State v. Roseberry

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-03-0247-AP
Appellee, )
) Yavapai County
v. ) Superior Court
) No. CR 2001-0177
HOMER RAY ROSEBERRY, )
)
Appellant. ) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. CR 2001-0177
The Honorable William T. Kiger, Judge

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________

TERRY GODDARD, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
by Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel
Capital Litigation Section
and Jon G. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee

DUCAR, LORONA & PARKS, P.C. Phoenix
by Jess A. Lorona
and Gregory E. McClure
Attorneys for Appellant
________________________________________________________________

B E R C H, Justice

¶1 Appellant Homer Roseberry was found guilty of

transportation of marijuana for sale, conspiracy to transport

marijuana for sale, and the first-degree murder of Fred Fottler.

The jury sentenced him to death for the murder.
¶2 Appeal to this court is direct and automatic when a

sentence of death has been imposed. Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”)

§ 13-703.04 (Supp. 2004); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.15, 31.2(b).

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3)

of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. § 13-4031 (2001), and

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.2(b).

I. FACTS1

A. Drug Transportation and Murder

¶3 In 1997, on a trip to California in their motorhome,

Roseberry and his wife, Diane, met members of a marijuana-

smuggling ring known as the Pembertons. In late 1998 and early

1999, Roseberry was paid by the Pembertons to transport three

loads of marijuana in his motorhome from Arizona to Michigan.

¶4 In early October of 2000, Roseberry agreed to transport

more than one thousand pounds of marijuana. When Roseberry

arrived in Phoenix to pick up the load, the Pembertons informed

him that Fred Fottler would accompany him to protect the goods.

Several large duffle bags of marijuana were then loaded into the

motorhome.

¶5 On October 20, 2000, Roseberry set off from Phoenix.

At that point, pursuant to a scheme devised by Roseberry and his

1
The testimony regarding Roseberry’s initial drug deliveries
for the Pembertons is unclear and conflicting. We present the
facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s
verdict. State v. Hall, 204 Ariz. 442, 445 n.1, 65 P.3d 90, 93
n.1 (2003).

- 2 -
friend, Charles Dvoracek, Dvoracek traveled to Wickenberg,

Arizona, where he was supposed to intercept and steal the

motorhome and marijuana while Roseberry and Fottler ate at a

Denny’s restaurant. So in the early morning hours of October

21, 2000, Dvoracek parked his truck on the side of the road and

waited for the motorhome to stop at Denny’s. But the motorhome

did not stay at the restaurant; instead, after pulling off the

road, Roseberry drove the motorhome back onto the highway and

continued north toward his home in Nevada.

¶6 Dvoracek followed the motorhome, which Roseberry soon

pulled over onto the shoulder of the road. As Dvoracek pulled

in behind it, he heard two pops. Roseberry stepped out of the

motorhome and told Dvoracek that he had “shot the guy” the

Pembertons had sent to accompany him on the drug run. Roseberry

explained that he pulled the motorhome over because Fottler had

fallen asleep on the couch. He seized the opportunity to shoot

Fottler in the back of the head.

¶7 Because Fottler was still making gurgling noises,

Roseberry returned to the motorhome and shot him a third time.

Roseberry and Dvoracek then wrapped Fottler’s body in a blanket

and dumped it into the gully on the side of the road.

¶8 As Roseberry drove north through Arizona, he threw his

gun out the window of the motorhome. Roseberry and Dvoracek

stopped in Kingman, Arizona, to remove other evidence of the

- 3 -
crime. They took a blood-stained sheet from the motorhome and

threw it over a fence. They also buried Fottler’s wallet and

moved one of the duffle bags of marijuana from the motorhome to

Dvoracek’s truck so Dvoracek could sell the drugs to raise money

in case it became necessary to bail Roseberry out of jail.

¶9 When the men arrived at Roseberry’s home in Henderson,

Nevada, on October 21, 2000, they put the motorhome and drugs

into storage.

¶10 Later that day, Roseberry confided to his wife, Diane,

that he killed Fottler so he could steal the marijuana and sell

it himself. Roseberry told her that his story was going to be

that “some Mexicans” with guns were on board the motorhome with

him and the victim, and they had killed Fottler while Roseberry

was out of the vehicle.

¶11 Diane called her brother, Otis Sonny Bowman, and asked

him to fly in from Indiana, which he did in the early morning

hours of October 22, 2000. Two drug dealers flew in with

Bowman. The drug dealers agreed to purchase about 300 pounds of

marijuana, which Bowman later transported to Ohio in Roseberry’s

motorhome. Roseberry and Dvoracek split the money from the sale.

¶12 Dvoracek’s neighbor, Steven Berkowitz, also transported

three loads of marijuana to Ohio for Roseberry and Dvoracek. On

his third trip, however, Berkowitz was stopped by the local

highway patrol and arrested for drug possession.

- 4 -
 B. The Arrest, Investigation, and Trial

¶13 Fottler’s body was soon discovered in Arizona.

Investigative leads from United States Customs agents quickly

led Yavapai County Deputy Sheriffs to Roseberry, whose motorhome

customs agents had observed while surveilling a Tucson stash

house.

¶14 An arrest warrant and indictment were issued for

Roseberry. The State timely notified him that it would seek the

death penalty, but the notice did not specify the aggravating

factors on which the State would rely.

¶15 The jury found Roseberry guilty of the first-degree

murder of Fottler, transportation of more than two pounds of

marijuana for sale, and conspiracy to transport more than two

pounds of marijuana for sale. The court held the aggravation

phase of the trial the next day. The jury found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Roseberry committed the murder for

pecuniary gain. After a six-month delay and the dismissal of

two jurors, the court held the penalty phase of the trial.

