of
additional United States Supreme Court opinions, and both
Blakely and Booker clarify that, at least in the non-capital
context, a jury need find only that fact or those facts that are
“legally essential” to expose a defendant to a particular
sentencing range.
¶24 Second, in Ring III, we considered the statutory
scheme peculiar to capital sentencing in Arizona, rejecting the
State’s “single aggravator” argument in part because
the procedures urged by the State do not reflect any
sentencing procedure ever adopted by our legislature.
In both the superseded and current capital sentencing
schemes, the legislature assigned to the same fact-
finder responsibility for considering both aggravating
and mitigating factors, as well as for determining
whether the mitigating factors, when compared with the
aggravators, call for leniency. Neither a judge,
under the superseded statutes, nor the jury, under the
new statutes, can impose the death penalty unless that
entity concludes that the mitigating factors are not
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The
process involved in determining whether mitigating
factors prohibit imposing the death penalty plays an
important part in Arizona's capital sentencing scheme.
204 Ariz. at 562 ¶ 89, 65 P.3d at 943 (citations omitted). In
response to Ring II, the Arizona Legislature adopted a revised
capital sentencing scheme designed to conform Arizona law to the
17
Ring II mandate. See id. at 545 ¶ 13, 65 P.3d at 926. The
legislature chose not to split between fact-finders the duties
of finding aggravating and mitigating factors and balancing
those factors to determine whether the death sentence is
appropriate. Instead, the legislature left these duties in the
hands of only one fact-finder in both the superseded and the
revised statutes.
¶25 Arizona’s non-capital sentencing scheme stands in
contrast to the capital sentencing scheme discussed in Ring III.
As the court of appeals pointed out, “Arizona’s non-capital
felony sentencing provisions have accommodated a scheme where
some factual determinations which increase a defendant’s
sentence are found by the jury while others are found by the
judge, with the ultimate sentencing decision made by the
latter.” Martinez, 209 Ariz. at 285 ¶ 19, 100 P.3d at 35. As
of the time of Martinez’ sentencing, the Arizona Legislature had
not revised A.R.S. § 13-702 in light of the Supreme Court’s
Sixth Amendment holdings.4 Thus, unlike the capital sentencing
4
Following oral argument in this case, the legislature
amended A.R.S. §§ 13-702 and 13-702.01 to conform them to the
Supreme Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. See 2005
Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 20, §§ 1-2. The amended statutes are
consistent with the conclusion we reach today. The statutes
bifurcate responsibility for finding aggravating factors between
the jury, which must find at least one aggravating factor beyond
a reasonable doubt, and the judge, who may then find additional
aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
§ 1. (“If the trier of fact finds at least one aggravating
18
provisions reviewed in Ring III, Arizona’s non-capital
sentencing statutes provide no indication that the legislature
intended to vest responsibility for finding all aggravating
facts in a single factfinder.5
V.
¶26 The Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find beyond a
reasonable doubt, or a defendant admit, any fact (other than a
prior conviction) necessary to establish the range within which
a judge may sentence the defendant. If, however, additional
facts are relevant merely to the exercise of a judge’s
discretion in determining the specific sentence to impose on a
defendant within a given statutory sentencing range, the Sixth
Amendment permits the judge to find those facts by a
preponderance of the evidence. Under A.R.S. § 13-702, the
existence of a single aggravating factor exposes a defendant to
___________________
circumstance, the trial court may find by a preponderance of the
evidence additional aggravating circumstances.”).
5
We also note that determining aggravating factors in a
capital case serves a somewhat different purpose than that
served by determining aggravating factors in non-capital cases.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that aggravating factors in capital cases must “genuinely narrow
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Zant
v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). In non-capital
sentencing, however, aggravating factors serve only to establish
the range of sentence and do not involve Eighth Amendment
issues.
19
an aggravated sentence. Therefore, once a jury finds or a
defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth
Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find and consider
additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up
to the maximum prescribed in that statute.
¶27 In this case, the sentencing judge relied upon eight
aggravating factors in imposing aggravated sentences for
Martinez’ burglary and theft convictions. The jury implicitly
found one of those aggravators, the severe injuries and death of
the victim, when it convicted Martinez of first degree murder.6
Because at least one aggravating factor was implicit in the
jury’s verdict, the verdict exposed Martinez to a maximum
sentence of seven years imprisonment each for the burglary and
theft convictions. See A.R.S. § 13-702.A. The trial court’s
consideration of additional aggravating factors in imposing a
sentence within this range did not violate Blakely.
VI.
¶28 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm that portion of
the court of appeals opinion upholding the trial court’s
6
A.R.S. § 13-702.C.1 includes, as an aggravating factor, the
“[i]nfliction or threatened infliction of serious physical
injury.” A.R.S. § 13-105.34 (2000) defines “serious physical
injury” as including “physical injury which creates a reasonable
risk of death.” No one in this case argues that injury that
actually results in death falls outside this definition.
20
judgment imposing aggravated sentences for Martinez’ theft and
burglary convictions.
__________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice
CONCURRING:
_______________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice
_______________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice
_______________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice
_______________________________________
Charles E. Jones, Justice (Retired)
21