¶16 On June 6, 2003, the jury returned a verdict of death,

finding that any mitigating factors were not sufficiently

substantial to call for leniency. On July 14th, the judge

sentenced Roseberry to death for Fottler’s murder, to an

aggravated term of ten years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to

transport two pounds or more of marijuana for sale, and to a

- 5 -
consecutive aggravated term of ten years’ imprisonment for

transportation of marijuana for sale. An automatic notice of

appeal was immediately filed, challenging all of Roseberry’s

convictions and sentences.

II. DISCUSSION

¶17 Roseberry raises thirteen issues on appeal and lists

fourteen others to prevent preclusion. We address only those

issues argued to this court and attach a list of preserved

claims as an appendix to this opinion.

A. Ex Post Facto Violation

¶18 Roseberry argues that the new death penalty sentencing

statute, A.R.S. § 13-703.01 (Supp. 2004), violates the ex post

facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions, and

A.R.S. § 1-244 (2002).2 In State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 547,

¶ 24, 65 P.3d 915, 928 (2003) (“Ring III”), this court held that

A.R.S. § 13-703.01 does not violate either the state or federal

constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws because

jury sentencing is not a substantive change from prior Arizona

law, but rather is merely a procedural change. See also Schriro

2
Roseberry challenges application of the new statute on the
basis of A.R.S. § 1-244, which provides that “[n]o statute is
retroactive unless expressly declared therein.” This argument
fails because the legislature expressly provided that the new
sentencing procedures in A.R.S. § 13-703.01 would apply to any
sentencing proceeding on any first degree murder case held after
the effective date of the amending act. 2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws,
ch. 1, § 7.

- 6 -
v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2524 (2004); State v. Towery, 204

Ariz. 386, 391, ¶ 12, 64 P.3d 828, 833 (2003). Because this

procedural change does not retroactively alter the definition of

the crime of murder or increase the penalty, Roseberry’s ex post

facto claim fails. See Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 545-46, ¶ 16, 65

P.3d at 926-27.

B. Notice of Aggravating Factor and Presentation to Grand
Jury

¶19 Roseberry argues that his state and federal jury trial

rights were violated because the State did not present the

aggravating factor to the grand jury for a probable cause

determination. He also claims that the State’s failure to

provide formal notice of the aggravating circumstance on which

it would rely in seeking the death penalty violates his state

and federal due process rights, as well as his right to notice

under Rule 15.1(g) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

¶20 We recently ruled that neither the state constitution

nor the United States Supreme Court opinions in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

(2002) (Ring II), require that aggravating factors be presented

to the grand jury. McKaney v. Foreman (State), 209 Ariz. 268,

269, ¶ 1, 100 P.3d 18, 19 (2004). The question resolved in

McKaney is the same one Roseberry raises. We therefore conclude

- 7 -
that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit the

pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance to the grand jury.3

¶21 Roseberry next argues that his due process rights were

violated because he did not receive formal notice of the

aggravating factor. The State admits that it did not provide

notice pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure

15.1(i)(2). However, Roseberry did not object to the lack of

notice before trial, during trial, or before the aggravation

phase, and he does not claim surprise or prejudice. Because

there was no objection, we review this claim only for

fundamental error. See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 449-50, ¶

85, 94 P.3d 1119, 1144-45 (2004). “Fundamental error is ‘error

of such dimensions that it cannot be said it is possible for a

defendant to have had a fair trial.’” Id. at 450, ¶ 86, 94 P.3d

at 1145 (quoting State v. Smith, 114 Ariz. 415, 420, 561 P.2d

739, 744 (1977)).

¶22 Roseberry’s trial fell into a procedural gap caused by

a change in notice requirements under the rules of criminal

procedure. The previous rule allowed the State to disclose its

list of aggravating circumstances within ten days after a jury

returned a verdict of guilt on a first-degree murder charge.

3
Moreover, claims relating to problems in the grand jury
process must be raised before trial. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz.
424, 439-40, ¶ 31, 94 P.3d 1119, 1134-35 (2004). Roseberry
failed to raise this claim before trial and thus waived his
claim.

- 8 -
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(g)(2)(a) (2001). After the United States

Supreme Court released its Ring II decision in June of 2002,

however, Arizona amended its death penalty statute and

corresponding rules of criminal procedure. Roseberry’s trial

was postponed six months to allow the legislature to change its

laws to conform to the Ring II requirements.

¶23 The rule now in effect requires the State to provide

notice of the aggravating factors on which it will rely in

seeking the death penalty within sixty days of arraignment.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(i)(2) (2005). That requirement was not

in place when Roseberry was charged; under the old rule, the

State could provide notice ten days after the murder conviction.

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(g)(2)(a) (2001). In Roseberry’s

case, however, the aggravation phase of the trial began the day

after the guilt phase verdict was returned, nine days before

notice of the aggravating factors was due.

¶24 Roseberry conceded at oral argument that he received

actual notice of the aggravating circumstance on or before

October 30, 2002, when the State filed its requested jury

instructions for the aggravation phase of the trial. Among

other requested instructions, the State requested an instruction

on the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain. Roseberry

therefore had actual notice within the time prescribed by the

rule then in effect and more than a month before trial.

- 9 -
¶25 Because Roseberry had actual notice of the aggravating

circumstance before trial and conceded at oral argument that he

suffered no prejudice from the lack of formal notice, he was not

denied due process. See State v. Lee, 185 Ariz. 549, 556, 917

P.2d 692, 699 (1996). We do not find fundamental error on this

point.

C. Potential Jurors’ General Objections to the Death
Penalty

¶26 Roseberry contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by excusing eleven potential jurors for cause based

on their personal objections to the death penalty. We review a

trial judge’s decision to strike potential jurors for cause for

abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 302, ¶¶ 24,

26, 4 P.3d 345, 357 (2000). Because defense counsel did not

object to the dismissal of individual jurors, however, we review

only for fundamental error. Moody, 208 Ariz. at 449-50, ¶ 85,

94 P.3d at 1144-45.

¶27 The Sixth Amendment prohibits the exclusion for cause

of venire persons solely because they “have general objections

to the death penalty.” State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314, 318,

¶ 6, 4 P.3d 369, 373 (2000) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391

U.S. 510 (1968)). In Anderson, we held that “[a] general

objection to the death penalty is not sufficient to create a

presumption that a prospective juror is unfit because of bias to

- 10 -
sit on the panel.” Id. This rule, however, has an exception:

“prospective jurors who state unequivocally that they could

never impose the death penalty regardless of the facts of the

particular case” may be excused for cause without violating the

constitution. Id. ¶ 7 (citing Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 514).

Prospective jurors should be excused for cause if either their

objection to, or support of, the death penalty prevents them

from properly judging the facts of a particular case. Id.

(citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 734 n.7 (1992)).

¶28 Roseberry requested that the trial judge privately voir

dire each potential juror who indicated a strong feeling

regarding the death penalty. The judge agreed to do so. After

explaining to the potential jurors that the penalty phase of the

trial might require them to impose a sentence of death, the

judge asked those assembled in the courtroom if any of them

believed “that their ability to perform their duty [as jurors]

would be substantially impaired or simply would be prevented” by

their beliefs regarding the death penalty. Eight people

responded affirmatively, and all eight of them were brought into

chambers individually for further questioning.4

1. Prospective Juror I.J.

¶29 The judge asked I.J. pointed questions about his

4
Roseberry does not object to the dismissal of Juror L.J.
and thus her dismissal will not be addressed. Initials are used
to protect the privacy of these individuals.

- 11 -
opposition to the death penalty, and I.J. responded that he

“would not be able to . . . effectively come to a right

decision.” The prosecutor followed up with questions to which

I.J. ultimately responded that he would follow the law set forth

in the judge’s instructions. Based on that response, the judge

did not strike I.J. at that time.

2. Prospective Juror J.S.

¶30 When asked in chambers about her objection to the death

penalty, J.S. responded that she could not impose the death

penalty on anyone and could not consider the State’s evidence in

the aggravation phase of the trial. Defense counsel tried to

rehabilitate J.S., but she maintained her position that she

could never vote to impose the death penalty. The judge excused

her for cause, without objection by either counsel.

3. Prospective Juror B.H.

¶31 After explaining to B.H. the procedure and issues in

Roseberry’s case, the judge asked if she had any questions about

them. B.H. stated that she could not “come to grips with being

a part of something that sends somebody to death.” After

further questioning, she explained that even if all the facts

pointed toward a conviction, she was not sure she could convict

because she could be sending somebody to death. The prosecutor

asked B.H. if she could set aside her feelings and follow the

law, to which she responded, “No, I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t be able

- 12 -
to.” Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate her, but B.H. stated

that, for her, imposing death was not an option. She further

stated that “if it came right down to it, I could not apply the

death penalty.” At that point, the judge excused B.H. for

cause, without objection by either counsel.

4. Prospective Juror F.F.

¶32 Asked whether she could serve as a trial juror, F.F.

responded, “I couldn’t do the death penalty for anybody. I’d

feel really, really, really — I couldn’t do it.” She stated

that she couldn’t “even hit a fly.” Defense counsel tried to

rehabilitate F.F., but she remained adamant that she could not

sentence anyone to death. When the judge again questioned F.F.,

she reaffirmed, “I can’t do the death penalty for anybody.” At

that point, the judge dismissed F.F. for cause, without

objection by either counsel.

5. Prospective Juror M.M.

¶33 After explaining the legal proceedings to M.M., the

judge asked him if he would be able to serve as a trial juror.

M.M. stated that he is “very much against and [his] religion is

against the death penalty.” He expressed no problem with

determining guilt or innocence, but maintained that he could not

say that someone deserves the death penalty. The judge then

asked him, “No matter what the State would prove, you would not

vote or make your verdict be death?” The prospective juror

- 13 -
responded, “That’s right.” Defense counsel tried to

rehabilitate M.M., but he continued to assert that he could not

sentence anyone to death. Based on M.M.’s answers, the trial

judge dismissed him, without objection by either counsel.

6. Prospective Juror E.Y.

¶34 After explaining the trial process to prospective juror

E.Y., the judge asked him if it would be impossible for him to

follow the law, to which E.Y. responded “yes.” He stated that

he was “strongly opposed to the death penalty. I would rather

find a man innocent and put him out on the streets than send him

to his death.” Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate the juror,

but E.Y. insisted that he “could not send a man to his death.”

Based on his answers, the trial judge excused E.Y. for cause,

without objection by either counsel.

7. Prospective Juror S.S.

¶35 After explaining the trial process to S.S., the judge

asked her if it would be possible for her to be a trial juror.

She responded that she “could never, never, never, never go

along with” the death penalty. She went on to say that “God

takes life, not people.” Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate

S.S., and she did indicate that she could determine innocence or

guilt, but she maintained that she could not follow the judge’s

instructions if it “involved death.” At that point, the judge

dismissed S.S. for cause, without objection by either counsel.

- 14 -
¶36 She was the last juror individually questioned on the

first day of jury selection; but the following day, after the

court reassembled the prospective jurors and asked if any might

have a problem being a juror in this case, ten people raised

their hands. In response, the court individually questioned an

additional nine jurors and met with Juror I.J. again.5

8. Prospective Juror S.A.

¶37 When asked by the judge about her concerns about being

a trial juror, S.A. said, “I just feel like from a moral

standpoint I could not go along with the death penalty.”

Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate the potential juror, but

S.A. insisted that she could not vote to impose death. With

that, the judge excused S.A. for cause, without objection by

either counsel.

9. Prospective Juror R.J.

¶38 When questioned by the judge, R.J. stated, “I just

don’t believe in the death penalty.” The judge explained the

trial process to him and asked if he would be able to apply the

law, and R.J. replied that he would not. Defense counsel tried

to rehabilitate R.J., but when asked if he would follow the

judge’s instruction, he said he would not be able to vote for

death even if the defense did not establish mitigation

5
From the second day’s proceedings, we describe only the
questioning of the five potential jurors whose dismissals
Roseberry challenges as error on appeal.

- 15 -
sufficient to call for leniency. At that point, the judge

excused R.J., without objection by either counsel.

10. Prospective Juror I.J.

¶39 Juror I.J. had been questioned in chambers the previous

day, but indicated on the second day that it would be impossible

for him to be a trial juror, and so he was individually

questioned again. I.J. stated that he had spent a “very

sleepless night” since his questioning in chambers the day

before, and he had concluded that “no amount of evidence . . .

could ever convince [him] to put any individual to death.”

Defense counsel questioned I.J. further about his beliefs, to

which I.J. responded “there is no amount of evidence that would

ever convince me to put anybody to death.” The judge then

dismissed I.J. for cause, without objection by either counsel.

11. Prospective Juror K.G.

¶40 Juror K.G. stated that he could never “convict someone

if it required the death penalty.” He said that regardless of

the evidence, he would be unable to vote for death and unable to

follow the law. Both counsel questioned K.G., but he held fast

to his position. At that point, the judge dismissed K.G. for

cause, without objection by either counsel.

12. Prospective Juror L.E.

¶41 Prospective juror L.E. stated that she did not believe

she could vote for the death penalty under any circumstances.

- 16 -
The judge asked L.E. if she would be able to follow the law, and

she said no; she did not feel that she had the “right to do that

to somebody.” Defense counsel explained the trial process to

L.E., and she responded that she could not vote for death. She

stated firmly that she would not follow the law because it was

not up to her to decide if someone should die. The judge then

dismissed L.E. for cause, without objection by either counsel.

¶42 All eleven of the dismissed prospective jurors were

carefully questioned by the trial judge and defense counsel.

Defense counsel did not object to any of the dismissals and thus

this court reviews the dismissals only for fundamental error.

See Moody, 208 Ariz. at 449-50, ¶ 85, 94 P.3d at 1144-45.

¶43 Roseberry claims that his death sentence cannot be

upheld because the jury was chosen after excluding venire

persons for cause solely because they voiced general objections

to the death penalty. His premise is incorrect: Each dismissed

juror expressed more than a general objection to the death

penalty. As illustrated above, all admitted that they would not

follow the judge’s instruction on the law and thus it was

appropriate for the judge to dismiss them.

¶44 The trial judge was exceptionally careful in

questioning each juror who indicated disagreement with the death

penalty, and defense counsel personally examined those jurors.

Each dismissed juror clearly stated that he or she would not

- 17 -
follow the law, if following the law meant that the defendant

would be sentenced to death. Such statements meet the standards

for dismissal set forth in Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 514, and

adopted by this court in Anderson, 197 Ariz. at 318, ¶¶ 6-7, 4

P.3d at 373, and thus there was no error, fundamental or

otherwise.

D. Insufficient Evidence of Pecuniary Gain

¶45 Roseberry claims that the evidence that he committed

the murder for pecuniary gain was insufficient to support the

verdict. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5) (Supp. 2004).6 This court

reviews a jury’s finding for substantial evidence, viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury

verdict.7 State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484,

486 (1987). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla

and is such proof that ‘reasonable persons could accept as

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz.

64, 67, 796 P.2d 866, 869 (1990).

¶46 To prove that a defendant was motivated by a desire for

pecuniary gain, “the state must prove that pecuniary gain was a

‘motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely the

6
Roseberry did not raise this issue at trial by way of a
Rule 20 motion or objection.
7
In addition, this court conducts an independent review.
See infra § J, ¶¶ 77-79.

- 18 -
result.’” State v. Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, 159, ¶ 91, 42 P.3d

564, 590 (2002) (quoting State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 433,

¶ 32, 984 P.2d 31, 41 (1999)). “[P]ecuniary gain aggravation

does not require a motive to kill [but may] be based upon a

causal connection between the pecuniary gain objective and the

killing.” Id. ¶ 93.

¶47 At the aggravation phase of Roseberry’s trial, neither

the State nor the defense presented any new evidence because the

aggravation jury was the same jury that heard the guilt-phase

evidence. Instead, both counsel made closing arguments.

¶48 During his argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury

that the evidence showed that Fottler was killed so that

Roseberry could steal and sell the marijuana. He further

reminded the jury that Roseberry had admitted during the trial

that he started transporting marijuana for the Pembertons

because he needed the money. Roseberry also told his wife and

Dvoracek that he was going to make a lot of money by selling the

marijuana himself after getting rid of Fottler.

¶49 The pecuniary gain motive is further illustrated by the

evidence that Roseberry and his co-conspirators wasted no time

in setting up a deal to sell some of the marijuana. Indeed,

they called Bowman the very day Fottler was killed. Later,

Roseberry and Dvoracek arranged to have Berkowitz transport

marijuana to Ohio, and they split the proceeds of those sales.

- 19 -
¶50 The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Roseberry

was motivated to kill Fottler by the desire for pecuniary gain,

and that finding is well supported. Indeed, it is difficult to

imagine any other reason for Roseberry to kill Fottler.

Roseberry admitted that he had met Fottler only once before the

ill-fated drug run, and that meeting lasted just a few minutes.

There was no evidence of animus toward Fottler and no evidence

that hostility erupted between the two men during their

motorhome trip.

¶51 Reasonable evidence clearly supports the jury’s finding

that the receipt of pecuniary gain served as a motive, cause, or

impetus for the murder of Fottler, and thus we affirm the jury’s

finding of the (F)(5) aggravating factor.

E. Error in Jury Instructions

¶52 Roseberry makes three claims of error regarding the

jury instructions.

¶53 First, he argues that the trial court improperly

instructed the jurors to consider mitigation evidence using a

“significant impairment” standard. He did not, however, object

to the instructions during the trial and actually included the

same “significant impairment” language in the jury instructions

he requested for the penalty phase. Roseberry therefore invited

any error and waived his right to challenge the instruction on

appeal. See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 565-66, ¶ 9, 30 P.3d

- 20 -
631, 632-33 (2001) (stating that we “will not find reversible

error when the party complaining of it invited the error”).

¶54 Second, Roseberry claims that the trial court gave the

following instruction to the jury: “Aggravating circumstances

are those which increase the guilt or the enormity of the

offense.” That language, however, was not part of the court’s

instructions to the jury. Although the State included the

instruction in its proposed jury instructions for the

aggravation phase, the trial court declined to give the

requested instruction. We therefore will not address the issue.

¶55 Third, Roseberry asserts that the trial court’s

reasonable doubt instruction violated his right to a fair trial

and denied him due process. The instruction at issue is

identical to the one set forth in State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz.

592, 596, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995), which we have upheld as

constitutional several times. See State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz.

431, 441, ¶ 49, 72 P.3d 831, 841 (2003); State v. Prince, 204

Ariz. 156, 161, ¶ 25, 61 P.3d 450, 455 (2003); Cañez, 202 Ariz.

at 156, ¶¶ 75-76, 42 P.3d at 587. Furthermore, Roseberry did

not object to this instruction, and thus this court will only

review for fundamental error. See State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz.

1, 11, 870 P.2d 1097, 1107 (1994). Because the language of the

instruction is required by our holding in Portillo, the trial

- 21 -
court did not commit any error, much less fundamental error, in

giving that instruction.

F. Separation of Powers

¶56 Roseberry claims that A.R.S. § 13-703.05 (Supp. 2004),

which requires review of death sentences for abuse of

discretion, violates the separation of powers doctrine, as well

as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. However, by its own terms, the statute does not

apply in Roseberry’s case. Although the legislature stated

clearly that A.R.S. § 13-703.05 applies “to any sentencing or

resentencing proceeding on any first degree murder case that is

held after the effective date of this act,” it applies to a

capital case only if “the offense was committed on or after the

effective date of this act.” 2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, §

7(C). The statute became effective August 1, 2002. Id. § 5.

The murder in this case occurred in October, 2000. Section 13-

703.05, A.R.S., is therefore inapplicable to this case.

G. Double Punishment, A.R.S. § 13-116

¶57 Roseberry argues that the trial judge violated the

double punishment prohibition in A.R.S. § 13-116 by imposing

consecutive sentences for conspiracy to transport and actual

transportation of marijuana.8 The statute provides, in relevant

8
In his analysis of this issue, appellate counsel appears to
confuse this case with another, as he refers to four victims and

- 22 -
part, that “[a]n act or omission which is made punishable in

different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished

under both, but in no event may sentences be other than

concurrent.” A.R.S. § 13-116 (2001) (emphasis added).

¶58 To determine whether conspiracy and transportation

constitute separate acts, for which consecutive sentences are

permissible, or only one act, for which sentences must be

concurrent, we first apply the “identical elements test.” See

State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 312, 778 P.2d 1204, 1208 (1989)

(citing State v. Tinghitella, 108 Ariz. 1, 3, 491 P.2d 834, 836

(1971)). The test requires that we identify the ultimate crime,

discard the evidence that fulfills the elements of that crime,

and then determine whether the remaining facts satisfy the

elements of the other crimes. Id. (citing State v. Vaughn, 147

Ariz. 28, 30, 708 P.2d 453, 455 (1985)). If they do, then

consecutive sentences are permissible unless, given the entire

transaction, it was not possible to commit the ultimate crime

without also committing the other offense. Id. at 315, 778 P.2d

at 1211. Finally, if such a factual impossibility exists, we

argues that Roseberry cannot serve consecutive sentences for
first-degree burglary and being a prohibited possessor.
Roseberry, however, was not charged with or convicted of either
of those crimes, and his case involves only one victim. The
issue in this case relates to the marijuana charges and thus we
will apply the arguments made in Roseberry’s brief to the actual
facts of his case. Review of this legal issue is de novo. See
Galaz v. Stewart, 207 Ariz. 452, 454, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 166, 168
(2004).

- 23 -
must ascertain whether Roseberry’s conduct in committing the

secondary crime subjected the victim “to a different or

additional risk of harm than that inherent in the ultimate

offense.” Id. at 314, 778 P.2d at 1210.

¶59 In this case, although Roseberry identifies the murder

as the ultimate crime, he has not challenged the imposition of

the sentences for the drug charges as consecutive to the

sentence on the murder charge, but rather contests the order

making the sentences for the conspiracy and transportation

charges consecutive to each other. Because both conspiracy to

transport more than two pounds of marijuana and transportation

are class two felonies, see A.R.S. § 13-1003(D) (2001)

(conspiracy takes on the same class as the offense that is the

object of the conspiracy); id. § 13-3405(B)(11) (2001)

(designating transportation of two pounds or more of marijuana a

class two felony), neither is readily identifiable as the

ultimate offense. Because Roseberry has not argued otherwise,

we designate the conspiracy the ultimate crime for purposes of

this analysis.

¶60 The evidence that fulfills the conspiracy was that

Roseberry plotted with the Pembertons to use his motorhome to

transport more than a thousand pounds of marijuana and drove to

Phoenix. Discarding the evidence that supports that crime, we

find that independent evidence establishes the transportation

- 24 -
offense, which occurred when Roseberry had the drugs loaded into

his motorhome in Phoenix and then drove the marijuana-filled

vehicle to Nevada. Thus the evidence established two distinct

crimes that were committed by two entirely different sets of

acts. The facts do not show the commission of a single act that

“is made punishable in different ways by different sections of

the laws” so as to preclude the imposition of consecutive

sentences. See A.R.S. § 13-116.

¶61 In satisfaction of Gordon’s second step, the acts

comprising the conspiracy and the transportation were such that

Roseberry could have conspired to transport the drugs without

ever actually transporting them. See Gordon, 161 Ariz. at 315,

778 P.2d at 1211.

¶62 The third Gordon requirement, “whether the defendant’s

conduct in committing the lesser crime caused the victim to

suffer an additional risk of harm beyond that inherent in the

ultimate crime,” also supports the imposition of consecutive

sentences. Id. The transportation and conspiracy crimes

subjected the victim — society — to different risks. Conspiracy

adds an element of concerted criminal activity that endangers

society differently than individual acts do. Cf. United States

v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693 (1975) (noting that “the law of

conspiracy serves ends different from, and complementary to,

those served by criminal prohibitions of the substantive

- 25 -
offense”; conspiracy laws protect “society from the dangers of

concerted criminal activity”); see also Callanan v. United

States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961) (observing that “collective

criminal agreement — partnership in crime — presents a greater

potential threat to the public than individual delicts”).

Conspiracy to transport marijuana and the actual transportation

of marijuana may thus be punished separately by our criminal

laws. We therefore uphold the imposition of consecutive

sentences for the drug-related convictions.

H. Dismissal of Juror Eight9

¶63 Roseberry argues that the dismissal of Juror Eight a

week before the beginning of the penalty phase of the trial was

an abuse of discretion and that the trial court erred by failing

to instruct the reconstituted jury to begin sentencing

deliberations anew, as is required by Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 18.5(h). We review a trial judge’s decision to

dismiss a juror for abuse of discretion. State v. Milke, 177

Ariz. 118, 122, 865 P.2d 779, 783 (1993). Because Roseberry did

not object to the dismissal of the juror or the trial judge’s

failure to instruct the reconstituted jury to “begin

deliberations anew,” we will review only for fundamental error.

9
Roseberry does not contest the dismissal of Juror Ten, who
was dismissed for having read newspaper accounts of the trial
after serving on the jury for the guilt and aggravation phases,
but before the penalty phase.

- 26 -
Moody, 208 Ariz. at 449-50, ¶ 85, 94 P.3d at 1144-45.

¶64 A jury convicted Roseberry on December 19, 2002; that

same jury found the pecuniary gain aggravating factor the next

day. After a stay to allow the defense to take a special action

to the court of appeals, the trial court set the mitigation

hearing for June 4, 2003. On May 27, 2003, however, Juror Eight

handed the bailiff a letter from a doctor. The letter stated

that the juror’s wife was scheduled to undergo open-heart

surgery on June 4th, the day the jury was supposed to reconvene

for the mitigation or penalty phase of the trial. The judge

held an impromptu hearing with counsel on May 28th to address

the issue.

¶65 The prosecutor asked the judge to dismiss Juror Eight,

and although both defense lawyers addressed Roseberry’s absence

from the hearing,10 they did not clearly object to the dismissal

of Juror Eight, nor did they raise any concerns about potential

procedural problems based on Rule 18.5(h). The judge decided to

dismiss Juror Eight and replace him with an alternate.

¶66 In addressing the reconstituted jury before the

mitigation hearing began, the trial judge carefully questioned

each juror to make sure each had followed the admonition not to

10
Roseberry did not attend the hearing and his counsel
refused to waive his presence. Roseberry does not raise the
lack of waiver as an issue on appeal and therefore we do not
address it.

- 27 -
discuss the case or read about it during the six-month break.

He then gave explicit instructions that the jurors must consider

all of the evidence from the trial, including the guilt,

aggravation, and penalty phases. For example, he instructed the

jury: “The evidence you consider at the penalty phase is the

evidence presented at the guilty-not guilty phase and the

aggravation phase as well as any evidence presented at the

penalty phase.” He cautioned that the jurors “must consider any

evidence presented in the penalty phase, as well as any evidence

[they] heard at the previous two phases that related to any

mitigating circumstance to decide whether there are any

mitigating circumstances and to assess what weight to – to give

to any mitigating circumstance.” The judge also instructed the

jurors to evaluate the weight to be given the pecuniary gain

factor.

¶67 Furthermore, the trial judge took precautions to ensure

that Juror Twelve, the alternate who replaced Juror Eight, was

able to deliberate for the penalty phase. Juror Twelve affirmed

that he had no problem serving as a juror and deliberating in

the penalty phase. The prosecutor asked the juror about his

comfort with the prior proceedings and the jury findings:

Prosecutor: You understand that the jury has
deliberated without you and now you’re
going to step in to deliberate?
Juror: Yes, I do.
Prosecutor: You understand that that jury has found

- 28 -
 Mr. Roseberry guilty of first-degree
murder?
Juror: Yes.
Prosecutor: Do you understand that the jury has
also found that the State has proven an
aggravating circumstance?
Juror: Yes.
Prosecutor: Those have to be your verdicts as well.
Do you have any difficulty with that
concept?
Juror: No, I don’t.

¶68 Defense counsel asked the juror if he had any problems

sitting as a juror only for the mitigation portion of the trial,

to which Juror Twelve responded that he did not. At that point,

the judge allowed the juror to return to the waiting room while

the judge and counsel continued to voir dire the remaining

jurors.

¶69 Although we recognize that it is preferable to complete

a defendant’s trial with the same jury that began it, our Rules

of Criminal Procedure allow an alternate to be seated for the

penalty phase of the criminal trial. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

18.5(i) (“In the event a deliberating juror is excused during

either the aggravation or penalty phases due to inability or

disqualification to perform required duties, the court may

substitute an alternate juror . . . to join in the

deliberations.”). We have held that a defendant is not

constitutionally entitled to have the same jury that rendered a

guilty verdict decide resentencing. Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 551,

¶ 39, 65 P.3d at 932.

- 29 -
¶70 The alternate juror was questioned extensively by the

court and both counsel about his role as a replacement juror,

and no one objected to his placement on the jury. Moreover,

Roseberry makes no effective argument showing why the

replacement juror should not have been seated. We find,

therefore, that there was no fundamental error in the

replacement of Juror Eight for the mitigation phase of

Roseberry’s trial.

¶71 Roseberry next complains of the trial judge’s failure

to instruct the jury, as Rule 18.5(h) requires, to “begin

deliberations anew.” The failure was logical, however, because

no penalty phase deliberations had begun before Juror Twelve was

seated. Indeed, the newly constituted jury had not yet heard

any evidence or argument on mitigation.

¶72 Roseberry does not address Rule 18.5(i), which

instructs that a jury reconstituted to hear penalty

deliberations “shall not deliberate anew about a verdict already

reached and entered,” but “shall only begin anew for the phase

of the sentencing that [the juror is] currently deliberating.”

The trial judge carefully followed these rules: He instructed

the jury that it was to consider all of the evidence presented

in the case when it made its mitigation finding. He

specifically instructed the jurors to consider the evidence

presented at the guilt phase, as well as at the aggravation and

- 30 -
penalty phases. The judge’s instructions were sufficient to

protect Roseberry’s due process rights. We find no error.

I. Failure to Consider Mitigation Evidence

¶73 Roseberry claims that his constitutional rights were

violated because, although the jurors heard the mitigation

evidence on five statutory and five non-statutory mitigating

factors, they failed to find that mitigating factors existed, or

if they did find the factors to exist, they failed to give them

sufficient weight.11 He contends that because the trial judge

found the three mitigating factors — lack of prior convictions,

medical problems, and childhood difficulties — when sentencing

Roseberry for the drug offenses, the jury must have failed to

consider these factors for the murder offense.

¶74 But other than noting that the trial judge found the

mitigating factors in connection with the sentencing on the drug

convictions, Roseberry does not say why he believes the jury did

not consider any mitigating evidence. Because there is no

special verdict on mitigation,12 we cannot tell whether the jury

failed to find the mitigating factors, or whether it did find

11
This court’s independent review of these factors is set
forth in § J, ¶¶ 77-79, infra.
12
There cannot be a special verdict on mitigation because the
jurors need not agree that a mitigating factor has been proven
to exist. A.R.S. § 13-703(C) (2004). “Each juror may consider
any mitigating circumstances found by that juror in determining
the appropriate penalty.” Id.

- 31 -
some or all of them to exist, but concluded that they did not

outweigh the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain. The finding

and weighing of mitigating factors is for the jury. A.R.S.

§ 13-703.01(H). That the judge may have found certain

mitigating factors does not mean that the jury had to find the

same factors, as long as the jury’s findings were supported by

reasonable evidence. Roseberry has not shown that any jury

finding was unsupported, nor has he shown any failure by the

jury to perform its duty. Indeed, he has not shown that the

jury did not find the same factors the trial judge found.

¶75 Nor does Roseberry argue that the jurors were

improperly instructed. To the contrary, the record shows that

they were comprehensively instructed to consider all of the

evidence presented at the trial, including “factors in fairness

and mercy [that] may support a sentence other than death.” We

presume that the jury followed those instructions. See Weeks v.

Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000); see also State v. LeBlanc,

186 Ariz. 437, 439, 924 P.2d 441, 443 (1996).

¶76 Finally, the penalty verdict form, signed by the jury

foreman and read in open court, states that the jury “considered

all the facts and circumstances of this case.” Absent contrary

evidence or effective argument, we must presume that this is

true. See LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. at 439, 924 P.2d at 443. We find

no merit in Roseberry’s claim that the jury improperly weighed

- 32 -
or failed to find mitigation evidence.

J. Independent Weighing

¶77 This court independently reviews the jury’s findings of

aggravation and independently determines “if the mitigation is

sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of

existing aggravation.” State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 443-44,

¶ 60, 967 P.2d 106, 118-19 (1998); see also A.R.S. § 13-703.04.

The recent revisions to Arizona’s criminal code have not changed

our review of the death sentence in this case because the crime

occurred before 2002. We do not defer to the findings or

decision of the jury, but must review the record de novo to

determine the propriety of the death sentence. We consider “the

quality and the strength, not simply the number, of aggravating

and mitigating factors.” Greene, 192 Ariz. at 443, ¶ 60, 967

P.2d at 118.

¶78 In this case, the State proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that Roseberry committed Fottler’s murder for pecuniary

gain. See State v. Phillips, 205 Ariz. 145, 147, ¶ 7, 67 P.3d

1228, 1230 (2003) (reasonable doubt standard). He told his wife

and Dvoracek that he was going to make a lot of money selling

the marijuana and he could only do so by getting rid of Fottler.

Thus, the expectation of pecuniary gain clearly motivated or

served as the impetus for Roseberry’s actions. See A.R.S. § 13-

703(F)(5).

- 33 -
¶79 Our independent review further shows that the evidence

of mitigation is not sufficiently substantial to call for

leniency. As noted in ¶¶ 73-76, Roseberry presented evidence on

five statutory and five non-statutory mitigating circumstances,

all of which were either weak or non-existent. In reviewing the

entire record, we do not find mitigating evidence sufficiently

substantial to call for leniency and thus we affirm Roseberry’s

sentence of death.

III. CONCLUSION

¶80 For the foregoing reasons, Roseberry’s convictions and

sentences are affirmed.

__________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Justice

CONCURRING:

______________________________________
Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice

______________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice

______________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

______________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

- 34 -
 Appendix

Roseberry raises the following issues in order to prevent

federal preclusion. He acknowledges that this court has decided

all issues adversely to the positions he asserts. Each

proposition is followed by a citation to case law rejecting the

position he asserts.

A. The death penalty is cruel and unusual under any

circumstances and violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 15 of

the Arizona Constitution. State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75, 81,

¶ 30, 50 P.3d 825, 831 (2002).

B. The death penalty is imposed arbitrarily and

irrationally in Arizona and therefore violates the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

Article 2, Sections 4 and 15 of the Arizona Constitution. State

v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 247, 762 P.2d 519, 534 (1988).

C. Application of the death penalty on the facts of this

case would constitute cruel and unusual punishment, in violation

of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and Article 2, Sections 1, 4, and 15 of the Arizona

Constitution. Smith, 203 Ariz. at 81, ¶ 30, 50 P.3d at 831

(rejecting the argument that the death penalty is cruel and

unusual punishment under any circumstances).

D. The State’s discretion to seek the death penalty has

- 35 -
no standards and therefore violates the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 2,

Sections 1, 4, and 15 of the Arizona Constitution. State v.

Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 291, 908 P.2d 1062, 1076 (1996).

E. Arizona’s death penalty is applied so as to

discriminate against poor, young, and male defendants in

violation of Article 2, Sections 1, 4, and 13 of the Arizona

Constitution. State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 516, 898 P.2d

454, 465 (1995).

F. The absence of proportionality review of death

sentences by Arizona courts denies capital defendants due

process of law and equal protection and amounts to cruel and

unusual punishment, in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution. Smith, 203

Ariz. at 82, ¶ 32, 50 P.3d at 832.

G. Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme is

unconstitutional because it does not require the State to prove

that the death penalty is appropriate. Failure to require this

proof violates the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 15 of the

Arizona Constitution. State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267, 284, ¶ 64,

25 P.3d 1139, 1156 (2001), rev’d on other grounds, Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).

- 36 -
 H. Section 13-703.01, A.R.S., provides no objective

standards to guide the jury in weighing the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances and therefore violates the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and

Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution. See State v.

White, 194 Ariz. 344, 355, ¶ 49, 982 P.2d 819, 830 (1999)

(discussing standards for court’s weighing of factors).

I. Arizona’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional

because it does not require the sentencer to find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the

accumulated mitigating circumstances, in violation of the Fifth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona

Constitution. State v. Poyson, 198 Ariz. 70, 83, ¶ 59, 7 P.3d

79, 92 (2000).

J. Section 13-703.01, A.R.S., does not sufficiently

channel the sentencer’s discretion. Aggravating circumstances

should narrow the class of persons eligible for the death

penalty and reasonably justify its imposition. The broad scope

of Arizona’s aggravating factors encompasses nearly anyone

involved in a murder, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 2,

Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution. Smith, 203 Ariz. at 82,

¶ 40, 50 P.3d at 832.

- 37 -
 K. Execution by lethal injection is cruel and unusual

punishment, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 15 of

the Arizona Constitution. State v. Hinchey, 181 Ariz. 307, 315,

890 P.2d 602, 610 (1995).

L. Arizona unconstitutionally requires imposition of the

death penalty whenever at least one aggravating circumstance and

no mitigating circumstances exist, in violation of the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution. State v.

Miles, 186 Ariz. 10, 19, 918 P.2d 1028, 1037 (1996).

M. Arizona’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional in

that it requires defendants to prove that their lives should be

spared, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 15 of the

Arizona Constitution. State v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 258,

778 P.2d 602, 623 (1988).

- 38 -